ICASS AFSA Survey Results - American Foreign Service Association

ICASS AFSA Survey Results - American Foreign Service Association ICASS AFSA Survey Results - American Foreign Service Association

11.07.2015 Views

My experience as an EXO at other posts (I'm in a different backstop now) is that competition between agencies actually keptcost to the taxpayer down.Administrator Shah should request a moratorium on consolidation until more thorough and transparent analysis is done on theexperience to date.The idea of consolidation is fine, but the implementation has been really badly handled with all of the decision-making authorityapparently being given to State --no matter how hard the USAID post management fight for retaining some authorities itseems that AID/W doesn't back them up.ICASS services are inefficient and customer service providers can not accomodate USAID's different needs due to USAID'sdifferent objectives. USAID implements and manages projects. State Department meets with host government officials andwrites cables. Administrative services to accommodate these two very different objectives need to be flexible. State's culture isone of inflexibility and demanding that USAID adapts to their standards without even making an attempt to adapt to USAID'sneeds. The ICASS council will never function adequately in any post to be able to create positive change. The best solution is toallow agencies to find the lowest cost service that meets the needs of the agency. Which is what ICASS was suppose toencourage by allowing agencies to opt out of ICASS services, as services were voluntary - per the FAM. By requiring USAID touse these services, USAID will no longer receive services that are efficient or meet the needs of the agency. Why doesn't theFAM apply to USAID where the FAM states that ICASS services are voluntary? These rules apply to all other agencies at post,and indeed, most other agencies opt out as they have found lower cost solutions that better meet their needs.This is a logical move as an armchair notion, but needs looking into the details. Who is the best and low cost provider andICASS cost containment seems not to have been considered. Each year ICASS takes more & more out of our limited OE &discretionary resources; this is not sustainable.I feel like USAID is not highly represented at meetings where the consolidation issues are discussed, and thus, they become aState driven exercise, and "we" agree to whatever they come up with.It is a good initiative, but State (motor pool) does not understand the concept of serving a customer.When in need of a specific service USAID is neglected often, and priority is given to State. Supervisors from USAID often haveto intervene multiple times(contact State),to get a service done.My USAID mission management has not been transparent with information regarding consolidation. Senior staff at my missionare completely in the dark, and rumors are flying among the FSN staff. Our management has not managed the transition well,and it is causing stress and unease among staff. this is entirely USAID's fault.Why it may be appropriate to consolidate cashiering and recruitment, I think that warehouse management, asset managementand motor pool should be for each agency to manage.Quality of Service - GSO does not respond to inquiries about quality of service. The Management Officer considers any questionregarding expenditure rates or quality of service as opposition to consolidation itself. Housing - State requires USAID to pay forany improvements on a property (leased or government owned), but when the house is assigned again State will assign it totheir own. Thus there is a disincentive to improve properties which effects employee morale and quality of life. The HousingBoard composition was changed without consultation. A memo was drafted and approved by the DCM without any consultationwith the participating agencies. The Management Officer insists on making changes to processes even when they are inviolation of the State Department's own DOSAR. When this violation problem is raised, USAID is accused of sabotaging theconsolidation policy. State seems oblivious to the fact that their best and brightest do not go to Posts that have a USAIDMission. Therefore, the quality of the USDH staff is usually a downgrade when it transitions from USAID to State. Not apleasant fact to acknowledge but a fact nonetheless. Also notable, in the past, a USAID officer could appeal an EXO's decisionto the Mission Director, now such an appeal has to go to the DCM because the GSO reports to the Management Officer who is apeer of the Mission Director. Frankly, if State wants a constructive suggestion, they should assign staff to USAID to do thework. It would still be consolidation (they get the budget funding) but the team would report to the Mission Director or her/hisdesignee. At least then there would be a way to demand improved services without making it an interagency tussle involvingthe DCM.the system will never be seen as equitable if one entity controls the system on behalf of the other--especially when the entitiesare separated by an entire city and it is not possible to know or dialog with your "service providers". this inequity--whetherperceived or real--puts us as odds with our colleagues at State, as it feels as though we are in competition with one anotherrather than collaborating. This is bad for morale of any kind. My motto is "if it ain't broke, don't fix it"--i don't think thatUSAID's systems are broken, and fear that things will continue to get worse with further fixing (consolidation).USAID/Washington has either not taken or not communicated a strong position on the issue of consolidation to the field, or toDoS. Passing on a few ambiguous and poorly written cables does not constitute a strong position. Until early 2009, EXOs wereencouraged to "push back" or to "do only what makes sense", while negotiations were taking place in Washington toconsolidate Tier 3 missions that are not even co-located. This wasted tremendous amounts of good will. At the same time, themessage that consolidation is limited only to listed admin services was not defended effectively, allowing some Embassies toexperience a bit of "consolidation creep" into programmatic areas. Mission Directors, Technical Office Team Leaders and EXOs

