Air and Space Power Journal - Air & Space Power Chronicles

Air Force Chief of StaffGen John P. JumperCommander, Air Educationand Training CommandGen Donald G. CookCommander, Air UniversityLt Gen Donald A. LamontagneCommander, College of AerospaceDoctrine, Research and EducationCol Bobby J. WilkesEditorCol Anthony C. CainSenior EditorLt Col Malcolm D. GrimesAssociate EditorsLt Col Michael J. MastersonMaj Donald R. FergusonProfessional StaffMarvin W. Bassett, Contributing EditorLarry Carter, Contributing EditorMary J. Moore, Editorial AssistantSteven C. Garst, Director of Art and ProductionDaniel M. Armstrong, IllustratorL. Susan Fair, Illustrator Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager Air and Space Power ChroniclesLuetwinder T. Eaves, Managing EditorThe Air and Space Power Journal, published quarterly, is theprofessional flagship publication of the United States AirForce. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentationand stimulation of innovative thinking on militarydoctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, andother matters of national defense. The views and opinionsexpressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authorsand should not be construed as carrying the official sanctionof the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education andTraining Command, Air University, or other agencies or departmentsof the US government.In this edition, articles not bearing a copyright notice may bereproduced in whole or in part without permission. Articlesbearing a copyright notice may be reproduced for any USgovernment purpose without permission. If they are reproduced,the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesyline. To obtain permission to reproduce material bearing acopyright notice for other than US government purposes,contact the author of the material rather than the Air andSpace Power Journal.http://www.af.milhttp://www.aetc.randolph.af.milhttp://www.au.af.milhttp://www.cadre.maxwell.af.milVisit Air and Space Power Jour nal onlineat http://www .airpower.maxwell.af.milor e-mail to aspj@maxwell.af.mil

Spring 2004 Volume XVIII, No. 1 AFRP 10-1Prelaunch Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Flight LinesEmerging Air and Space Power Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5VorticesPIREPThe Effect of Human Factors on the Helmet-Mounted Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Maj James R. Vogel, USAFDr. Marian C. SchultzDr. James T. SchultzWhither High-Energy Lasers? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Maj Gen Donald L. Lamberson, PhD, USAF, RetiredCol Edward Duff, USAF, RetiredDon Washburn, PhDLt Col Courtney Holmberg, PhD, USAFWhat Should We Bomb?Axiological Targeting and the Abiding Limits of Airpower Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Dr. Paul Rexton KanElectromagnetic Applications of Biomimetic Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Dr. Morley O. StoneDr. Rajesh R. NaikDr. Lawrence L. BrottDr. Peter S. Meltzer Jr.FeaturesGetting There FIRST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Col Steven C. Suddarth, USAFLt Col Ross T. McNutt, USAFMaj William T. Cooley, USAFPowering the Future: Advances in Propulsion Technologies Provide aCapability Road Map for War-Fighter Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Maj Michael F. Kelly, USAF, RetiredFuel Cells: Powerful Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lt Col David P. Blanks, USAFMilitary Applications of Information Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Paul W. Phister Jr., PE, PhDIgor G. PlonischThe Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Center: The Next Step inJoint Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Maj Eric Braganca, USAF71525333951617791

The Nonrescue of Corvette 03 © . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101Col Darrel D. Whitcomb, USAFR, RetiredNet AssessmentJayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115Stephen A. BourqueReviewer: Maj Paul G. Niesen, USAFThe Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116A. Jay CristolReviewer: Lt Col Robert B. Kane, USAFMalta Spitfire: The Diary of a Fighter Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117George Beurling and Leslie RobertsReviewer: Lt Col Rob Tate, USAFROn Target: Organizing and Executing the Strategic Air Campaign against Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118Richard G. DavisReviewer: Lt Col Merrick E. Krause, USAFSecret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119Heike Bungert, Jan Heitmann, and Michael Wala, eds.Reviewer: Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, RetiredCorporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120P. W. SingerReviewer: John H. BarnhillSpace Policy in the 21st Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120W. Henry Lambright, ed.Reviewer: Maj John E. Shaw, USAFDer Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg, 1940–1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121Jörg FriedrichReviewer: Dr. Douglas PeiferWhen Thunder Rolled: An F-105 Pilot over North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124Ed RasimusReviewer: Dr. David R. MetsMission Debrief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Air and Space Power Journal Board of ReviewersProf. Tami Davis BiddleUS Army War CollegeLt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF, RetiredMelbourne, FloridaCol Matthew Caffrey, USAFROperations DirectorateHeadquarters USAFBrig Gen Phillip D. Caine, USAF, RetiredMonument, ColoradoDr. Don D. ChipmanUSAF Squadron Officer CollegeDr. Clayton K. S. ChunUS Army War CollegeDr. Mark ClodfelterNational War CollegeDr. James CorumUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesDr. Conrad CraneStrategic Studies InstituteUS Army War CollegeDr. Dik A. DasoNational Air and Space MuseumSmithsonian InstitutionDr. Lee DowdyAlabama State UniversityCol Dennis M. Drew, USAF, RetiredUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesBrig Gen Charles Dunlap Jr., USAFStaff Judge AdvocateUSAF Air Combat CommandDr. Stephen FoughtUSAF Air War CollegeCol David M. Glantz, USA, RetiredJournal of Slavic Military StudiesCol Thomas E. Griffith Jr., USAFUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesDr. John F. Guilmartin Jr.Ohio State UniversityDr. Grant T. HammondCenter for Strategy and TechnologyAir UniversityProf. Daniel HughesUSAF Air War CollegeDr. Thomas HughesUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesLt Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAFSpace DivisionUSAF Weapons SchoolDr. Tom KeaneySchool of Advanced International StudiesJohns Hopkins UniversityProf. Theodore KluzUSAF Air War CollegeDr. Charles KrupnickUS Army War CollegeDr. Benjamin S. LambethRANDLt Col David MacIsaac, USAF, RetiredMontgomery, AlabamaDr. Karl P. MagyarMontgomery, AlabamaCol Edward Mann, USAF, RetiredColorado Springs, ColoradoDr. Jerome V. MartinPeru State CollegeCol Phillip Meilinger, USAF, RetiredScience Applications International CorporationProf. John H. Morrow Jr.University of GeorgiaDr. Daniel MortensenUSAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Researchand EducationProf. James MowbrayUSAF Air War CollegeDr. Karl MuellerRANDDr. Richard R. MullerUSAF Air Command and Staff CollegeCol Robert Owen, USAF, RetiredEmbry-Riddle Aeronautical UniversityDr. Reina J. PenningtonNorwich UniversityDr. James SmithUSAF Institute for National Security StudiesCol James Spencer, USAFUSAF AcademyCol Richard Szafranski, USAF, RetiredToffler AssociatesDr. James TitusUSAF AcademyCol Mark Wells, USAFUSAF AcademyDr. Kenneth P. WerrellChristiansburg, VirginiaDr. Harold R. WintonUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies3

APJCOL ANTHONYC. CAIN,EDITORWE ARE PLEASED to announcethe availability of afree subscription to the onlineversion of Air and SpacePower Journal. After you subscribe, we willadd your e-mail address to our electronicdistribution list. This allows us to automaticallysend you an e-mail message containinga table of contents with links to fulltextarticles in each new quarterly issue ofASPJ, thus ensuring that you don’t missany of our informative features.Subscribing is easy. All you have to do islog on to the “Subscription Center” at theAir Force Link Web site http://www.af.mil/subscribe, select the “sub[scribe]” radiobutton for Air and Space Power Journal,enter your name and e-mail address, andthen click on the “submit” button. We willnotify you of your subscription via e-mailand ask that you confirm it. Our onlinepublication offers you a great opportunityto publish your ideas. Please e-mail yoursubmissions to aspj@maxwell.af.mil.We on the ASPJ editorial staff look forwardto a new academic year, anticipatingmany new, insightful articles and reviewsin our quest to publish the best in air andspace power thought. We are always seekingquality articles. If you are interested insubmitting an article for publication,please refer to our guidelines in the “MissionDebrief” section of this issue, or checkthe submission instructions on our Website: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/howto.html. Additionally,we invite you to sample some new andvery exciting books that are appearing onthe market by reading our reviews, both inthe published version of ASPJ and online athttp://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/bookmain.html. If you wouldlike to write a review for us, please referto the guidelines on our Web site. As youcan see, you have many opportunities tocontribute to your Journal. ■4

APJCOL ANTHONYC. CAIN,EDITOREmerging Air and Space Power TechnologiesTHE FULL RANGE of air and spacepower capabilities is inherently tiedto technology, more so than anyother form of military power. Althoughnavies most closely approximate airand space forces in this relationship, the capabilitiesresident in sea forces matured inthe industrial age and are constrained by thephysical challenges of operating on and beneaththe surface of the world’s oceans. Airand space power also originated in the industrialage, but technological advances andthe potential to expand its operational capabilitiesuniquely equip this form of power tobridge conflicts between the industrial andinformation ages.The problem with any institution that reliesso heavily on technology is that leadersand practitioners have to balance presentneeds, doctrinal requirements, and strategiesfor future innovation. On the one hand, thelure of new technology can encourage a fascinationwith gadgets that ultimately reducesthe application of air and space power to atactical level. On the other hand, airmenmight have to forgo research into new technologicalareas because of the expenses thatinvariably accompany innovation. In the1920s and 1930s, airmen struggled withboth of these constraints on technologicalchange. They ultimately created a doctrineand strategy for employing airpower thathelped define technologies—the long-rangebomber and precision bombsight—requiredto execute the strategy. In the absence offiscal resources and clearly defined threats,members of the interwar generation laid adoctrinal foundation for employing airpowerin the event of another war between thegreat powers. In their dogged pursuit ofdoctrine, however, they failed to anticipaterequirements for long-range fighter escorts,thus illustrating how the balancing act requiresconstant attention and investment.Presently, US Air Force members do nothave the freedom to develop doctrine gradually.The global war on terrorism; ongoingoperations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere;conventional and unconventionalthreats to states; and the imperative to protectthe homeland dictate heightened operationstempo and command vast resources.These factors can militate against researchingand introducing new technologies.Therefore, air and space professionals mustpay careful attention to identifying futurerequirements and capabilities that serve ascatalysts for the next generation of technologicaladvances.Our Air Force must recruit innovatorswho can transform the technological superioritywe now enjoy into even more impressivecapabilities that prepare us to meetfuture threats and challenges which we cannotimagine today. As in the interwar period,doctrine, operating concepts, and organizationalstructures must also evolve inanticipation of emerging technological capabilitiesto ensure that all components ofair and space power come together preciselyat the right time and place. This wasthe challenge for the airmen of yesterday,and it will remain so for air and spaceforces of the future. ■5

What We BelieveAir Force doctrine hasevolved from an informal,largely oral traditionof tenets to thepresent comprehensivesystem of doctrine documents.Clearly our serviceneeded more rigorthan was contained inthe Cold War versions ofAir Force Manual 1-1, but why have air and space powerprofessionals opted for a doctrine structure that contains37 separate doctrine documents, including such subjectsas Leadership and Force Development (Air Force DoctrineDocument [AFDD] 1-3), Health Services (AFDD 2.4-2),Education and Training (AFDD 2.4-3), and Legal Support(AFDD 2.4-5)?Institutions publish formal doctrine for at least twoaudiences. The primary audience of formal Air Forcedoctrine is internal—airmen. Members of our institutionmust have access to and be well grounded in our commonlyheld beliefs. Airmen must also be able to effectchange to those beliefs through alteration, deletion, andaddition to existing doctrine. The second audience forformal institutional doctrine is external—individuals,groups, and institutions outside the Air Force. They gainknowledge of our values, beliefs, capabilities, and organizationthrough our formal published doctrine. These secondaryaudiences typically benefit from our institution’scapabilities and services but lack the background, training,and infrastructure to provide or accomplish thosethings themselves. Therefore, published doctrine allowsexternal audiences to smoothly integrate their inherentcapabilities with ours, without having to spend the effort,time, and resources necessary to duplicate those capabilitiesin their own institutions.Not all doctrine shares the same purposes. Just as warfaremay be examined along a spectrum that spans strategic,operational, and tactical activities, doctrine also functionsat various levels. Basic Doctrine (AFDD 1 series)communicates fundamental institutional beliefs that derivefrom historical experiences. It is a record of ideasand concepts that worked and those that didn’t whenairmen employed air and space capabilities; it is also acommon frame of reference when discussing the bestway to prepare and employ air and space forces, shapingthe manner in which our Air Force organizes, trains,equips, and sustains its forces.Operational Doctrine (AFDD 2 series) communicates howthe Air Force translates basic doctrine’s fundamentalbeliefs into practice through organizations and distinctcapabilities. Tactical Doctrine (AFDD 3 series) outlinesforce-employment principles that allow the institution toaccomplish specific objectives. When considered as awhole, the three levels of doctrine allow air and spaceprofessionals to understand and forge links betweenstrategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.Without constant attention, doctrine may degenerateinto dogma. This observation cuts to the heart of whatprofessionalism means. Practitioners—airmen—have aresponsibility to reinvigorate their doctrine with newideas from two sources. First, and perhaps most importantly,is an understanding of historical and recent experience.Because doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge,each new operational experience should presentopportunities for its revitalization. Second is doctrine’scharacteristic of embracing forward thinking. In otherwords, doctrine should not be a formula to be applied byrote; rather, it should become a catalyst for developingnew concepts, organizations, and capabilities appropriateto future challenges. In this sense, current doctrinebecomes a source—an outline, a forecast, or a guide—onwhich future doctrine can be developed. Basic doctrine isperhaps the fundamental outlet for this second aspect. Itis broadly written, and the concepts therein may providemomentum and justification for technological and organizationalinnovation.Doctrine represents what is institutionally believed tobe the best way for professional airmen to employ air andspace power to serve the national interest. One measureof the maturity and the health of professional military institutionsis their published formal doctrine. The healthof those institutions reflects the importance that theirmembers place on knowing, applying, challenging, andrevising the ideas contained in their doctrine. The institution’smaturity, then, is the direct result of the scopeand rigor of the members’ investment in their doctrinalstructure. In other words, published doctrine does notrelieve airmen of the requirement to think—on the contrary,it provides an institutional mandate and a forumfor continuous professional improvement.To Learn More . . .Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1. Air Force Basic Doctrine, November 17, 2003. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Library/Doctrine/afdd1.pdf.Boyne, Walter J. The Influence of Air Power upon History. Gretna, LA: Pelican, 2003.Futrell, Robert F. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force. 2 vols. 1971. Reprint, Maxwell AFB,AL: Air University Press, 1989.Holley, I. B., Jr. Ideas and Weapons. 1953. Reprint, Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1997.6

APJConflicts, no doubt, will be carried on in the future in the air, onthe surface of the earth and water, and under the earth and water.––Gen William “Billy” MitchellThe Effect of Human Factors onthe Helmet-Mounted DisplayMAJ JAMES R.VOGEL, USAFDR.MARIAN C. SCHULTZDR.JAMES T. SCHULTZ*IN WORLD WAR I, the mounting of machine guns on airplanesmarked the official beginning of the evolution of pilot-centeredweapons employment. The technological advancement of combataircraft and pilot-to-vehicle interface has enjoyed steady growththroughout the history of these aircraft. Following the innovation of themounted machine gun, the development of both airborne radar and theinfrared search-and-track system allowed fighter pilots to cue theirweapons beyond the bore line of the airplane.In most fighter aircraft, the field of view of these two cueing systems isapproximately plus or minus 60 degrees off the aircraft’s bore line. Althoughboth systems are very important to one’s ability to use weapons beyondvisual range, the employment of heat-seeking missiles and modern machineguns still requires the pilot to point the nose of the fighter jet at thetarget. Consequently, fighters can find themselves engaged in long-turningfights, thus becoming vulnerable to both the aircraft with which they areengaged as well as other enemy aircraft in the area—a deadly scenario.Introduction of the head-up display (HUD) marked the first step towardallowing pilots to cue their missiles or guns with an out-of-the-cockpitaiming device. A giant leap forward in terms of pilot-to-aircraft interface,the HUD displayed not only accurate weapons-aiming symbols, but also*Maj James R. Vogel is an F-15 instructor pilot currently assigned to the 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron at EglinAFB, Florida. He has been selected as part of the initial cadre for the F/A-22 and will be reassigned to Nellis AFB,Nevada. Dr. Marian C. Schultz, a tenured associate professor of management and management information systems atthe University of West Florida, has served as a consultant for numerous organizations. Dr. James T. Schultz, a tenuredassociate professor of aviation business administration at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, is currently the programchair for the bachelor of science program in management of technical operations at Embry-Riddle.7

elevant flight data such as airspeed, altitude, and heading (fig. 1). For thefirst time, pilots could view such information without looking back insidethe cockpit.Currently, the development of high off-boresight weapons is driving thelatest work in pilot-centered weapons employment. Many foreign air forcesalready have this capability, and a number of others are acquiring it. DeanF. Kocian of the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Human EffectivenessDirectorate addresses the evolution of high off-boresight weapons andtheir dramatic impact on fighter aircraft:Since the mounting of machine guns on airplanes in World War I, pilots have pointedthe nose of their aircraft in the direction of the target. The dynamics of airbornecombat required pilots to outmaneuver each other. Superior aircraft speed and agilitywere the keys to a successful engagement; however, that scenario has changed. . . .This scenario represents a total paradigm shift in the way air-to-air combat is fought.The sighting reference for cueing a weapon is no longer the nose of the aircraft, butrather the pilot’s helmet. As long as the target is within visual range and the pilot canview the target through the display in the helmet visor, the relative position of theaircraft to the enemy is not critical, but tactical implications are profound. 1In order to cue high off-boresight weapons to the target in a visualdogfight, pilots must have a helmet-mounted aiming device, which itselfrepresents a human-factors breakthrough. Since the beginning of aerialcombat, air forces around the world have run a technological race aimedat gaining superiority through increased propulsion and maneuverabilityof fighter aircraft. But these new levels of performance can take a toll onhumans. For example, pilots subjectedto high-G forces risk loss ofconsciousness and extendedincapacitation; however, the helmetmountedtarget cue and high offboresightweapons enable the missile,capable of more than 50 Gs, to executethe high-G turn instead of the pilot.Development of the Helmet-Mounted DisplayThe United States Air Force hasworked on a helmet-mounted displayfor fighter aircraft for roughly 30years. The proliferation of varioustypes of high off-boresight weaponsFigure 1. An F-15C’s HUD. (Reprinted by enemy countries lends a sense offrom Maj Reid Cooley, briefing, subject:Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System, urgency to fielding this capability as422d Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis soon as possible. Indeed, the fact thatAFB, Nevada, June 2001.)the Air Force is not holding on to the8

leading edge of this technology places our combat capability in the visualenvironment at risk. Less proficient pilots flying inferior aircraft enjoy adistinct advantage because they have a helmet-mounted display system.The Russian MiG-29 Fulcrum and its AA-11 Archer high off-boresight,heat-seeking, short-range missile are considered the primary threat in thevisual environment. MiG-29 pilots acquired helmet-mounted cueingdevices for use almost a decade ago. Even though they are rudimentary,using only a flip-down aiming monocle and lacking missile-cueing symbols,they give the Russians a tremendous advantage in visual dogfighting.Ironically, the Israeli air force, which purchases its F-15 and F-16 fighterjets from the United States, also outpaces us in this arena because it hasfielded a display and sight helmet (DASH) for those aircraft.Essentially, helmet-mounted displays are “must have” equipment onfourth-generation fighter aircraft since high off-boresight weapons andvisual cueing outweigh any aircraft-performance advantage in dogfighting.For that reason, the Air Force and Navy are currently in the process ofacquiring and fielding the Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS),the most advanced such system in the world (fig. 2), which—together withthe AIM-9X high off-boresight, short-range, heat-seeking missile—will soonallow the United States to regain the advantage in aerial combat.Vista Sabre II, the JHMCS’s initial prototype, provided a building blockfor helmet-display development. Several helmet-mounted trackers anddisplays had emerged parallel to the Vista Sabre program, but significantperformance or safety problems limited their utility. In conjunction withthe 422d Test and Evaluation Squadron at Nellis AFB, Nevada, Vista SabreII performed the initial operational-utility evaluation, beginning in 1993.Kaiser Electronics produced the electronic components and helmetFigure 2. JHMCS helmet and display. (Reprinted from Maj Reid Cooley, briefing, subject:Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System, 422d Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis AFB,Nevada, June 2001.)9

hardware, while McDonnell Douglas’s software engineers developed theoperational flight program for the F-15’s computer, which would allow thehelmet-mounted displays to function and interface with aircraft-weaponsinformation.The evaluation uncovered several important human-factor or “liveware”­to-hardware issues related to helmet cueing and the employment of offboresightweapons. The first concerned the problem of poor helmet fitand its effect on helmet-display performance. Although the new helmetmounteddisplay hardware was incredibly light, the center of gravity andincrease in relative weight under nine-G loads tended to shift the helmeton the pilot’s head during high-G maneuvering. Because a magnetic fieldin the cockpit of the aircraft senses the position of the helmet and feedsthe current line of sight from the helmet to the aircraft’s flight computer,any such shifting would generate errors, thus making the accuratepointing of the missile seeker at a target nearly impossible. Specifically, theVista Sabre II test found that static pointing errors of more than twodegrees could render aiming capability ineffective.The evaluation also noted the inability of pilots to hold their headssteady during high-G turns and aircraft buffeting, the latter designatingthe shaking sensation one feels when the aircraft performs at the edge ofthe flight envelope during a high angle of attack. Vista Sabre II revealedthat the system needed interface suppression to smooth head bounceduring high-G maneuvers and in regions of aircraft buffeting. Otherwise,the pilot’s ability to aim with the helmet is severely degraded.Furthermore, in a finding referred to as “eyeball critical sensor,” pilotsexpressed concern over reflections and glare associated with the helmetdisplay. Early visors had a noticeable “patch” that enhanced contrast andcreated a more discernable display—vital to sustaining good vision and,therefore, flight safety. Clearly, the Vista Sabre II program proved mosteffective in establishing a starting point for the evolution of helmetmounteddisplays.The Visually Coupled Acquisition and Targeting System (VCATS), thefollow-on system to Vista Sabre II, made its inaugural flight in February1997, successfully bridging the gap from the prototype helmets of theearlier program to today’s JHMCS helmets. The VCATS targeted problemsrevealed by Vista Sabre II’s operational utility evaluation. For example, itimplemented the custom of equipping helmets with space-age gel linersand ear cups in order to achieve the fit required for optimum cueingperformance. Moreover, the VCATS helmet visors were custom ground tofit precisely around the mask and lock into place, creating more stabilityand helping eliminate glare from under the visor, while tracker algorithmsand more precise system integration nearly eliminated static pointingerrors discovered in early helmet tests. The VCATS also implementedhigh-update-rate trackers, accelerometers, and digital-filter algorithms foractive noise cancellation, vastly improving head bounce under high-G10

loads and aircraft buffeting. In order to combat the eyeball-critical-sensorissues, the VCATS removed the visor patch and utilized “hot-tube”cathode-ray-tube technology to reduce glare and increase contrast in thevisor display. In general, the VCATS system successfully overcame theproblems revealed by the early Vista Sabre II test.In addition to taking on problem areas unearthed by Vista Sabre II, theVCATS also integrated the helmet-cueing capability into the “hands onthrottle and stick” (HOTAS) functions of the F-15—a compatibility criticalto the pilot-centered interface with the helmet system. The system alsoensured full compatibility with night operations; indeed, fightersthroughout the world may soon see displays—typically projected on thehelmet visor—in the field of view of their night vision goggles (NVG). Inthe case of the VCATS, testing has proven the compatibility withpanoramic NVG (fig. 3).The VCATS program proved itself invaluable to the development of theJHMCS and the advancement of helmet-mounted displays in the USmilitary. According to Kocian,an outstanding example of human-centered design, VCATS advances the [Air Force’sHuman Effectiveness Directorate] mission to maximize the potential of Air Forcewarfighting personnel. The directorate’s primary goal is to link, via human-systemintegration, technological advances in controls, displays, and information-handlingwith the military pilot’s human factors including sensory, perceptual, cognitive, andmotor capabilities; strength and anthropometrics; experience; and skills. 2Human Factors in Helmet-Cueing IntegrationDespite the impressive track record of the VCATS, designers must faceseveral human-factor issues prior to successfully fielding and employingFigure 3. VCATS with panoramic NVG. (Reprinted from Lt Col Terry Fornof, briefing,subject: VCATS, 422d Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nevada, June 2001.)11

the JHMCS. They must always concern themselves with maximizing thecapability of the weapons available and ensuring the safety of the newhelmet—especially during the ejection procedure.First, early helmets did not take into account how often pilots useperipheral vision during a close-range dogfight. In general, while wearinghelmets, they can turn their heads approximately 60 degrees from side toside of the aircraft’s bore line. New technologies, however, confer uponfourth-generation missiles an off-boresight capability exceeding 60 degrees.In order to compensate for pilots’ limited range of head movement, theJHMCS utilizes an “up-look” aiming reference (fig. 4). That is, two up-lookreticles provide higher off-boresight cueing capability by allowing pilots tocue the missile with their peripheral vision. Thus, they can utilize the fullcapability of missile technology and successfully employ weapons beyond60 degrees off boresight.Figure 4. JHMCS peripheral-vision up-look reticle. (Reprinted from Maj Reid Cooley,briefing, subject: Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System, 422d Test and Evaluation Squadron,Nellis AFB, Nevada, June 2001.)Second, the extra weight of the hardware in a helmet-mounted cueingdisplay might present problems. Although engineers can make the unitsincredibly light, the operational environment for fighter aircraft is muchmore complex than the one G experienced here on Earth. Today’s fighterpilots attempt to perform high off-boresight helmet cueing under loads upto nine Gs—nine times the force of gravity. But G effects are expedientialrather than linear in nature. Since dogfighting pilots constantly move theirheads to clear the flight path and maneuver to kill the adversary, having toendure extra weight with a slightly different center of gravity places atremendous amount of force on their necks. This is a serious concernaccording to contributors to a panel discussion held at the Aerospace12

Medical Association Annual Scientific Meeting in Detroit in May 1999,who mention how air forces around the world already lose a considerablenumber of workdays due to soft-tissue neck injuries. They conclude thatthese numbers will dramatically jump as more pilots begin to fly withhelmet-mounted devices. 3Third, in addition to increases in neck injuries due to flying maneuvers,one must also consider the effect of additional helmet weight on the pilotduring ejection, particularly the possibility of neck injury due to inertialloading with drogue and parachute deployment. Other problems couldarise from an increase in helmet size and inattention to windblast. 4Engineers and developers must balance capability against pilot safety,perhaps opting to decrease the maximum limits of maneuver aircraft if thepilot is equipped with a helmet-cueing system.Finally, flying with JHMCS increases the potential for spatialdisorientation as well as task saturation. Most fighter pilots are used toflying with HUD information, which is always in the same place relative tothe airplane—on the bore line in the direction the aircraft is traveling. Butflying with “HUD-like” displays on the visor can initially be disorientingbecause information is now located wherever they happen to be looking atthe time. The problem is compounded at night due to the general lack ofeither a horizon or visual cues. Furthermore, having to keep up withaircraft parameters such as altitude, heading, and airspeed displayeddirectly in front of the right eye while attempting to employ and monitorweapons during dogfighting can quickly become overwhelming to pilots.To help lessen the danger of helmet displays contributing to this sort oftask saturation, designers have enabled a HOTAS function so that pilotscan blank the display if it becomes distracting in the tactical environment.Obviously, human-factor issues concerning helmet-mounted cueingsystems should not be taken lightly. Awareness of these issues, along withproper education and training, can help prevent such problems fromleading to tragedy.Potential of Helmet DevelopmentHelmet-mounted displays have evolved at a rapid pace over the lastdecade, and the future may hold even more technological advances formilitary helmets. Short-term improvement projects include voicecommands and sound-direction recognition; long-range technologicaladvancements might include imagery transmission and piloting by remotevirtual helmets and cockpits.The integration of sound into the next generation of pilot helmetsseems inevitable, with several companies already developing and testingthe use of voice commands. In fact, Robert K. Ackerman notes that voicecommands will eventually take the place of HOTAS measures to providerapid response to the demands of air combat. 5 Future pilots may also have13

the luxury of flying with a three-dimensional sound system within theirhelmet, currently under development for use in the French-built Rafalefighter. The system will provide direction-specific cues that alert pilots tothe direction of the threat and that distinguish between different types ofthreats by means of various sounds. 6 Future US helmets for pilots of JointStrike Fighters will feature night vision, sound, and other sensors.Although the next giant leap in helmet technology might seem far away,one finds growing interest in pilots flying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)by wearing a helmet in a virtual cockpit and receiving images, just as theywould if they were actually in the aircraft. Technological developmentscould overcome obstacles involving photo imagery, data transmission, anddisplay, thereby enabling the rapid growth of UAVs.ConclusionHuman factors and pilot-centered design in aviation have a long andcolorful history, beginning with the mounting of machine guns on aircraftand progressing through advanced weapons displays on helmet visors. Byrecently conquering several technological problems, developers andengineers have enabled helmet-mounted display systems to become aviable and almost necessary part of fighter aircraft. The high off-boresightcapabilities of today’s fourth-generation missiles, along with the challengeof overcoming human limitations, are partly responsible for the growth ofhelmet-mounted cueing devices. We have also seen that this innovativesystem carries with it certain risks, such as spatial disorientation, tasksaturation, and ejection compatibility, that engineers and users mustaddress. But the advantages of helmet-mounted displays and the possibilityof adding refinements like sound integration and virtual control holdgreat promise for the future of this technology. ■Eglin AFB, FloridaPensacola, FloridaDaytona Beach, FloridaNotes1. Dean F. Kocian, “Human-Centered Design Project Revolutionizes Day and Night Air Combat,” no.HE-00-10 (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Research Laboratory, Human Effectiveness Directorate,2001), http://www.afrlhorizons.com/Briefs/June01/HE0010.html (accessed August 13, 2003).2. Ibid.3. “Military Flight Helmets: Is Head Protection Still Important?” (panel discussion chaired by Lt ColR. Munson at the Aerospace Medical Association Annual Scientific Meeting, Detroit, May 1999),http://www.geocities.com/iamfsp/panel.htm (accessed September 19, 2003).4. Ibid.5. Robert K. Ackerman, “French Helmet Visors Clear the Skies for Combat Pilots,” Signal Magazine,August 1996, http://www.us.net/signal/Archive/Aug96/French-aug.html (accessed August 13, 2003).6. Ibid.14

