Vol. 6 Num. 1 - GCG: Revista de GlobalizaciÃ³n, Competitividad y ...

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James Gerberof the US to honor its commitments under the North American Free Trade Agreement toopen its trucking sector. The lack of border crossing infrastructure has been discussed inmany venues (e.g., Gerber, 2009) and has been shown to have serious consequences forboth countries in the form of lost revenues and jobs (San Diego Association of Governments,2006; El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 2007).103Perhaps the most harmful component of Mexico’s neighborhood is its proximity to the largestdrug-consuming nation in the world. According to the Trans-Border Institute at the Universityof San Diego (Trans-Border Institute, 2011; Duran-Martinez, et. al., 2010), drug-relatedhomicides in Mexico reached 11,583 in 2010, and drug violence is intensifying and spreadingto more states. The Mexico Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum reportsthat Mexico’s worst showing in the Global Competitiveness Index is in the area of securityand is related to organized crime, violence, and a lack of trust in the police (Hausman, et.al., 2009). The authors note that the insecurity associated with the drug violence imposesserious costs on business. Clearly, if the United States were not Mexico’s northern neighbor,these costs would not exist.4.2. China’s economy is less centralizedChina’s public administration is far less centralized than Mexico’s. Local, provincial,and regional authorities have their own sources of revenue, and officials at each level ofgovernment are judged by the level above based on their ability to generate economicgrowth in their jurisdiction. While this is not without its own set of problems, the ability oflocal officials to set priorities and generate revenue streams to support them, along with thestrong incentives they have to create growth, is an institutional advantage that is not presentin Mexico, where local and state officials have many fewer revenue sources and their careersuccess is unrelated to the economic performance of their jurisdiction.The hypothesis that fiscal decentralization is key to China’s success has many proponents(Montinola, et. al., 1995; and Qian and Weingast, 1997) but the extent of decentralization isdisputed (Tsui and Wang, 2004). Qian and Weingast argue that it prevents predatory practicesby central governments and avoids some misallocation of resources, but Tsui and Wangrespond that the extent of local autonomy is constrained by central government mandatesand that the cadre-management control system enforces strong vertical mandates fromhigher authority down to lower local levels.The debate focuses on the ability of local governments to set priorities and to raise localrevenue for implementing their priorities. While local governments have some constraints,they also have sources of revenue, particularly land sales and leases, which are unavailableto their Mexican counterparts in municipios and states. Land in China is state-owned, butthe definition of “state” is sometimes hazy—that is, it might be the city, the province, or thenational government, depending on the context (Hsing, 2010). Local authorities are able tooffer land for real estate development, factory location, or other economic activities at pricesthat are extremely attractive to foreign and domestic investors. The consequences are quitestriking if one considers the impact on foreign direct investment, in particular, and its impacton economic growth. Huang (2003), Whalley and Xin (2006), and Gereffi (2009), among manyGCG GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY - UNIVERSIA ENERO-ABRIL 2012 VOL. 6 NUM. 1 ISSN: 1988-7116pp: 91-106
Why isn’t Mexico on China’s Growth Path?104 others, have argued that FDI, foreign invested enterprises (FIE), and international supplychains have been major sources of Chinese growth. China has outpaced Mexico in itsreceipt of FDI (Figure 4), and has geographically diversified its FDI much more than Mexico.Figure 4: Inward FDI in China and MexicoSource: UNCTAD, 2010.Table 3 divides Mexico and China into 6 regions each. Both the Chinese and Mexican regionsare a rough division of provinces and states based on their physical geography. In eachregion, the share of national FDI is for a five-year period (2003-2007) in order to minimizethe effect of one-time investments such as the purchase of a major bank or other largeenterprise. Mexico’s FDI is much more concentrated, even after taking into considerationthe income per capita and population of the regions. The Central district (DF, Estado deMéxico, Morelos, Puebla and Tlaxcala), for example, has 33.7 percent of the population,36.0 percent of Mexico’s GDP, and 63.5 percent of the FDI, 2003-2007. Every other region,including the border, receives a smaller share of FDI than its GDP share.GCG GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY - UNIVERSIA ENERO-ABRIL 2012 VOL. 6 NUM. 1 ISSN: 1988-7116pp: 91-106
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CARTA DEL EDITOR IN CHIEFEditor in
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StaffDe la Torre, José, Dean, Chap
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Staff2. MULTINACIONALES, INVERSIÓN
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SELECCIÓN PROCEDURE PROCEDIMENTOIN
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Instrucciones para Autores y Proced
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INDEXACIÓN INDEXING INDEXAÇÃOInd
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Economic Relationships between Lati
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Miguel A. MontoyaThe rest of the pa
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International Joint Ventures among
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36Japanese Foreign Direct Investmen
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Japanese Foreign Direct Investment
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Page 132 and 133: Zhu HongboIn fact, some Latin Ameri
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Page 136 and 137: 1. Introduction137China’s emergen
Page 138 and 139: Edy WongTable One: Compositions of
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Page 146 and 147: Edy Wongdemand-side factors in the
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Page 150 and 151: Edy Wongindustry. Second, value cha
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Edy Wongconsumption of Western luxu
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Edy WongReferences155Child, J.; Rod
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