are being rendered less relevant at the mission level as USAID became less of an independent agency and more a ward of theDepartment of State. The "ownership" we had developed for our areas of responsibility and to the countries we serve in isbeing replaced with a less urgent, but more stressful, need to comply with the directives of non-development professionals(COM and DCM) and to complete and submit a myriad of reports. Our DoS colleagues have clearly taken advantage of the factthat USAID has been a weakened agency and the attitude shows in their lack of respect for our agency, our leadership and ourwork. Please, if USAID is to become another office of the DoS, please say so right now. USAID FSOs will accept the role and willposition ourselves to be effective in such an organization. If not, let's take a stance and get on with it!Service standards have declined and the ATTITUDE of the ICASS staff is awful. In general, they have no service mentality andare insulted by the term "service provider." Many are extremely unpleasant to work with. Those who try to be helpful and makeICASS work are soon "reigned in" by the ICASS staff. There have been attempts at more than one Mission where I've workwhere the ICASS staff have attempted to improperly charge costs to ICASS in order to get USAID to pay for things that weshouldn't. USAID staff end up spending an enormous amount of time in oversight of vouchers, services, etc. I don't think we'vesaved money -- now rather than managing quality services, we're an oversight body constantly having to watch for decreasesin services, follow-up on service complaints, inappropriate billing and attempts to take over more of USAID's operations. In onepost, the ICASS staff were inappropriately using business class even on short flights and when this was reported no action wastaken -- in fact one of the officers in charge was nominated for an award. If you were to ask for specific examples from thefield, you could write volumes.After one month at post I still do not have normal computer access through Open Net. Less frequent travel to meetcounterparts. Decrease in quality of housing (at greater cost, I am told).Services are provided first and at a higher quality to State Department Employees. I am at my second ICASS consolidated postand this was the case at each location. Also, the proportion of costs sunk do not equal the service percentage given - at mycurrent post we pay 40% of Motor pool and vehicles provided - but cannot get out to visit projects because of Embassy visitorsand priorities.Open Net has sufficiently changed the efficiency of network. It's much slower and many of our sites and connections are nolonger available.Loss of ability to adequately support field staff. Loss of aidNET has been disastrous. A DOS power play for administrativeprimacy that ignores the operational reality of multiple Foreign Affairs agencies.We now can't get cars most of the time, or are told to take a cab, which is charged directly to USAID, not to ICASS. So it hasdecreased efficiency, made my job harder, and increased costs.They use expensive inexperienced American personnel, who turn over every two years, to supervise work that an experiencedFSN is capable of doing and who will be at Post for years. State does not operate with a customer service state of mind. Theyare focused on the Ambassador only, while USAID is focused on development.Our NEC will have a power bill of over $1M per year which is more than 5X what we currently pay. Also, since the embassyinsists on using Americans to manage IT, HR, maintenance and other basic support services, the cost of these services is waytoo high. Finally, the lack of forward planning on building space needs puts constraints on our ability to grow or adjust.much higher costs, far lower service - basic work orders takes 3-4 times as long or are simply never done. Dual standard forleased vs. owned housing which greatly disadvantages those in leased houses and boosts costs tremendously for USAID. Totalloss of cost control and strong-arming by the Embassy to accept more USDH who are far more expensive and actuallycontribute little.(1) Increased cost for services; (2) Increased conflict between USAID and the Embassy (USAID is being treated as an inferiorpartner); (3) Lowest morale levels ever, especially for those who were consolidated; (4) Increased waste of facilities; i.e. theformerly USAID Warehouse has been run down; there is very little care for it and it is as if it is not a USG property; (5)Increased staffing levels (more and more staff are being hired yet the impact is not seen); (6) Inferior products are beingpurchased; (7) Increased monitoring required to monitor payment vouchers, etc. (8) Lack of transparency on how propertywas supposed to be marked under the consolidation; etc, etc.Example - FSN personnel...State has no idea how USAID uses FSN personnel. Many of our FSN's are high grade and extremelyqualified persons, in some cases they have more experience that State personnel. The people at State grading our personnelrefuse, simply refuse, despite the CAJE system to grade them high. (Yes, CAJE can be manipulated) It causes problems forUSAID with retention of FSN staff. I have seen that the majority State personnel treat FSN personnel like they are their maids.FSN personnel at USAID are treated as partners. State should NOT be doing our cajing of FSN.Poor customer service (from State and contractors), providers that are not accountable to AID in any way, poorly managedcontracts where problems are not addressed, services that don't meet our needs, no way to complain/resolve problems. Forexample - our new travel agent is so poor that we often have to call airlines ourselves to make our own reservations or resolveproblems that the travel agent has created. This is after wasting significant amounts of time trying to get the travel agent toprovide the service they are supposed to be providing to us (that we are paying for!). Official travel is a major part of our jobsand essential to our role in project monitoring - we've even had to cancel trips because travel arrangements weren't made in

