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Miguel A. MontoyaThe rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I describe the research design.I then present the case study. I conclude with the lessons from the case study.252. Research DesignI analyzed the IJV between the Mexican conglomerate Salinas Group and the Chinese automakerFAW that was established in 2007 and lasted until 2009. In 2007 Ricardo Salinas, thepresident of Salinas Group, one of the largest business groups of Mexico, started negotiationswith FAW, a leading Chinese car company, to import Chinese cars to Mexico as a firststep towards the manufacturing of Chinese automobiles in Mexico.I focus on this case study because it is one of the rare instances of IJVs between companiesfrom developing countries. As a result, it can serve as a laboratory for better understandingIJVs, given that this literature has usually studied IJVs between a foreign partner that is anadvanced economy firm and a local partner that is a developing or advanced economy firm,or among firms from advanced countries. In these cases, the foreign firm provides the technologicalsophistication while the local partner provides the access to the market; however,there is a tension in the relationship because the companies operate in the same industryand thus are helping competitors (see Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996 for a discussion ofco-opetition and the tensions).With the help of a graduate assistant, I gathered public information on the IJV between thetwo firms and created a timeline of events, identifying the what, when, who, how and whyof the actions taken. I conducted in-depth interviews lasting several hours with the ownerof the group, Ricardo Salinas, and with Kathleen Ligocki, Salinas Motors Group’s director in2009. These interviews were complemented with a visit to the site of the plant and additionalinterviews with officials of the Michoacán Ministry of Economic Development, who requestedto remain anonymous.I then followed recommendations of Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994) on how to structure thecase study and analyze the information, going back and forth between case study materialsand the literature to identify what is unique to this case that can inform theory directly.GCG GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY - UNIVERSIA ENERO-ABRIL 2012 VOL. 6 NUM. 1 ISSN: 1988-7116pp: 23-35
International Joint Ventures among Developing Country Multinationals: The Case of Salinas Group-Faw26 3. IJV between Salinas Group and Faw to build Chinese Cars in Mexico3.1. History of Salinas GroupSalinas Group (SG) started operations in 1906 in Monterrey in the state of Nuevo Leon inNorthern Mexico with a furniture factory that Benjamin Salinas opened with his brother-in-lawJoel Rocha. In the 1920s, they established the first furniture store called Salinas y Rocha indowntown Monterrey, beginning with their sales system which consisted of microcredit withweekly payments. Different from other companies at the time, they not only sold furniture butalso provided the credit to purchase the furniture. By the end of the 1920s they had threestores in the city. These two entrepreneurs understood the value of lending money in orderto close the sales, and unknowingly created the business model that today underpins Elektraand Banco Azteca (Salinas Group, 2009).In 1950 Benjamin Salinas’ son, Hugo Salinas R., ventured into the business of manufacturingradios and televisions. In 1952 Hugo Salinas P., the grandson of the founders and sonof Hugo Salinas R., was appointed general manager of the business. In 1959 the first storeopened, which he named “Elektra”, and there he orchestrated a scheme of credit buying andselling goods directly door to door. By 1968 Elektra had 12 stores in Monterrey. In 1976 thedevaluation of the peso against the dollar forced the company to temporarily suspend itscredit scheme, but it was then resumed until 1989.In 1987 Hugo Salinas P. retired and named Ricardo Salinas, his son, as the new CEO ofGrupo Elektra. In the middle of a strong economic crisis and facing the possibility of thebankruptcy of the business, Ricardo Salinas made a deep restructuration of the Elektra operations.He designed a new business model: low margins, an only cash payment policy and abasic product line. These measures radically changed the path of the company, which slowlybut steadily returned to profitability in its operations. In 1993 the company started quoting inthe Mexican Stock Exchange. In 1996 Elektra created “Dinero Express” (delivery & paymentsystem of money in Mexico).As part of its strategy of meeting the lower segments of the population, in 2002 the group obtaineda license to create Azteca Bank, which operates in the Elektra stores. In 2003 they alsogot permission to operate an Afore (management service retirement fund) which rounds outits financial services. In addition, Azteca Bank opened 813 branches in Grupo Elektra stores.In 1993 a group of shareholders led by Ricardo Salinas made a successful bid for Imevisiónpublic television network, changing the name to TV Azteca. By 1996 TV Azteca began toproduce soap operas, establishing Digital Azteca and Azteca Music. In 1997 TV Azteca beganquoting in the Mexican Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange. By 2011 TVAzteca was the second largest Mexican television network after Televisa.In 1998 Azteca TV made a strategic investment in Unefon, a wireless telephone servicescompany. In 2003 the company acquired a stock majority in Iusacell, which became the thirdlargest mobile operator in Mexico, with approximately 7% of the mobile phone market inMexico and a presence in 90% of the Mexican mobile market.GCG GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY - UNIVERSIA ENERO-ABRIL 2012 VOL. 6 NUM. 1 ISSN: 1988-7116pp: 23-35
Page 2 and 3: CARTA DEL EDITOR IN CHIEFEditor in
Page 5 and 6: StaffDe la Torre, José, Dean, Chap
Page 7 and 8: Staff2. MULTINACIONALES, INVERSIÓN
Page 9 and 10: SELECCIÓN PROCEDURE PROCEDIMENTOIN
Page 11 and 12: Instrucciones para Autores y Proced
Page 14: INDEXACIÓN INDEXING INDEXAÇÃOInd
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Entrepreneurial Clusters in China a
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921. Introduction: Mexico and China
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Why isn’t Mexico on China’s Gro
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1081. IntroductionChina and Latin A
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Promote China-Latin American Relati
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1161. A Brief History of Economic r
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Building the New Silk Road across t
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Zhu HongboIn fact, some Latin Ameri
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Zhu Hongbo5. Conclusions135China an
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1. Introduction137China’s emergen
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Edy WongTable One: Compositions of
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Edy WongTable 2: China’s R & D Ex
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Edy Wongon ‘new economic geograph
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Edy WongIn today’s global market,
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Edy Wongdemand-side factors in the
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Edy Wongterms of quality, reliabili
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Edy Wongindustry. Second, value cha
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Edy Wongconsumption of Western luxu
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Edy WongReferences155Child, J.; Rod
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