Upreti, Trilochan, International Watercourses Law and Its Application ...

Upreti, Trilochan, International Watercourses Law and Its Application ... Upreti, Trilochan, International Watercourses Law and Its Application ...

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230 / International Watercourses Law and Its Application in South Asia Prospects and Problems of Nepalese Water Resources / 231is considered the foundation of the principle of equitableutilisation. Furthermore, being an indispensable part ofequitable utilisation, the issues of sharing the costs and benefitsin a shared river, lake or stream, has been dealt with in severalresolutions of conflicts between states. 150Nepal and India have agreed in principle to share the cost inproportion to the benefits in the Mahakali River Treaty, 1996.Article 3 (3) states:“The cost of the project shall be borne by theParties in proportion to the benefits accruing tothem. Both the Parties shall jointly endeavour tomobilize the finance required for theimplementation of the Project.” 151This arrangement entails the acceptance of the principle thatmust be applied in future co-operation in the area of waterresources development between two states. Besides this, twoprojects, namely the Gandak and the Kosi projects wereimplemented by India at her own cost. These projects do notprovide examples of downstream benefits. However, they areinstances of providing some irrigation and hydroelectricbenefits for Nepal as a matter of Nepal’s entitlement to suchshared resources. 152150 G. William Sherk, Dividing the Waters: The Resolution of InterstateWater Conflicts in the United States, the Hague: Kluwer Law, 2000, p.60.151 37 ILM (1997), p. 700.152 Article 5 of the Gandak project states “(iii): the Government of India agrees toprovide locking arrangements for facility of riverine traffic across the barragefree from payment of any tolls whatever, provided that this traffic will beregulated by the project staff in accordance with the rules mutually agreedupon between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India.Similarly Article 7 provides irrigation facilities to Nepal at their cost. The Kosiproject agreement Article 4 provides that Nepal would be entitled to 50% ofelectricity generated from the project and that a huge irrigation network wouldbe provided at India’s cost, and that some irrigation benefits would also beprovided. These benefits would also be provided as a share of Nepal’sownership in the resources.”Nonetheless, putting the theory into practice is a verycomplicated task, as experience shows, which suggests thatwithout co-operation between the riparian countries concerned,the task is not feasible. The real issue in the development ofNepalese water resources is the sharing of costs and benefitswith her lower riparian states. Evidently, the sharing andallocation of benefits from Nepalese water resources is not onlybilateral in nature: it has crossed over into the sphere ofregional management. The fact is that Bangladesh would, likeIndia, benefit from water works in Nepal. From experience inthe international arena, downstream benefits could becategorised as follows:Power BenefitsThese should be evaluated by comparison with otheralternatives available for generating power. This obviously setsthe maximum price that Nepal might seek for the cost ofgeneration and transmission to the Indian border, i.e. theaverage of the two ‘costs’, and if it goes on to other countriesadjoining India, some of the costs for such facilities could bepaid by Nepal to India. It is understood that Nepal hassuggested to India that her current thermal replacement cost,plus the Karnali generation cost, divided by two, would lead toa fair price. That could provide a basis for negotiation, but itshould not be forgotten that there could be a cut-off price whichIndia would not be willing to exceed, as she would then find itprudent and economic to develop her own hydroelectric,thermal or nuclear options. 153 The Columbia River Treaty hasprovided a method for calculating flood benefit, and alsoregulated flow in the downstream state for extra generation ofpower. 154 Likewise, the Ycetra and Itaypu Project in the BorderRiver Panarma, the Columbia River experience, and the Laos-153 Supra note 22, pp. 344-345.154 R. W. Johnson, “The Columbia Basins” in A.H. Garretson, et.al (eds),The Law of International Drainage Basins, New York: Oceana Pub.,1967, pp. 167-241.

232 / International Watercourses Law and Its Application in South Asia Prospects and Problems of Nepalese Water Resources / 233Thailand experience on the Mekong basin have furnished goodexamples of the sharing of border resources. Severalhydroelectric projects in Canada which sell power to the USAprovide examples of methods of the sale of power; this isgenerally on the basis of 80% of alternative generation cost, orsometimes its cost of generation and sale of power shared bytwo. 155 However, India persistently advocates the plus priceprinciple based on the price of generation plus a certainpercentage as profit. 156Irrigation BenefitsAn augmented flow of water could provide extended irrigationand cropping downstream, and the potential for increasingproductivity to feed 240 million people of a growing populationin North India, and 10 million in Bangladesh. 157 It is arguedfrom technical experience that the life of a dam or reservoir isnormally 50 years and the benefits should be taken within thisperiod. It appears (in Indo-Nepal water diplomacy), that thisissue remains much more complicated than expected. Nepalasserts that the waters augmented in a reservoir or dam can beused in times of scarcity during the dry season, increasing cropyields and even permitting the growing of different types ofmore beneficial crops. Hence, those benefits should becalculated and duly paid to Nepal. The other benefit is thecontrol of silt and sedimentation, which significantly reduces oreven prevents flood devastation and other damage; this toomust be shared. In this sphere, international experience couldbe shared and meaningful co-operation from India is to beexpected, to enable a breakthrough. 158155 Supra note 12, p. 339.156 Supra note 48, pp. 53-65.157 Supra note 25, p. 225.158 Supra note 22, pp. 344 346.Flood Control BenefitsThese could be calculated on the basis of the value of peopleand property in the lower reaches of the catchment area savedfrom damage. There are numerous reports prepared by the GOIand international organisations which suggest that the annualdamages from the recurrent floods from Nepalese rivers couldform a basis for negotiation. Nonetheless, immense devastationfrom Nepalese rivers flowing to India can be prevented, andIndia should not be exempted from the obligation to pay forthis. Billions of dollars could be saved by flood modernisationprogrammes alone. Take, for example in Bihar State, the KosiRiver flood in 1987: out of 39 districts, 33 were severelyflooded, and an estimated Rs. 1200 crore worth of property wasdamaged; such huge potential benefits should be shared on anequal basis. 159Navigational BenefitsMuch emphasis has been given to the basic need for Nepal’sexistence, and this remains a crucial element of Indo-Nepalrelations. If this issue were appreciated by India, Nepal couldenjoy navigational facilities via rivers down to the sea. This is aproblem for Nepal that should be sorted out, and we shouldnote here that its resolution is pivotal in the solving of the widerproblems of Indo-Nepal water sharing and allocation.Navigation on the Gandak and Kosi, via the Mahananda and theKoroyota and thus into the lower Ganga-Brahmputra system,has been proposed by Bangladesh. If the Gandak-Kosi-Mahananda schemes were to be consented to by India, or workswere carried out pursuant to the Indo-Nepal Gandak agreementof 1959, which provides for a lock in the Gandak barrage, or ifother potential for navigation at the Kosi or Karnali rivers wereexpedited by India as a gesture of goodwill, a big impedimentfor Nepal would finally be removed. 160 Furthermore, one way159 Supra note 17, p. 116.160 Supra note 22, p. 347; see supra note 12, p. 177; also see supra note20, pp. 208-209.