are being rendered less relevant at the mission level as USAID became less of an independent agency and more a ward of theDepartment of State. The "ownership" we had developed for our areas of responsibility and to the countries we serve in isbeing replaced with a less urgent, but more stressful, need to comply with the directives of non-development professionals(COM and DCM) and to complete and submit a myriad of reports. Our DoS colleagues have clearly taken advantage of the factthat USAID has been a weakened agency and the attitude shows in their lack of respect for our agency, our leadership and ourwork. Please, if USAID is to become another office of the DoS, please say so right now. USAID FSOs will accept the role and willposition ourselves to be effective in such an organization. If not, let's take a stance and get on with it!<strong>Service</strong> standards have declined and the ATTITUDE of the <strong>ICASS</strong> staff is awful. In general, they have no service mentality andare insulted by the term "service provider." Many are extremely unpleasant to work with. Those who try to be helpful and make<strong>ICASS</strong> work are soon "reigned in" by the <strong>ICASS</strong> staff. There have been attempts at more than one Mission where I've workwhere the <strong>ICASS</strong> staff have attempted to improperly charge costs to <strong>ICASS</strong> in order to get USAID to pay for things that weshouldn't. USAID staff end up spending an enormous amount of time in oversight of vouchers, services, etc. I don't think we'vesaved money -- now rather than managing quality services, we're an oversight body constantly having to watch for decreasesin services, follow-up on service complaints, inappropriate billing and attempts to take over more of USAID's operations. In onepost, the <strong>ICASS</strong> staff were inappropriately using business class even on short flights and when this was reported no action wastaken -- in fact one of the officers in charge was nominated for an award. If you were to ask for specific examples from thefield, you could write volumes.After one month at post I still do not have normal computer access through Open Net. Less frequent travel to meetcounterparts. Decrease in quality of housing (at greater cost, I am told).<strong>Service</strong>s are provided first and at a higher quality to State Department Employees. I am at my second <strong>ICASS</strong> consolidated postand this was the case at each location. Also, the proportion of costs sunk do not equal the service percentage given - at mycurrent post we pay 40% of Motor pool and vehicles provided - but cannot get out to visit projects because of Embassy visitorsand priorities.Open Net has sufficiently changed the efficiency of network. It's much slower and many of our sites and connections are nolonger available.Loss of ability to adequately support field staff. Loss of aidNET has been disastrous. A DOS power play for administrativeprimacy that ignores the operational reality of multiple <strong>Foreign</strong> Affairs agencies.We now can't get cars most of the time, or are told to take a cab, which is charged directly to USAID, not to <strong>ICASS</strong>. So it hasdecreased efficiency, made my job harder, and increased costs.They use expensive inexperienced <strong>American</strong> personnel, who turn over every two years, to supervise work that an experiencedFSN is capable of doing and who will be at Post for years. State does not operate with a customer service state of mind. Theyare focused on the Ambassador only, while USAID is focused on development.Our NEC will have a power bill of over $1M per year which is more than 5X what we currently pay. Also, since the embassyinsists on using <strong>American</strong>s to manage IT, HR, maintenance and other basic support services, the cost of these services is waytoo high. Finally, the lack of forward planning on building space needs puts constraints on our ability to grow or adjust.much higher costs, far lower service - basic work orders takes 3-4 times as long or are simply never done. Dual standard forleased vs. owned housing which greatly disadvantages those in leased houses and boosts costs tremendously for USAID. Totalloss of cost control and strong-arming by the Embassy to accept more USDH who are far more expensive and actuallycontribute little.(1) Increased cost for services; (2) Increased conflict between USAID and the Embassy (USAID is being treated as an inferiorpartner); (3) Lowest morale levels ever, especially for those who were consolidated; (4) Increased waste of facilities; i.e. theformerly USAID Warehouse has been run down; there is very little care for it and it is as if it is not a USG property; (5)Increased staffing levels (more and more staff are being hired yet the impact is not seen); (6) Inferior products are beingpurchased; (7) Increased monitoring required to monitor payment vouchers, etc. (8) Lack of transparency on how propertywas supposed to be marked under the consolidation; etc, etc.Example - FSN personnel...State has no idea how USAID uses FSN personnel. Many of our FSN's are high grade and extremelyqualified persons, in some cases they have more experience that State personnel. The people at State grading our personnelrefuse, simply refuse, despite the CAJE system to grade them high. (Yes, CAJE can be manipulated) It causes problems forUSAID with retention of FSN staff. I have seen that the majority State personnel treat FSN personnel like they are their maids.FSN personnel at USAID are treated as partners. State should NOT be doing our cajing of FSN.Poor customer service (from State and contractors), providers that are not accountable to AID in any way, poorly managedcontracts where problems are not addressed, services that don't meet our needs, no way to complain/resolve problems. Forexample - our new travel agent is so poor that we often have to call airlines ourselves to make our own reservations or resolveproblems that the travel agent has created. This is after wasting significant amounts of time trying to get the travel agent toprovide the service they are supposed to be providing to us (that we are paying for!). Official travel is a major part of our jobsand essential to our role in project monitoring - we've even had to cancel trips because travel arrangements weren't made in

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