Whither High-Energy Lasers? MAJ GEN DONALD L. LAMBERSON,PHD, USAF, RETIREDCOL EDWARD DUFF, USAF, RETIREDDON WASHBURN,PHDLT COL COURTNEY HOLMBERG,PHD, USAF*IMAGINE AN ABILITY to execute speed-of-light attacks against enemyforces with massive bursts of photon energy, literally incinerating theintended target. The desire for such a weapon is not the exclusiveresult of an appetite nourished by Hollywood science fiction andaction-movie cultures, nor is it even a recent phenomenon. Mankind hasbeen intrigued by the concept of directing light against a target for a verylong time, and the absence of today’s advanced technology did notpreclude dreams and fantasies of novel weapons. An incident in “ancient”history illustrates this well.The story takes place in the coastal city of Syracuse on the southeasternshore of Sicily, an island located across the Messina Straits from thesouthwestern coast of Italy. During the year 213 BC—2,217 years ago—Syracuse was the home of Archimedes. He was in his 75th year and afterspending many years in Greece had returned to Syracuse for hisretirement. Marcus Claudius Marcellus, the Roman commander, beganattacking Syracuse during the second Punic War with a fleet of over 50quinqueremes, vessels that were propelled by five banks of oars and filledwith soldiers armed with all kinds of devices to overcome the city walls.Hiero, king of Syracuse, asked Archimedes to design a defense for the city.Attack after attack was successfully repelled, largely through the use of themechanical engines engineered by Archimedes to hurl stones and otherobjects against the attackers. Marcellus demanded surrender; otherwise hepromised to burn the entire city and execute all the people—Roman style.Fortunately for Syracuse, Archimedes had a secret weapon up his sleeve.The geographical location of Syracuse led Marcellus to attack by seafrom the east. He also chose to attack at daybreak so the sun would be athis back and in the eyes of the Syracuse defenders, hindering them fromdetecting and tracking his fleet. However, this geographical orientationalso proved advantageous to Archimedes since the fleet’s approach wouldbe at a well-defined, small angle from the position of the sun. Archimedesconceived of a defense that employed mirrors to reflect and focus thesunlight on the Roman ships as they approached the island. The energy’s*General Lamberson serves on several senior-level Air Force technical review and advisory panels and, while on activeduty, was responsible for much of the Air Force’s research, development, test, evaluation, and acquisition. Colonel Duffis the deputy for programs, Laser Systems Office, and Dr. Washburn is the program manager of the Relay MirrorTechnology Program, Directed Energy Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. ColonelHolmberg is chief scientist, Air University Center for Strategy and Technology, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.15

flux—reflected and focused sunlight—was sufficient to set the ships’tarred-fir planks on fire. In their first recorded use, relay mirrors destroyedMarcellus’s fleet.Whether this story is real or just a fable will probably never be known. 1However, it is known that although Syracuse—through Archimedes—wonthe battle, it soon lost the war. Marcellus landed his regrouped forces onthe undefended western end of the island and captured Syracuse by landattack, unintentionally killing Archimedes in the process.Nothing in the laws of physics would have precluded Archimedes frombuilding and employing this extraordinary defensive weapon. Severalexperiments, some recent, have successfully demonstrated that even crudemirrors could concentrate sufficient energy to cause the storied effect.One experiment fitted an aiming device to bronze shields, traditionalequipment for the soldiers of Syracuse, and was able to successfully focusthe reflected sun’s energy and set wood on fire at several hundred meters.However, what really matters is not whether the story is true, but ratherthat it has persisted for over 2,000 years, which demonstrates theattractiveness and importance of such a capability.Military research into high-energy lasers for weapons applications tracesits beginnings to the early 1960s. Since then, significant advances in laserpowerproduction, target tracking, and beam control have been made. 2Systems such as the Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL) of the early 1980sdemonstrated that laser systems staged on airborne platforms coulddestroy enemy missiles. Nevertheless, are we any closer to fielding thatrevolutionary new capability for the war fighter?The answer is “perhaps so.” How? When? The remainder of this articleaddresses the difficulty of transitioning new technologies to the war fighterand the importance of robust technology demonstrations for high-energylaser weapons systems. Additionally, it highlights two critical newtechnologyareas that will likely be the key to our long-term laser warfightingcapability.Technology TransitionConsider the general problem of transitioning a new technology intowar-fighting systems. The laser was invented in 1961, and high-energydevices were demonstrated several years later. The high-energy lasercommunity is often criticized because there is not yet any productionassociated with high-energy laser weapons. It turns out that an extendedperiod of incubation is true of most revolutionary technologies. Today weare all familiar with the rapid evolution of fielded computer technologyand capability, but the transistor, which makes it all possible, was inventedin 1940. Arguably, it was the 1980s before the accelerated development ofcomputer technology really matured. The Air Force Scientific Advisory16

Board, under Dr. Gene McCall, characterized this phenomenon in its NewWorld Vistas study of 1995. 3Consider a new technology which doubles in some attribute, say“relative importance,” every four years as shown in figure 1. It is interesting tosee how the “relative importance” compounds over 40 years—three ordersof magnitude (from 1 to 1,000) on the chart, with most of the accelerationbeing in the last few years. In fact, the first few years are barelydistinguishable. This simple, nonlinear behavior seems to be acharacteristic of many technologies; the computing world knows it well asMoore’s Law. An example in the weapons field is the development andfielding of precision strike weapons. The first prototypes of these now-sofamiliarweapons were available in the early 1960s, but maturation did notoccur until after Desert Storm in the early 1990s.Relative Importance1,2001,1001,00090080070060050040030020010000 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45Time (Years)Figure 1. An attribute that doubles every four years demonstrates the effect ofcompounding, which is typical of many developing technologies.Where would we place today’s high-energy lasers on the chart of thehypothetical case just described? They are arguably somewhere around theknee of the curve, perhaps near the 30-year point. It is also plausible thatthe development of high-energy laser technology has nearly reached apoint that, within the next decade, will enable most of the currentlyenvisioned applications. Based on the simple exponential-growth analogyabove, high-energy laser weapons are poised for a revolutionary leap.Whether or not US military interest in high-energy lasers actuallyaccelerates these developments depends on many factors, not the least ofwhich is the unfolding world situation and the demands and circumstancesof the military operator. Although the research, development, andacquisition communities can neither predict nor control that requirement,the current trends of what the war fighter needs seem well entrenched—increased precision, rapid response, and tailored lethality to minimizecollateral damage and reduce civilian casualties. What these communities17

can control and optimize is their readiness to transition high-energy laserweapons into production. The path to success is through mature andmeaningful demonstrations on ground (mobile and fixed), naval, andairborne (tactical and strategic) platforms of interest.Our recent experience is that today’s US military is quite imaginative andcreative in applying the weapons it has on hand, even the so-called hi-techweapons. In fact, it is common for the military operator to find applicationsfor weapons that the weapon developer never had in mind. However, thetypical operator is neither well informed nor overly interested inrevolutionary technologies that may satisfy his requirements. That is whytechnology demonstrations, or early system prototypes, are so crucial incapturing the interest and imagination of the operator. It is important thatthese demonstrators show not only that the physics, engineeringtechnology, and integration issues are understood, but also that theyprovide operators with sufficient access to demonstrators to whet theirappetite for a new operational vision. If that is marketing, so be it.Demonstrator systems of this class tend to be very complex and expensive;they take years to develop. After all, depositing significant energy withcentimeter-like precision at ranges from a few kilometers to perhapsthousands of kilometers is a very complex task. There are, however, threesuch high-energy laser demonstrators in the works today.Technology DemonstratorsThe Army’s Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) (and its mobilevariant), United States Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM)Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL), and the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA)Airborne Laser (ABL) are the Department of Defense’s (DOD) majorlaser-weapon-technology demonstrators.The high-energy laser community owes much to the Army’s successfuldemonstration of the THEL. The megawatt-class deuterium fluoridechemical laser, which lies at the heart of the THEL, is a very maturetechnology. It successfully engaged and destroyed several in-flight Katyusharockets at ranges of several kilometers. The THEL’s successful demonstrationhas attracted the attention of many who are interested in tactical laserweapons. As a spin-off of the original effort, there is now a program todevelop a mobile THEL (MTHEL).The ATL is the latest demonstrator to be defined and programmed.The ATL uses a closed-cycle, chemical oxygen-iodine laser (COIL) with anappropriate beam control. The closed-cycle system captures all of thewaste by-products, making it suitable for tactical employment. The ATLwill be installed in a C-130 aircraft to demonstrate its ability to engagetactical targets from a moving platform at ranges of approximately 10kilometers. This SOCOM demonstration program is important and shouldbe completed in the next three to five years.18

The MDA’s ABL program is the largest and most complex of the majorhigh-energy laser demonstrators that the Air Force is executing. The ABLuses a very large COIL, and its components are integrated into thefuselage and systems of a Boeing 747-400 aircraft. It is designed to operateat very high altitudes (~40,000 ft) and have a capability to kill theaterballistic missiles (TBM) while they are still in their boost phase. Theaircraft has been modified and flown to Edwards AFB, California, where itslaser modules are being tested in a dedicated test cell. Its beam-controlsystem is finishing a low-power checkout in Sunnyvale, California, before itis installed in the aircraft for low-power flight tests. Finally, the high-energyCOIL will be installed on the aircraft for full system integration andtesting. These efforts should be completed in about two years.To propagate and focus laser energy over a distance of hundreds ofkilometers and through the atmospheric turbulence that exists above40,000 feet requires a robust atmospheric compensation or correctionsystem for the laser beam. An adaptive-optics technology system has beenbuilt and shown to achieve good results at low power, but not yet at highpower. The ABL, therefore, remains the major demonstrator by which tojudge the maturity of US high-energy laser-engineering knowledge.The success of these demonstrators will directly affect not only thetransition of laser weapons into production but also the prospect of moreadvanced applications. One can anticipate a “window of opportunity” toopen with the success of the ABL, ATL, and MTHEL, which will definehigh-energy laser-weapon activities for some time to come.New Technology HighlightsThis article limits itself to discussing electric solid-state lasers and relaymirrors. These topics, because of their extraordinary importance, deserveemphasis before all other high-energy laser-technology research.Laser-Technology MaturityBefore this article launches into the benefits of solid-state lasers, it is usefulto understand the technological maturity of high-energy lasers ingeneral—both chemical and electric solid-state. Researchers know verywell how to generate megawatts (MW) of laser energy with the gases fromchemical lasers. With chemical oxygen-iodine and deuterium-fluoridelasers, we can also get suitably high-quality beams at full power. It is noaccident that all three of the demonstrators discussed previously usechemical lasers. Currently that is the only way to achieve an excess of 10kilowatts (kW) of average power, which is required for the desired effectson targets. So it is reasonable to assume that chemical lasers will be theengines of choice for large, strategic, high-energy laser applicationsrequiring laser powers on the order of a megawatt (MW or 10 3 kW).Numerous studies have been conducted that suggest tactical applications19

of high-energy lasers become relevant at around the 100 kW level. 4 Forpower levels in this range, solid-state lasers have clear advantages whencompared to chemical lasers, which include being able to avoid thedifficult challenge of providing and disposing of hazardous chemicalsduring battlefield operations. Neither is it clear that chemical gas laserscan be efficiently packaged for the small volumes associated with trucks orfighter aircraft.Electric Solid-State LasersAlthough significant challenges exist, electric solid-state lasers have greatpotential and are very attractive for tactical applications. Since we are alreadyaccustomed to generating and distributing electrical power on our platformsto run various subsystems, the logistics of electric solid-state lasers appearsmuch more simple and attractive than that for chemical lasers. An “unlimitedmagazine,” where a laser-weapon platform has “laser bullets” as long as it hasfuel, is also very appealing. Likewise, it appears that solid-state lasers can bemore efficiently packaged. Currently, the maximum power achieved by solidstatelasers is around 15 kW with relatively poor beam quality. Scaling theselasers to attain a system with higher power and high brightness is a significantchallenge. A major joint effort is under way to demonstrate the nation’s firstweapon-class tactical laser small enough to fit on board combat aircraft,ground vehicles, and naval vessels.The DOD High Energy Laser Joint Technology Office in Albuquerque,New Mexico, is leading the Joint High-Power Solid-State Laser DevelopmentProgram with significant participation from industry and each of theservices. The Program Research and Development Announcement(PRDA), dated August 2002, stated that the goal of the program is todemonstrate and deliver a 25 kW–class solid-state laser by December 2004.The PRDA also emphasized system characteristics such as beam quality,size, weight, efficiency, reliability, and ruggedness as key factors inestablishing a scalable design path for a 100 kW system capable ofintegration onto tactical platforms. These goals are challenging and evenmore so on the prescribed schedule. Raytheon Company in El Segundo,California, and Northrop Grumman Space Technology in Redondo Beach,California, each won contract awards to pursue separate and distinctapproaches. Additionally, the DOD selected Lawrence Livermore NationalLab’s solid-state heat-capacity laser program, sponsored by the Army, tojoin in the competition.Relay MirrorsOnce these demonstrations establish the feasibility of high-energy laserweapons, the next question becomes, How can their range be extended?Atmospheric absorption, atmospheric turbulence, and curvature of theearth all limit the full potential of high-energy laser weapons. Tocompensate for these limitations, developers could build larger, more20

powerful lasers; use larger primary telescope optics; or attempt to placethe laser system on high-flying platforms or even in space. For a givenplatform, however, the volume and weight constraints are likely to be verylimiting. Researchers should continue to increase the brightness of thelaser beam through more advanced beam-control techniques, and notsolely for increased range. Nevertheless, this technique also is limited. Asthe performance of high-energy laser systems continues to improve on themargins, relay-mirror configuration could be another range-boostingoption to consider.Relays are not a new idea—Archimedes used a relay optic with solarpower as a weapon. The Strategic Defense Initiative Office also consideredrelays in the early days of missile defense. However, at that time, the poorlaser-beam quality that researchers were able to transmit to the relaysystem was a critical limitation. Researchers at the Starfire Optical Range, adivision of the Air Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL) Directed EnergyDirectorate at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, have been diligently workingthat issue for some time and now know how to solve that problem.Scientists use a cooperative beacon and adaptive optics in the source-torelayuplink to sense and then minimize atmospheric aberration.Therefore, a bifocal relay mirror effectively puts the laser source at themirror. This dramatically increases system brightness and intensity on thetarget at a constant range or extends the laser’s range to a target whileretaining the original levels of brightness and intensity. The implicationsof this are easy to understand.The separation of the laser source from the beam-directing systemallows each subsystem to operate in its most advantageous environment. Inaddition to the substantial range extension, technologists are just nowbeginning to understand the system flexibility such separation allows. Theheavy, high-energy, and illuminator laser sources can be kept on thesurface—ground- or sea-based platforms—far removed from the actualfighting, easing maintenance and allowing for the generation of beamswith higher power. The optical relay system will be above most of theatmosphere, minimizing the adverse effects caused by atmosphericturbulence. Additionally, a single laser using a network of multiple mirrorscould overcome horizon limitations and generate alternate line-of-sightpaths to attack targets occluded by clouds or other obstacles. Some relayplatformconcepts include networking multiple lasers for a single relaythat can be pushed forward in the battlespace and occupy the high ground,essentially loitering in a geostationary position high above an area of interest.When one previously considered the advantages and disadvantages ofrelay-mirror systems on various host platforms—manned aircraft, unmannedair vehicles, and even high-altitude airships—satellite relays were likely tohave been seen as the most advantageous. However, the advent of MDA’sHigh-Altitude Airship (HAA) program now allows one to consider additionaltrade-offs when deciding to locate a relay-mirror system in space or on an21

airship. Relays mounted on a space-based platform offer the advantage ofa large coverage area. That coverage comes with a high price tag—the costof a large number of satellites for persistent offensive and defensive globalcoverage or a lesser cost associated with fewer satellites and an offensivecapability only. Cost is probably the biggest disadvantage to a space-basedsystem—both for an operational capability as well as for its demonstration.In contrast, an airship-based system would be limited to regional coverage,have fewer vehicles deployed, and, according to planners’ current estimates,a modest cost for both an operational and demonstration capability.While support is growing for demonstrating relay mirrors on an HAA,other efforts are also under way. The services recently held a Relay MirrorWorkshop at Kirtland AFB and studied ways to develop and demonstrateits technology. The AFRL’s Directed Energy Directorate calls its overallrelay-mirror paradigm Evolutionary Aerospace Global Laser Engagement,or EAGLE (see fig. 2 and table 1). They have several experiments plannedin the near term for potential relay-mirror concepts used in conjunctionwith ground-based lasers.While the advantages of arelay-mirror system are many,so are the technical challenges.First, engineers must controlthe beam characteristics ofboth the illuminator and thehigh-energy laser to minimizethe size of the mirror thatreceives the high-powerbeam. Likewise, engineersmust create an uplinkcapability that can acquireand actively track the locationof the relay mirror as well asprovide the informationrequired for the adaptive-Naval Land Airborne SpaceLaser SourcesSpace-Based RelayMirrorHigh-AltitudeAirborne RelayProvides Laser Capabilities overAir/Ground/Space ContinuumFigure 2. The AFRL EAGLE conceptFutureMissions22Table 1. Future missions of a relay-mirror systemMissionsBattlespace preparation Target designation Air/ground attack Space control - Antisatellite (ASAT)- Defensive satellite (DSAT) Asset protection Cruise missile defense Ballistic missile defense - Active tracking- Discrimination- Theater missile defense (TMD)

optics feedback loops. Although conventional adaptive optics canaccomplish many useful missions, incorporating advanced adaptive opticsinto the source and relaysystems will increasedeployment opportunities bymaximizing the system’srange and efficiency.Engineers face a differentset of technical challenges indeveloping the relay platform(see fig. 3 and table 2). Despitethese significant challenges,relay mirrors are a trulytransformational technologyfor high-energy laser weaponssystems.RelayPlatformUplinkSourceTarget LinkFigure 3. Components of the HAArelay-mirror systemTargetTable 2. Technical challenges of a relay-mirror systemSourceIlluminator characteristics HEL characteristics Thermal management Power and energy Uplink (source link)Acquire and actively track relay mirrorAdaptive optics on relay-mirror beacon Propagate outgoing beamAdvanced adaptive opticsThermal bloomingRelay platformDual line-of-sight stabilization Acquisition, tracking, and pointing (ATP) in two directions Boresight alignment and beam cleanupRapid retargetingSeparation uplink beams for downlink point-aheadLightweight optics Lightweight illuminator/designatorInternal throughput (coatings, etc.)Thermal managementIntegrated power, energy, and thermal managementTarget linkPassive tracking and pointingActive tracking and pointingAdaptive optics wave-front sensor (WFS) of target beacon Aim-point maintenanceThermal bloomingTracking through clutterTargetActive track interactions Lethality requirements Target interaction 23

Relay mirrors not only will enable lethal capabilities, but also willprovide numerous opportunities for low-power laser-sensor applications.The 1999 AFRL “Lasers and Space Optical Systems Study” extensivelyreviewed these applications and concluded that relay mirrors could handlevarious irradiance, as well as different wavelengths, which could enable anumber of long-range sensing applications. The same arguments forachieving system flexibility apply to these applications in the same way asthey do for high-power applications.ConclusionsClearly there are major milestones, significant challenges, and excitingnew technologies facing the high-energy laser community for the nextdecade or so. High-energy laser weapons research is arguably on the kneeof the technological development curve. Weapon-class chemical lasersystems—THEL, ATL, and ABL—have demonstrated, or will soon do so,their worth in appropriate environments. The High Energy Laser JointTechnology Office is pushing state-of-the-art, solid-state lasers for tacticalapplications. Finally, advances in cooperative beacons and advancedadaptive optics are enabling relay-mirror technology to emerge as asignificant force enhancer for all high-energy laser systems. These areindeed exciting times, but it is a very tough job and the Air Force cannotexpect to be totally successful. Future combat capabilities, as forecasted bythese demonstrators and to the degree they are successful, will greatlybenefit the US war fighter and provide unprecedented asymmetric warfightingcapabilities for the twenty-first century. ■NotesNiceville, FloridaKirtland AFB, New MexicoMaxwell AFB, Alabama1. Dio Cassius, Roman History, vol. 2, Fragments of Books 12–35, trans. Earnest Cary and Herbert B.Foster (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1914).2. For an excellent account of the historical development of high-energy lasers, see Robert W.Duffner, Airborne Laser: Bullets of Light (New York: Plenum Trade, 1997).3. USAF Scientific Advisory Board, New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century: DirectedEnergy Volume (Washington, DC: USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1995).4. “Directed Energy Worth Analysis and Vehicle Evaluation (DE-WAVE),” conducted by LockheedMartin Aeronautics Corporation; “Tactical High Energy Laser Fighter (TAC-HELF) Study,” by BoeingCorporation; and “High-Energy Laser Weapons Systems Applications,” the Defense Science Board’s June2001 summer study, are three such analyses.24

What Should We Bomb? Axiological Targeting and the Abiding Limits ofAirpower TheoryDR.PAUL REXTON KAN*Airpower is an unusually seductive form of military strength because, likemodern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment.—Eliot A. CohenIN THE 100 years since the advent of airpower and its subsequent usein warfare, airmen and strategists still debate the appropriate targetsfor aerial bombing that will ensure victory. Early airpower advocatespromised quick and decisive victory in modern war by selecting andstriking targets critical to an enemy’s war efforts. They reasoned that bydepriving modern nation-states of their ability to use certain key featuresof their societies, airpower would prevent the horror of trench warfarewitnessed in World War I, thereby limiting overall human suffering.In the post–Cold War era, Western air forces have fought against statesled by dictators, ethnonationalist tyrants, and religious fundamentalists; allhad little industrial might to sustain open hostilities for a long period oftime. Nonetheless, victory came at a substantially lower cost to civiliansthan was the case during the air campaigns of World War II. The promiseof the early airpower advocates seems to have been realized. Although thecivilian casualties and significant hardship caused by recent conflict do notmatch those incurred during World War II, they continue as features ofpost–Cold War air campaigns.This article explores a new theory that reopens the debate overairpower’s targeting priorities: axiological targeting. Lt Col Peter Wijningaof the Royal Netherlands Air Force and Richard Szafranski first exploredthis theory in their article “Beyond Utility Targeting: Toward AxiologicalAir Operations.” The term axiological, which combines the two Greekwords axios (worthy) and logos (reason or theory), is the study or theory ofvalues—what they are and where they are placed. Wijninga and Szafranskiargue that the Air Force should explore axiological targeting as a way ofrefining the theory and practice of coercive airpower. For them, “the aimof axiological aerospace operations is to use air, space, and informationpower to force a behavior shift in belligerent leadership in the quickestand most economical ways possible. . . . Value targeting engages the mindsand needs of leaders at all levels, knowing that they, and not their war­*The author is an assistant professor of international security and military studies at Air Command and Staff College,Maxwell AFB, Alabama.25

fighting stuff, are the real source of the conflict and its prolongation andthe essential ingredient to its resolution.” 1 Axiological target sets mightinclude bank accounts and finances, as well as entertainment, sports, andrecreational facilities, used by the senior leadership. In other words,axiological targeting sees nonmilitary centers of gravity as more strategicand countervalue targets as more important than counterforce targets.This new theory seeks to coerce adversaries by holding at risk thosethings they value most. The authors reason that one can reduce thesuffering of innocents even further by striking more personal targets.Unlike previous airpower theories, axiological targeting does not focus onelements that an adversary uses to mount a military campaign. Rather, it ismore flexible and more notional in its identification of countervaluetargets that may be centers of gravity.However, this approach is fraught with dangerous assumptions that mayput civilians and armed forces at greater risk. In fact, axiological targetingrepresents the limits of airpower in practice and the complicated logic ofairpower as theory. Now that the context of warfare has shifted away fromtrench fighting of the early twentieth century, one must evaluate howaxiological targeting may be applied against today’s adversaries on today’sbattlefields. This article explores the risks of this new theory anddemonstrates how it represents the overall limits of airpower in confrontingopponents during the early twenty-first century.What Is Axiological Targeting?Axiological targeting is part of the school of coercive-airpower thoughtthat believes airpower is uniquely suited to force an adversary to accept thedemands of the attacker. It accepts the challenge issued by Robert Pape,who maintains that coercive airpower has significant drawbacks: “The keyproblem with coercion is the validity of the mechanisms that are supposedto translate particular military effects into political outcomes.” 2 Coercioninvolves the destruction of certain targets but does not require completeannihilation of the adversary or of his necessary means of resistance. Assuch, axiological targeting becomes a logical extension of the airpowertheories of the interwar period. By identifying the correct target set withina center of gravity, airmen can use that set as a lever to modify an enemy’sbehavior and attitude.One can easily recognize a campaign of coercion by examining therhetoric employed by the political leaders of an attacking state—bombingcampaigns are designed to “send a message to the leadership” or “ratchetup the pressure” in hopes the adversary will acquiesce to the attacker’sdemands. The modern airpower of many Western militaries is uniquelysuited for a strategy of coercion since adversaries can do little to inflictsubstantial casualties against air forces that can evade their air defensenetworks.26

The United States Air Force, in particular, can deploy rapidly and bringto bear tremendous and persistent firepower: “The USAF offers a highlyversatile coercive instrument. Air power can attack strategic, operationaland tactical targets. It can resupply friendly forces and provide essentialintelligence. One, some, or all of these functions may play a role insuccessful coercion.” 3 In addition, airpower represents a large part ofpolitical calculations that include the quick resolution of a conflict onAmerican terms. One of the advantages the Air Force has over otherservices is its ability to halt ground invasions or limit aggressions beforethey become faits accomplis. 4Although the Air Force is a potent fighting machine, the challenge ofaxiological targeting (as with all airpower theory) lies in acquiring thenecessary intelligence to glean some insight into the mind of the adversary.How does he meet his particular idiosyncratic needs? What does he valuemost, and what level of military pressure would make him capitulate? Assuch, axiological targeting stands in contradistinction to the currenttheory and practice of utility targeting.Utility targeting is designed to strike at the means of waging war.Troops, airfields, bases, ships, trains, tanks, aircraft, and command andcontrol (C2) facilities exemplify targets that have a direct use in militarycampaigns—what Wijninga and Szafranski call “war-fighting stuff.” Forthem, John Warden’s five-ring theory is the epitome of utility targeting.According to Warden, one can treat the enemy as a system comprised offive concentric rings (from the inside out): leadership, organic or systemessentials, infrastructure, population, and fielded forces. One can targetthese elements with airpower, either to create a malfunction in the systemor induce paralysis, thereby bringing about surrender. Wijninga andSzafranski believe that axiological targeting further refines the center ringof Warden’s theory by identifying objects that enemy leaders use to sustainthemselves by fulfilling their basic needs. 5If Warden’s five-ring approach is the epitome of utility targeting intheory, then the epitome of such targeting in practice is the air campaignsof the first and second Gulf wars. Leadership targets were of primaryinterest to air-campaign planners because by “decapitating” the Iraqi regime,the coalition could prevent Saddam Hussein’s military from mounting aneffective resistance. In effect, coalition forces paralyzed the regime bytargeting enemy leaders, communication systems, and infrastructure inmajor cities. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the press referred to targetingby using the terms shock and awe, which suggested that by conductingprecise and simultaneous attacks on utility targets at the initiation ofhostilities, the coalition hoped to create so much fear and disarray that theenemy would have little choice other than capitulation. 6 At first glance,hitting Saddam’s palaces may seem in line with axiological targeting.However, we considered them utility targets due to the possibility that they27

contained labs for the production of weapons of mass destruction and/orthat they served as fortified bunkers to protect senior Ba’ath Party leaders.In contrast, the most persuasive case favoring the effectiveness ofaxiological targeting may be the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s(NATO) air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. The goals were purelycoercive: “to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s purpose so thatSerbian leaders understand the imperative of reversing course, to deter aneven bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo, and, ifnecessary, to seriously damage the Serb military capacity to harm thepeople of Kosovo.” 7 Early on, political leaders selected airpower as themilitary instrument, excluding any use of NATO ground troops. Debatesover centers of gravity and targets soon emerged within the US militaryand among NATO allies. Although conventional utility targets—fieldedforces in Kosovo and C2 nodes—were struck, American air commandersargued for more strategic attacks to break Yugoslav leader SlobodanMilosevic’s will. Days of air strikes continued, but the Serbian offensiveagainst the Kosovars intensified, and the humanitarian catastropheworsened. After much debate and political maneuvering, targets shifted toinclude institutions that Milosevic used to maintain his rule. As asserted bythe Air Force’s Lt Gen Michael Short, NATO’s joint force air and spacecomponent commander, the threat of destroying everything that kept theSerb leadership in power and comfort did the job. 8 Shortly thereafter,Milosevic capitulated to NATO demands.Axiological targeting has a seductive quality about it—ground forcesavoid the harshness of direct conflict, and standoff attacks focus onleadership rather than on civilians. With the advent of greater precision inmunitions, targeting has become more accurate, thereby reducing sufferingand hardship on both sides of the conflict. However, like the airpowertheories before it, axiological targeting is not without its dangers. In fact,these liabilities reveal the genuine limits of airpower in modern conflict.Influencing Behavior through BombardmentMuch of airpower theory and practice is designed to influence behaviorof the adversary. Early airpower theorists concentrated on “civilian morale,”believing that a population undergoing sustained bombardment wouldrise against its government and demand an end to hostilities. At the veryleast, citizens would be afraid to go to their jobs, thus crippling the targetstate’s economy. Modern airpower thought during and after the firstPersian Gulf War focused on paralyzing the leadership or shocking it socompletely that it had no choice other than surrender. In this context,morale would mean very little if the adversary were simply incapable oforganizing himself to resist.Axiological targeting represents a return to the belief that airpower caninfluence behavior. Yet, throughout the history of airpower’s use in28

warfare, human behavior has remained difficult to predict. In many cases,bombing elicited the opposite of the desired response—instead of incitingrebellion, it strengthened enemy resolve; instead of crippling an economy,it led to the streamlining of industry. The case of Kosovo is not clear-cut interms of illustrating effective airpower coercion or the overall value ofaxiological targeting. We simply do not know why Milosevic capitulated,but we do know about many other events that occurred during thebombing. For example, the US Army widened roads in Albania, someNATO allies deployed ground troops to Kosovo’s borders, and theRussians actively engaged the Serbs diplomatically. Any of these events—orall of them—together with the bombing campaign could have figured intoMilosevic’s calculations.Ball-Bearing Factories or Banks?Although axiological targeting aims for greater precision and thefurther reduction of civilian casualties, issues of discriminating betweencombatants and noncombatants remain salient. Although such targeting isdesigned to inflict more pain on the leadership by striking those things itvalues, citizens will still suffer. Much like the ball-bearing factories socritical to Nazi Germany’s war machine, axiological targets such as banksand sports stadiums are staffed by civilians. Clearly, the targeting of a Serbtelevision station in Belgrade during Operation Allied Force forced warfighters to face concerns about the cost to civilians.Axiological targeting also fails to heed Pape’s advice to study morecarefully how state policy can depend upon a single leader. Dictators haveproved adept at presenting those things they value as popular symbols oftheir rule as well as co-opting national treasures as part of theirgovernment. If air planners using axiological targeting determine that anancient bridge is the dictator’s most valued item, they cannot dismiss thepossibility that the citizenry feels the same way about it. Moreover,knowing that it probably will be bombed, citizens by the hundreds mightvoluntarily stand on the bridge, hoping to prevent its destruction. Underthese circumstances, bombing the bridge would likely fail to conform tothe law of armed conflict (LOAC), thereby limiting the flexibleapplication of force that axiological targeting presupposes.Conversely, if the attacker values something within the target country,such as an ancient temple or museum that contains items of culturalsignificance, the adversary can position high-value targets and resourcesnearby in an effort to thwart a bombing campaign. Aerial bombing, nomatter the theory, will always be subject to political considerations, moralquestioning, and the LOAC. These constraints and strictures do notdisappear upon the adoption of axiological targeting and will continue toforce airmen into difficult decisions about defining the effectiveness ofairpower operations.29

Effectiveness of Axiological TargetingNot an entirely new theory of airpower, axiological targeting insteaddemonstrates the same shortcomings that have accompanied airpowerthought since its inception. Such targeting theory does not solve thepuzzle of human behavior, political questions, and moral quandaries. Infact, the most recent example of axiological targeting used by terrorgroups points to the theory’s major drawback.The attacks by al-Qaeda against the United States on September 11,2001, prove instructive when one examines the central thesis of axiologicaltargeting. The strikes against the World Trade Center, whose towerssymbolized American power and prestige, are a potent example ofaxiological targeting, but they did not elicit the desired response from theUnited States. Why, then, should we think that an adversary would actdifferently if it were subjected to a US axiological-targeting campaign?The underlying assumptions of axiological targeting continue to beplagued by problems of “mirror imaging”—the notion that Western airforces will confront adversaries who rationally conduct a cost-benefitanalysis of their actions. This fallacy further assumes that all enemy leadersvalue certain things subject to targeting from the air. They may in factbelieve it more prestigious to stand up to a bombing campaign conductedby a powerful Western air force. Perhaps the greatest problem of mirrorimaging, however, is the belief that Western air forces will inevitably facestate actors in the future.Globalization and Nonstate ActorsThreats beyond those presented by nation-states demonstrate a growingneed to understand the role of airpower as an instrument of nationalpower. Axiological targeting still struggles with significant drawbacks whenapplied to nonstate actors who operate in an increasingly globalizingworld. Any new theory of targeting must take into account these actorsand the context in which they operate.Globalization, as described by Malcolm Waters, is a “social process inwhich the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangementsrecede and in which people become increasingly aware that they arereceding.” 9 This global social process has dispersed information andtechnology to greater reaches of the planet and, as a result, has empoweredvarious types of human social organizations with the authority to declarewar. These groups, such as ethnonationalist zealots, clan-based warlords,terrorist organizations, and even criminal syndicates, now have both themeans and the willingness to follow through and wage war, often justifyingand employing violence in ways that challenge contemporaryunderstanding of air operations.30

