11.07.2015 Views

Vol. 6 Num. 1 - GCG: Revista de Globalización, Competitividad y ...

Vol. 6 Num. 1 - GCG: Revista de Globalización, Competitividad y ...

Vol. 6 Num. 1 - GCG: Revista de Globalización, Competitividad y ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Why isn’t Mexico on China’s Growth Path?106 Table 3 is not conclusive, but it does illustrate a fundamental difference in the dispersion ofFDI in Mexico and China. Mexico’s is disproportionately concentrated in the center of thecountry, in and around the capital. China’s FDI, by contrast, is much larger and is dispersedmore evenly across the eastern coastal regions, where access to transportation infrastructureand foreign markets are greater. Hypothetically, but worth further investigation, a more wi<strong>de</strong>lydispersed FDI leads to a wi<strong>de</strong>r diffusion of technology, less congestion of transportationand logistics in export centers, and a broa<strong>de</strong>r geographical distribution of the benefits ofeconomic growth. Regardless of the benefits that dispersed inward FDI may generate, itis indirect evi<strong>de</strong>nce of greater <strong>de</strong>centralization of the Chinese economy. Local officials arerewar<strong>de</strong>d if they generate economic growth, and inward FDI is one way to accomplish that.5. Conclusion: Policy and geography overlapObviously, Mexico cannot change its location, but in theory at least, it can adopt a lesscentralized form of fe<strong>de</strong>ralism. The perceived need for a strong center was created partly asa reaction to US imperialism and the dismembering of large parts of the country in the 19 thCentury, along with the state’s nation-building policies in the post-revolutionary 20 th Centuryas the national government tried to overcome the many languages and ethnicities of thecountry by forging a Mexican i<strong>de</strong>ntity. Nevertheless, the cultural and economic presenceof the US on the nation’s northern bor<strong>de</strong>r was a constant pressure and lent urgency to theformation of a central state capable of resisting its wealth and power. In that sense, “the badneighborhood” hypothesis is responsible, at least in part, for the highly centralized structureof Mexico’s public finances and the relative lack of local autonomy from the center.Other factors are important as well: China saves 40 percent of its GDP, Mexico a little morethan 20 percent; high savings allow high investment but also generate large reserves thatguard against external macroeconomic shocks; China actively uses industrial policies; itimposes performance requirements on its inward FDI in or<strong>de</strong>r to promote technology transfer;its sheer size forces the world’s leading firms to <strong>de</strong>velop a presence insi<strong>de</strong> the country;and the communist era eliminated most traditional economic interest groups and wiped outopposition to subsequent reforms. Some of these factors may be irrelevant; for example, therole of industrial policy is <strong>de</strong>bated. The point here is not to argue that there is one factor or asimple formula for turning a <strong>de</strong>sperately poor country into a rich one. As many others havepointed out, if economic growth were easy and obvious, all countries would be rich. Rather,the goal is to propose two factors that stand out when Mexico is contrasted with China.<strong>GCG</strong> GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY - UNIVERSIA ENERO-ABRIL 2012 VOL. 6 NUM. 1 ISSN: 1988-7116pp: 91-106

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!