230 / <strong>International</strong> <strong>Watercourses</strong> <strong>Law</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Its</strong> <strong>Application</strong> in South Asia Prospects <strong>and</strong> Problems of Nepalese Water Resources / 231is considered the foundation of the principle of equitableutilisation. Furthermore, being an indispensable part ofequitable utilisation, the issues of sharing the costs <strong>and</strong> benefitsin a shared river, lake or stream, has been dealt with in severalresolutions of conflicts between states. 150Nepal <strong>and</strong> India have agreed in principle to share the cost inproportion to the benefits in the Mahakali River Treaty, 1996.Article 3 (3) states:“The cost of the project shall be borne by theParties in proportion to the benefits accruing tothem. Both the Parties shall jointly endeavour tomobilize the finance required for theimplementation of the Project.” 151This arrangement entails the acceptance of the principle thatmust be applied in future co-operation in the area of waterresources development between two states. Besides this, twoprojects, namely the G<strong>and</strong>ak <strong>and</strong> the Kosi projects wereimplemented by India at her own cost. These projects do notprovide examples of downstream benefits. However, they areinstances of providing some irrigation <strong>and</strong> hydroelectricbenefits for Nepal as a matter of Nepal’s entitlement to suchshared resources. 152150 G. William Sherk, Dividing the Waters: The Resolution of InterstateWater Conflicts in the United States, the Hague: Kluwer <strong>Law</strong>, 2000, p.60.151 37 ILM (1997), p. 700.152 Article 5 of the G<strong>and</strong>ak project states “(iii): the Government of India agrees toprovide locking arrangements for facility of riverine traffic across the barragefree from payment of any tolls whatever, provided that this traffic will beregulated by the project staff in accordance with the rules mutually agreedupon between His Majesty’s Government <strong>and</strong> the Government of India.Similarly Article 7 provides irrigation facilities to Nepal at their cost. The Kosiproject agreement Article 4 provides that Nepal would be entitled to 50% ofelectricity generated from the project <strong>and</strong> that a huge irrigation network wouldbe provided at India’s cost, <strong>and</strong> that some irrigation benefits would also beprovided. These benefits would also be provided as a share of Nepal’sownership in the resources.”Nonetheless, putting the theory into practice is a verycomplicated task, as experience shows, which suggests thatwithout co-operation between the riparian countries concerned,the task is not feasible. The real issue in the development ofNepalese water resources is the sharing of costs <strong>and</strong> benefitswith her lower riparian states. Evidently, the sharing <strong>and</strong>allocation of benefits from Nepalese water resources is not onlybilateral in nature: it has crossed over into the sphere ofregional management. The fact is that Bangladesh would, likeIndia, benefit from water works in Nepal. From experience inthe international arena, downstream benefits could becategorised as follows:Power BenefitsThese should be evaluated by comparison with otheralternatives available for generating power. This obviously setsthe maximum price that Nepal might seek for the cost ofgeneration <strong>and</strong> transmission to the Indian border, i.e. theaverage of the two ‘costs’, <strong>and</strong> if it goes on to other countriesadjoining India, some of the costs for such facilities could bepaid by Nepal to India. It is understood that Nepal hassuggested to India that her current thermal replacement cost,plus the Karnali generation cost, divided by two, would lead toa fair price. That could provide a basis for negotiation, but itshould not be forgotten that there could be a cut-off price whichIndia would not be willing to exceed, as she would then find itprudent <strong>and</strong> economic to develop her own hydroelectric,thermal or nuclear options. 153 The Columbia River Treaty hasprovided a method for calculating flood benefit, <strong>and</strong> alsoregulated flow in the downstream state for extra generation ofpower. 154 Likewise, the Ycetra <strong>and</strong> Itaypu Project in the BorderRiver Panarma, the Columbia River experience, <strong>and</strong> the Laos-153 Supra note 22, pp. 344-345.154 R. W. Johnson, “The Columbia Basins” in A.H. Garretson, et.al (eds),The <strong>Law</strong> of <strong>International</strong> Drainage Basins, New York: Oceana Pub.,1967, pp. 167-241.

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