Globalization also provides new sources of funding for such groups,permitting them to become more self-sufficient than they were during theCold War, when the superpowers provided them support. They now takeadvantage of the transnational nature of globalization by funding theiractivities through the international trafficking of narcotics, people, smallarms, and illegally seized natural resources such as diamonds. Unlikenation-states, these groups do not rely on a national industry, soidentifying proper targets for airpower continues to present problems foraxiological targeting.Striking against drug crops or diamond mines valued by a particularnonstate leader still raises issues of behavior modification, morality, andeffectiveness when axiological targeting is applied to nation-states. A rebelleader may see his stature elevated merely because the United States or someEuropean country orders an air strike against him. One must also addressthe problem of discriminating between combatants and noncombatants.Do people who earn a living from drug crops represent legitimate targets?What about those forced to work in diamond mines? Also, regardless ofwhether one uses utility targeting or axiological targeting in a militarycampaign against nonstate actors, the LOAC may serve as a hindrance toair-campaign planners and to overall military effectiveness against thesetypes of actors. It is worth exploring whether a conventional counterforceapproach would prove more effective.Evolution of Airpower ThoughtFar from fulfilling the promises of early airpower advocates, axiologicaltargeting serves to sustain the conversation about the effectiveness ofairpower. If globalization continues to define the context in which challengesto national and international security arise, one would do well to discusshow airpower should be coordinated among various nations and alliancesrather than debate what targets to strike from the air. In fact, NATO’scampaign against the Serbs in Kosovo does not illustrate the effectivenessof axiological targeting so much as it demonstrates the need to think ofways to use airpower more effectively in concert with indigenous forces onthe ground, such as the Kosovo Liberation Army. After Kosovo, the USairpower operation in Afghanistan also worked closely with anotherindigenous force on the ground—the Northern Alliance.Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has used airpower inconjunction with various coalitions and alliances, bringing it to bear againstan array of adversaries, from dictators to a radical religious regime. Thecoordination of these coalitions and the campaigns against these adversariesmay foreshadow the challenges presented to us at the beginning of thisnew millennium. Clearly, further study of how we organize coalitions andhow nonstate actors operate would benefit airpower thinkers and leaders.Undoubtedly, however, issues related to morality, effectiveness, and the31

unpredictability of human behavior will continue to intertwine with futureairpower campaigns no matter who participates or against whom we directthem. These basic issues have accompanied advocates of airpower since itsadvent and application in warfare.Rather than serving as a point of departure for airpower, axiologicaltargeting asks us to think more creatively about how to meet violentchallenges of the near future. The engendering of more discussion on oneof the most lethal instruments of power in the world can only help. Thus,axiological targeting remains true to the spirit of early airpower advocatesby demonstrating that airpower’s use in war continues to be more art thanscience. ■NotesMaxwell AFB, Alabama1. Lt Col Peter W. W. Wijninga and Richard Szafranski, “Beyond Utility Targeting: Toward AxiologicalAir Operations,” Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 53, 56, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/szafranski.pdf.2. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1996), 329.3. Ibid., 5.4. Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson, Air Power as a Coercive Instrument (SantaMonica, CA: RAND, 1999), 3.5. Wijninga and Szafranski, “Beyond Utility Targeting,” 48.6. Recent reporting, however, tends to downplay the significance of shock and awe. Gen T. MichaelMoseley reveals that less than 10 percent of coalition bombs targeted Iraqi leadership or militarycommand structures. The majority of air attacks went against fielded forces. See Operation Iraqi Freedom:By the Numbers (Shaw AFB, SC: Combined Forces Air Component, Assessment and Analysis Division,2003), 9.7. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington,DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 101.8. John A. Tirpak, “Short’s View of the Air Campaign,” Air Force Magazine 82, no. 9 (September 1999),http://www.afa.org/magazine/sept1999/0999watch.asp.9. Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995), 3.The importance assigned to air forces by major Europeanpowers, among which may be potential enemies, leaves nodoubt our future enemies will unquestionably rely greatly,if not primarily, upon the actions of their air forces tobring about defeat of the United States.—Lt Kenneth Walker32

APJEditor’s Note: PIREP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to passon current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we intend to usethis department to let readers know about air and space power items of interest.Electromagnetic Applications ofBiomimetic ResearchDR.MORLEY O. STONEDR.RAJESH R. NAIKDR.LAWRENCE L. BROTTDR.PETER S. MELTZER JR.*FOR THE PAST several years, the AirForce Research Laboratory (AFRL) hasbeen developing sensors capable ofdetecting electromagnetic radiationacross the spectrum—from the infrared (IR),through the visible, and into the ultravioletregions. These sensors have become integralparts of military weapons systems as well as intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissancesystems—and, undoubtedly, the capabilities wehave developed are technologically sophisticated.However, many biological systems possesssensing capabilities unmatched by currenttechnologies. For example, the IR-sensitivebeetle (Melanophila acuminata) is attracted tofires and smoke 50 kilometers away. 1 Theseinsects are attracted to forest fires becauseburned trees provide the ideal environmentfor larvae to develop and hatch into adults.The forest fires emit IR radiation that thebeetle detects via a specialized IR sensorknown as the IR pit organ or IR sensilla. Byunderstanding the mechanism and the biologicalprocesses involved in this IR sensor, onecould develop new and improved materialsand sensors for Air Force applications.Literally, the term biomimetics means to imitatelife. In a more practical sense, biomimeticsis an interdisciplinary effort aimed at understandingbiological principles and then applyingthem to improve existing technology.This process can mean changing a design tomatch a biological pattern or actually usingbiological materials, such as proteins, to improveperformance. 2Biomimetics, which had its earliest andstrongest footholds in materials science, is rapidlyspreading to the arenas of electromagneticsensors and computer science. This article addresseselectromagnetic radiation on eitherside of the visible, ultraviolet, and IR regions,providing a general overview of recent advancementsin biomimetics research as it relatesto the Air Force and national defense.When examining the landscape of biomimetics,one finds the application obviousin a number of areas, many of which are defenserelated. The study of fish swimming, for*All of the authors work in the Materials and Manufacturing Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB,Ohio. Dr. Stone is the principal research biologist; Dr. Naik is a senior research scientist; Dr. Brott is a polymer scientist; and Dr. Meltzeris a senior technical writer and editor.33

34 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004example, has obvious tie-ins to underwater locomotion and naval interests, and much of thework in structural biomimetics (how biology builds structures) is of interest to the Army due to thepotential for producing next-generation, lightweight armor based on naturally occurring biologicalcomposite materials. 3 From a commercial standpoint, few biomimetic results haveproved as exciting as the recent successes in biologically derived silica and silica polymerization.4 After all, a significant portion of the economy—especially the technology sector—is basedon manipulating silicon. It is easy to understand why the ability to manipulate this elementunder benign, ambient conditions using biomolecules has many people excited.Sensing electromagnetic radiation is of particular interest in aviation because of the increasingdistances over which sensors need to operate. The ability to detect such radiation in the IRwithout cryogenics—the science of low-temperature phenomena—has been an important technologydriver because of increased sensor reliability and reduced payloads. The latter are becomingeven more important as space migration dominates defense and commercial interests.Against this backdrop, it is easy to see why several funding agencies have expanded the area ofresearch in biomimetics—in particular, biomimetic electromagnetic sensing. In short, biomimeticsshould allow for smaller, lighter, less complicated, and easier-to-maintain sensor systems.The Materials and ManufacturingDirectorate’s Critical Research RoleScientists at the AFRL’s Materials and Manufacturing Directorate (ML) at Wright-PattersonAFB, Ohio, working with the Air Force Office of Scientific Research near Washington, DC, andprominent research scientists at universities, have made significant strides in biomimetic research.Their efforts support the Air Force’s goal of producing hybrid materials with propertiessuperior to those made entirely of either synthetic or biological alternatives. They also increaseour understanding of living creatures that possess unique properties and abilities that we couldsomeday use to enhance the performance and affordability of critical defense technologies.In fact, biomimetic technologies could have a profound impact on materials science and nationaldefense, the principal objective being to use the best biology has to offer to enhance AirForce systems—particularly sensor and detection systems. To achieve this goal, scientists in thedirectorate’s Survivability and Sensor Materials Division (MLP) are drawing upon biology’sability to sense electromagnetic radiation outside the visible-light region. This is important tothe Air Force due to the proliferation of and reliance upon sensors and detection systems thatoperate in the IR region of the electromagnetic spectrum. The quest for understanding thisphenomenon has escalated even further as a result of the extreme sensitivity reported in biologicalIR/thermal detection and because biology, unlike most synthetic systems, can achievethis sensing without cryogenics.MLP researchers continue to be intrigued by various organisms’ ability to sense IR radiationthrough using the readily available elements of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen,whereas science’s sole option has been a reliance on toxic formulations of inorganic alloys. Atvarious universities around the world, ML supports studies that examine a variety of specimenswith unique properties and abilities, including the IR-sensitive beetle; snakes from the boa,python, and pit-viper families; and bacterial-based systems of thermal detection. These investigationshave yielded critical insights and have helped ML scientists and others progress towardthe development of bio-inspired and bio-derived technologies—the principal research paths inthe rapidly growing field of biomimetics.The resourcefulness of nature in detecting electromagnetic radiation is evident. Less clear isthe means of engineering these traits in order to enhance vital technologies and lower theircosts. The process of signal processing in biological systems, for example, is very complicated

PIREP 35and well beyond the scope of current biomimetics. Instead, researchers are focusing on isolatingbiological “triggers”—the molecules responsible for initial stimulus detection. They emphasizecoupling the triggers into optical and electrical detection systems and bypassing the impossibletask of re-creating biological signal transduction. Thus far, in-house researchers havesuccessfully created composite polymer films that electronically report changes in a protein’sstructure upon IR stimulation. They have also built an imaging array based on this technology,resulting in the world’s first biomimetic thermal imager. Current efforts aim to reduce the sizeand weight of the biomimetic array to allow integration with a Micro-Air Vehicle.The enormously complex, multistep biological processes associated with biomimetics oftenoperate nonlinearly. In addition, the molecules involved in these processes are sometimesfragile, and integration with other systems can become problematic. Despite these drawbacks,the research holds considerable promise. For instance, biomimetics frequently uses compositematerials that provide combinations of properties that no single material can achieve.Optical StructuresAs evidenced through studies of biological visible and ultraviolet systems, nature has evolvedincredibly intricate coatings and patterns to reflect, absorb, and transmit light. The complexityof these natural coatings has made replicating them in the laboratory a challenge. For example,many of the curved surfaces involved in fabricating biological coatings would require gray-scalelithography, a sophisticated technique that at present is not considered “standard” in microandnanofabrication. Two specific examples include the hawk moth’s eye cornea and the beetle’sIR sensilla. The 15-micrometer (µm, 10 -6 meters) domed structures of the beetle IR sensilla aregigantic compared to the feature sizes now produced by the microprocessor industry. Commercialcompanies are currently engaged in applying advanced lithographic procedures toreplicate biological surfaces, and many of these techniques are being applied to nonstandard(i.e., nonsilicon) materials like germanium.Believing that replicating the surface structure of a snake’s IR pit organs would constitute asignificant advancement in optical coatings for IR optics, ML scientists involved in biomimeticresearch have given top priority to this endeavor. The micropits of the IR pit organ, for example,are approximately 300 nanometers (10 -9 meters) in diameter, and the scale ridges are spaced at3.5 µm. The latter dimension has implications for the IR spectrum, and the former has visiblelightconsequences. In recent publications, ML researchers have reported successful holographicduplication of snake-scale structure in a photopolymer matrix. 5 A holographic approachuses light to record the fine details of a biological surface. By combining this “reading” beamand a reference beam, one produces an interference pattern that can record a multitude of biologicalinformation. Advances in materials-fabrication techniques and optical coatings currentlyunder way have the potential to improve the performance of virtually every military optical systemthat exists.Thermal and Photon (Quantum) DetectorsBefore proceeding from coatings to the application of biomimetics to IR sensors, one woulddo well to review the state of artificial or man-made sensors. Broadly speaking, IR sensors fallinto two categories: thermal detectors and photon—or quantum—detectors. On the thermalside are thermocouples, thermopiles, bolometers, and pneumatic (Golay) detectors. For example,the microbolometer format for thermal imagers currently dominates this class of state-of-theart,noncooled IR detectors for applications in US Army thermal-imaging systems, civilian firefightingapplications, and even Cadillac’s night-vision systems for automobiles. On the photon­

36 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004detector side are photoconductive, photovoltaic, and electromagnetic detectors. In general, thisclass of detectors—commonly used for space applications—is made from semiconductor materialsand must be cryogenically cooled. The response time of the detector and the speed of thepotential target have always constituted the principal difference between these two categories.Thermal detectors respond relatively slowly (on the order of milliseconds: 10 -3 seconds) comparedto photon detectors (on the order of microseconds: 10 -6 seconds).Researchers have concluded that biological IR sensing is a thermal process, but how thendoes one apply this knowledge to new detector strategies? To compete with an artificial, inorganicdetector that directly converts a photon to an electron, one needs to make the biologicalthermal process more efficient. In a biological system, IR photons are absorbed into the systemvia molecular resonant frequencies inherent in the chemical structure of the tissue. In essence,this energy transfer from the IR photons causes the molecules within the system to “vibrate” onthe molecular level. This molecular motion eventually dissipates as thermal energy on a veryminute scale. Researchers at ML believe that the thermal change is sufficient to trigger a signalin the terminal nerve masses of the IR pit organ that eventually leads to a change in the neuronfiring rate to the brain, which in turn interprets this change as either “hot” (increased rate) or“cold” (decreased rate). A successful biomimetic approach would simplify this process by engineeringthe “trigger” in this process—the original IR-absorbing biological macromolecule.Bacterial thermoproteins provide a modelfor this engineering process since they havethe ability to manipulate bacterial genes easilyand produce the desired recombinant proteinsvia fermentation. To increase the effi­Thermoprotein/polymerexamining similar sensing concepts (fig. 1). 7A critical step in the maturation of biomimeticsfor electromagnetic sensing will entail meshingtraditional synthetic polymer synthesis andprocessing with biochemistry and molecularbiology and then successfully applying “softmatter”lithography. This approach of combiningbiological macromolecules with syn­biological system. A recent publication ad-dressed temperature-induced changes inpolymer-hydrogel swelling behavior using syntheticcoiled-coil domains and CD spectroscopyto examine the dynamic range andelasticity of the structure. 6 ML researchers areIR orthermal energySubstrate(IR transparent window)film layerciency of this biological system, ML re-searchers are exploring ways of opticallysensing thermally induced changes in proteinstructure. One common laboratory technique—theuse of circularly polarized lightin circular dichroic (CD) spectroscopy—optically records changes in protein secondarystructure to study the dynamics within theVapor-depositedthin gold filmIncident lightθReflectedlightChange in θproportional tochange in temperatureFigure 1. Schematic drawing of a thermal sen­sor based on a thermoprotein. (Reprinted from thetic polymers is key to maintaining the Morley O. Stone and Rajesh R. Naik, “Applica­functionality of the biological element, while tions: Biomimetic Electromagnetic Devices,” inimparting an appropriate avenue of signal Encyclopedia of Smart Materials, ed. J. A. Harveytransduction and/or propagation. [New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000], 112–21.)

Conclusion PIREP 37There is a growing awareness of the contribution that biomimetics can make to numerouswell-established research areas, of which electromagnetic sensing is a small part. The highlyinterdisciplinary nature of biomimetic work makes it difficult for a single research group to besuccessful unless its expertise truly spans multiple scientific disciplines. Additionally, few areasspan basic, fundamental science to applied research as completely as biomimetics. Bearing thisgrand challenge in mind, one remains cognizant of still-undreamt advances that can occur byimitating nature’s optimization, which has occurred across millions of years. Continued research inbiomimetics by the Air Force could lead to the development of dynamic materials, devices, andprocesses that directly support the war fighter by heightening the performance of vitally importantmilitary technologies and by reducing costs. These advances in the understanding ofthe natural world benefit science at large and provide opportunities for innovative commercialapplications never before possible. ■Notes1. Wulfila Gronenberg and Helmut Schmitz, “Afferent Projections of Infrared-Sensitive Sensilla in the BeetleMelanophila Acuminata (Coleoptera: Buprestidae),” Cell Tissue Research 297, no. 2 (July 1999): 311–18.2. Charles S. Zuker, “The Biology of Vision in Drosophila (G Protein/Phospholipase C/Ion Channels/Signal Transduction),”Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, USA 93 (1999): 571–76.3. Michael Sfakiotakis, David M. Lane, and J. Bruce C. Davies, “Review of Fish Swimming Modes for Aquatic Locomotion,”IEEE Journal of Oceanic Engineering 24, no. 2 (April 1999): 237–52; X. Shen et al., “Molecular Cloning and Characterizationof Lustrum A, a Matrix Protein from Shell and Pearl Naore of Maliotis Rufescens,” Journal of Biological Chemistry272, no. 15 (December 1997): 32472–81; and Mehmet Sarikaya, “An Introduction to Biomimetics: A StructuralViewpoint,” Microscopy Research and Technique 27 (1994): 360–75.4. Nils Kröger, Ranier Deutzmann, and Manfred Sumper, “Polycationic Peptides from Diatom Biosilica That DirectSilica Nanosphere Formation,” Science 286 (November 5, 1999): 1129–32; Jennifer N. Cha et al., “Silicatein Filamentsand Subunits from a Marine Sponge Direct the Polymerization of Silica and Silicones in Vitro,” Proceedings of the NationalAcademy of Science, USA 96, no. 2 (1999): 361–65; Rajesh R. Naik et al., “Silica-Precipitating Peptides Isolated from a CombinatorialPhage Display Peptide Library,” Journal of Nanoscience and Nanotechnology 2, no. 1 (2002): 95–100; and RajeshR. Naik et al., “Controlled Formation of Biosilica Structures in Vitro,” Chemical Communications 2 (2003): 238–39.5. Sean M. Kirkpatrick et al., “Holographic Recording Using Two-Photon-Induced Polymerization,” Applied Physics A69 (2002): 461–64; and Morley O. Stone et al., “Ultrafast Holographic Recording of Snake Infrared Pit Tissue UsingTwo-Photon Induced Photopolymerization,” Photonics West, SPIE Proceedings 36 (2000): 3934.6. Chun Wang, Russell J. Stewart, and Jindrich Kopecek, “Hybrid Hydrogels Assembled from Synthetic Polymers andCoiled-Coil Protein Domains,” Nature 397, no. 6718 (February 1999): 417–20.7. Rajesh R. Naik, Sean M. Kirkpatrick, and Morley O. Stone, “The Thermostability of an Alpha-Helical Coiled-CoilProtein and Its Potential Use in Sensor Applications,” Biosensors and Bioelectronics 16 (2001): 1051–57.

Centralized ControlIt is crucial that onecommander have theauthority and responsibilityfor planning, coordinating,and executingjoint air operations. Accordingto Air Force DoctrineDocument (AFDD)1, Air Force Basic Doctrine,centralized control is “theplanning, direction, prioritization, synchronization, integration,and deconfliction of air and space capabilities toachieve the objectives of the joint force commander” (p.34). The concept of centralized control—an airman centrallycontrolling all theater air and space forces—isoften referred to as the master tenet and must be adheredto if the joint force commander is to receive those forces’maximum combat capability.As with all the tenets of air and space power (decentralizedexecution, flexibility and versatility, synergistic effects,persistence, concentration, priority, and balance), centralizedcontrol requires an airman to have the necessary insightsand understanding, keep things in their proper perspective,and provide appropriate direction to the integratedjoint air and space forces. Successful commanders will rememberthat all wars are unique and provide importantlessons, but the next war will always be different. The airmanin charge of the current war must always draw onhistory, analyze his (or her) and others’ recent experiences,and then adjust and apply doctrine to achieve thegreatest results with the joint forces with which he (orshe) has been entrusted.Working hand in hand with decentralized execution,an airman must implement centralized control of air andspace forces, maintaining a strategic perspective of thebig picture to prioritize and balance the limited resourcesat his or her disposal. That airman, the joint forceair and space component commander (JFACC), is the singlefocal point for employing a joint commander’s air andspace forces and is best positioned to ensure that eachdemand is heard and that the competing demands areappropriately prioritized. That requires the JFACC to developand maintain a handle on theaterwide operations.The doctrine of centralized control has been violatedat various times in history with predictable results. Thecompetition for air assets in North Africa at the beginningof World War II and again during most of the war inSoutheast Asia was intense, causing airpower capabilitiesto be fragmented and placed under the control of variouslower-level commanders. Without having a single airmanin charge, scarce resources were not properly prioritizedand were, therefore, often misallocated, causingdelays in achieving operational objectives. The lessonslearned in North Africa became part of the Army AirCorps’s doctrine, documented in the War DepartmentField Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of AirPower, dated July 21, 1943:The inherent flexibility of air power, is its greatest asset. Thisflexibility makes it possible to employ the whole weight of theavailable air power against selected areas in turn; such concentrateduse of the air striking force is a battle winning factorof the first importance. Control of available air powermust be centralized and command must be exercisedthrough the air force commander if this inherent flexibilityand ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited.Therefore, the command of air and ground forces in a theaterof operations will be vested in the superior commandercharged with the actual conduct of operations in the theater,who will exercise command of air forces through the air forcecommander and command of ground forces through theground force commander.This War Department manual well explained the needto have an airman in control of theaterwide airpower(and now space-power) resources—the beginning of thecentralized-control concept. The lessons learned duringVietnam only serve to reinforce that earlier doctrine asthe most effective way to employ air and space forces.To Learn More . . .Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1. Air Force Basic Doctrine, November 17, 2003. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Library/Doctrine/afdd1.pdf.Fawcett, Lt Col John M., Jr. “The JFACC Team.” Air & Space Power Chronicles. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/fawcett.html.Polowitzer, Maj William G. “Role of the JFACC in Future Conflicts.” Alexandria, VA: GlobalSecurity.org, 1993. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1993/PWG.htm.38

APJGettingThere FIRSTCOL STEVEN C. SUDDARTH, USAFLT COL ROSS T. MCNUTT, USAFMAJ WILLIAM T. COOLEY, USAFEditorial Abstract: The US Air Force’s broadbasedresearch and development programallows it to remain preeminent in the creationof new technologies. A strong and rapidproduct-development capability turns thesetechnologies into fieldable systems, and arobust production capacity efficiently producesthe number of weapons it needs at an affordableprice. All of these elements require a wayof thinking about large organizations andtechnical innovation that involves flexibility,innovation, resources, support, and tempo(FIRST).IN MILITARY COMBAT, firing the firstshot is often critical to victory; being firstis also important in innovation and technology.For example, Elisha Gray, a verysuccessful and wealthy American inventor, isbarely known today because he found himselfat the patent office just a few hours behind acompeting inventor—Alexander Graham Bell,who had also come up with the idea for thetelephone. Although one might reasonablyargue that the telephone was simultaneouslyinvented by several different groups (includingthree competitors outside the United States),Bell had a design that could be easily reproduced,and he enjoyed the industrial advantagesof the United States—not to mentionthe fact that he was first in line at the patentoffice. Patent rights do not usually protectmilitary technology, but those who are first toemploy a new war-fighting technology oftengain the advantage. Being the first to developthe atomic bomb gave the United States theleverage to conclude World War II and dictatethe terms of peace. The same principleholds true with regard to the impact of stealthtechnologies or precision weapons guided bythe global positioning system (GPS) on ourcurrent military advantage. In virtually allcompetitive situations, being first forcesopponents to react to actions; it also sets standardsand allows the initiator to shape thedirection of other development efforts.How does the US Air Force assure itself offirst place in terms of having the most significantmilitary technologies? The service relieson a broad-based research and development39

40 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004(R&D) program for new technologies, a strongand rapid product-development capability toturn these technologies into fieldable systems,and a robust production capacity to efficientlyproduce the number of weapons it needs at aprice it can afford. Because all of these elementsrequire innovation, this article addressesthe R&D effort and the science and technology(S&T) that comprise the seed corn forfuture capabilities.Current State ofResearch and DevelopmentContributing in R&D doesn’t necessarilymean being the first to do the whole thing,but it clearly means being first at something.This goal is easy to understand for individualsand small teams. What, however, does one dowith large organizations that also need to beinnovative?Like most industrial nations, the UnitedStates provides for R&D through a “threeleggedstool.” The best known leg is academicresearch institutions. Although founded forthe purpose of learning, these organizationsrepresent the oldest, most evolved researchstructures available and provide the greatestresults in terms of fundamental science. Theother two legs—commercial industry andgovernment research organizations—play keyroles in turning the seeds of science into producible,deployable fruits. Typically large laboratoriesand development centers, they arecapable of conducting activities on a widescale—from short-term studies by individualresearchers to massive, highly collaborativenational-level efforts. Such organizationsinclude Bell Labs, Palo Alto Research Center(PARC), Sandia National Laboratories, LosAlamos National Laboratory, Lawrence LivermoreNational Laboratory, and the Air ForceResearch Laboratory (AFRL).Over the past decade, these organizationshave experienced considerable decline;indeed, many people now question their relevance.Some see these organizations as overgrownbureaucracies more interested in thepreservation of budgets and empires than inthe conduct of new research or the delivery ofnew technologies. 1 Others argue that becausethe technology base has changed, these largeorganizations have no role because we don’tneed new rockets, hypersonic vehicles, nuclearweapons, and so forth. Still others point outthat the commercial-electronics and computersoftwareindustries remain our only meaningfulsource of innovation. One must also considerthe assertion that so much technology isup for grabs that organizations no longerneed to invest in R&D themselves—they canjust pick from the tree of knowledge (fromothers’ research) for free. Thus, AT&T divesteditself from most of Bell Labs, Xerox got rid ofPARC, and most Fortune 500 companies havedownsized their central R&D efforts. 2 Arethese research organizations truly dinosaursof another technology and business era?Although some of these arguments may havemerit, the fact remains that the world is becomingmore technologically sophisticated, notless. Nations (or companies) that ignore theneed to stay in the forefront of R&D do so attheir own peril.If there is a grain of truth to these complaintsabout large R&D organizations, whatcan the Air Force do? To some degree, theanswer lies in understanding the nature ofthe “new” economy and the qualitative changein business philosophy from monolithic entitiesto supply chains. For most of the twentiethcentury, an automotive manufacturer, forexample, made nearly all of the componentsfor its automobiles. Different divisions madeengines, exhaust systems, bodies, interiors, andso forth. Although a few external businessessuch as Bendix and Delco supplied brakes,starters, and batteries, the monolithic entityoften purchased and absorbed these companies.Economies of scale dictated that themanufacturer control as much of the processas possible in order to regulate volume, quality,efficiency, and rhythm. This trend changed inthe last part of the twentieth century as manufacturingtechniques improved and the informationage began. Companies can now outsourcesignificant pieces of their business yetspecify quality and track inventories well

GETTING THERE FIRST 41enough to realize a different economy ofscale that uses the entire external economy,minimum capital investment, and maximumagility. In many cases, these supply chains aremanaged several layers deep. In other words,an automaker now outsources most parts,often dictating the sources of their suppliers’raw material and tracking their quality andinventories as well. How is this new economyrelevant to R&D? Essentially, the R&D communityuses supply chains too.One might argue, however, that R&D hasalways been managed by supply chain. Fromthe beginning of scientific discovery, the workof one researcher led to insight and publicationby another, and so on; thus, ideas grew asthey circulated, and researchers used theworldwide knowledge base available throughpublication. Today, many organizations havetried to exploit the new economy moreexplicitly by increasingly outsourcing R&D,either by hiring others to do it for them or bynot doing it at all and thereby counting onthe technology base to provide all their needswithout charge. Both of these approaches sufferfrom pitfalls. Outsourcing R&D may leadto research results, but organizations that haveno role in their discovery often find theseresults difficult to exploit. Those who decidenot to engage in R&D find themselves at themercy of the marketplace and in terribledanger of rendering their work late, obsolete,or—even worse—irrelevant.New Approach to Research andDevelopment: FIRSTA more sensible approach entails examiningwhat makes the new economy tick—agility. Supply-chain systems allow small entrepreneurialteams to exploit the work of othersmall teams. Sometimes those teams arelocated outside the parent organization;sometimes they are within. Small teams canchange. They can drop one path and pursueanother, change their entire business, or disband,thus allowing their members to formagain into new teams. But large, monolithicorganizations have a difficult time with agility,a situation which produces the great R&Dquandary of the twenty-first century: we oftenneed large R&D efforts, yet we want theseorganizations to be entrepreneurial and takeadvantage of changes in the economic system.How do we do it? By getting there first and bygetting there with a way of thinking aboutlarge organizations and technical innovationthat involves flexibility, innovation, resources,support, and tempo (FIRST):• F lexibility: Organizations must establishthemselves so that they either adapt totheir environment or influence thatenvironment to make the most of theiropportunities. The key to flexibility isencouraging the dynamics of small teamsand eliminating “borders.”• I nnovation: Organizations must fosternew approaches, not stifle them. Thekey to innovation is setting asideresources for fresh opportunities andidentifying and killing fruitless efforts.• Resources: Organizations must providesubstantial financing. The key toresources is providing funding that isgenerous, realistic, stable, and sufficientfor all efforts.• Support: Organizations must build uptheir scientific and engineering (S&E)workforce, giving it a role in their futureand leadership. The key to support isfocusing on the skill growth of the R&Dcadre.• Tempo: Organizations must understandthe importance of managing time, bothin terms of long-term vision and of pursuingopportunities rapidly. The key totempo is realizing that in many cases,time is probably more valuable thanmoney and must be treated as such.We now address how one can apply theFIRST principle to a large research organizationsuch as the AFRL. Although the remainderof the article examines the AFRL in particularand the Air Force and Department ofDefense (DOD) R&D systems more generally,the issues of adapting to the new economy are

42 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004by no means unique to the Air Force. Thatsaid, it is critical that our service maintaintechnological superiority over any potentialadversary. As part of the DOD transformationeffort, the Air Force is undergoing considerableintrospection to examine its role andways of doing business. Against this backdrop,the service has a healthy perspective onprospective changes and improvements.With over 5,000 people, installationsthroughout the United States, and 10 substantialresearch directorates covering a widevariety of disciplines (sensors, propulsion,information systems, air vehicles, human factors,munitions, materials, directed energy,space, and basic research), the AFRL is agood example of the large government establishmentsalluded to earlier. Although theAFRL itself is technically less than 10 yearsold, its components have rich histories overthe past 30–60 years. During that time, theseorganizations have made numerous criticalcontributions to the national military-researcheffort, including key roles in integratedcircuitdevelopment, jet propulsion, adaptiveoptics, directed energy, phased-array radar,error detection/correction coding—far toomany to list here. In most cases, the AFRLplays the role of integrator of ideas andsource of funding, letting external laboratoriesconduct the actual research. Today, mostsuch efforts come together in proceduresdeveloped well in advance through extensivestrategic planning. Although the AFRL’sresults are unquestionably impressive, FIRSTprinciples involve asking how one can makethe system better and more competitive withother research establishments.FlexibilityTo be flexible is to make the most of opportunities,wherever and whenever they arise.Simply changing organization charts, missionstatements, and the like does not necessarilyreflect flexibility. Rather, flexible organizationstend to focus themselves more on overallcontribution than on parochial roles andways of obtaining results. Perhaps one of thebest stories of organizational flexibility is the3M Corporation’s development of the Post-itNote. The company encouraged extramuralR&D from its staff and allowed itself to capitalizeupon the results. The Post-it emerged asan innovation from an adhesives-group effortthat fell outside normal group objectives, butsenior management decided to attempt pilotproduction rather than quash the effort,resulting in over $200 million in sales withinthe first couple of years. 3The opposite of flexibility is not a fixedorganizational structure but boundaries thatlimit the cross-fertilization of ideas. Organizationscan take a very rigid view of their missionand role, often as the result of negotiationswith competitors or the desire to reduceduplication of effort. Thus, for example, theelectronics laboratory agrees to have nothingto do with propulsion, and the Air Forceagrees to have no involvement in groundvehicles. The problem is that research isshaped by the creativity of the workforce andis seldom planned. Bell was a speech therapist—notan engineer—but his backgroundproved to be exactly what he needed todevelop the telephone. The Wright brotherswere bicycle makers—not aeronautical engineers—buttheir background in machiningproved critical, matching well with theirextensive self-study of aerodynamics. Similarly,the modern study of neural networks inartificial intelligence is the result of psychologistsdabbling in computer science. 4 Onemight argue that the most fruitful sciencedoesn’t happen within disciplines as much asit does along the permeable boundariesbetween them. Establishing roles eliminatesthese productive boundaries. At first, however,this concept seems counterintuitive. Onthe surface, it seems sensible that forcingresearchers to focus on the tasks clearly delineatedin their organization’s mission wouldlead to better results. But human creativitydoesn’t work that way. Cross-fertilization isreally the key to success, and goals have to beinterpreted a little more loosely in researchbecause it is a business full of surprises.Judged against this view of flexibility, thegovernment gets mixed reviews. On the one

GETTING THERE FIRST 43hand, most government organizations encouragecollaboration among their own componentsand with outside entities. Programs likeDual Use Science and Technology, for example,team multiple government labs withindustry in collaborative efforts. The MultidisciplinaryUniversity Research Initiativesprogram provides government funds to universitiesfor building winning proposals frommultiple research departments to promoteinterdisciplinary efforts. Interdisciplinary,interorganizational work is very good but stillfalls short of the kind of flexibility shown by3M in its Post-it story. What happens whensomeone in the electronics lab comes up witha design for a new engine? According to thecurrent government procedure, the electronicslab can work with the propulsion lab, butthe latter agrees to do only the propulsionpart and the former to do only the electronicspart. So what happens to the new-engine idea?Normally it dies because it did not originatein the propulsion lab, which, therefore, isn’tparticularly interested. To keep the idea alive,the electronics lab should allow its ownemployees to pursue the concept at least farenough to develop sufficient interest externally.If the idea is really good, the electronicslab will spend some of its own resources andencourage the inventor to build a team of“disciples,” at least until they can expandupon, prove, and even market the idea.Unfortunately, like most large organizations,the government does the opposite. Take, forexample, the Defense Reliance program, createdin the early 1990s as the result of pressuresfrom Congress and the Pentagon to eliminatewasteful duplication in research. Each servicelaboratory agreed to pick nonoverlappingspecialties and to avoid research in areas thatinvade each other’s turf. Thus, the Air Forcedoes fixed-wing aerodynamics, and theArmy does rotary-wing. Furthermore, theArmy does unmanned ground vehicles, theAir Force does unmanned (fixed-wing) airvehicles, and the Navy does unmannedundersea vehicles (despite the fact thatthese three types of vehicles share manycommon research issues and often need toplay together in creative architectures).People also tend to evaluate flexibility bylooking at the organization chart, the ideabeing that an organization is flexible if it canchange its management structure from time totime. Indeed, organizational change can implyadaptation to pursue opportunity. Often, however,it reflects such internal issues as theadvancement of careers and the protection ofbudgets. Frequently, ordinary workers noticeno significant change in their environment as aresult of major organizational restructuring.The kind of flexibility described here doesnot really pose a threat to organizationalcohesion and identity. Organizations normallymaintain their character by means ofmission statements, image, and hiring decisions.People also have a natural tendency toorganize themselves around themes and toseek out organizations with the appropriate“labels.” The psychology departments at Stanfordand the University of California–SanDiego remained psychology departments inspite of the fact that their professors and studentsdabbled in computer science andneural networks. The point is that flexibilityremains possible within large organizationsthat choose to seize opportunities.InnovationDiscretionary funds must be made availablefor new initiatives and innovation, for innovationand venture capital are very closelyrelated. Moreover, research staffs should beable to move on to something new upon completionof a project, successful or not. Fundsprededicated through strategic plans do littleto help the kind of project-to-project mobilityso critical to innovation. Similarly, externaldirection from Congress, the Office of theSecretary of Defense (OSD), or the Air Staffmay be important in some cases for particularprograms, but in general, such direction caneasily hinder innovation. The Air Force’s doctrinaltenet of centralized control and decentralizedexecution serves as a sound guidingprinciple in R&D situations as well. Leadershipcan establish a standardized process for

44 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004starting new efforts and killing old ones (thecentralized-control aspect) while scientistsand engineers propose, develop, and pursuenew technology opportunities (decentralizedexecution). The ability to terminate unproductiveprograms and mitigate overhead costsis of key importance because such innovationrequires discretionary funding. One of themost effective ways of ending programsoccurs through an initiative process.For many years the Air Force Office of ScientificResearch, the service’s basic researchmanagementorganization, cultivated anactive initiative program. Each fall, seniorleadership voted to terminate a percentage ofongoing programs that had concluded successfully,failed to produce the desired results,gone on too long, or become insignificantplayers. Money from terminated programswent into an initiative account. In order tocounter the temptation of not terminatingenough programs, the initiative account wasbalanced by “taxing” ongoing programs.Thus, the leadership could either terminatesomething or pay a high tax. Every spring acompetition was held to select initiatives fromcreative ideas proposed by staff members.Unfortunately, this system no longer exists,replaced in the early 1990s by a multiyear,top-down strategic plan with the glorious title“New World Vistas.”Innovation capital is essential not onlybecause it provides funding for new ideas, butalso because it promotes the kind of internalpersonnel mobility and organizational flexibilityso critical to agility. Without flexiblefunding, R&D staffs are loathe to terminateexisting programs because they know thatnew funding will be hard to come by. Insufficientfunding, in turn, will have a detrimentaleffect on their job environment, satisfaction,and success. Long-term strategic planning is apoor substitute for initiative capital because itreplaces short-term creativity with a road mapthat often takes too long to implement.ResourcesSeveral kinds of resources or capital are keyingredients to successful R&D: money (cer­tainly the most visible and tracked item),people (discussed in detail under “Support,”below), and facilities. Finally, location is oftenan overlooked asset (or liability) that hasmuch to do with the productivity of a laboratory;thus, laboratories located in Boston orPalo Alto may enjoy much higher successthan those in the middle of Iowa.Since the extensiveness of the facilities andthe number and quality of the people areclosely tied to money, funding deserves thekind of attention that one might expect.Although the bottom line remains the mostvisible issue in funding, other issues may bejust as important. For example, can funds beapplied easily in a timely manner? Building asystem around strategic planning such as thegovernment’s Planning, Programming, andBudgeting System (PPBS) may require longdelays and intensive manpower just to advocate,track, and disburse money, thereforenegating many of the potential benefits ofhaving funds in the first place. Thus, fundingmethods must match the organization’s viewof how it will address flexibility, innovation,and project tempo.In many cases, however, adequate fundssimply are not provided, or they lack the necessarystability to fully enable the R&D enterprise.Although Air Force labs are well fundedby outside-observer standards, the long-termtrend generally has not been promising, andone might also argue that the budget is notvery stable. Air Force S&T funding droppedprecipitously after the late 1980s to less thanthat for both the Army and Navy in 1993 and1998, respectively (figs. 1 and 2). 5The question certainly arises as to why thesereductions have been made. Is Congress or theOSD forcing these changes? One can trace therelative adjustments made to the Air Force’sS&T budgets for fiscal years 2000 (FY00), FY01,and FY02 during the PPBS process from 1997through 2002 (fig. 3). Numerous adjustmentswere made to the S&T budget throughout theFuture Years Defense Plan; however, in mostcases the adjustments decreased the S&Tbudget, pointing both to a potential lack ofsponsorship within the Air Force and a pen­

GETTING THERE FIRST 455,00011,000Air Force S&T Funding (in FY03 $ millions)4,5004,0003,5003,0002,5002,0001,500Air Force S&T FundingDOD S&T Funding10,0009,0008,0007,0006,0005,0004,000DOD S&T Funding (in FY03 $ millions)1,0001960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 20003,0002005YearFigure 1. Air Force and DOD S&T funding. (Data from FY 2004 Defense Budget [Washington, DC:Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 2003].)3.02.5Percent2.01.51.00.5ArmyNavyAir Force1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005YearFigure 2. S&T funding as a percent of service total obligation authority. (Data from FY 2004Defense Budget [Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 2003].)

POMBESPBPOMBESPBPOMBESPBPOMBESPBPOM46 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004Relative Change to Air Force S&T BudgetBaseline is FY0298 PB AF (–)OSD (–)FY01AF (–)OSD (–)AF (–)FY00AF (–)Baseline is 96 PBOSD (+)OSD (+)OSD (+)BESPBPOMBESPBFY02 Execution BeginsTotal ∆=–$136MOSD (+)OSD (+s)OSD (+)Scale$100MFY01 Execution BeginsTotal ∆ = –$315MFY00 Execution BeginsTotal ∆ = –$368M1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003YearPOM = Program Objective MemorandumBES = Budget Estimate SubmissionPB = President’s BudgetFigure 3. FY00, FY01, and FY02 Air Force S&T budget decisions through the FY97–02 PPBS cycle.(Adapted from briefing, Roy Phillips, to James Engle (SAF/AQR), subject: Air Force S&T FundingAnalysis/Discussion, June 18, 2002.)chant for using S&T as a funding source forother Air Force priorities. Interestingly, the AirForce was responsible for 78 percent of thedecreases in S&T funding while the OSDaccounted for 98 percent of the increases overthis time period. Although falling far short ofrestoring the cuts, the OSD has generallycountermanded the Air Force’s S&T cuts. TheAir Force might have many reasons for usingthe S&T budget as a bill payer, but such cuts donot provide the stability that promotes the kindof innovative organization mentioned above.In addition to reducing funding, Congresshas become increasingly involved in the AirForce’s S&T program decisions. According tothe AFRL, the magnitude of this oversight hasgrown from zero in FY95 to approximately 14percent of the AFRL’s budget in FY02 (fig. 4).Congressionally directed research may yielduseful innovations for the Air Force, but itgreatly reduces the discretionary funding socritical to innovation.Normally, most organizations have basicinfrastructure requirements that create billswhich must be paid, regardless of the audacityand vision of their leaders. Likewise, they haveongoing commitments that establish mustpaybills. Unstable and declining budgetspresent serious difficulties for an R&D organizationbecause they tend to remove criticaldiscretionary funds first. Thus, small start-upteams are far more likely to lose funding,even though such teams often represent thegreatest opportunities for innovation. Does

GETTING THERE FIRST 47FY02 $ Millions2,5002,0001,5001,000500Result of Congressional ReductionCongressional AddsAir Force S&T PB092 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01Fiscal YearFigure 4. Evolution of congressionally directedresearchthis mean that a research organization cannotdownsize and still remain productive? Not atall. What matters is that such an organizationpreserve enough stability to know how to sizeitself as time progresses so it can maintain astable discretionary budget.SupportOne must support the S&E workforce in orderto have agility. Workers need an environmentin which they can experiment, form and dissolveteams as needed, and associate with peerswho push them toward excellence. Finally,they need to feel content enough about theirwork that they choose to come and stay.Unfortunately, the military finds itself at aconsiderable disadvantage in this arena, havingalready experienced a significant dismantlingof its S&E workforce. For example,although the Air Force’s program officeshave retained more or less the same organizationalstructure for the past three decades,the S&E portion of military officers diminishedfrom 56 percent in 1974 to 14 percentin 2001. 6 (Specialization is categorized in termsof the highest degree held in a technicalspecialty.) Furthermore, the story may beeven worse than these dire numbers suggest.Many S&E personnel report that their workoften has little or no technical content, thatmost of this work is surrendered to contractors,and that they are not really used eventhough they are needed. 7The Air Force must make a substantialeffort to rebuild this workforce; indeed, certainkey reforms have already begun. Of allthe areas discussed thus far, the service islikely treating support of the S&E workforcemost seriously. For the past three years, it hasheld two senior-level S&E summits, publishedan S&E concept of operations, expandedgraduate-education programs, made certainchanges in hiring and assignment policy, andenacted special-pay incentives (althoughsome of these pay incentives have now beencancelled). All of these modifications appearto have enjoyed some success, but they havenot completely turned the corner in terms ofimproving the quality and quantity of theS&E workforce. Evidently, these changes donot directly address the top issue raised insurvey groups—the desire for more meaningfuland challenging work. Such qualitativechanges in working conditions are vital notonly to enhancing job satisfaction, but also torunning an agile R&D program. Thus, theimprovement of technical content is a winwinproposition.Perhaps of most critical importance, theAir Force must completely settle the issue ofhow it should best use its S&E workforce.Today, one encounters many competingvisions of the role of government in R&D,most of which are incompatible. For exam-ple, hiring engineers in order to build astrong internal R&D capability is fruitless ifthey are used merely as contract monitors.The Air Force must take steps to end theinstability in roles-and-management practiceswith which its S&E workforce has coped overthe years. Stability depends in large partupon making other reforms that will exploitthis workforce to the fullest.In short, much is being done to supportthe S&E worker in the Air Force and, thus,within the AFRL. However, because all of theFIRST factors interlock, without the rightorganization, philosophy, budget, vision, andso forth, the workforce may flounder. Such aprospect underscores the urgency of dealingwith the other topics at hand.

48 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004TempoOne could argue that in America we dothings on “too” time scales: too short and toolong. Too short because we don’t have thepatience to run investments past an immediatelyforeseeable payoff; thus, we miss contributionsof great value. Too long because weactually believe that our detailed strategicplans will not be overrun by events. Ideally, wewould replace them with “to” time scales:toward a meaningful, long-term vision andtoward faster results on a project scale. Inother words, we could replace detailed strategicplans with visions such as “we expect tohave an entire unmanned strike force” or, asPresident Kennedy proposed in 1961, “toland a man on the moon before the decade isout.” Such visions are quite different from thedetailed, committee-built road maps (strategicplans) that list endless series of projects,each funded according to the political winnersor losers of a given year. On the otherend of the scale, we need to ensure that wepursue ongoing projects with a sense ofurgency seldom seen in government. Doingso may entail initiating fewer projects, finishingthem, and then turning resources towardother promising activities.The benefit of a new technology to themilitary depends upon the advantage it providesmultiplied by the time the system operatesbefore a countersystem negates it, ormultiplied by the total amount of time a costsavingtechnology is deployed. In either case,the time to develop and field that technologydirectly affects its overall value. The oftenunrecognized cost of delays in developingtechnologies and systems can become dramaticallylarger than expected. Take, forexample, a new material or change thatimproves the reliability and overhaul time ofjet engines on military aircraft. The cost ofdelay associated with reengining the KC-135fleet came to $231 million a year (fig. 5). Whenapplied across all engines, such costs couldeasily reach into billions of dollars a year. Thecost of delay remains the same, regardless ofwhether the delay occurs during technologydevelopment or production. The bottom lineis that the government should do all it can tolimit costly delays by making dynamic changesin funds and offering proper incentives tocomplete projects with urgency.Newt Gingrich often refers to governmenttime, indicating that, for example, peoplehave come to accept long lines at the departmentof motor vehicles that they would findabsolutely unacceptable at any commercialestablishment. We have grown accustomed tolong delays in R&D demonstration programsfor defense, but commercial venture capitalistsoften look for similar results and returns in18 months or less. By getting answers quickly,they can determine whether a project has$231$19.6Lost Value ($M)250200150100500$20$32$11.8Lost Value ($M)20151050$2.0 $1.6 $1.110% Development 20% Production 10% Performance 12 -Month 1% Development 1% Production 1% Performance 1 -MonthCost Overrun Cost Shortfall Slip Cost Overrun Cost Shortfall SlipFigure 5. Cost of delay for the KC-135 reengining program. (Adapted from Donald G. Reinertsen etal., “Cost of Delay Analysis: Calculating Project Decision Rules,” Journal of Cost Analysis and Management,Winter 2002, 14–15, http://www.sceaonline.net/Publications/JOURNAL%202002.pdf.)

GETTING THERE FIRST 49commercial potential and limit the amount ofmoney invested to make that determination. Aprogram that produces an answer in 18months is much more valuable than one thatyields the same answer in five years. The longerproject would have to generate more thanthree times the money to realize the samerate of return as the shorter one. This is notto say that the military should undertake onlyshort-term efforts. To do so would eliminategrand (and essential) programs, such as Minutemanand the GPS, that qualitatively changethe way we fight. Rather, we need to pursue allprograms with a sense of urgency that eitherdelivers quickly or fails, freeing up fundingfor other efforts. Unfortunately, the currentmilitary acquisition system tends to take fiveyears to field even the simplest of systems (i.e.,those that should take only a few months), andsubstantial projects take decades. Most of thattime is spent in the advocacy and strategicplanningphases, both of which could easilybe skipped or greatly abbreviated.Don Reinertsen, one of the nation’s leadingproduct-development consultants, has definiteideas about tempo. When a participant at theProgram Executive Officer/System Commander(PEO/SYSCOM) Conference of 1999 stated,“You cannot speed innovation,” Reinertsenresponded by asking, “What would you do ifyou wanted to slow innovation down? Youwould inadequately fund it, assign inadequatestaff, and load that staff with lots of additional,unrelated duties. Given your resourcingand staffing processes, what makes youthink that we have gotten those aspects rightand cannot speed up your innovation?” 8Agile organizations do not “seize the day”by asking their folks to purchase test equipmentby filling out a Form 9 purchase requestand then stop work repeatedly to chase thepaperwork through the procurement bureaucracy.Rather, they risk the cost of the equipment,order it with overnight shipping, andget the team back to work. And such organizationsdon’t require that all funding requestsbe submitted two years in advance, as does aslow, bureaucratic process like PPBS so it canalign all of the associated stakeholders beforework can begin. Because time is indeed money,an effective R&D organization cannot affordto waste time. Agile organizations make themost of their time because to waste time is tosquander opportunities. Time is always importantin military-development efforts. A timelyanswer regarding the readiness of a particulartechnology or project can lead to its inclusionor exclusion in a larger system-developmenteffort and thus eliminate parallel design tracks.The reduction in uncertainty can dramaticallyreduce considerations of potential designs.ConclusionThe fact that FIRST principles provideagility for an R&D organization becomes particularlyimportant in the new economic environment.Because these principles stressopportunity, they urge aggressiveness withrespect to time. For the government, followingthese principles would require significantchange in its current practices. Thus far, governmentefforts at R&D “reform” have proceededthrough contract law, strategic planning, andso forth, in such a way as to minimize financialand programmatic risk by focusing on carefulmanagement of money and detailed plans.No clear evidence exists that such reformshave been effective—at least not to the extentadvertised. Budgets change too often, andplans are seldom followed. FIRST principlesturn the tables—accepting risk in order to seizeopportunity and stressing quick action withconsiderably less regard for fiscal accountability.This proclivity does not imply that FIRSTorganizations take risks with abandon; rather,they fence them off by doing small thingsquickly in order to jettison “dry wells” beforethey sap the organization. These organizationsthen move on quickly to new opportunities.Opportunity-driven organizations cannotafford to waste time, and they are willing toaccept some losses in order to move quickly.The R&D mobilization that took place duringand shortly after World War II offers a goodillustration of the benefits of FIRST principles.Overnight, major laboratories, educationalcenters, test ranges, and organizations were

50 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004created to build systems of historic significance:the atomic bomb, computer, radar, andmany other key innovations. Much of this workwas conducted with scanty contracting—sometimes only a handshake. Organizationsrepeatedly seized opportunities not sanctionedby their official charter (flexibility).They regularly spent unprogrammed moneyon risky ventures (innovation). Budgetsallowed for new opportunities (resources). Amassive R&D workforce emerged (support).And everything was conducted very quicklybut with patience to see the truly importantprograms through to the end (tempo). Indeed,despite failed efforts, bad specifications, andoccasional waste or fraud, time was always ofthe essence, and the national effort generallyyielded stunning results.In the 1950s, similarly audacious projectsbrought about ICBMs, nuclear submarines,the hydrogen bomb, early precision-guidedmunitions, and our first space systems. Interestingly,these far-reaching projects were completedon a budget comparable to the one fordefense spending today. Not only have ourcurrent accountability and careful planningfailed to render us immune to unsuccessfulefforts, bad specs, and fraud, but we also seemto have paid a price. Evidently, our methodicalpace does not provide us a technological edge,and we find ourselves leaning increasingly oncommercially developed technology. Haveour reforms really been worth the cost interms of opportunity?Today the Air Force technological establishmentcontinues to deliver results in theface of persistent funding pressures and challengesin hiring and keeping talent. However,one wonders what the service could do if itwere allowed to pursue opportunities withoutrestriction. Its challenges are typical of thosethat face large R&D organizations, but theconsequences are far more serious in militaryorganizations. On the one hand, if a companyloses its technological edge and misses anopportunity, a competitor—perhaps a smallercompany with a newer, more agile, and unfetteredR&D system—will exploit the loss, butlife goes on for the both of them. The AirForce, on the other hand, absolutely cannotafford to lose its opportunities to the “competition”because the consequences can literallymean the difference between life anddeath. ■Notes1. Although the term some is rather nebulous, theauthors refer to remarks one commonly hears from seniorleadership and operational forces within the Air Force.No doubt one would find similar criticisms in commercialindustry as well. For example, the staff in Xerox’s PARCsubsidiary frequently lamented the lack of appreciationfrom the “copierheads” who ran the parent company.2. Industrial Research Institute, IRI’s R&D Trends Forecastfor 2003, November 2002, 3, http://www.iriinc.org/webiri/publications/trends2003.pdf.3. In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America’s Best-RunCompanies, videocassette (Schaumburg, IL: Video PublishingHouse, John Nathan and Sam Tyler Productions,Harper & Row/Warner Books, 1985), based upon thebook of the same title by Thomas J. Peters and Robert H.Waterman Jr. (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).4. See David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, andthe PDP Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing,vol. 1, Foundations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986).5. The Air Force’s S&T funding experienced anincrease in FY03 and FY04, a phenomenon that merits acloser look. Although this appears to reverse a downwardtrend, careful examination reveals a possible change inaccounting procedure for funding the service’s classifiedprograms. A recently added program element accountsfor $369 million or 21 percent of the 27 percent increasein FY04. Although these funds will likely be used for S&T,the important point is that the accounting procedure forclassified S&T has changed—not the funding itself—which does not translate into a significant increase in traditionalS&T funding.6. Lt Col Steven C. Suddarth, “Solving the Great AirForce Systems Irony,” Aerospace Power Journal 16, no. 1(Spring 2002): 11.7. See Lt Col David Arreola and Nancy A. Soper, AirForce Scientist and Engineer Career Field Focus Group Findings,prepared for the Air Force Science and Engineer CareerField Policy Council, April 2001, http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/cp/secp/Documents/Synopsis%20of%20Focus%20Group%20Results.doc.8. Donald G. Reinertsen, Reinertsen and Associates,PEO/SYSCOM Conference, Cycle-Time-Reduction Session,Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir,VA, 1999.

52 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004mobility, and agile combat support. Arnold’scommitment to technology superiority remainsthe hallmark of Air Force culture.For over 85 years, Propulsion Directoratescientists, engineers, support personnel, andcontractors have been answering Arnold’s callfor world-class research that puts capabilitiesinto the hands of Air Force war fighters tohelp them dominate air and space—now andin the future. Its 450 ongoing programs, over1,000 people, and an annual budget of morethan $300 million not only have provided acomplete spectrum of advanced propulsiontechnologies for aircraft, rockets, and spacecraftbut also have conducted leading-edgeresearch and development in air and spacefuels, propellants, and power systems. 3 Theirinventions have expanded the envelope ofpropulsion technologies and pushed air andspace vehicles higher, faster, and farther—eveninto space—than Orville and Wilbur Wrightever could have imagined. Today, those technologiesare flying in air and space on morethan 130 military and commercial systems,including the F/A-22 Raptor, the newlychristened F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), andthe twin Mars rovers—Spirit and Opportunity,which successfully landed and began theirexplorations on the red planet in January2004. 4 This article discusses mainly the directorate’sefforts and their actual and potentialimpacts—efforts that have been accomplished,are in progress, and are planned for the future.Technological advancements in the earlydays of flight brought a whole new set of challenges,and history books confirm the key rolethat propulsion technologies played in meetingthose challenges and in the nation’s manyair and space accomplishments. The lateMelvin Kranzberg, professor of history at CaseWestern Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio,said the technical innovation in the Wrightbrothers’ airplane quickly necessitated additionaltechnical advances to make it moreeffective. 5 Those advances in engines, coolingsystems, propellers, power systems, and fuelwere closely linked to the Power Plant Sectionat McCook Field in Dayton, Ohio—first hometo the Army Air Corps’s aircraft-engineeringfunctions and great-grandfather to today’sPropulsion Directorate. The innovations inpropulsion and power that were inspired bythe Wright brothers and accomplishedthrough the years at McCook Field, WrightField, and later, Wright-Patterson Air ForceBase, Ohio, and Edwards Air Force Base, California,dramatically changed the course ofaviation and its applications.In the air and space age, propulsionresearch and development capabilities will continueto be of even greater and more urgentimportance. F. Whitten Peters, former secretaryof the Air Force and now vice-chairmanof the Commission on the Future of the USAerospace Industry, agreed with the judgmentreached by that commission in 2002 thatpropulsion is the crucial enabler to the nation’sfuture air and space capabilities. The commissionreached that conclusion after meetingwith over 100 companies, government organizations,and interest groups, having heardfrom more than 60 witnesses and spoken withthe government and industry representativesfrom seven foreign countries. 6With an eye on maintaining and strengtheningfuture capabilities, the nation must builda rapid air and space response force enablingrobust, distributed military operations acrossthe service’s core competencies. 7 As has beentrue in past endeavors, the long-term challengein building a rapid air and space responsecapability will be developing the technologiesthat enable quick reaction to war-fighteroperations or crises wherever needed, muchlike those Arnold envisioned in the early daysof flight.Meeting and overcoming this challenge willrequire significant innovation. Already, scientistsand engineers can imagine exciting possiblesolutions as current technology matures—from superconducting power generation thatenables high-power, directed-energy weaponsto supersonic and hypersonic engines that canpower long-range strike aircraft and advancedrocket propulsion and air-breathing hypersonicengines to enable easy access to space. Workis also well under way developing electric-,

POWERING THE FUTURE 53solar-, laser-, and plasma-propulsion systems formini- and microsatellites of the future.While many of these technologies may seemlike science fiction, so too were the jet engine,the airplane, and the rocket engine only 100years ago. Fifty years from now, some of thesenew technologies may still seem like sciencefiction, but others will have moved into therealm of the possible. The task at hand fortoday’s scientists and engineers is to performresearch that identifies those breakthroughtechnologies and moves them from sciencefiction to science fact. 8Propulsion and Power for AircraftIf the Air Force is to succeed in providingthe nation with a rapid air and space responsecapability, researchers must provide a numberof technologies including a focus on propulsionand power solutions for aircraft, weapons,and space systems. 9 Although it is importantto recognize propulsion as a critical enabler,so too are the test facilities that support theresearch and development of these revolutionaryand transformational technologies.Revolutionary Propulsion and Power for AircraftPropulsion researchers are already testing oneof the most promising technologies supportingthis capability: a supersonic combustionramjet, or scramjet, engine that uses conventionaljet fuels to reach hypersonic speeds—speeds over Mach 5. With technology of thistype the Air Force could deliver a useful payloadanywhere on Earth in a few hours, providinga force tailored to accomplish nationalobjectives rapidly anywhere on the world’ssurface and in the near-Earth air and spacedomain.This new scramjet technology has the potentialto power future hypersonic vehicles, suchas cruise missiles and long-range strike andreconnaissance aircraft, at speeds up to eighttimes the speed of sound. While today’s aircraftand missiles only fly up to the Mach 3range, new hypersonic aircraft and weaponswould offer a faster response to war fighters,giving them the ability to take out time-criticaltargets within a few hours, if not minutes.Dubbed “HyTech,” for hypersonic technology,the program got its start in 1995 in the wakeof the cancelled National Aero-Space Planeprogram—an effort aimed at developing ahydrogen-fueled, scramjet-powered, singlestage-to-orbitvehicle capable of aircraftlikehorizontal takeoffs and landings. In contrast,the Air Force’s version of the scramjet isdesigned to run on JP-7 fuel, a more logisticallysupportable fuel than hydrogen. While theNational Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA) continues to pursue the developmentof a hydrogen-fueled system with its“Hyper-X” program, the Air Force, by usinghydrocarbon fuels like JP-7 instead of hydrogen,hopes to one day deploy these systemsanywhere, anytime, and anyplace.Wind-tunnel tests on the engine, completedin June 2003, successfully demonstrated theoperability, performance, and structural durabilityof the scramjet system. Building onmore than 2,000 tests from componentsthrough an integrated, flight-weight engine,the directorate’s scientists and engineers, aswell as contractors from Pratt and Whitneyand the United Technology Resource Center,have demonstrated that the engine works,and they are excited about extending thistechnology to systems that will give war fightersa distinct advantage over future enemies.With 25 runs at Mach 4.5 and Mach 6.5, theflight-weight engine reliably produced significantnet positive thrust, which is importantbecause it demonstrates the ability to efficientlyburn fuel and accelerate a vehicle at thesespeeds. The thermal characteristics and structuraldurability of the engine were also validatedat both speeds.Another propulsion team is exploring thepulsed detonation engine, or PDE—a newtype of engine which may well be the first ofits type to power an aircraft in flight. Foryears, propulsion researchers around theworld have searched for a better, more efficientway to increase speed and improve theperformance of aircraft. They believe that thePDE may one day fill that critical gap in

54 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004America’s ability to reach simple, low-cost,high-speed flight. Today, the PDE theseresearchers have developed creates thrust byusing a series of controlled explosions of fueland air in detonation tubes that look likelong exhaust pipes. By designing a process inwhich the detonations of the fuel and air mixtureare controlled, researchers were able todevelop sufficient thrust to power future aircraft.The propulsion team is well on its wayto proving the PDE concept as an inexpensive,simply constructed, and more efficientengine for tomorrow’s war fighters. In fact,the PDE could bring a new level of efficiencyand thrust capability to propulsion systems inthe Mach 2 to Mach 4 range by improvingfuel economy, demonstrating high thrust-toweightratios, and simplifying the engine’smechanical structure.Evolutionary Propulsion and Power for AircraftThe directorate is also pursuing improvementsin more traditional turbine engine technologiesto improve performance and reliability whilereducing sustainment costs. Turbine engineresearch, development, acquisition, and sustainmentare major Department of Defense (DOD)businesses with a collective annual investmentof more than $5.7 billion, excluding fuel cost.Sustainment consumes 62 percent of thatbudget—more than $3.5 billion—which is whythe Air Force’s science and technology leadersplace such great emphasis on reducing thosecosts. 10 Keeping sustainment expenses in checkis one of the goals of the air-breathing propulsiontechnology efforts in progress today, aswell as those currently in the planning phases.The Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense AdvancedResearch Projects Agency (DARPA), NASA,and major US engine manufacturers have beenjointly developing and demonstrating cuttingedgepropulsion technologies for over a decadeunder the Integrated High Performance TurbineEngine Technology (IHPTET) program.That program has the goal of doublingpropulsion-system capability and reducingacquisition and maintenance costs 35 percentby 2005. IHPTET technologies not only havesuccessfully transitioned into many of the AirForce’s legacy propulsion systems poweringtoday’s frontline military aircraft, but also areproviding the enabling technologies for awide range of new systems such as the JSF. 11Nearly every technology developed underthe IHPTET program can, in some way, transitionto the commercial sector to improvethe performance, reliability, life, and operationalcost characteristics of commercial turbineengines—in aircraft, marine, and industrialapplications. These contributions helpsustain the positive balance of air and spacetrade and maintain US market share intoday’s highly competitive, global economy.Without IHPTET program success, aggressivepropulsion-technology development programssponsored by world competitors would quicklychallenge the US military and economicadvantage in turbine propulsion. 12Recent IHPTET successes are providingtechnologies that allow critical modernizationof the F100, F110, and F404 families ofengines—the backbone of Air Force frontlineaircraft. Also, the knowledge necessary to fixproblems currently encountered in the enginesof the Air Force, Navy, and Army operationalfleets is available because of IHPTET achievements.For example, IHPTET provided thekey fan technology for the F118 engine poweringthe B-2 and demonstrated viability ofthe majority of technologies chosen for theF119 engine in the F/A-22. IHPTET is alsothe critical base for all JSF propulsion conceptsand other new engines, such as the F414powering the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. 13 Asa result of these recent accomplishments,turbofan and turbojet designs now beingdeveloped can achieve a 40 percent increasein thrust-to-weight and a 20 percent reductionin fuel burn over baseline engines; turbopropand turboshaft engines can attain similarresults with a 40 percent gain in horsepowerto-weightand a 20 percent improvement inspecific fuel consumption; and air-breathingmissile engines can have a 35 percent increasein thrust-to-airflow, burn 20 percent less fuel,and cost 30 percent less.The performance improvements demonstratedin IHPTET efforts are also being traded

POWERING THE FUTURE 55to provide increased component lives or costreductions in fielded systems. The third-phasegoal of gaining a 100 percent increase inthrust-to-weight capability will enable specificsystem payoffs such as sustained Mach 3+ inan F-15–sized aircraft; greater range and payloadin an F-18–sized, short takeoff and verticallanding (STOVL) aircraft; a 100 percent rangeand payload increase in a CH-47–sized helicopter;and intercontinental range in an airlaunched cruise missile (ALCM) sized missile. 14Next-Generation TurbinesBuilding on the IHPTET’s successes, the VersatileAffordable Advanced Turbine Engine(VAATE) program is focused on achieving atenfold improvement in turbine engineaffordability by the year 2017 through a jointDOD, NASA, Department of Energy, and airand space industry effort. In parallel withincreases in turbine-engine capability, theVAATE program places major emphasis onresearch and development, production, andmaintenance costs. Its engines will containnumerous technology innovations, providingthe war fighter the most versatile and affordablepropulsion for legacy (F-16, F-15, andB-1), pipeline (F/A-22, F-35, unmannedcombat aerial vehicle [UCAV]), and futuremilitary systems (long-range strike aircraft,global-reach transport, and supersonicUCAVs). 15For the future, VAATE technologies willassure further dramatic improvements inturbine-engine affordability, not only for militaryapplications such as aircraft, rotorcraft,missiles, and unmanned air vehicles (UAV),but also for America’s domestic applications.VAATE attributes include an integrated inletsystem; a low-emission combustion system;long-life, high-temperature turbines; hightemperaturebearings and lubricants; and anautomatic, adaptive-engine health-managementsystem.The VAATE program is now an approvedDOD technology objective and recentlyawarded its first major procurement activity tomultiple defense contractors for approximately$350 million. Contracts are focused on materialsystems, advanced-fuel technology, andother system technologies required to enable asupersonic, long-range strike capability. 16Electrical Power for AircraftA revolutionary transformation in aircraftelectrical-power technologies that promisesgreater aircraft reliability and a significantlysmaller logistical tail to support tomorrow’sair and space force is under way. The MoreElectric Aircraft (MEA) program is a realitythat has been demonstrated in the newlychristened F-35 JSF. By teaming with sister services,universities, and air and space industrypartners, the directorate’s power-technologyresearchers have translated three decades oftechnological progress into stunning advancesthat promise greater war-fighter capabilityand a 20 percent reduction of aerospaceground equipment (AGE).The fundamental transformation useselectrical power to drive aircraft subsystemscurrently powered by hydraulic, pneumatic,or mechanical means. It provides aircraftdesigners with more options to power gearboxes,hydraulic pumps, electrical generators,flight-control actuators, and a host ofother aircraft subsystems. 17 New concepts likeelectric environmental control and electricfuel pumps, along with magnetic bearings forgenerators and eventually “more electric” turbineengines, are in the works. They promisedramatic simplifications in aircraft systemdesign, while improving reliability and maintainabilityin the years to come.The MEA effort also promises to reducethe bulky and heavy AGE required at homeand downrange during deployments and contingencies.Currently, the AGE that supports24 F-16 Falcons includes electric generators,hydrazine servicing carts, air conditioners,high-pressure air carts, and hydraulic-fluid“mules”; 16 C-141 Starlifters are required forits transport. There could be a reduction ofup to 20 percent in the size and weight ofequipment required to support MEA units;the freed airlift could be used to transportother war-fighting assets.

56 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004Other Propulsion and PowerApplicationsTo succeed in providing the full spectrumof rapid air and space response, Air Forceresearchers must provide a number of technologiesthat include a focus on propulsionand power solutions for weapons and spacesystems. As with other efforts, the directorateis collaborating with other government agencies,industry, and academia to develop,demonstrate, and transition propulsion andpower technologies for use in these applications.Those efforts have the potential for evolutionaryand revolutionary developments ina variety of air-breathing weapons, hypersonicand supersonic cruise missiles, airbornedirected-energy weapons, rocket-poweredmissile systems, intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBM), space launch, tactical missiles,and spacecraft propulsion.Propulsion and Power for WeaponsThe most strenuous near-term weapons applicationis for a scramjet-powered, fast-reaction,long-range, air-to-ground missile cruising atgreater than Mach 6—more than 4,500 mph.That missile could be launched from a bomberor fighter, and its rocket booster would accelerateit to speeds of about Mach 4 where itsscramjet would start and continue its accelerationto a cruising speed above Mach 6.Although its maximum flight duration is about10 minutes, it flies seven times faster than aconventional cruise weapon to quickly coverhundreds of miles to reach time-critical targets.A single shooter employing this hypersonicweapon can cover 49 times the areareachable with a conventional cruise weapon.In the supersonic realm of weaponry, theVAATE program discussed earlier will enablea supersonic, long-range, modular cruise missilewith a Mach 3.5+ cruise capability. Thisadvanced weapon will also provide a rapidresponse time to target, coupled with a flexiblemission profile, by using affordable, reliable,and high-performance turbine engines.The directorate’s work in advanced electricalpower and thermal management tech­nologies is also enabling concepts like highpowerlaser weapons on fighter aircraft,high-power microwave weapons for attackingelectronics, and nonlethal millimeter wavetechnologies that use electromagnetic energyto repel advancing adversaries. Recentadvancements have been made in severalareas addressing the challenges of supportingthese futuristic weapons. 18One of the most critical problems facingthe future implementation of these directedenergyweapon (DEW) systems is adequateelectrical power. Adding DEWs to the warfighter’sarsenal would provide the Air Forcewith a significant transformational capability.Scientists and engineers are aggressivelyworking to mature the technologies neededto package and deliver multimegawatts ofpower in the confined space of a fighter aircraftor space platform. They are developinga new class of electrical components thatoperate at higher temperatures, such asswitches and capacitors, along with superconductivityand thermal-management technologies.All have shown tremendous progressin recent years. For example, those involvedin the developmental testing of diamond-likecarbon capacitors say their progress is the mostsignificant in decades. In fact, directorateresearchers have enabled the production ofcapacitors with improved energy density andtemperature capabilities that are more thantwo times better than today’s state-of-the-artcapacitors. These improvements are crucialfor airborne applications of DEW because theyoffer considerable savings in system weight,improved electrical performance, and theability to withstand high-temperature operatingenvironments.The next-generation high-temperaturesuperconducting wire, dubbed YBCO for itsmolecular configuration of yttrium, barium, andcopper oxide, is another key DEW-enablingtechnology. By using YBCO conductor technology,high-speed and high-temperaturesuperconducting generators can producemegawatts of electrical power while weighingup to 80 percent less than traditional ironcoregenerators.

POWERING THE FUTURE 57Conceptually, one- to five-megawatt powergenerators would allow the electrical DEW tooperate as long as jet fuel is available to turnthe turbine engines, thereby providing a “deepammunition magazine.” Aerial refuelingwould eliminate the requirement to land andrearm the aircraft in a conventional sense. Incontrast, the Airborne Laser (ABL) program’splatform uses a chemically fueled laser toshoot down ballistic missiles while they arestill over an enemy’s own territory. When allchemical reactants are expended, the aircraftmust return to base for reloading. 19Propulsion and Power for MissilesThe ICBM is a more traditional weapon withpropulsion and power requirements. Althoughmany thought the end of the Cold War wouldmean the end of the ICBM with its nuclearwarheads, this has not been the case. The proliferationof both nuclear and nonnuclearweapons of mass destruction (WMD) intonations and nonstate groups, including terrorists,presents serious challenges to theUnited States that necessitate the need for acontinued nuclear force. However, this nuclearforce must have global reach and the capabilityto be tailored to fit the target’s uniquerequirements. Directorate scientists and engineers,having been involved in every ICBMdevelopment since the Atlas and Thor, foresawthis need and continued to pursueimprovements in solid-rocket propulsion fornext-generation ballistic and tactical missiles.Their $68 million missile research investmentsgave the Peacekeeper the ability to carry morethan twice the payload of the Minuteman III,while fitting within the same silo, and savedthe Peacekeeper program over $22 billion, a32,000:1 return on research investment.Researchers continue to make importantimprovements in ICBM technologies, allowingthe next ICBM to greatly exceed therange of the current Minuteman III. 20Propulsion and Power for SpaceScientists and engineers are also focused onthe heavens with such collaborative effortsas the Integrated High Payoff RocketPropulsion Technology (IHPRPT) program,a national initiative to improve and doublecapabilities across the broad spectrum ofour nation’s rocket propulsion technologyby 2010. 21 This program addresses propulsionneeds across space launch, ICBMs, tacticalmissiles, and spacecraft propulsion. Itis also one of the few times since the developmentof the space shuttle main enginemore than 30 years ago when the Air Forceand NASA are jointly developing reusablerocket-engine boost technology for futureDOD and NASA launch vehicles.IHPRPT teams with industry and focusestheir research and development efforts in suchareas as new propellants that break through theperformance barrier of traditional chemicalpropellants. Their research and development(R&D) also includes new and more affordablepropulsion subsystems for solid rocket motorsand liquid-rocket engines; and electric propulsionfor satellites; laser propulsion; and solarpropulsion for orbit transfer. 22A joint Air Force and NASA rocket-engineprogram called the Integrated PowerheadDemonstrator (IPD) will demonstrate newdesigns and techniques for application infuture liquid-rocket engines to enhance performanceand save weight and costs. The programis a combination of research efforts andvalidation testing to provide new, more efficientportions of the rocket engine that preconditionand pump liquid fuels and oxidizersinto the main engine. The technologydeveloped under the IPD program will providethe world’s first hydrogen-fueled rocketengine with oxygen-rich staged combustion.The IPD test program expects to place a fullyintegrated engine on the NASA Stennis teststandfacilities for testing in 2004. 23While rocket engines have been around fordecades, continued research like that beingconducted through the IPD test program willlead to a very high return on this investmentsince propulsion remains a significant percentageof any vehicle’s weight and cost. Forinstance, in space launch vehicles, propulsionaccounts for 70 to 90 percent of the vehicle

58 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004weight and 40 to 60 percent of the system costs.Satellite propulsion represents 50 to 70 percentof the weight and 25 to 40 percent of thecosts. Also, a satellite’s life span is limited tothe lesser of either power or propulsion life,which is why researchers strive to developsmaller, lighter, more powerful, and moreaffordable propulsion and power systems toimprove the capabilities in tomorrow’s spacevehicles. 24These new launch vehicles could eventuallymeet an on-demand space-surge capability. Itstands that if the Air Force could quickly providejoint force commanders with whateverspace assets are required, then the Air Forcecould strategically respond to situations andminimize the need for ultrahigh-resolutionworldwide intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance assets in predictable orbits.Propulsion researchers are leading the way inarming the country’s joint force commanderswith the ability to respond rapidly in any givensituation by supplying space assets in nearreal time. This can be accomplished by eitherlaunching and maneuvering new assets intoplace or by moving existing space platformsor weapons to wherever they are requiredwithin several hours. 25Part of the HyTech program discussed earlierincludes an effort to build a durable enginethat provides affordable, reusable, on-demandspace-access systems. The joint Air Force–NASA X43C program will demonstrate keytechnologies supporting this application.Conceivably, a two-stage-to-orbit vehicle couldtake off like a conventional aircraft poweredby an advanced turbine engine like thosebeing developed under VAATE and thenreach Earth’s upper atmosphere by combinedscramjet-rocket power to put a payload intospace. This concept would provide bothground basing and orbit flexibility at only halfthe cost of today’s approaches, thereby givingthe Air Force more affordable access to space.The nation currently has no truly reusablerocket engines for space launch. The spaceshuttle engines, based on research from the1960s, are routinely pulled for maintenanceand service after nearly every flight. If we areto achieve operationally responsive space liftby using truly reusable launch vehicles, thenation needs engines that can last a minimumof 50 flights between overhauls. So, while pursuinglong-term, high-risk, high-payoff effortslike hypersonic engines for space access,researchers are also pursuing significantadvances in liquid-rocket engines. Currentand planned programs are developing thematerials, components, fuels, and other technologiesto enable truly reusable launch vehicles.In the future, hypersonics and rocketswill come together in combined cycle enginesproviding further improvements in performance,cost, and responsiveness. Within 20years, the nation will see the Wright brothers’vision being taken into space by operationallyresponsive launch vehicles, which will changethe face of battle for many years to come. 26In the nearer term, the Air Force has anincreased requirement for propulsive microsatellitesto support a range of future specializedmissions. In conjunction with anoperationally responsive space-lift capability,microsatellites could be used to rapidlyreconstitute space assets that have failed,ensuring the war fighter uninterrupted service.Individual microsatellites can approachand inspect damaged satellites so the operatorcan then deploy specialized microsatellitesto enact repairs, upgrade electronics, or refillpropellant tanks.Scientists have invented the micropulsedplasma thruster, or microPPT. This miniaturizedpropulsion system weighs about 100 gramsand provides precise impulse bits in the 10­micronewton range. These impulse bits provideattitude control on present 100-kilogram(kg) small satellites and station keeping, as wellas primary propulsion on next-generation25 kg microsatellites. The primary attractivefeatures are the use of a solid, inert propellant(Teflon); expected high, specific impulsewhen combined with electromagnetic acceleration;and a simple, lightweight design basedlargely on commercial, flight-qualified electroniccomponents. A comparatively simpleversion of the microPPT is undergoing flightengineering and qualification for demonstra­

POWERING THE FUTURE 59tion aboard the US Air Force Academy Falcon-Sat III satellite scheduled to launch in 2006.Five microPPTs are manifested on the flightto increase attitude control for the vehicle. 27ConclusionThe intent in facing these technology challengeshead-on is to seek out both linear andnonlinear solutions that provide significantlyincreased capabilities to America’s war fighters.The linear challenges will be met with scienceand technology efforts maturing before 2020,which are continuations of today’s currenttechnology. These efforts offer lower risk andmodest payoff, and they include reusable boostand orbit-transfer vehicles, solid and hybridexpendable launch vehicles, and satellitepropulsion. The service’s nonlinear challengesare efforts maturing after 2020 that are newtechnology breakthroughs involving higherrisk but very high payoff. These include spaceramjets, magnetohydrodynamics-enhancedpropulsion, and directed-energy launches. 28While these technology developments couldlead to many strategic and force-structureimplications, the Propulsion Directorate’s goalremains focused on developing new propulsionand power technologies that support theAir Force vision of rapid air and spaceresponse. That focus is documented in amutually supportive and coherent plan forair, space, and energy technologies that coversthe next 20 to 50 years. ■Notes1. C. V. Glines, “Book review of Hap Arnold and theEvolution of American Air Power by Dik Alan Daso,” AviationHistory Magazine, http://www.historybookworld.com/reviews/hbwevolutionofamericanairpower.html.2. Pamela Feltus, “Henry ‘Hap’ Arnold,” History ofFlight Essays, US Centennial of Flight Web site, http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Air_Power/Hap_Arnold/AP16.htm.3. Kristen Schario, “Powering the Future,” TechnologyHorizons Magazine (PR-01-08), December 2001, http://www.afrlhorizons.com/Briefs/Dec01/PR0108.html.4. Ibid.5. Melvin Kranzberg and Carroll W. Pursell Jr., eds.,Technology in Western Civilization: Technology in the TwentiethCentury (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).6. F. Whitten Peters (keynote address, 2002 TurbineEngine Technology Symposium, Dayton, OH, September9, 2002).7. Dr. Alan Garscadden and Michael Kelly, “RapidAerospace Response: Technological Capabilities CanProvide a Roadmap for War-Fighter Operations,” TechnicalHorizons Magazine, December 2003, http://www.afrlhorizons.com/Briefs/Dec03/PR0305.html.8. Ibid.9. Ibid.10. IHPTET brochure, http://www.pr.afrl.af.mil/divisions/prt/ihptet/ihptet_brochure.pdf.11. Peters.12. S. Michael Gahn and Robert W. Morris Jr., eds.,“Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine Technology(IHPTET) Program Brochure,” 2002, http://www.pr.afrl.af.mil/divisions/prt/ihptet/ihptet_brochure.pdf.13. Ibid.14. Ibid.15. IHPTET brochure.16. Ibid.17. Michael Kelly, “Power Technologies Create Revolution,”Leading Edge Magazine, January 2003, 12, https://www/afmc-mil.wpafb.af.mil/organizations/HQ-AFMPC/PA/leading_edge/archives/2003/Jan/JanWeb.pdf.18. Michael Kelly, “Powering Transformation: Path toTactical Directed-Energy Weapons Now Reality Thanks toNew Power Technologies,” Leading Edge Magazine, August2003, 10, https://www.afmc-mil.wpafb.af.mil/organizations/HQ-AFMC/PA/leading_edge/archives/2003/Aug/Augweb03.pdf.19. Ibid.20. John Remen, Air Force Research LaboratoryPropulsion Directorate, Space & Missile Propulsion Division’sstrategic development manager, interview by theauthor, September 2003.21. Schario, “Powering the Future.”22. “Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology(IHPRPT) Program Background,” http://www.pr.afrl.af.mil/technology/IHPRPT/ihprpt.html.23. Ranney Adams, “Air Force Research LaboratoryLeading U.S. Rocket Engine Innovations,” Aerotech Newsand Review, July 14, 2003, http://www.aerotechnews.com/StoryArchive/2003/071403/afrl.html.24. Schario, “Powering the Future.”25. Garscadden and Kelly, “Rapid Aerospace Response.”26. Remen, interview.27. Dr. Greg Spanjers, “New Satellite Propulsion SystemHas Mass Below 100 Grams,” Technology Horizons Magazine,December 2001.28. Garscadden and Kelly, “Rapid Aerospace Response.”

Decentralized ExecutionExecuting the MissionThe counterweight toair and space power’s“master tenet” of centralizedcontrol is decentralizedexecution. In a balancedoperation, these twotenets are critical to theeffective employment ofair and space power.They are, in fact, thefundamental organizing principles, and decades of experiencehave proven them the most effective and efficientmeans of employing air and space power. Decentralizedexecution balances any command-level tendency towardmicromanagement by authorizing subordinates to seizethe initiative in dealing with the inevitable uncertaintiesfaced during combat mission execution.Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionaryof Military and Associated Terms, defines decentralizedexecution as the “delegation of execution authorityto subordinate commanders.” Air Force Doctrine Document(AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, provides thespecifics for air and space power, stating that decentralizedexecution of that power is “the delegation of executionauthority to responsible and capable lower-level commandersto achieve effective span of control and to fosterdisciplined initiative, situational responsiveness, and tacticalflexibility” (p. 34). When commanders clearly communicatetheir intent to lower-level echelons, decentralizedexecution allows those subordinates to exploit opportunitiesin rapidly changing, fluid situations in a mannerthat is consistent with the senior commander’s overallplan. The theaterwide focus provided by centralized controland the operational flexibility resulting from decentralizedexecution allows air and space power to bestmeet the joint commander’s theater objectives. It assuresa concentration of effort while maintaining an economyof force—exploiting air and space power’s versatility andflexibility—ensuring that air and space forces remain responsive,survivable, and sustainable.Operation Linebacker II (December 1972) is a clearexample of the deleterious effect of overcentralizingplanning and execution by staffs far removed from theoperational environment. Those responsibilities must bedelegated to the echelon best suited for the task. As evidencedby several recent operations, modern communicationsprovide a strong temptation to centralize the executionof air and space power. Those commandarrangements, however, will not stand up in a fullystressed, dynamic combat environment and should notbecome the norm for air operations.Despite impressive gains in data exploitation andautomated decision aids, a single person cannot achieveand maintain detailed situational awareness when fightinga conflict involving many simultaneous engagementstaking place throughout a large area. A high level of centralizedexecution results in a rigid campaign that is unresponsiveto local conditions and results in the joint effortlosing its tactical flexibility. For this reason, acampaign’s execution should be decentralized within acommand and control architecture that exploits the abilityof strike-package leaders, air-battle managers, forward aircontrollers, and other frontline commanders to makeon-scene decisions during complex and rapidly unfoldingoperations. Nevertheless, in some situations, theremay be valid reasons for executing specific operations athigher levels, most notably when the joint forces commander—or,perhaps, even higher authorities—wish tocontrol strategic effects, even if that means the sacrificeof tactical efficiency.To Learn More . . .Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1. Air Force Basic Doctrine, November 17, 2003. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Library/Doctrine/afdd1.pdf.60

Editorial Abstract: Getting somewhere,sharing information, and producing thingsall require energy. However, our primarysource of energy—oil—is nonrenewableand exhaustible. If we wish to advance, wemust seek an alternative, such as hydrogen,the most abundant element in the universe.Fuel cells have the potential not only totransform the future energy needs of theUnited States and the US Air Force, but alsoto change how and why we fight.FuelCellsPowerful ImplicationsLT COL DAVID P. BLANKS, USAFENERGY IS THE lifeblood of theglobal economy. Getting somewhere,sharing information, and producingthings all require energy. Throughoutthe industrial age and into the informationage, energy has served as the foundationfor mankind’s progress. However, our primarysource of energy—oil—is nonrenewableand exhaustible. As Kenneth Deffeyes writes,“Fossil fuels are a one-time gift that lifted usfrom subsistence agriculture.” 1 In other words,petroleum products have gotten us where weare, but if we wish to advance, we must lookelsewhere for our energy.Hydrogen, the most abundant element inthe universe, represents an alternative sourceof energy. Indeed, moving from oil-based tohydrogen-based energy sources presentsintriguing possibilities. Fuel cells, a currentand growing technology that harnesses hydrogenfor energy production, are an importantpart of that transition. To extend the capabilitiesand operational advantages it needs toconfront future challenges, the US Air Forceshould include research and development offuel cells and other alternative-energy sourcesin its transformation strategies. Not only dofuel cells have the potential to transform howthe military operates, but also they may changehow and why we fight.Fuel cells have the potential to transformthe future energy needs of the United States.61

62 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004To devise strategies to make that potential areality, air and space power professionals mustreview ongoing conflicts over energy andfossil-fuel resources; understand the promiseand limitations of fuel-cell technologies; andtake advantage of the transformation availablethrough cheap, renewable energy.Energy and ConflictEnergy resources are major causes of conflictin the modern era—take, for example,the Gulf War of 1991. The United States participatedin this UN-sanctioned effort to liberateKuwait in part because access to energyresources was a vital national interest. Thenational security strategy of 2000 echoed theimportance of such access: “The UnitedStates will continue to have a vital interest inensuring access to foreign oil sources. Wemust continue to be mindful of the need forregional stability and security in key producingareas . . . to ensure our access to, and thefree flow of, these resources.” 2 More than adecade after Operation Desert Storm, thenational security strategy expresses similarsentiments concerning the importance ofenergy to the United States and its allies: “Wewill strengthen our own energy security andthe shared prosperity of the global economyby working with our allies, trading partners,and energy producers to expand the sourcesand types of global energy supplied.” 3 As playersin the global economy continue to seekalternatives to oil, conflict will either intensifyor diminish, thus changing the character andthe location of future wars—but not necessarilythe motivations. The development and proliferationof fuel cells may not guarantee worldpeace, but it should reduce our dependenceon oil and minimize the role of energy as asource of international conflict.One can hardly overestimate the importanceof the world’s supply of fossil fuels forenergy needs. The US Department of Energy(DOE) reports that current worldwide oildemand amounts to approximately 74 millionbarrels per day (mbd). 4 Projected worldwidedemand through the year 2020 ranges from alow of 90 mbd to a high of 130. 5 The currentestimated worldwide supply of oil rangesfrom 1 trillion barrels to 1.8 trillion. 6 Giventhe range of consumption, one could estimatethat exhaustion of the supply couldoccur anytime between the years 2025 and2050, but this figure can be misleading. Someexperts argue that one should examine productioncapacity in terms of demand—that is,speculate when the production peak will causedemand to outstrip supply. 7 This predictionbecomes important because it drives part ofthe when-and-why discussion for moving fromfossil fuels to alternative-energy sources.Again, estimates vary, but some scientistsbelieve that, under today’s conditions—price,distribution ability, political environment,and so forth—approximately 1.4 trillion barrelsof economically recoverable oil are available. 8Assuming that worldwide demand rangesfrom a low of 75 mbd to a high of 130, thebest estimate for when demand begins to outstripsupply occurs somewhere between 2008and 2020. 9 Oil production will continue, butother economic factors will shape the marketplace.Either the price of crude oil will beginto rise in order to curb demand, or consumerswill pay more for a larger share of the availablesupply. Inevitably, both outcomes willoccur to one degree or another.When the cost of oil exceeds $30 per barrel,alternative-energy sources become more economicallyviable. Such alternatives cover thegamut—from coal, to nuclear, to solar, tohydrogen—all with their own advantages anddisadvantages. In the context of near-termdevelopment and exploitation, hydrogenpower holds promise as the next majorenergy source for mankind. In particular, fuelcells offer tremendous potential to meet anever-increasing energy appetite.The Nature of Fuel CellsFuel cells are miniature power plants thatconvert the chemical energy inherent in hydrogenand oxygen into direct-current electricitywithout combustion. 10 Unlike batteries, whichstore energy, fuel cells produce electricity as

FUEL CELLS 63long as fuel is supplied. As we will see, thetypes of available hydrogen fuels vary significantly.Welsh chemist William Grove first proposeddeveloping fuel cells in 1839. As hestudied the electrolysis of water—the processof breaking it down into molecular hydrogenand oxygen—he concluded that there mustbe a way to reverse the process and combinethe two elements. 11 Through experimentation,Grove and others laid the foundation for creatingefficient fuel-cell energy sources. Theidea remains simple: “Harness the chemicalattraction between oxygen . . . and hydrogen. . . to produce electricity.” 12 Generating electricityby using the two most abundant elementson Earth could provide power tomankind through the next millennium.The chemistry of fuel cells is straightforward,and all types draw upon the sametechnology. The proton-exchange membrane(PEM) fuel cell, for example, is composed ofan anode (the negative post), a cathode (thepositive post), an electrolytic membrane toblock electron flow, and a catalyst that facilitatesthe chemical reaction (fig. 1). 13 Withhydrogen flowing across the anode, the catalystsplits the hydrogen into electrons andprotons, diverting the electrons to an externalcircuit to be used as electricity while theprotons flow through the membrane. Oxygenis pumped into the cathode side, reactingwith the hydrogen protons to form water. 14Although a single fuel cell produces only aminuscule 0.7 volts, densely stacking PEMfuel cells can produce much greater voltages. 15Fuel cells present numerous opportunitiesfor energy production. First, they are inherentlymore efficient than internal-combustionengines because the intermediate step ofcombustion is eliminated. 16 Second, withpure hydrogen as the fuel source, water is theonly emission from fuel-cell reactions. Thus,these devices have the advantage of operatingfree of greenhouse gas (e.g., methane, carbondioxide, etc.) and pollutants, thereby satisfyingnumerous environmental concerns. 17HeatHeatHydrogen(H 2 ) in–e –e– +Flow Field Membrane Flow FieldFUEL CELLOxygen(O 2 ) inWater(H 2 O) outFigure 1.Typical fuel-cell configuration. (Adapted from Sharon Thomas and Marcia Zalbowitz, Fuel Cells:Green Power, Los Alamos National Laboratory, http://education.lanl.gov/resources/fuelcells/fuelcells.pdf,6, 12 [March 3, 2002].)

64 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004Finally, since fuel cells are inherently reliable,they could conceivably act as a source of trulydistributed power. 18Carol Werner notes that “different types offuel cells are named according to the type ofmedium used to separate the hydrogen andoxygen.” 19 Besides the PEM type, at least fourvariants exist, each with advantages and disadvantages:1. Alkaline: principal application in space;operates between 60 and 90 o C.2. Phosphoric acid: used in stationarypower applications; operates between160 and 220 o C.3. Molten carbonate: stationary power, mostpromising future power-generation technology;operates between 620 and 660 o C.4. Solid oxide: power generation operatingat highest temperatures of 800–1,000 o C. 20Although the promise of cheap, abundantpower sounds exciting, the true test comes indemonstrating practical energy-productioncapability. Since the National Aeronauticsand Space Administration began using alkalinefuel cells in the early 1960s, tremendousprogress has been made in decreasing theirsize and increasing their capacity to produceusable electrical energy. Fuel cells now rangein size from microdevices to power-gridenhancingunits. Their future holds evengreater efficiencies and more utility.Faced with the relatively slow and costlyincremental advances in chemical-batterytechnology over the last 50 years, numerousorganizations have turned to micro fuel cells“as the hot portable energy source of thefuture.” 21 For example, both the laptop computerand cellular-phone industries are investigatingfuel-cell batteries because consumersdemand longer battery life and greater reliability.Whereas the life of lithium-ion batteriesis measured in hours, fuel cells may deliverenergy as long as fuel is available. 22 Manyproblems remain, however, not the least ofwhich is squeezing sufficient wattage out ofan ever-decreasing real estate. Nevertheless,current micro fuel cells are being successfullytested in cellular phones. As consumerssearch for ways to free themselves from wallplugs and power outlets in cars, companiessuch as Motorola seek to meet market demandsby using micro fuel cells. Among the manychallenges for these applications is the factthat the by-products of fuel cells are heat andwater, both of which are obviously undesirableto cell-phone users. 23 Overcoming theimpediments presented by designing andmarketing viable fuel-cell technologies thatsupport consumer products may occupy theresearch-and-development community for theremainder of the decade.From micro to macro, fuel-cell usage todayranges from homes, to power grids, to over 30Department of Defense installations. Eventhough these fuel cells primarily serve nichemarkets that demand assured access to power,the fact that these alternative-energy sourceshave become widely accepted bodes well fortheir future. Fuel cells in the five-to-10-kilowatt(kW) range are available to the consumerhousingmarket. Meeting the energy needs ofa typical four-bedroom home, a 5 kW fuel cellalso has the capacity to charge conventionalbatteries and produce excess power that theowners can sell back to the power grid. PeterBos, chief executive officer of an energyconsultingcompany, predicts that “1 percentof U.S. homes will have fuel cells between2006 and 2010, when a 5kW model will costroughly $7,000. A few years after that . . . fuelcells will cost only $1,200 and be in half ofU.S. homes. By 2031, 99 percent of the homesin the United States won’t need to be hookedup to the electrical grid.” 24At present, office buildings, hospitals, theelectrical-power industry, and others can buyfuel cells in the 300 kW, one-and-a-halfmegawatt(MW), and 3 MW ranges. 25 Fuelcells presently capture only a tiny fraction ofthe overall electric market, but they offer manyadvantages, including cost-competitiveness inshrinking petroleum markets, truly distributedpower sources, and favorable environmentaleffects. Although no one is talking about closingdown coal, oil, or nuclear power plants, itis quite conceivable that macro-fuel-cell

FUEL CELLS 65capacity will continue to grow from megawattto gigawatt (10 9 watts) capacities. Nevertheless,the largest portion of fuel-cell research—the one most likely to affect the most peoplein the near future—includes devices used inthe transportation industry.According to a Federal TransportationAdvisory Group report entitled Vision 2050:An Integrated National Transportation System,“the United States transportation system consumesapproximately 12.5 million barrels ofoil each day,” 26 nearly two-thirds of the dailynational oil usage. Because oil is a nonrenewableresource and because expected demandwill outstrip supply well before 2020, as mentionedabove, we must do something aboutour dependence on petroleum: “If just 20 percentof cars used fuel cells, the U.S. could cutoil imports by 1.5 million barrels everyday.” 27Clearly, fuel cells will have their greatest transformationaleffect in the transportation sector.Automakers are on the leading edge ofdeveloping and exploiting fuel-cell technology.Every major auto manufacturer has or hasscheduled a fuel-cell-based car for near-termproduction. Essentially, such vehicles are electriccars that do not “plug in” each night torecharge their batteries. Rather, they generateelectricity from some form of hydrogenrichfuel. Currently, fuel-cell cars and busesprovide mileage ranges commensurate withthose of conventional gas-powered vehicles.The principal challenges lie in making thesevehicles cost-competitive with those poweredby internal-combustion engines and in developinga safe and efficient fuel-distributioninfrastructure.First-generation fuel-cell cars are now available,but fuel-cell-powered airplanes remain amere twinkle in developers’ eyes, although theBoeing Company plans to develop and test afully electric airplane supplied by fuel cells. 28Despite this ambitious goal, most developerssee only a secondary role for these devices onaircraft. Although hydrogen—liquid hydrogen,in particular—has been used as aviationand rocket fuel, hydrogen-fed fuel cells couldgenerate electricity for equipment such asauxiliary power units. Nevertheless, ongoingstudies at the Air Force Research Laboratoryforesee unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) fullypropelled and supplied by fuel cells by 2010. 29These innovative aircraft have the potentialto shape strategy for years to come.Despite the size or capacity of fuel-celltechnology, the current debate concernswhich form of hydrogen fuel to propagate.The winner in the fuels race will determinethe rate of fuel-cell proliferation. Three ofthe main contenders at this time are purehydrogen, methanol or other liquid hydrocarbons,and methane (natural gas), each ofwhich presents unique challenges for fuel-celldevelopment and fuel distribution.Not surprisingly, pure hydrogen is the mostefficient fuel for these devices but presentsmyriad problems associated with making itviable. For example, it is not readily availablein nature but most often encountered incompounds in which hydrogen atoms chemicallybond to one or more other elements. 30Separating those bonds takes energy, therebydecreasing the relative efficiencies of fuelcells. Furthermore, the processing, storing,and distributing of pure hydrogen is too difficultin the near term to become globallyviable. 31 As one writer puts it, “You don’t havea hydrogen pipeline coming to your house,and you can’t pull up to a hydrogen pump atyour local gas station.” 32 Pure hydrogen issimply difficult to obtain, and even when onehas it, a great deal of pressure and volume isnecessary to store it in order to reap theenergy-to-weight efficiencies. Nevertheless,when manufactured renewably (e.g., solarpower), pure hydrogen in a fuel cell creates atrue zero-emission system, with only heat andwater as by-products. In light of the difficultiesassociated with producing the element inits pure form, however, most fuel-cell developersturn to another alternative for theirsource of hydrogen.Since the automotive industry is the primarydeveloper, liquid hydrocarbons lead theway as fuel sources. In particular, muchresearch involves using methanol, whoseprincipal advantage is its similarity to gasolineand, hence, worldwide familiarity with its pro­

66 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004duction, transportation, and distribution. 33Depending upon their source, liquidhydrocarbonfuels can also become a renewableenergy resource. Disadvantages includestorage, corrosiveness, and fuel waste due to“crossover” in the fuel-cell membrane. 34Regular gasoline and ethanol are just twoof the available liquid-hydrocarbon alternatives,but the need for “reformation” of the fuelprior to introduction into the fuel-cell systemremains the constant among all liquid sources.The reforming process extracts hydrogenfrom the more complex molecular structures;however, the fact that carbon monoxide andcarbon dioxide can become additional byproductsof the energy-production cycle makesthese systems less attractive. 35 While the transportationindustry focuses on liquid hydrocarbons,the stationary power-productionindustry is investigating natural gas as a sourceof hydrogen.Most Americans are familiar with naturalgas as an energy resource, especially fordomestic applications. But few consumers areaware of its uses beyond heating and cookingpurposes. As a potential source of hydrogenfor fuel cells, natural gas boasts an establisheddelivery infrastructure and significantlyreduces greenhouse-gas emissions. Outsidethat established infrastructure, however, theneed to compress natural gas and to use specialdispensing equipment reduces its appealas a source of hydrogen. 36 Lastly, because naturalgas is nonrenewable, reliance on it as afuel offers meager benefits for long-termenergy security. But another developmentpromises to make natural gas the fuel of thetwenty-first century.Especially worthy of mention are methanehydrates. Methane is “the chief constituent ofnatural gas.” 37 Although no consensus existsregarding the total amount of natural gas discoveredand/or producible, one may assumea reasonable figure of 5,000 trillion cubicfeet. 38 Additionally, if the accuracy of the USGeological Survey of 1995 is within even oneorder of magnitude, the US portion of gashydratereserves approaches 200,000 trillioncubic feet. 39 Despite tremendous obstacles, ifonly a small fraction of these hydrates couldbe recovered in the form of usable gas, thepotential for natural gas as a source of energytakes on staggering dimensions. 40 As a sourceof fuel for fuel cells, this mother lode presentstremendous opportunities. Whether purehydrogen, liquid hydrocarbons, or naturalgas emerges as the primary source for fuelcells, the development of each is assured.Scenario-Based PlanningThe DOE maintains a division dedicated tohydrogen-fuels research. Within that division,the Hydrogen Technical Advisory Panel(HTAP) conducts scenario-based planning toenvision possible hydrogen-fuel developments.In a conference held in 2001, the HTAP identifiedtwo main drivers for hydrogen developmentand proliferation: the rate of socialconcern and activism and the rate of hydrogentechnologydevelopment. 41 The panel developedfour quadrants and story lines fromthese drivers to address the DOE’s vision of ahydrogen-fuel-based society. Since the HTAP’swork focuses primarily on DOE-related issuesrather than Air Force issues, the scenariostory lines developed by the panel are notparticularly useful for addressing the service’sconcerns. But by using the HTAP’s driversand the methodology described in the AirForce’s study Alternate Futures for 2025 (1996),one can derive four plausible fuel-cell worldsfor the future (fig. 2). 42Quadrant A: GreenpeaceGreenpeace is a world characterized byincreased awareness of global warming. Theinhabitants of Greenpeace—situated at theaxes of slow fuel-cell development and highsocial awareness—have taken to heart thedestructive environmental effects brought onby mankind over the industrial age and earlyportion of the information age. Activelyengaged in seeking to reduce greenhouse-gasproduction, Greenpeace has turned to severalalternative forms of energy production to meeta still-increasing worldwide appetite for energy.

FUEL CELLS 67High Level of Social Concern and ActivismSlow Rate ofHydrogenTechnology /Fuel-CellDevelopmentA. GreenpeaceD. SOS(Same Old Stuff )B. FuelcellvilleC. For a PriceFast Rate ofHydrogenTechnology /Fuel-CellDevelopmentLow Level of Social Concern and ActivismFigure 2. Fuel-cell world quadrantsPlausible History. In the Greenpeace world,social concerns drive energy alternatives. Thesuccess of the New Electric Car 5 (NECAR5)initiative prompts the development ofNECAR6 (fig. 3). 43 Publicity of the true costsof fossil fuels on the environment makes dailyheadlines. 44 Although natural gas is a fossilfuel, the campaign promoting cleaner-burningfuels results in quick exploitation of vastreserves of methane hydrates on the US continentalshelf in 2010. 45 California’s lead inrequiring zero-emission vehicles becomes anational model in 2015. 46 By 2020 Air Forcebase realignment and closure activities resultin the consolidation and closing of foreignoperatedfacilities. Each “superbase” is poweredby stationary fuel cells, maintainingautonomy from the commercial power grid. 472005: NECAR6 2010: Methanehydrates tapped20022020: Air Force consolidateswithin US territory2015: Fuel-cell car becomesgovernment standard2025: Last coal-firedplant closes2030: Alternative-energy methodsproduce more than fossil fuelsFigure 3. Greenpeace timeline

68 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004Concerns over national greenhouse-gas emissionsforce the closure of the last coal-firedpower plant in 2025. Advances in photovoltaics,geothermal energy, and wind-recoveryensure that alternative-energy productioneclipses that of conventional fossil-fuel facilities.48 Greenpeace is marked by slow fuel-celldevelopment as a variety of energy alternativesemerge in a socially aware world.Capabilities. Fuel cells exist in society andthe military; however, their proliferation isbut one facet of the alternate-energy equation.In 2002, capacities of 3 MW of stationarypower evolved but only to the point whereit was economically feasible for governmentsponsoredorganizations to take advantage ofthis capability. Because the majority of fuelcellprogress occurs in transportation, fuelcells can power nearly all forms of transportation.Nevertheless, fuel cells remain a nichemarket in external power production as otheralternatives emerge.Implications for the Air Force. In a Greenpeaceworld, environmental concerns affectoperations tempo, basing, and training. Tosatisfy increasing societal awareness, the AirForce will have to adopt energy alternatives.Fuel cells can provide stationary power andmeet stationary requirements for deployedforces. But a slow rate of technological developmentmeans that fuel cells will continue tofill only secondary roles. The Air Force’s fuelcellinvestments will continue to leverageother government programs as well as commercialresearch and development. 49 Finally,since the United States has not yet becomeself-reliant in terms of energy, it still expendsvast sums of money protecting energy supplies.Implications against the Air Force. Adversariesstand poised to take advantage of aGreenpeace world. Our historical indifferenceto environmental issues can be usedagainst us in a major public-relations campaigndirected at Air Force operations. Aspeople worldwide become more sociallyactive, we are apt to find ourselves objects oftheir ire. Furthermore, a global-environmentmovement that targets oil use holds dangerfor energy-producing alliance nations.Critical Issues and Pathway. The Greenpeacescenario depends upon a dramaticincrease in social awareness. How such awarenessevolves becomes the key to getting toquadrant A. Assuredly, environmental groupswill tout the benefits of fuel cells while decryingthe destructive effects of traditional fuelsources. What causes this message finally totake hold may come from one of severalsources. First, many countries are more “green”oriented than the United States. If our positionin the world diminishes in the comingdecades, those external views may becomemore prominent. Second, as members of ayounger, more environmentally conscientiousgeneration mature, their message maybegin to take hold as they move into leadershippositions. Additionally, if record warmweatherpatterns continue, even detractors ofglobal-warming theories may concede thatfossil fuels adversely affect the environment.Finally, local, state, and federal governmentsmay lead the environmental cause. The mandatingand subsidizing of environmentalissues may generate increased social awareness.Fuel-cell technology may make noticeablegains, but without increased social awareness,a pathway to Greenpeace is not possible.Quadrant B: FuelcellvilleIn Fuelcellville high social concerns and a fastrate of fuel-cell technology development converge.Fuel-cell capabilities advance rapidly asnations and corporations eagerly seek alternativesto fossil fuels. As technology developmentovercomes storage and distribution barriers,economies of scale allow wide proliferation offuel-cell technology.Plausible History. The DOE’s hydrogen programsucceeds in obtaining a massive infusionof federal dollars in 2005 (fig. 4). 50 Socialactivism brought on by the election of 2008results in a government mandate that all federalvehicles be powered by direct-methanolfuel cells by 2010. In 2012 the demand for oilexceeds supply, raising the cost of a barrel of oilto $100 and pump prices to five dollars per gallonin 2015. 51 Advances in stationary fuel-cellpower result in the Fuel Cell Proclamation Act

FUEL CELLS 6920022005: DOE’s infusion ofresearch and development2020: Fuel CellProclamation Act2010: All government vehiclesmethanol-fueled2015: Gas hits five dollars pergallon in the United States2025: 95% efficiency achieved2030: Worldwidedistributed powerFigure 4. Fuelcellville timelineof 2020 whereby all government facilities areremoved from the power grid and fed by fuelcells. Lower Heating Value efficiencies reach 95percent in 2025. 52 Fuel-cell technology permeatesall four corners of the globe, resulting in atrue hydrogen economy and absolute, worldwidedistributed power by 2030. 53Capabilities. Fuel cells are adopted as theprimary means of power production. Societybecomes truly all-electric as fossil fuels areabandoned in favor of the rapid developmentof hydrogen-fuel technology. Portable fuelcells become as common as AA alkaline batteries.The internal-combustion engine goesthe way of the covered wagon because vehiclespowered by fuel cells meet all cost and performancerequirements. Lastly, stationaryfuel cells achieve remarkable efficiencies, anda movement away from centrally based powerproduction to distributed power productionbecomes standard.Implications for the Air Force. In Fuelcellvillethe Air Force will likely remain at the forefrontof the transition from petroleum tohydrogen-based fuels. Large-scale governmentinvestment will allow the service to field stateof-the-artfuel-cell equipment, thus decreasingthe logistical footprint of deploying forces andreducing overall airlift requirements. 54 Theincreased reliability associated with electricalversus mechanical equipment means the AirForce will need far fewer maintainers in activeservice. Effects-based strategy needs to evolvefrom slogan to practice. Fuelcellville does notdiminish the military option; it just transformshow it is powered.Implications against the Air Force. Thetransition from oil-based to hydrogen-basedsocieties may cause increased tensions in theMiddle East. As oil revenues decrease, peacekeepingrequirements will likely increase. Theprimary source of regional conflict will likelyshift from petroleum resources to waterrights. 55 Distributed power generation worldwideforces a fundamental reassessment ofAir Force doctrine. The production of electricalenergy is no longer considered a centerof gravity because there are simply too manyenergy facilities. Instead, storage and distributionnetworks gain increased strategic andoperational importance. Finally, in Fuelcellvillethe increased dependence on electronics andelectronic controls increases the vulnerabilityof Air Force equipment to electromagneticpulses. Without electromagnetically hardenedequipment, everything from transportationto information is subject to disruption.Crucial Issues and Pathway. The path toFuelcellville presents the double challenge ofincreased social awareness and increased

70 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004technology. Besides the environmental concerns,key technological hurdles must also becleared. First among these is the efficiency offuel cells. In the transportation industry, ifcars powered by these devices can overcomeproblems associated with fuel storage, safety,and supply infrastructure, fuel cells will beginto move from government-led efforts to themainstream. Second, fuel cells cannot achievewidespread public acceptance until theybecome commercially and economically viable.Government investment must bridge the developmentcosts to true commercial viability andthen advertise the successes to encouragenew customers and investors to continue. 56Without an engaged public or three to fourtechnological leaps, establishment of a pathwayto quadrant B becomes less likely.Quadrant C: For a PriceCharacterized by low social activism and hightechnological development, the For a Priceworld presents fuel-cell opportunities tothose who can afford it—namely governmentsand government-supported industries.While most Americans remain apathetic todecreasing fossil-fuel supplies and deterioratingenvironmental conditions, other countries—mostnotably Iceland, Germany, Singa­pore, and Japan—make rapid advancementsin fuel-cell development. The US governmentand its departments capitalize on theseadvantages, primarily in the military arena,but overall costs compared to those for fossilfuels keep fuel cells from breaking into themainstream.Plausible History. In 2005 the Air andSpace Expeditionary Force (AEF) Battlelab’searly work on the Common Core Power Productionspawns the first full AEF deploymentof support equipment wholly powered by fuelcells (fig. 5). 57 In 2010 solar-cell efficienciesallow the Air Force to test the first fuel-cellpoweredUAV. 58 The California and New Yorkenergy-deregulation experiments of 2000–05fail miserably, resulting in enactments ofgovernment-subsidy programs. To advanceadditional research, industry leaders switch toa fuel-cell infrastructure for stationary-powerdistribution in 2015. By 2020 the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reapsthe benefits of member-nation research andadopts PEM fuel-cell standards for all groundtransportationvehicles. 59 The year 2025 marksthe first anniversary of Project Endure—thesuccessful, continuous operation of a fuelcell-poweredUAV. 60 With 176 nation-state signatoriesto the Kyoto protocols in 2012, fuelcells and other alternative technologies20022005: First AEF fuelcelldeployment2020: NATO adoptsPEM standard2010: First fuel-cell-poweredUAV enters inventory2015: Industry adoptsfuel-cell infrastructure2025: UAV achieves oneyear of continuous flight2030: Fuel cells break$1,000 per kW barrierFigure 5. For a Price timeline

FUEL CELLS 71advance rapidly. However, since the MiddleEast and South America still supply 90 percentof the world’s oil without interruption orprice fluctuations, fuel-cell benefits remainlimited to those customers outside the mainpower grid and other niche markets. 61 Notuntil 2030 do fuel-cell costs per kW of energyproduced break the $1,000 barrier. 62 Fuelcells have been available over the past threedecades; however, cost has prevented theirintroduction into mainstream commercialmarkets.Capabilities. Fuel-cell technology makesadvances in portable, mobile, and stationarymarkets. However, American social pacifismprevents widespread concern or desire forenvironmentally friendly alternatives to fossilfuels. Accordingly, capabilities exist but onlyto those who can afford them. The US governmentsees utility in fuel cells and incorporatesthose technologies into specific militaryapplications that require reliability and persistence.Adoption of common fuel standardsfor fuel cells allows more concentrated development,which nevertheless remains outsideUS influence.Implications for the Air Force. The AirForce recognizes that fuel-cell developmentwill not occur without government-led efforts.Even though rapid technological developmentswill not replace jet fuel in aircraft, theservice still needs to capitalize on advancesmade by other countries in unique missionapplications. Specifically, support equipmentand UAVs are ripe for fuel-cell proliferation.UAVs powered by these devices allow forspacelike capabilities in persistence with substantiallyreduced costs. 63 Benefits to thelogistical tail run the gamut from maintenanceto supply. With fuel-cell-technologyapplications primarily confined to governments,the Air Force stands to have a significantunilateral benefit in this scenario.Implications against the Air Force. Untilcosts become competitive with conventionalpower production, fuel-cell usage is likely toremain confined to governments that canafford them. Because those governmentstend to be democratic and because of increas­ing globalization, fuel cells offer the potentialfor greater national security. For our adversarieswho take advantage of fuel cells in theFor a Price scenario, distributed powerassumes key importance. Energy infrastructureloses its desirability as a target. But ifsuch targets are in fact attacked, the potentialfor collateral damage may well exceed theexpected payoff or desired strategic effect. Asa result, fuel cells become a means to achievestrategic ends against the United States.Crucial Issues and Pathway. To realize aFor a Price world, similar technical breakthroughsto Fuelcellville must occur. Thoseadvancements are likely to come through governmentinvolvement because initial costsprevent extensive proliferation. However, thecrucial issue in quadrant C remains socialapathy. Diverse interests and attitudes keepAmericans and the rest of the world largelyuninvolved. America is often categorized as a“throwaway” society. Whether their attitude isbased in fact or perception, the Americanpublic considers the country’s environmentalpolicy largely “window dressing” rather thanan effective plan. We consume most of theworld’s energy, yet we comprise less than 5percent of the planet’s population. Ourreluctance to engage in environmental negotiationsgives rise to world acrimony. Ouraffluence can make us indifferent to problemsbeyond our own borders. Additionally,rising nations—be they industrial or informational—spurnenvironmentally imposed mandatesby citing the need for immediateprogress rather than long-term effects.Finally, debate continues over the extent towhich existing technologies affect the environment;this, in turn, delays the reaching ofconsensus in addressing problems on a globalscale. As long as overall social apathy exists,fuel-cell developments are unlikely to transformthe worldwide energy picture.Quadrant D: SOS (Same Old Stuff)SOS is a world not too different from the onewe live in today, distinguished by a low rate ofsocial activism and low fuel-cell development.Research on alternative-energy technologies

72 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004remains a minuscule portion of the federalbudget. Indifference to the modest 1 o C risein global temperatures over the past threedecades has only furthered global-warmingdebates. Fossil-fuel usage continues as the primarysource of energy. Tensions over accessto energy sources require continued USdefense involvement around the world.Plausible History. As the federal deficitexceeds $7 trillion, a Balanced Budget Amendmentpasses in 2005, causing cuts throughoutgovernment (fig. 6). Notable among these isthe cancellation of all DOE hydrogen projects.64 Oil-industry leaders, in cooperationwith the Russian government, explore thevast Siberian region. An oil find estimated at10 trillion barrels is announced in 2010. 65The Organization of Petroleum ExportingCountries responds by increasing production,causing gasoline prices to drop to 50 centsper gallon. In 2015 scientists in Antarcticareport that the ozone hole has closed. In contrastto global-warming theories, the apparentcause is tied more to the 1980s ban on chlorofluorocarbonsthan on greenhouse-gas emissions.The Joint Strike Fighter achieves initialoperational capability in 2020 and introducesJP-10 as the fuel standard. Not only does JP-10meet all engine-performance requirements,but also its energy content is so high and flashpoint so low that it becomes the standard forauxiliary-power production. 66 By 2025 theArmy’s transformation process is complete, anda demonstration using a soda-can-sized fuelcell powers an office for one week. 67 Furtherdemonstrations lead to the building of a blimpfor the modern age—the Hindenburg II—powered solely by fuel cells. However, in 2030a freak accident reminiscent of the one thatdestroyed the dirigible’s namesake keeps fuelcelltechnology confined to niche markets. 68Capabilities. Fuel cells remain noveltyitems for most of the population. Like theprogress of conventional battery technologyin the last half of the twentieth century, fuelcellefficiencies make only modest gains.Automobile makers offer fuel-cell alternativecars, but their range and refueling requirementsmake them less attractive than vehiclesequipped with internal-combustion engines.Stationary fuel-cell power generation remainscost prohibitive to all but the most isolated orecologically minded. The impending oilshortage never materializes, and fuel cells, aswell as other energy alternatives, remain onthe sidelines.Implications for and against the Air Force.SOS is perhaps the most recognizable yetmost dangerous of all the worlds discussedhere. The Air Force can be expected to main­20022005: Balanced 2010: Siberian oil findBudget Amendment2020: JP-10standard adopted2015: Ozone hole closes2025: Demo of office powered forone week on soda-can-sized fuel cell2030: Hindenburg II crashesFigure 6. SOS timeline

FUEL CELLS 73tain the status quo relative to other nations.No impetus for revolutionary change exists.The notion of transformation or effects-basedtargeting has the potential to become thenext “quality” movement—a mere slogan foreach new service chief. Our dependency onforeign oil never wanes. Danger lurks aroundthe globe as other countries make advancesin alternative-energy sources and seekalliances based on assured-energy access.How we choose to respond will affect ourvision and strategy for decades to come. SOSlives up to its name.Crucial Issues and Pathway. Since there islittle debate that American society currentlyresides in quadrant D, remaining there meansdoing little that is different. The critical issuehere is research and development. If governmentand private funding remains at levelssimilar to those of today, advances in fuel-celltechnology are likely to do no more thancreep ahead. In addition, myopic environmentalreviews both inside and outside governmentprevent anything beyond grassrootsefforts from flourishing. Although the UnitedStates might remain within SOS, there is noguarantee that the remainder of the worldwill do so. It is conceivable that multiple pathwayscan coexist. Nevertheless, without a combinationof social activism and technologicaladvances, transition from fossil-based tohydrogen-based fuels is unlikely.Future Issues and ApplicationsDespite claims to the contrary, predictingthe future is an inexact art. Each of the fuelcellworlds considered here can occur, but itis unlikely that any one will unfold exactly asoutlined. They do have certain crucial issuesin common, however. Specifically, the world’sresponse to the impending oil crisis, whetherit occurs 10, 20, or even 100 years from now,will define our energy future. Additionally,whether global society responds to environmentalconcerns now or delays decisions untilsome indeterminate future will characterizeour willingness to accept short-term gains indeference to long-term effects. These twoissues underscore fuel-cell development andproliferation.The utility of the four future worlds lies notin their predictive value, but in preparing othersto think of the possible. Many acquisitiondecisions made today do not bear fruit for warfighters for years to come. We have the optionof behaving either proactively or reactively. Byunderstanding what is possible, we can takepositive steps to prepare for the future.Beginning in the mid-1990s, fuel cells havenow been installed at 30 Department ofDefense locations. 69 To begin a movementfrom SOS to any other quadrant, the AirForce must become part of government-ledefforts to change to alternative-energy methods.Current fuel-cell technology is too immatureand cost prohibitive for pure private-sectordevelopment. Through government efforts,fuel cells can move out of the laboratory andonto Main Street, USA.Additionally, anticipating how adversariesmight use this technology remains fundamentalto any evolution of our strategy. TheAir Force should start preparing now foradaptation and response to fuel-cell-poweredsocieties. Do we continue to target energyinfrastructure, as we have done in nearlyevery conflict since World War II? How do weinterdict energy supply lines when the mainfuel is not petroleum-based but gaseous, produciblein the field, and not under the controlof relatively few governments? Do we aiddeveloping nations by allowing them toleapfrog our own industrial mistakes andpowering them with sustained energy? Theseand numerous other questions demand flexibilityin our strategy. The Air Force shouldconsider the following steps in order to retainthis flexibility:1. Increase funding in hydrogen technology.2. Exploit developments made in othergovernment and private sectors.3. Take risks and rapidly transition technologiesin the most promising arenas ofboth manned and unmanned air vehicles.

74 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 20044. Increase the percentage of bases poweredby alternative-energy sources.5. Develop war-game scenarios based onthe proliferation of fuel cells by boththe United States and its adversaries.Because fuel cells have powerful implicationsfor the military and the world, we must beready to deal with them.Fossil fuels cannot sustain the planet’senergy appetite indefinitely. Continued accessto these resources means additional expenseon our part in terms of finances and possibleloss of life in defending them. If we are tobecome what Michio Kaku calls a type-onecivilization in this third modern millennium,we must look beyond fossil fuels for our primaryenergy sources. 70Fuel-cell technology is fundamentally soundalthough it faces many challenging obstaclesin the years ahead to achieve its potential.Whether these devices remain curiosities orinfuse themselves into the mainstream is yetto be determined. The path to any of thefuture worlds discussed here is certainly notpreordained. However, if we wish to continueto progress, we must begin to capitalize nowon what Los Alamos National Laboratorydubs a “once in a lifetime opportunity”: fuelcells. 71 ■Notes1. Kenneth F. Deffeyes, Hubert’s Peak: The ImpendingWorld Oil Shortage (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, October 2001), i.2. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington,DC: The White House, December 2000), 34.3. The National Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica (Washington, DC: The White House, September2002), 19–20.4. Department of Energy, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieor (accessed April 7, 2002).5. Ibid.6. Geohive, http://www.geohive.com/charts/energy_oilres.php (accessed February 28, 2002).7. Deffeyes, Hubert’s Peak, i.8. Geohive.9. Review of Deffeyes, Hubert’s Peak, http://www.amazon.com (accessed April 7, 2002).10. Carol Werner, “Fuel Cell Fact Sheet,” Environmentaland Energy Study Institute, February 2000,http://www.eesi.org/publications/02.00fuelcell.pdf, 1(accessed March 15, 2002).11. Alan Leo, “Fuel Cells in Brief,” Technology Review,February 5, 2002, http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/wo_leo020502.asp, 2 (accessed February 11, 2002).12. Ibid.13. Karim Nice, “How Fuel Cells Work,” in MarshallBrian, HowStuffWorks, http://www.howstuffworks.com/fuel-cell.htm, 2 (accessed January 31, 2002).14. Sharon Thomas and Marcia Zalbowitz, Fuel Cells:Green Power, Los Alamos National Laboratory, http://education.lanl.gov/resources/fuelcells/fuelcells.pdf, 4(accessed March 3, 2002).15. Ibid., 7.16. Werner, “Fuel Cell Fact Sheet,” 1.17. Thomas and Zalbowitz, Fuel Cells, 27.18. Werner, “Fuel Cell Fact Sheet,” 2.19. Ibid., 3.20. Peter Hoffman, Tomorrow’s Energy: Hydrogen, FuelCells, and the Prospectus for a Cleaner Planet (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 2001), 156–57.21. Steven Ashley, “Fuel Cell Phones: Portable Powerfrom Fuel Cells Inches Along,” Scientific American, July2001, http://www.sciam.com/2001/0701issue/0701scicit4.html, 2 (accessed January 31, 2002).22. David Voss, “A Fuel Cell in Your Phone,” TechnologyReview, no. 9 (November 2001): 69.23. Ibid., 70.24. Quoted in Charles Wardell, “Dreams of the NewPower Grid,” Popular Science 260, no. 3 (March 2002): 62.25. Ballard Power Systems, http://www.ballard.com(accessed April 7, 2002).26. US Department of Transportation, Vision 2020:An Integrated National Transportation System, February2001, http://scitech.dot.gov, 7 (accessed March 16, 2002).27. Werner, “Fuel Cell Fact Sheet,” 2.28. “Boeing to Explore Electric Airplane,” BoeingCompany news release, November 27, 2001, http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2001/q4/nr_011127a.html(accessed January 31, 2002).29. Thomas Reitz, Air Force Research Laboratory,Propulsion Directorate, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, telephoneinterview by the author, March 27, 2002. Subsequentelectronic message contained unpublished paperand briefing.30. Nice, “How Fuel Cells Work,” 3.31. Thomas and Zalbowitz, Fuel Cells, 19.

FUEL CELLS 7532. Nice, “How Fuel Cells Work,” 3.33. Thomas and Zalbowitz, Fuel Cells, 17.34. Ibid.35. Ibid., 19.36. Ibid.37. US Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy,“Methane Hydrates,” http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/oilgas/hydrates, 1 (March 11, 2002).38. US Department of Energy, table, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/table81.html (accessed April 7,2002).39. US Department of Energy, “Methane Hydrates,” 2.40. Ibid.41. Jim Ohi, “Enhancing Strategic Management ofthe Hydrogen Option: Scenario Planning by the DOEHydrogen Technical Advisory Panel” (proceedings of the2001 DOE Hydrogen Program Review), 3.42. Joseph A. Engelbrecht Jr. et al., Alternate Futures for2025 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September1996), 9–17.43. See United Press International, “Bush ViewsHybrid Vehicles,” http://www.home.knology.net/news.cfm?id=1362 (accessed February 25, 2002), for speculationabout future proliferation of fuel-cell vehicles.44. See “Benefits of Fuel Cell Transportation,”http://www.fuelcells.org/fct/benefits.htm (February 21,2002), for a statement that for every gallon of gasolinemanufactured, distributed, and consumed, roughly 25pounds of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is released.45. Natural-gas consumption in the United States willincrease to more than 32 trillion cubic feet by 2020. USDepartment of Energy, “Methane Hydrates,” 2.46. By 2003 10 percent of vehicles must be of the zeroemissiontype. Extrapolated to 2015, the number comesto approximately 100,000. Thomas and Zalbowitz, FuelCells, 29.47. See Ballard Power Systems for predictions concerningthe capacity of stationary fuel cells.48. See “Power Till the Cows Come Home,” NationalGeographic 201, no. 4 (April 2002): xxiii–xxiv, for informationabout unused wind capacity worldwide.49. Briefing, Col Al Janiszewski, US Air ForceResearch Laboratory, Propulsion Directorate, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, to EL-636 class, March 11, 2002.Research dollars for fuel-cell work are localized withinthe directorate.50. See Ohi, “Enhancing Strategic Management,” 11,for HTAP recommendations for future investment.51. See review of Deffeyes, Hubert’s Peak, for speculationabout Hubert’s Peak coming to fruition and consequencesfor worldwide oil prices.52. See Joseph Fellner, Air Force Research Laboratory,Propulsion Directorate, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH,interview by colleague Dr. Thomas Reitz, March 27, 2002;and idem, briefing, “Fuel Cells for Persistent Area Dominance(PAD) Concept,” chart 10, January 15, 2002, forspeculation about increased efficiencies in out-years.53. See Hoffman, Tomorrow’s Energy, 247–64, for sixscenarios that converge on hydrogen proliferation.54. Thomas J. Piro, Common Core Power Production(C2P2), written for Air and Space Expeditionary ForceBattlelab, November 15, 2001, contract no. F19628-98-C-0067, p. 23, par. 3-3: “The reduced size and weight of aPEM fuel cell will reduce the airlift requirements for adeployed air expeditionary force.”55. “Observers say that by 2025, 48 countries will beseverely short of water and half the people on earth willnot have access to clean supplies. I can promise that ifthere is not sufficient water in our region . . . we shalldoubtless face war.” Paul Welsh, “Water Wars: Part I—The Middle East,” http://news.bbc.co-uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_677000/677547.stm (accessedApril 12, 2002).56. Ohi, “Enhancing Strategic Management,” 5.57. See ibid., 8, par. 2-3, for the author’s speculationabout the first AEF fielded with fuel cells.58. See Fellner briefing, charts 30–31, for informationabout future efficiencies of UAVs.59. See M. J. Bradley and Associates, “Future Wheels:Interviews with 44 Global Experts on the Future of FuelCells for Transportation and Fuel Cell Infrastructure anda Fuel Cell Primer,” November 1, 2000, submitted toDefense Advanced Research Projects Agency for agreement,no. NAVC 1099-PG030044, iv–v, for debate on whichfuel is the most likely hydrogen-fuel source of the future.60. See Fellner briefing, charts 30–31, for informationabout future efficiencies.61. See Geohive, charts on energy statistics, http://www.geohive.com/charts (accessed April 6, 2002), forpredictions concerning oil-supply locations through 2020.62. See Wardell, “Dreams of the New Power Grid,” 62,for quotation by Bos on fuel-cell costs futures.63. See Fellner briefing, charts 25–31, for informationabout future capabilities.64. See Ohi, “Enhancing Strategic Management,” 11,for speculation by the author on where future cuts mayoccur.65. See Tom Clancy’s novel The Bear and the Dragon(New York: Berkley Books, 2000), 64–65, for speculationabout finding a massive oil field in the Siberian plains.66. See Janiszewski briefing for speculation about thefuture of propulsion technology.67. David Mulholland, “Fuel Cells Could EnhanceMilitary Capabilities,” Army Times 59, no. 54 (June 7,1999): 24.68. Thomas and Zalbowitz, Fuel Cells, 26. The originalHindenburg did not explode just because of hydrogen gas.The dirigible’s cotton fabric had been treated with acetateand nitrate (gunpowder); the combination was highlyflammable.69. “Fuel Cells,” U. S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiencyand Renewable Energy, April 22, 2003, http://www.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/fuelcells/stationary_power.html.70. Michio Kaku, Visions: How Science Will Revolutionizethe 21st Century (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday,1997), 323.71. Thomas and Zalbowitz, Fuel Cells, 34.

Operational Control (OPCON)Joint Publication (Pub)1-02, Department of DefenseDictionary of Military andAssociated Terms, December17, 2003, defines operationalcontrol as “commandauthority that maybe exercised by commandersat any echelonat or below the level of combatant command. Operationalcontrol is inherent in combatant command (commandauthority) and may be delegated within the command”(p. 385). Basically, OPCON is the foundation for commandat all levels; it gives commanders the authority toorganize commands and employ the necessary forces forassigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritativedirection for carrying out an operational mission.Additionally, OPCON allows commanders to direct all aspectsof military operations and joint training for thepurpose of conducting an assigned mission.According to the definition in Joint Pub 1-02, combatantcommanders and their designated representatives(subordinate commanders) have the express authority toexercise OPCON; neither the service chief nor the commanderof the major command is in the loop. In order toaccomplish an assigned mission effectively, the combatantcommander will delegate OPCON of assigned (or attached)forces to the subordinate component commanders,who may include a joint force air and space componentcommander (JFACC) or a commander, Air Force forces(COMAFFOR). Regardless of the individual to whom thecombatant commander relinquishes OPCON, the chainof command still goes up to the combatant commander.When a subordinate commander receives OPCONover joint forces, that control normally carries with it fullauthority to organize the commands and forces as he orshe deems necessary for accomplishment of the operationalmission. According to joint doctrine, this authority—granted by the president and secretary of defense—canprovide for the transfer of OPCON from one combatantcommand to another. Such a transfer might occur becauseforces are often located in one area of responsibility(AOR) but are assigned to another command locatedelsewhere. In such situations, the national leaders decidewhich commander has OPCON of which forces. Normally,the geographic combatant commander has OPCON ofthese forces although there are exceptions to this rule.For example, forces that transit through a different AORfor a brief stint do not normally become part of that combatantcommander’s OPCON. Similarly, when forces actuallybed down in one geographic command but aretasked to support a different combatant commander, thecommander tasked with the mission retains OPCON.Although the lines of distinction are somewhat hazyin these examples, the authority for OPCON traditionallyremains with the commander tasked to achieve missionobjectives rather than with the geographic commanderto whom the forces are apportioned for planning purposes.The lines of distinction are further blurred whenthe original geographic commander temporarily surrendersOPCON of the apportioned forces but continues tohave responsibility for providing logistical support, includingfood, water, bedding, air traffic control, and manyother administrative functions. Although charged withlogistically supporting the forces on his or her “base,” theoriginal commander does not necessarily have OPCONof them.When it comes to preparing to fight wars and actuallyfighting them, we airmen believe in our air and spacepower doctrine. We use it to guide our employment of airand space assets in military operations. Based upon experienceand historical examples, Air Force doctrine representswhat we have come to understand. Although doctrinecannot provide a solution to every problematicsituation, it does give us a starting point. We then have toutilize our own experiences and analyses of past situationsin order to determine how best to handle the newones. Air Force doctrine should reflect what has workedover the years, and for cases with which we have no experience,it should grow in order to capture and includesuch events. The key lies in determining which combatantcommander is responsible for conducting the operationalmission and ensuring that he or she has OPCONof those forces.To Learn More . . .Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1. Air Force Basic Doctrine, November 17, 2003. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/library/doctrine/afdd1.pdf.76

MilitaryApplications ofInformationTechnologiesPAUL W. PHISTER JR., PE, PHDIGOR G. PLONISCH*Editorial Abstract: The information age hasincreased the amount of data available to allcommanders. Consequently, the Air Force ResearchLaboratory’s Information Directorateseeks to transform military operations by developingsystems that focus on unique AirForce requirements. The major thrusts includeGlobal Awareness, Dynamic Planning andExecution, and the Global InformationEnterprise. Supporting these developments aretechnology-focus areas, ranging from informationexploitation, to air and space connectivity,to command and control.AMONG OTHER REASONS, warfareconstantly changes because advancementsin technology lead to advancementsin “the art of war.”Today’s information age has produced an explosionin the amount of information that is(or will be) available to commanders at alllevels. Some observers believe that by 2010 “[airand space] planners will have an incredibleamount of information about the target state.They’ll never know everything, but they willdetect orders of magnitude more about theenemy than in past wars. With this information,commanders will orchestrate operationswith unprecedented fidelity and speed. Commanderswill take advantage of revolutionary*We wish to thank all the individuals assigned to the Information Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL/IF). Withouttheir dedication and devotion to duty, we could not have written this article. Special thanks go to the following: Dr. Northrup FowlerIII (AFRL/IF chief scientist); division technical advisors Dr. Warren Debany, Mike Wessing, and John McNamara; and others who contributedto the development of this paper, including Scott Adams, Carson Bloomberg, Tim Busch, Col Matthew Caffrey Jr., USAFR, JoeCaroli, Steven Drager, Steven Farr, Dan Fayette, Joe Giordano, Rick Hinman, Richard Jayne, John Lemmer, Dr. Mark Linderman, Dr.Richard Linderman, Dr. Mark Minges, Dr. Thomas Renz, Dave Legare, William McQuay, Richard Metzger, Dr. Don Nicholson, PaulOleski, E. Paul Ratazzi, Dr. John Salerno, Scott Shyne, Lt Justin Sorice, Clare Thiem, Derryl Williams, Dave Williamson, and Bill Wolf.77

78 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004advances in information transfer, storage,recognition, and filtering to direct highly efficient,near-real-time attacks.” 1 Some peoplebelieve that this scenario has already come topass, laying the foundation for the transformationof warfare.This transformation within the military servicesmoves from classic platformcentric warfareto networkcentric warfare (NCW), thelatter dealing with human and organizationalbehavior and based on new ways of thinkingand applying those concepts to military operations.2 It is defined as an informationsuperiority-enabledconcept of operations thatgenerates increased combat power by networkingsensors, decision makers, and shootersto achieve shared awareness, increasedspeed of command, heightened tempo of operations,greater lethality, increased survivability,and a degree of self-synchronization. 3A conceptual view of NCW would highlightsome of its major elements or building blocks(fig. 1). One may also envision a networkcentricview regarding command and control(C2) in the context of previous work done forC2 concepts (fig. 2).Figure 1. Elements of networkcentric warfare.(This figure, as well as figures 3–20, is reprintedfrom USAF sources.)OperatorDisplayCognitive DomainInformation DomainPhysical DomainDisplayOperatorKnowledgeInformationHostDataBox-to-BoxTerminal Terminal(JointTactical (MultifunctionalInformation InformationDistribution DistributionSystem) System)HostInformationKnowledge010110 010110Radio FrequencyDataDataMessagesBrain-to-BrainLegend: Technical Procedural OperationalFigure 2. Domains of networkcentric warfare.(From briefing, Hanscom AFB, MA, subject: InformationTechnology for Networkcentric Warfare: An ESC [Electronic Systems Command] Integration Week Event,February 5–6, 2003.)

MILITARY APPLICATIONS 79Critical advances in warfare-related informationtechnology, the foundation of networkcentricoperations, have their roots in militarylaboratories, which provide a critical service tothe military by transforming basic informationtechnologies into war-fighting applications.Although the Air Force Command and Controland Intelligence, Surveillance, and ReconnaissanceCenter at Langley AFB, Virginia,has assumed the responsibility for the AirForce’s command, control, communications,computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(C4ISR) for more than half acentury, the Air Force Research Laboratory’sInformation Directorate (AFRL/IF) in Rome,New York, has researched and developed technologiesthat have helped fuel the informationrevolution. The electronic computer, integratedcircuit, storage and retrieval, and Internet,to cite but a few obvious examples, benefitedfrom research performed or guided byscientists and engineers located in Rome.Moreover, AFRL technologies have found andcontinue to find their way into both militaryand commercial worlds where they, quite literally,transform operations, practices, and evenways of thinking (i.e., changes in doctrine).Because information and information technologiesoften mean different things to differentcommunities, it is important to understandthe distinctions that might arise. Theword information is commonly used to refer tovarious points on the information spectrumthat convert data to knowledge. 4 Therefore,information has a different meaning, dependingon the domain in which one operates. Forexample, David S. Alberts and others haveidentified three domains—physical, information,and cognitive—each of which describesand defines information differently. 5 However,the fundamental fact remains that informationis the result of putting individual observationsinto some sort of meaningfulcontext. Given this distinction, information isdefined according to its application or, morespecifically, the domain within which it willoperate. Consequently, members of the commercialand academic communities treat informationdifferently than do their counterpartsin the military community.Aside from the domain distinction just described,there are a number of reasons whythe development of information technologiesdiffers between the military and the industrial/academic communities. For example, thecommercial market is driven by profit or returnon investment, not by overall system performance.Additionally, in the commercialworld, the end user of a new product has becomethe “beta tester.” In a combat environment,where a fault discovery can literally sinka ship, this practice is unacceptable. Similarly,although a faulty design may cause numerousreboots per day on a commercial system, suchrecurring faults in a military system can causeinjury or death. For example, during OperationEnduring Freedom, the system used byfive US soldiers to direct an incoming smartweapon rebooted and, unbeknownst to them,inserted their current location instead of thetarget location into the system. Consequently,the weapon vectored onto their position insteadof the selected target. The bottom lineis that military applications demand higherperformance at reduced cycle times and costthan do nonmilitary applications. Finally, commercialtechnologies are more computationallybased (e.g., building better calculators,computers, etc.) while military applicationsare based more on supporting courses of action(e.g., campaign-planning assessment andeffects-based operations [EBO]). Clearly, asignificant need exists for military-specific informationtechnology, even when such systemsdo not meet the profitability or return-oninvestmentcriteria of the commercial sector.At this point the value of the AFRL/IF trulycomes into play.Research Efforts inInformation TechnologyThe AFRL/IF seeks to transform militaryoperations by developing information-systemsscience and technology that focus on uniqueAir Force requirements. By using commercialpractices, it moves affordable capabilities to

80 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004Air Force ground, air, cyber, and space systems.Broad areas of investment in science and technologyinclude upper-level information fusion,communications, EBO, collaboration environments,distributed-information infrastructures,modeling and simulation, intelligent agents,information assurance, information management,and intelligent information systems anddatabases. Successful outcomes from theseareas provide affordable capability options requiredfor Air Force information dominanceand air and space superiority. To provide thesecapabilities, the AFRL/IF has three majorthrusts—Global Awareness, Dynamic Planningand Execution, and the Global InformationEnterprise—that receive support from seventechnology-focus areas: information exploitation,information fusion and understanding,information management, advanced computingarchitectures, cyber operations, air andspace connectivity, and C2.Information ExploitationGiven the growing threat of global terrorism,the potential use and exploitation of readilyavailable information technology by our adversariesmake it imperative that the United Statescontinue to invest in technologies for the protectionand authentication of digital informationsystems for the military and homeland defense.Toward that end, the AFRL/IF conductsadvanced research and development in thefield of digital data-embedding technology.The directorate’s work in such areas as informationhiding, steganography, watermarking,steganalysis, and digital data forensics willgreatly enhance war fighters’ ability to exploitenemy systems while providing greater securityto ensure that an adversary does not have accessto US and allied systems.Information Fusion and UnderstandingWhat is going on? Who is the adversary? Whatis he up to? Such questions are being addressedin the emerging area of fusion 2+ orsituational awareness (fig. 3). Over the pastdecade, the term fusion has become synonymouswith tactical or battlespace awarenessafter hostilities have begun. As such, work hasconcentrated on identifying objects, tracking01010101010Continuously assess globalconditions and eventsEstablish and maintainbattlespace situationalawarenessLocate, identify, track, andobserve/monitor friendly,enemy, nonfriendly, andnonaligned forces/actorson the battlefield in nearreal timeFigure 3. Fusion 2+

MILITARY APPLICATIONS 81algorithms, and using multiple sources for reducinguncertainty and maximizing coverage.As more situations unfold throughout theworld, smart, strategic decisions must be madebefore the deployment of limited assets. Inorder to assess adversarial intent and possiblestrategic impact, we have vastly broadenedthe scope of fusion to take into accountstrategic situational awareness and the informationtechnology necessary to support it.Air Force Space Command’s strategic masterplan states that “the first priority is to protectour vital national space systems so they’llbe available to all warfighters when and wherethey are needed” (emphasis in original). 6 Thisprotection also includes the ability to repairdamage caused by a wide variety of anomaliesthat might affect space systems in orbit. Aspart of the Defense Advanced Research ProjectsAgency’s (DARPA) Picosat program, theAFRL/IF launched the world’s smallest satellite—theMicro Electro-Mechanical Systems-Based Picosatellite Inspector (MEPSI)—fromthe space shuttle in November 2002, thus layingthe groundwork for an emerging onboardprotectionand/or servicing capability for satellites.The InfoBot (fig. 4) is a robust onboarddevice that receives, processes, correlates, anddistributes information reliably, unambiguously,and rapidly. This concept paves the wayfor numerous emerging capabilities, such asan onboard servicer or an onboard protector.Space protection requires warning of possiblethreats (both natural and man-made) toFigure 4. InfoBotallied space systems, receiving reports of possibleattacks against satellites and US crosscueingof other owners or operators, and directingforces to respond to a threat. To fulfillthese needs, space systems must have onboardsensors to detect attacks and quickly reportanomalies or suspicious events. The primarygoal of these “battle bugs” (fig. 5) would be toprovide a rapid-response capability to counteractimpending threats that cannot be avoidedby other conventional means (e.g., orbitalmaneuvering, shielding, etc.) in an inexpensiveyet effective manner.Figure 5. Space “battle bug”Information ManagementThe essence of the joint battlespace infosphere(JBI) (fig. 6) consists of globally interoperable“information space” that integrates, aggregates,and intelligently disseminates relevantbattlespace information to support effectivedecision making. The infosphere is part of aglobal combat-information-management systemestablished to provide individual users atall levels of command with information tailoredto their specific functional responsibilities.The JBI brings together all informationnecessary to support war fighters and theirmissions and allows them to obtain and integratedata from a wide variety of sources atthe touch of a screen, to aggregate this information,and to distribute it in the appropriateform and degree of detail required by users atall levels. The JBI is a true system-of-systems inthat it works for users at all echelons, from

82 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004Figure 6. Infrastructure of joint battlespaceinfospherethe remote battle-command center down tothe soldier in the foxhole. It is distinct inorganization, process, and usage from thecommunications infrastructure on which itrides and from the user-application systemsthat it serves.The JBI is a “place,” independent of fieldedC4ISR systems, where information can bebrought together. Past attempts to manage informationhave been system-based. That is, indeveloping a system (whether communicationsor user-application) to provide a given capability,developers made decisions on how todefine, organize, manipulate, store, and transportinformation based on what was optimalfor the particular system under development.These application-specific systems optimizedinformation based on the storage and accessneeds of the system’s software, data stores(databases), and intended user interface. Consequently,communication systems were optimizedbased on routing, bandwidth, throughput,and transfer speed. Management ofinformation based on these optimizations hasproven severely detrimental to interoperability—thatis, the ability of systems to exchangeand use information and services. TheJBI acts as an “information layer” that harnessesthe discipline of information managementby eliminating the current “rigid-layered”information environment and replacing itwith interoperable, consistently managed,widely available, secure information spacesthat encourage dissemination of informationto all who need it. The JBI will provide answersto numerous important questions: Wheredid the data come from? Who wants it? Whatis their priority? Is the data “good”? Can Itrust it? Does the data need to be transformed,aggregated, or integrated with other information?Who may access it?The multidomain network manager(MDNM) system (fig. 7) allows system administratorsto monitor multiple security domains(e.g., US Only, Coalition, Unclassified) simultaneouslyon a single set of terminals. It willprovide a network common-operating picture,hierarchical views of security domains, asecure boundary device for accessing net information,and a reduced operational footprint.Estimates indicate that the system willmake possible a 10–25 percent savings inmanpower, will keep costs low (less than$10,000 per installation), and will allow formultilevel attack detection of information warfareas well as response capability. Within anair and space operations center, for example,the MDNM would have the net effect of significantlyreducing the number of system administratorsrequired to monitor the varioussecurity domains around-the-clock, yearroundand of collectively monitoring the systemfor adversarial intrusions.An application programmer’s interface,Java View (Jview) (fig. 8) is designed to reducethe time, cost, and effort associated with thecreation of computer-visualization applicationsFigure 7. Multidomain network manager

MILITARY APPLICATIONS 83Figure 8. Jviewor the visualization interface of an application.Jview allows for the importing, displaying, andfusing of multiple simultaneous-informationsources. What does this mean for the warfighter? Imagine having ultrahigh resolutionwithin a flat screen in an F-15 or a B-2 or aneyepiece for the infantry soldier.The new Department of Defense (DOD)doctrine for networkcentric operations requiresthe application of information and simulationtechnologies in order for the war fighter tofunction in a knowledgecentric universe thatintegrates air and space information. Missioncommanders need to assimilate a tremendousamount of information, make decisions andresponses quickly, and quantify the effects ofthose decisions in the face of uncertainty.AFRL’s research on the distributed collaborativedecision support (fig. 9) environment providesan application-independent collaborationframework of integrated tools, informationtechnologies, and adaptive collaboration servicesaimed at providing enhanced decisionsupport, knowledge sharing, and resourcecontrolcapabilities. These technologies willallow geographically dispersed people, processes,and resources to work together moreeffectively and efficiently to create the productsfor distributed-defense enterprises of thefuture (e.g., collaborative battle management,crisis-response planning, and antiterrorism).Timely information about enemy forces,friendly forces, and battlefield conditions isespecially critical for combat aircrews whosebattlefield situation changes rapidly. The commonsituational awareness (CSA) advancedtechnologydemonstration (fig. 10) is developingand demonstrating the onboardinformation-system architecture needed tosupport task-saturated crews by processing,selecting, and displaying available information.The CSA program, targeted at multiplespecial-operations-forces mission and aircraftplatforms, will integrate information fromonboard systems and exploit off-board intelligencedatabases and imagery products toprovide a consistent battlespace picture tothe aircrew. The CSA design contains threekey elements: connectivity, integrated modulararchitecture, and a crew/system interface.Advanced Computing ArchitecturesGrowth of information technology in thetwenty-first century will be driven by ad-Figure 9. Distributed collaborative decisionsupportFigure 10. Common situational awareness

84 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004vanced computing technology brought aboutthrough the development and implementationof information-processing paradigmsthat are novel by today’s standards. Advancesin information technology will providetremendous benefits for war fighters who notonly face the enemy on the field, but alsostruggle to comprehend the overwhelmingamount of data coming at them from numeroussources. Future information systems willinclude biomolecular and quantum computingsubsystems (fig. 11) that incorporate datastorageand processing mechanisms with densityand performance metrics, such as powerand speed, far beyond current state-of-the-artsilicon technologies. These information systemsare likely to be hybrid systems consistingof biomolecular/silicon, quantum/silicon, orbiomolecular/quantum/silicon computingarchitectures. They will be able to process informationfaster as well as acquire new attributesthat will enable progress toward evenfaster, more intelligent computing systems.Current space systems utilize 1970s and1980s technology in the form of 286/386/486/586 microprocessors. However, tying C2systems, sensors, and weapons via “horizontalintegration” requires the ability to rapidlyprocess new as well as previously acquired rawimagery data. A diverse, distributed communityof intelligence analysts and battlefield decisionmakers needs this capability so itsmembers can take appropriate actions basedupon these analyses. AFRL/IF is working withits sister directorates—Sensors (AFRL/SN)Figure 11. Biomolecular and quantum computingand Space Vehicles (AFRL/VS)—on the nextgenerationspace computer (fig. 12). Imaginean onboard Cray-like supercomputer thatwould provide enough processing power sothat up to 50 percent of a satellite’s missionground station could be housed in a singlespacecraft. This space computer will enhancea satellite’s processing capability from millions(10 6 ) of operations per second to a trillion(10 12 ) operations per second in 2006. Missionground stations can take advantage of up to aquadrillion (10 15 ) operations per second in2010. Such capability carries with it significantadvantages within the space community:reduction in footprint, significant reductionin operation-and-maintenance costs, and theability to directly view, process, exploit, anddisseminate information throughout a theaterof operations without reaching back to a fixedmission ground station.Figure 12. Next-generation space computerCyber OperationsSoftware intelligent agents make possible thecontrolling and “patrolling” of cyberspace.These encapsulated software entities havetheir own identity, state, behavior, thread ofcontrol, and ability to interact and communicatewith other entities, including people,other agents, and legacy systems. Essentially“cybervehicles,” often referred to as “infocraft”(fig. 13), they would operate in the cyber domainsimilar to the way air and space vehiclesoperate in the atmosphere.

MILITARY APPLICATIONS 85Air and Space ConnectivityFigure 13. InfocraftAchieving a completely secure, noninterceptableoperational environment requires thesecure transfer of information using channelsdominated by quantum effects—that is, quantumkey distribution (QKD) (fig. 14). In mostcases, quantum noise is key to developing acommunications channel, but recent workemploying quantum-limiting behavior independentof noise is making a major contribu­tion to information assurance. In conjunctionwith the Air Force Office of Scientific Research,AFRL/IF is currently addressing threemajor problems that inhibit the establishmentof a quantum channel: signal-to-noiseratio, channel control, and maintenance ofusable data rates.The timely establishment of communications-networkconnectivity is vital to the successand survival of US forces in modern-warfareenvironments. Recent conflicts have proventhe need for rapid deployment and quickreaction to fast-changing scenarios. Effectiveand responsive decision making becomes impossiblewithout adequate and reliable local(e.g., handheld radio, wireline and wirelessdata networks, and point-to-point microwave)and long-haul (e.g., high-frequency or satellite)communications both within and outside thebattlespace. The adaptation of commercialradio,local-area-network (LAN) technologynow makes possible the swift establishment ofhigh-speed Internet-protocol-based data networksin forward locations. The vehiclemountedmobile satellite communicationsPrivateEnclaveEncrypted Trafficvia InternetPrivateEnclaveEnd-to-End Key DistributionQKDEndpointQKD SwitchQKD RepeaterQKD SwitchQKD SwitchQKDEndpointUltra-Long-Distance FiberQKD SwitchFigure 14. Quantum key distribution

86 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004(SATCOM) terminal (fig. 15) is attached toan Internet protocol router that will provideInternet connectivity for a wireless LAN comprisedof laptop computers in separate movingvehicles following the gateway vehicle.Over the past two years, several activities, suchas the Warrior and Global Patriot exercises atFort Drum, New York, have included demonstrationsof AFRL’s mobile SATCOM terminal.authentication, use insecure management protocols,employ weak and flawed encryption algorithms,are easily monitored, and are voidof intrusion-detection systems, just to name afew shortcomings.Figure 16. Enhanced commercial wireless networkfor military operationsFigure 15. Ka-band (satellite-based broadband)mobile SATCOM on the moveIndustry-standard commercial wireless LANs,such as the Institute of Electrical and ElectronicsEngineers (IEEE) 802.11 family, createan important opportunity for the military toleverage widely available, low-cost technologyin applications that are difficult, costly, or impossibleto realize with standard wired networksor traditional military-communicationssystems (fig. 16). These hugely successfulstandards provide link speeds of up to 54 millionbytes per second over distances rangingfrom hundreds of meters to tens of kilometers,using equipment that seamlessly integrateswith the vast majority of commercialdata-processing equipment currently used byour forces. In spite of the great potential ofthis technology, risks abound with its usesince the networks operate in unlicensed frequencybands, are easily jammed, lack mutualAt first glance, this technology seemscompletely inappropriate for use in critical,high-assurance environments such as thosesurrounding most military operations. Fortunately,it is possible to reduce or eliminatemost of the risks involved in using networksbased on IEEE 802.11. One such solution utilizesAFRL’s protected tactical access point, thecore of which is an IEEE 802.11b basic serviceset that uses a commercially available accesspoint as its centerpiece. Because client stationsare also based on unmodified IEEE 802.11bhardware, one thus achieves maximum leverageof low-cost commercial technology. Severaldifferent approaches and technologies arecombined to form a system in order to mitigateinherent risks and increase information assuranceon this network. Also, higher-layer mechanismssuch as virtual private networks, firewalls,address filtering, strong encryption,and mutual authentication supplement thesebottom-layer safeguards to provide a comprehensiveinformation-assurance solution basedon defense-in-depth strategies.The Advanced Transmission Languagesand Allocation of New Technologies for In­

MILITARY APPLICATIONS 87ternational Communications and the Proliferationof Allied Waveforms (ATLANTICPAW) project (fig. 17) is an international effortamong the United States, Germany,France, and the United Kingdom to enableinteroperability of multinational wirelesscommunicationsassets. The program seeks todemonstrate portability of radio-waveform softwareonto independent radio-hardware platforms.The approach to achieving waveformsoftwaretransportability entails the cooperativeformulation of a waveform description languageto capture radio-waveform functionalityand a waveform-development environment totranslate this description into operationalradio-waveform software.Airborne tactical data links, a key elementof our C2 structure, are essential to the abilityof our fighting forces to perform their missionand survive. Transforming war-fighter capabilitiesby exploiting networkcentric technologiesrequires a dramatic and affordable overhaulof this capability. The tactical targeting networktechnology (TTNT) program, funded byDARPA, will develop, evaluate, and demonstraterapidly reconfigurable, affordable, ro­bust, interoperable, and evolvable communicationstechnologies specifically designed tosupport emerging networked targeting applicationsdevised to keep fleeting targets at risk.Laboratory and initial flight testing have alreadyindicated that the TTNT design can exceedits goals.US space missions and services such as ondemandspace-launch control and on-orbitspace-asset servicing require on-demand accessto the satellite to conduct real-time operations.The main bottlenecks of space supportinclude limits and constraints on the availability,operability, and flexibility of reflectorantennas that provide links between space assetsand space-operation centers on theground. A novel geodesic-dome, phased-arrayantenna (fig. 18) under development—enabledby low-cost, innovative transmit/receivemodule technology—will alleviate the bottleneck.Furthermore, it will meet Air Forcetransformation needs through new capabilitiesin multiband, simultaneous access; programmablemultifunctionality; and integratedmission operation.WaveformDescriptionLanguageConversionProcessConversionProcessWaveformSoftwareWaveform-DevelopmentEnvironmentRadio SystemMiddlewareSoftwareLoadSoftwareCodeHardwareDemonstrable Radio SystemTestMilitary Standards,StandardizationAgreements, etc.WaveformSoftwareMiddlewareSoftwareHardwareFigure 17. ATLANTIC PAW

88 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004Figure 18. Geodesic-dome, phased-array antennaCommand and ControlThe Air Force’s commitment to meeting thechallenges of tomorrow resides within manyof its transformation activities. To frame theseactivities, the service is adopting an effectsbasedmind-set to air and space maneuverand warfare. Air and space strategy describesthe synchronization in time and space of airand space power to achieve desired objectives.Continuing this logic, EBO orients air andspace power and represents a means of articulatingthe joint force air and space componentcommander’s air and space strategy toachieve these high-level objectives using eitherlethal or nonlethal means. This implies leveragingair and space power’s asymmetric advantagesto create the desired effects at theright place at the right time. The AFRL has initiatedan advanced technology demonstration(ATD) to develop new capabilities for implementingEBO. Current processes for planning,executing, and assessing military operationsutilize target- and objectives-based approachesthat lack dynamic campaign assessment andfail to address timing considerations, directand indirect levels of effect, and automatedtarget-system analysis during strategy development.The AFRL/IF’s EBO ATD focuses onbuilding campaign-assessment and strategydevelopmenttools to fill existing voids.For years the Air Force has struggled tofind an approach to campaign assessmentmore general than the “rollup” of bomb damageassessment. The causal analysis tool (CAT),designed to perform dynamic air-campaignassessment under general conditions of uncertainty,utilizes Bayesian analysis (a statisticalapproach that takes prior information into accountin the determination of probabilities) ofuncertain temporal, causal models withoutrequiring analysts to have specialized mathematicalknowledge. CAT emphasizes supportfor modeling such (uncertain) causal notionsas synergy, necessity, and sufficiency. Developedas a tool for the analysis of EBO-style aircampaign plans, CAT is a critical piece of thestrategy-development tool that allows for assessmentof the effects-based plan from theplan-authoring component.According to Lt Gen William Wallace ofthe Army V Corps during Operation IraqiFreedom, “The enemy we’re fighting is differentfrom the one we’d war-gamed against,” 7 astatement that offers clear evidence of theneed to pursue enhanced methods of wargaming throughout the DOD. In this era ofEBO and transformation, war games mustevolve accordingly to foster an adequate portrayalnot only of US doctrine and systems,but also those of the enemy. War games mustbe adaptive, agile, and without bias. AFRL/IFis taking initial, collaborative steps to developthis new method of war gaming with the goalof both simulating victory and making it happen—fasterand with fewer casualties and lesscollateral damage. To accomplish these goals,AFRL/IF is developing a capability for a thirdgenerationwar game (3GWG). By incorporatingthree additional, crucial thrusts—decisioncycles, human factors, and operational effects—the3GWG augments second-generationwar games that successfully model attrition,movement, and logistics (fig. 19). Additionally,3GWGs will help educate decision makersby assisting them in making better decisions.The military commander must be able tolive in the future, understanding the impact

MILITARY APPLICATIONS 89Figure 20. Joint synthetic battlespaceFigure 19. War games for the next century ofwar fightersof decisions made today on the battlespace oftomorrow. The more senior the commander,the farther into the future he or she must beable to see. At all levels, commanders continuallymake decisions and decide upon coursesof action, based on their current understandingof the world and their ability to forecastthe outcomes of actions under consideration.This ability typically emerges after years oftraining, extensive combat experience, and arigorous selection process. However, even experiencedtacticians can consider only two orthree possible courses of action for all but thesimplest situations. To achieve predictivebattlespace awareness (PBA), one must addressnumerous, complex technical issues;additionally, for the Air Force, PBA must dealwith changes in culture, organization, architecture,and technology. A key ingredient ofPBA includes providing a simulation capabilityso the commander can better visualize thepotential futures resulting from military decisions.This simulation capability can take onmany forms, but it has been dubbed the jointsynthetic battlespace (fig. 20). The next fiveto seven years will witness the emergence oftechnology that will provide a real-world, synchronizedsimulation capability for the warfighter.SummaryNot only has information technology improvedcommanders’ situational awareness,but also it has increased the complexity ofthe decision-making environment. Successfuloutcomes from these areas provide affordablecapability options that the Air Forcerequires for information dominance and airand space superiority. The Air Force ResearchLaboratory’s Information Directorateremains on the cutting edge of transforminginformation technologies into war-fightingcapabilities. The AFRL/IF is committed to thetransitioning of science and technology thatprovide critical war-fighting capabilities insuch areas as signals, imagery, measurementsintelligence, information fusion, informationmanagement, advanced computing, cyberoperations, and C2—the critical informationtechnologyareas that will support the warfighter of the future. The directorate is alsocommitted to developing information dominancethat supports global awareness bymoving relevant information through thepredominantly commercial-based Global InformationEnterprise environment for thedynamic planning and execution of the commander’sbattle plan. ■

90 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004Notes1. Jeffery R. Barnett, Future War: An Assessment of AerospaceCampaigns in 2010 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air UniversityPress, January 1996), xx–xxi.2. The transition from platformcentric to networkcentricis but the beginning of a transformation to higherlevels of warfare. The authors believe that the next evolutionarysteps will move from informationcentric toknowledgecentric warfare.3. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Fredrick P.Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging InformationSuperiority, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: C4ISR CooperativeResearch Program [CCRP], February 2000), 2.4. David S. Alberts et al., Understanding Information AgeWarfare (August 2001; repr., Washington, DC: CCRP, July2002), 16, http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/ccrp/UIAW.pdf.5. Ibid., 16–29.6. United States Space Command, Long Range Plan, April1998, chap. 5, “Control of Space,” http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/lrp/ch05a.htm.7. Julian Borger, Luke Harding, and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Longer War Is Likely, Says US General,”Guardian Unlimited, March 28, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,924497,00.html (accessedJanuary 19, 2004).

The JointPersonnelRecoveryCoordinationCenterThe Next Stepin Joint IntegrationMAJ ERIC BRAGANCA, USAFEditorial Abstract: At every level of the Departmentof Defense, personnel recovery is a prioritymission, a fact reflecting the high value thatAmerican warriors place on their fellow soldiers,sailors, airmen, and marines. Each servicehas devoted thought, personnel, andresources to this critical mission. Improvingpersonnel recovery across the services requiresthat commanders carry out all tasks effectivelyand efficiently. To improve the integration ofpersonnel recovery, joint force commandersshould create a new entity—the joint personnelrecovery coordination center.PERSONNEL RECOVERY (PR) hasimproved dramatically in the last 15years. 1 At every level of the Departmentof Defense, PR is a priority mission,a fact reflecting the high value thatAmerican warriors place on their fellow soldiers,sailors, airmen, and marines. Each servicehas devoted personnel, thought, andresources to this critical mission area in orderto improve the joint force’s overall capabilityand interoperability. Especially in the yearssince Operation Desert Storm, the militaryhas purchased better radios, as well as moresophisticated surveillance and reconnaissanceequipment, and has improved training—allwith an eye toward carrying out “one of thehighest priorities of the Department ofDefense.” 2 The success of this approach hassaved lives in battlefields since the war withIraq in 1991—from the high-profile rescuesof downed F-117 and F-16 pilots over Serbia,to the less renowned but more numerous missionsin Afghanistan, and to such notable successesas the recovery of Pfc Jessica Lynchduring Operation Iraqi Freedom. Despite thisenviable track record, we still have an obliga­91

92 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004tion to look to the future and develop newmethods for tomorrow’s battlefield, whichmay require even more PR.Improving our PR capability requires thatcommanders understand the tasks involved,delegate them appropriately, and leveragethe personal and organizational creativitylatent in the force to carry out those tasks inthe most effective and efficient way possible.Of course, any changes to the current systemmust produce significant improvement andremain successful, yet be financially realistic.ProposalIn an effort to improve PR integration,joint force commanders (JFC) should createa new entity in their staffs—the joint personnelrecovery coordination center (JPRCC)—to replace the joint search and rescue center(JSRC). 3 By working for the JFC, the JPRCCwill intensify its focus on operational warfare.4 This arrangement will also allow components—particularlythe air component—tobetter direct their attention to tactical PRefforts and will open up new possibilities forenhanced joint integration, especially byusing more flexible command relationships.Furthermore, none of these changes willcome at the expense of recent improvements.Current joint doctrine offers JFCs theoption to retain the JSRC at their headquartersor delegate it to a component commander(fig. 1). 5 In practice, JFCs have routinely chosento delegate this responsibility to their aircomponent. But retaining the JSRC at theJFC level has the potential to improve PR dramaticallyby better monitoring and coordinatingall means of recovery, such as combatsearch and rescue (CSAR), nonconventionalassisted recovery, and so forth. 6 This new locationallows a more holistic view of PR and hasspawned a new name, JPRCC, which indicatesa broader view of the mission—specifically,less tactical control and more operationalintegration. Joint PR doctrine, now in draft,should sanction the addition of the JPRCC toCurrent JSRC StructureJFCJoint Force Air and SpaceComponent Commander(JFACC )Joint Force MaritimeComponent Commander( JFMCC)Joint Force LandComponent Commander( JFLCC) Joint Special OperationsTask Force( JSOTF)JSRCRescueCoordinationCenter(RCC)RCCRCCProposed JPRCC StructureJFCJPRCCJFACC JFMCC JFLCC JSOTFRCC RCC RCC RCCFigure 1. Current and proposed personnel recovery structure

THE JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY COORDINATION CENTER 93the JFC’s staff and delineate the risks associatedwith delegating it to a component. 7Creating a JPRCC at the JFC’s headquarterswill not decrease current tactical successesbut will open up new avenues for operationalintegration. Retaining traditional CSAR activitiesat the component level, such as the jointforce air and space component commander’s(JFACC) rescue coordination center (RCC),will significantly broaden PR options withoutslowing responsiveness or agility. It will maintainthe current record of successful missionsand increase joint awareness and involvementin PR. A new JPRCC will not requiresignificant funding, nor will it substantiallyincrease the number of personnel for the JFCor the components. Although it will add somepersonnel to the JFC’s headquarters, the warfightingcomponents will continue to functionas they have, retaining the vast majorityof their manning. 8 More importantly, thisnew concept will not alter PR/CSAR tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTP) for anyservice. 9 It will, however, require some newapproaches to operational thinking—demandsthat the small groups of military PR schools canmeet. Such new approaches can easily becomepart of Joint Chiefs of Staff and theater exercises,most of which already include PRevents. 10Improved Operational FocusThe JSRC, routinely delegated to theJFACC, has become the focal point for all PRefforts by “plan[ning], coordinat[ing], andexecut[ing] joint search and rescue [SAR]and CSAR operations; and . . . integrat[ing]CSAR operations with other evasion, escapeand recovery operations within the geographicalarea assigned to the joint force.” 11However, because the JSRC combines the tacticalfocus of the JFACC’s RCC and the operationalfocus of the JFC, its efforts are dividedbetween tactical execution and operationalplanning (fig. 2). This dual-hatted functionhas forced JSRCs to concentrate on essentialtactical tasks and accept risk by losing focuson other means of recovery. Current JSRCs atthe JFACC level devote much effort to developingand publishing special instructions andcommunicating with components, as well asmonitoring and (frequently) directing PRincidents. Maintaining control over PR tacticaloperations—something that a componentRCC must do—hampers JSRCs. But a JPRCCwill unleash new potential by developing PRspecificjoint intelligence preparation of thebattlespace (JIPB), allowing the JPRCC togenerate a broad threat-decision matrix; integratingPR themes into the JFC’s psychologicaloperations (PSYOP); including nontraditionalmilitary forces in planning; improving links tointeragency and nonconventional forces; andharnessing more flexible command relationships.Relieved of the RCC responsibility ofcontrolling tactical operations (retained bycomponent commanders), JPRCCs couldconcentrate more effectively on these operationallinks, thus significantly improving PRefforts by more effectively leveraging nationalpower for this high-priority mission.PR planners have struggled with recommendingwhen and how to execute PR missions.One of the JSRC’s current combatoperationstasks—a PR decision matrix,tailored to the current threat—is designed toaid PR decision makers in this regard. 12JSRCs typically have no planners since theyare usually located in the combat-operationssection of the air and space operations centerand are prepared to tactically control a PRFigure 2. Focus of the JPRCC

94 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004mission. Unable to look beyond current airtasking orders due to the demands of shortrangeplanning meetings, JSRCs must focuson the current fight. A JPRCC, however,could more readily focus on long-term issues.PSYOP and information operations in generalallow war fighters to inform enemy forcesand populations about friendly actions—acapability particularly important to PR missionsin which isolated or distressed persons mustevade the enemy in either hostile or neutralterritory. PSYOP can convince people in theseareas not to interfere in recovery missions. Infact, under favorable circumstances, PSYOPmay be able to persuade neutral parties toassist isolated personnel and return them tofriendly control. Since the JFC usually developsand/or approves operational PSYOP themes,having the JPRCC closer to this planningprocess will invariably improve the effectivenessof PR. Integrating PSYOP into a comprehensivePR plan requires time—which tacticallyfocused JSRCs don’t have.Integration with nontraditional military forces,such as Civil Affairs (CA), could also increaseour PR efforts. 13 Although some people thinkthat CA personnel arrive only when the fightingis over to build bridges, repair infrastructure,and coordinate humanitarian-reliefoperations, in reality they operate side by sidewith combat forces as decisive operations andnation-building phases merge. Central Commandestablished CA in Afghanistan and Iraqlong before combat operations ended; moreover,US forces are simultaneously conductingnation-building and antiterrorist operations.Because CA personnel gain local knowledgein their day-to-day dealings with the population,they can provide key insights to PR plannersand executors. Their routine contacts withmany nongovernmental organizations furtherbroaden their knowledge base. Although it isunrealistic for these forces to participateactively in combat-rescue efforts, they do lendvaluable guidance to a JPRCC’s threat assessmentor evasion policy. Afghanistan and Iraqaside, not all military operations are combatoperations. Frequently, US forces providehumanitarian relief in areas overwhelmed bynatural disasters or internal strife, as occurrednumerous times in Africa in the late 1990s(e.g., Rwanda and Mozambique). But thischange offers the JPRCC opportunitiesbeyond the links to military forces.The many boards, bureaus, cells, and officesin a JFC headquarters—all of which fuse variouselements of national power—frequentlyare the first places where diplomatic, information,and economic expertise mix withmilitary forces to achieve strategic or campaigngoals. 14 An operationally focused JPRCCwill easily tap into these rich sources of informationto provide war fighters more tools andoptions for the entire force. Since PR includesconcerns about prisoners of war (POW), havingaccess to an interagency working groupmakes available the diplomatic arm of USpower, highlighting the need to account andcare for US/allied POWs and personnel missingin action. The Joint Staff frequently deploysnational intelligence support teams to JFCheadquarters to assist in harnessing the vastcapability of the various intelligence agencies.15 As with the interagency working group,a JPRCC located above the components—andthus having ready access to these teams—willbe able to leverage its power.Better Tactical FocusSimilarly, JFACC staffs will find the changean improvement over the current method. Asalready mentioned, these personnel strugglewith dual tasking, serving as the componentRCC and operational JSRC throughout thejoint operations area. 16 This situation worksdue to the incredible effort by the dedicatedmen and women who make up these staffs.We no longer have to require so much workfrom so few people or rely on the good gracesthat have recently made our PR efforts successful,especially when the price of greatercapability is relatively low.In the years preceding and immediatelyfollowing Desert Storm, PR predominantlymeant rescuing downed aircrews (CSAR tomost people), so it made great sense to placethe JSRC with the air component. However,

THE JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY COORDINATION CENTER 95in recent conflicts, ground troops operatingin rear areas or serving as border guards on apeacekeeping mission, for example, are vulnerable.CSAR procedures, designed andtested for and by aviators, do not always workbecause ground forces face different realities,such as phase lines and surface boundaries,which airmen have difficulty understanding.JSRCs, used to transmitting information rapidlyvia the Secret Internet Protocol RouterNetwork to secure air bases and to airmenwith a common vision of the battlespace, nowstruggle to understand land warfare andinfantrymen. A JPRCC, with representativesfrom all the components, can establish proceduresfor the entire joint force, allowing theJFACC to concentrate on PR for airmen andnot on the unfamiliar field of land warfare. 17Current staffs struggle with many of theless-obvious tasks involved in PR, routinelyoverlooking repatriation, for example. Whatdoes one do with a survivor once friendlyforces regain control? If the survivor is aJFACC pilot, the JFACC’s RCC/JSRC has completecontrol over the repatriation process aswell as the survivor. However, if the survivor isfrom another component, as were the threeArmy soldiers captured in Kosovo in 1999, thesituation becomes much more difficult.Under a JPRCC, the JFACC will no longer beresponsible for enforcing policies on a sistercomponent. Likewise, the other componentswill view PR as part of their joint responsibilitiesand no longer solely as their contributionto the JFACC’s process. If the JFC owns theprocess (created with input from all components)through the JPRCC, then no componentcan circumvent it.The shift in responsibility required by thisapproach will make the change transparentto most war fighters. The JPRCC will not commandand control but will plan and integratethe joint force, leaving tactical tasks to thewar-fighting components. During a PR event,the JPRCC will monitor to maintain situationalawareness in the event the affectedcomponent requires assistance or is incapableof performing PR tasks. In such a case, theJPRCC—acting as the JFC’s agent and with hisor her guidance—will act as broker, nominatinga supported component and, with JFCapproval, designating other components tosupport. Tactical control of the PR event willremain with the war-fighting component, as itis now. This will assure continued success and,by limiting the JPRCC’s role in tactical operations,will prevent undue influence on servicespecificTTP. Such a scenario offers a win-winsituation for JFACC staffs—the JFACC retainsthe air-component RCC but is relieved of theresponsibility to integrate other elements ofmilitary power not directly related to airpower.However, there are even greateradvantages to creating the JPRCC.Better Joint-Force IntegrationThe single greatest improvement fromsuch a move is the ability to use more flexiblecommand relationships. Currently, most JSRCsassume tactical control (TACON) of any elementsconducting PR missions. 18 Althoughthis relationship has worked for air-dominantPR, TACON is usually not clearly defined(e.g., when does it begin and end?). Othercomponent commanders have been highlyreluctant to hand over control of their assetsto the JSRC when they have their own warfightingmissions to carry out, and they fearbeing forced to use another component’s TTP.TACON also creates more problems duringthe fusion of warfare across the land, air, andsea mediums. But establishing a JPRCC at JFCheadquarters and using the more flexiblecommand relationship of support could eliminateboth of these concerns. 19For more than 10 years, JFACCs have takenTACON of the other components’ air sortiesto incorporate them into a seamless air campaign.This action works because JFACC staffshave a great capacity to integrate this airpower.JSRCs have translated this concept to PRbecause that mission has frequently meant therecovery of downed pilots through the use ofairpower alone. Since those pilots belongedto the JFACC, TACON was the right commandrelationship. Recent contingencieshave challenged this paradigm, however, and

96 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004have opened gaps in the TACON approach.For example, the number and reach of specialoperations forces (SOF) introduce a morecomplex battlefield with small teams throughout,representing unique PR challenges andrequirements. A special-operations commanderwith a team in distress should be ableto tap into the JSRC for expertise withoutautomatically passing control of the missionto another component. When a JFACC pilotis the survivor, the JFACC commands thatindividual, who is unfamiliar with the environmentand requires detailed direction forrecovery. But a SOF team has dramaticallygreater situational awareness and the capabilityto make decisions favorable to its recovery.SOF commanders may require limited assistance(e.g., close air support [CAS] and intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance[ISR]) to recover their teams but have frequentlybeen forced to relinquish control oftheir forces (air and ground) to leverage thesupport of another component. This requirementhasn’t caused mission failure in recentyears, but the resultant friction has significantlydelayed missions while the SOF componentand JSRC resolved issues. 20 A JPRCC’sdesignation of one component as the supportedcommand and the others as supportingelements will eliminate this problem. Regardlessof which is supported, none will lose tacticalcontrol of assets. The supported commanderwill dictate the priority, timing, andeffects while the supporting commanderretains control of TTP to fulfill the mission.This principle’s greatest test comes as conventionalforces operate in less linear ways.For example, in Millennium Challenge 02—an experiment by Joint Forces Command—conventional forces leaped over pockets ofresistance to attack key nodes in order toachieve the desired effects. 21 This tactic createda nonlinear battlefield with pockets offriendly forces—similar to the fight inAfghanistan and Iraq today. An air-componentJSRC that tries to assume TACON of non-JFACC forces for PR is frequently unaware ofthe overall campaign and of the impact itsaction will have on the surface fight. 22Thus, commanders are reluctant to passTACON to other components because the latterdo not understand those forces. Typically,Air Force and Navy airpower remains underthe control of a single airman, who can exploittheir similarities. Frequently, Army and MarineCorps ground power comes under the controlof a single ground commander, who cansynchronize their operations. These forces canconduct air-ground operations without passingTACON between the air and ground componentsbecause they recognize their commonefforts and their dissimilar abilities. Forinstance, air commanders provide CAS toground commanders to help them achieveground objectives without passing TACON ofthe aircraft. Air commanders develop specializedcommand and control elements to providethis support while retaining control oftheir assets. This practice works since groundcommanders have little or no ability to controlairpower. The same sort of thinking shouldapply to PR.Changing PR command and control to“support” will produce a shift in favor of therest of joint war fighting. Rather than a radicalchange, this is really an example of the broaderjoint approach. A JPRCC above the componentswill be able to effectively use this technique,delegated by the JFC, because of itsability to view the broader implications of jointwarfare. This capacity to improve the commandand control of PR offers the greatestpotential to increase capability without additionalforces or cost. Simply allowing othercomponent commanders to retain control oftheir assets while they direct or assist PR operationswill dramatically increase their willingnessto participate.Cost of TrainingSince JFCs and component commandersmust incorporate this shift into their battlestafftraining, any attendant costs would berealized there. But these are recurring events,both within the services and jointly, so littleexpense is involved. This change will not levyany new training requirements or tactical

THE JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY COORDINATION CENTER 97training but, hopefully, will improve the qualityof PR training. All that’s needed is a mentalshift to align more closely with the rest ofjoint war fighting.ConclusionAmerican values demand that PR remain ahigh-priority mission. So the challenge for PRplanners and operators lies in creating a systemthat harnesses the massive talents of ourmilitary without setting aside so much powerthat doing so would impede the primary mission,whatever that might be. Creating aJPRCC at the JFC’s headquarters helps solvethis problem.Such an arrangement will provide betterfocus on the core functions of integration. Itoffers relief from tactical operations—truefor all boards, bureaus, cells, and offices—allowing concentration on operational issuessuch as a PR-specific JIPB, including bothground power and airpower. A JFC-levelJPRCC will be better positioned to integratewith nonconventional elements of US powersuch as PSYOP, CA (where appropriate), andinteragency groups. And since a JPRCC willnot assume control of tactical operations, thewar-fighting components will retain authorityover their own forces or TTPs, thus enhancingtheir chances of success. Without addingfunding or forces, PR will lend perspectiveand reach to the joint battlefield, but thegreatest improvement lies in the shift towardtrue joint war fighting.Using more flexible and responsive commandrelationships will better integrate thecomponents into a truly joint PR operation.Many components fear the loss of control andcapability when the only option calls for passingTACON of key assets to another component.Creation of a JPRCC and elimination ofany tactical role might cause the future of PRto look like this: the air component providesISR and airborne warning and control withE-8C and E-3 aircraft, respectively; the landcomponent provides a ground armoredreconnaissanceelement; the maritime componentprovides the recovery vehicle withHH-60 helicopters; and the special-ops componentprovides a SEAL team to move thesurvivor to a linkup point (fig. 3). The JPRCC’sSupported commander setstiming/tempo, priorities, and effects.JFACC ISR and Airborne Warning andControl System (AWACS) AircraftSupporting commanders synchronizeefforts to meet supported commander’sneeds, consistent with other operations.JFMCC Recovery HelicoptersJFLCC Armored ReconJSOTF SEAL PlatoonFigure 3. Personnel recovery of the future

98 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004role in such a mission simply involves designatingthe supported component and thenmonitoring operations. Although an extremepossibility, such a scenario highlights thepotential interaction possible when commandrelationships cease to become impedimentsto PR operations. This will be possible onlywhen the JPRCC relinquishes its war-fighterrole and becomes a facilitator. Today’s fluidbattlefield, intermixing linear and nonlinearwarfare, requires more agile responses. Movingthe JPRCC away from the war-fighting componentsoffers just such agility.Many good men and women have struggledfor years to improve PR and bring us the successeswe’ve seen over the last few years. Thischange will capture their hard work and excellentresults. It will also offer greater opportunitiesfor more innovation and improvements tomake sure that Americans who go into combatknow that their nation and its forces will doeverything possible to bring them home alive,no matter their situation. ■Notes1. Personnel recovery isthe aggregation of military, civil, and political effortsto obtain the release or recovery of personnel fromuncertain or hostile environments and denied areaswhether they are captured, missing, or isolated. Thatincludes US, allied, coalition, friendly military, orparamilitary, and others designated by the [presidentand secretary of defense]. Personnel recovery . . . is theumbrella term for operations that are focused on thetask of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnelfrom harm’s way. PR includes but is not limitedto theater search and rescue; combat search and rescue;search and rescue; survival, evasion, resistance,and escape; evasion and escape; and the coordinationof negotiated as well as forcible recovery options. PRcan occur through military action, action by nongovernmentalorganizations, other US Governmentapprovedaction, and/or diplomatic initiatives, orthrough any of these.Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionaryof Military and Associated Terms, April 12, 2001, 405.2. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2310.2,Personnel Recovery, December 2000, 3, par. 4.1.3. Joint personnel recovery center (JPRC) is the new termproposed for the next version of JP 3-50.2, Doctrine forJoint Combat Search and Rescue (now in final coordination).To avoid confusion with the existing joint personnel receptioncenter, I’ve altered the term to joint personnel recoverycoordination center—a more accurate name and one thatshould become the standard. This designation also indicatesits new role, distinct from the one most people associatewith the current JSRC model.4. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, September 10,2001, describes operational warfare as the level that linkstactics to strategic objectives and that focuses on theoperational art (II-2).5. JP 3-50.2, III-1.6. European Command has created a joint personnelrecovery coordination cell at its standing joint forceheadquarters, and Southern Command has moved theJSRC function from its air component to its headquarters.7. JFCs always have the option of altering their forceand staff structure, however. See JP 5-00.2, Joint Task ForcePlanning Guidance and Procedures, January 13, 1999.8. JP 3-50.2, chap. 6, lists the doctrinal JSRC requirement(15 personnel in three shifts); in practice, eachJSRC is task-organized in line with “mission, enemy, terrainand weather, troops and support available—timeavailable” (METT-T) considerations. Therefore, it’s notrealistic to precisely predict the number of personnelrequired for this new JPRCC; however, the additionalmanning most likely will not be significant.9. Substantial differences exist between the meaningsof PR and CSAR, the former covering the holistic missionin the theater or throughout the joint operations areaand the latter indicating the combat tactical task performedby designated rescue forces. Since CSAR is a subsetof PR, I use PR as the broader, more appropriateumbrella term.10. PR exercises are either stand-alone service eventsor additions to existing Joint Chiefs of Staff or theaterexercises. In the latter case, they are usually minor eventsthat would benefit greatly from locating the JPRCC onthe JFC’s staff.11. JP 3-50.2, vii.12. Ibid., chap. 1, par. 3b.13. According to US Special Operations Command,“Civil Affairs” are the forces, and “civil affairs operations”are the mission.14. Boards, bureaus, cells, and offices are staff elementsof a JFC’s headquarters that focus on a specificfacet of the operation, such as the joint movement center,Joint Information Bureau, and Joint Targeting CoordinationBoard. JP 5-00.2 lists more.15. These teams usually have elements from variousUS intelligence agencies, such as the Defense IntelligenceAgency, Central Intelligence Agency, NationalGeospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly the NationalImagery and Mapping Agency), National SecurityAgency, and so forth.

THE JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY COORDINATION CENTER 9916. The joint operations area is “an area of land, sea,and airspace defined by a geographic combatant commanderor subordinate unified commander, in which ajoint force commander (normally a joint task force commander)conducts military operations to accomplish aspecific mission.” JP 1-02, 284.17. A JPRCC will gain its perspective from both augmentees(as JSRCs do now) and liaison officers, which allcomponents send to the JFC. JSRCs have alwaysrequested augmentation and liaison officers from othercomponents, but the latter—viewing the mission as CSARand not PR—frequently have sent only their air planners.18. TACON is “command authority . . . limited to thedetailed direction and control of movements and maneuvers. . . necessary to accomplish missions.” JP 1-02, 519.19. JP 3-0 lists support as a “command authority”whereby “one organization should aid, protect, complement,or sustain another force . . . in accordance with adirective requiring such action” (emphasis in original) (II­9, GL-17). It can be used at any command echelon belowcombatant commander (the secretary of defense frequentlyuses this between combatant commands as well).20. Problems with the TACON relationship causedhours of delays for both rescues during Operation AlliedForce (Kosovo) in 1999. In the case of the downed F-16pilot, the delay nearly caused the rescue force to attemptthe mission under less-than-optimal daylight conditionsin a medium-threat environment.21. The 18th Airborne Corps, the original joint taskforce (JTF) for Millennium Challenge 02, planned toexperiment with retaining the JSRC at the JTF. However,when contingency operations prevented its participationlate in the preparation for MC02, the 18th cancelled theplan.22. This change also eliminates the likelihood of a PRmission’s running counter to another component’s operation.During the rescue of Bat-21B (Lt Col Iceal “Gene”Hambleton) in the late stages of the Vietnam War,ground forces felt that their mission was sacrificedbecause the air component focused solely on the rescueof a downed airman. Although the PR mission probablydidn’t cause any true disruption of the ground mission,the perception was that each component fought independentand contradictory battles.

Tactical ControlAccomplishing the MissionTactical control (TACON)is inherent in operationalcontrol (OPCON),but moves from the authorityto organize andemploy forces to the useof assigned or attachedforces or military capabilitiesto meet specificmissions or tasks. AirForce doctrine now emphasizes effects-based operations(EBO), rather than just executing a tasked missionto destroy a target or planning for annihilation or attritionwarfare. Now airmen must think through the fullrange of specific missions, consider their associated outcomes,and then choose the mission outcome that bestachieves the assigned objective, while finding ways tomitigate any impediments to achieving that objective.Therefore, TACON involves more than “just” accomplishingthe mission.Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Militaryand Associated Terms, defines tactical control as the“command authority over assigned or attached forces orcommands, or military capability or forces made availablefor tasking, that is limited to the detailed directionand control of movements or maneuvers within the operationalarea necessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned. . . . Tactical control provides sufficient authorityfor controlling and directing the application of force ortactical use of combat support assets within the assignedmission or task” (p. 519).TACON is typically exercised by the service componentcommander or the functional component commander(e.g., an Air Force service component commander is referredto as commander, Air Force forces [COMAFFOR],and an Air Force functional component commanderwould be the joint force air and space component commander[JFACC]). Normally, TACON is delegated fromthe combatant commander (CDR) to the joint forcecommander (JFC), who then should delegate it to acomponent commander. However, TACON can be delegatedto and exercised by any commander at any level.When OPCON is transferred between CDRs or is delegatedto a subordinate commander, TACON is also transferredor delegated.TACON allows the commander to move forces as requiredand to give them local direction. However, it doesnot include authority to change the organization of forcesor to conduct readiness training. It also excludes administrativeand logistical support (unless specifically included).For example, if an Air Force JFACC is givenTACON of Navy aircraft, then the JFACC can task thoseaircraft, using the air tasking order, but does not have theauthority to alter the structure or command relationshipsof those forces or to discipline their personnel. The servicecomponent commander retains those responsibilities.In this example, that would be the commander, Navyforces (COMNAVFOR).In a memorandum dated September 28, 1998, thesecretary of defense directed one exception to theseTACON doctrinal guidelines as they apply to the forceprotectionmission. He directed that “geographic [CDRs]CINCs will exercise directive authority [TACON], for thepurposes of force protection, in the covered countries,over all DOD personnel.” This exception raises an interestingimplication. When a JFACC is also the area air defensecommander (AADC) and has been delegatedTACON over Army Patriot batteries and naval aircraft forarea air defense, the JFACC can, while acting as AADCand for the purpose of force protection, direct the movementof those Army and Navy units.As airmen, successful mission accomplishment is ourjob, and receiving TACON for a mission is both a dutyand an honor. Every airman must be aware of the responsibilitythat comes with TACON and the full range ofoptions enabled by those additional forces, and thenmake the choices that lead to successful mission accomplishment.To Learn More . . .Air Force Doctrine Center. “Tactical Control (TACON).” Doctrine Watch, no. 4, December 2, 1999. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/DoctrineWatch/DoctrineWatch.asp?Article=4.Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1. Air Force Basic Doctrine, November 17, 2003. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Library/Doctrine/afdd1.pdf.100

The Nonrescue of Corvette 03 ©COL DARREL D. WHITCOMB,USAFR, RETIREDEditorial Abstract: “These things we do so that others may live” is the motto of Air Forcerescue forces. However, sometimes a combination of factors such as a shoot-down location ina high-threat environment, not having aircraft available to search for survivors, havinginadequate radios, or using difficult command and control structures can impede a successfulrescue. Although the lessons learned from Corvette 03 seem to repeat the nonrescue of afighter crew in North Vietnam 18 years earlier, these lessons have initiated immediate andlong-lasting improvements in search-and-rescue operations.THE NEWS WAS bad. An Americanfighter had been shot down deep inenemy territory. Both crew memberswere on the ground and slightlyhurt. Rescue efforts were ongoing, and rescuershad established contact with the pilotand the weapon systems officer (WSO) usingtheir call sign, Jackal 33. Nevertheless, becauseof political constraints, recovery efforts weredelayed. It was late December 1972, and AirForce and Navy aircraft were pummelingNorth Vietnam as part of Linebacker II.The crew of the downed F-111A, CaptRobert Sponeybarger, pilot, and Lt WilliamWilson, WSO, were located about 50 mileswest of Hanoi. Although landing together in©2003 by Darrel D. Whitcomb. All rights reserved.101

102 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004their aircraft’s survival capsule, they were nowseparated by several hundred yards of densejungle. Rescue forces located in Thailandworked tirelessly to rescue them, and fighteraircraft passing through the area were able todetermine the general location of both. Therescue task force had to wait for two daysbecause of a bombing halt that the presidenthad directed. Unfortunately, enemy forceswere nearby and used the respite to captureSponeybarger. When the bombing halt ended,Jolly 73, an HH-53 Jolly Green from the 40thAir Rescue and Recovery Squadron based atNakhon Phanom, Thailand, was able to getinto the area and locate Wilson. However, asthey came to a hover and, using the recoverycable, began lowering the aircrew extractiondevice, enemy gunners opened up on thevulnerable helicopter. As the bullets whizzedby, Wilson made a dash for the Jolly Green’sjungle penetrator. Within inches of reachingthat objective, the WSO lost his footing and felldown an embankment. Then a heavy-calibermachine gun put several bullets through theJolly Green’s windscreen just above the pilots’helmets. Capt R. D. Shapiro, the HH-53’s aircraftcommander, quickly reassessed the situationand decided to depart instead of repositioningfor another attempt—the enemy’sreaction was just too intense.As they headed west, the helicopter crewsoon discovered that the hostile fire haddamaged their aircraft and rendered itunable to in-flight refuel. Although they didnot have enough fuel to reach Thailand,they were able to land on a mountain innorthern Laos and a backup helicoptersoon picked them up. A third helicopterlanded near the stranded HH-53 to recoverits classified equipment, but hostile fireforced them to depart. A-1E Sandys werethen given the order to destroy Jolly 73 toprevent it and its equipment from fallinginto enemy hands.The North Vietnamese captured Wilson thenext day as he tried to evade. The combinationof political constraints and the intenseenemy reaction had foiled a successful rescueattempt. 1Does history repeat itself? It is a pungentquestion.A little more than 19 years later, Americanand allied air forces were engaged in anotherstrategic air campaign. This time, the enemywas Iraq, and “Desert Storm” was the conflict’sdesignation. Initial strikes began on January17, 1991, directed at strategic targets and theIraqi air defenses. By the third day, Iraqisstarted firing surface-to-surface “Scud” missilesat Israel. Although they were relativelyinaccurate and had little tactical value, strategicallythey could affect the allied coalitionagainst Iraq if they were successful in goadingthe Israelis into a response. Lt Gen Charles A.“Chuck” Horner, dually assigned as the commanderof US Central Command Air Forces(CENTAF) and the joint force air and spacecomponent commander (JFACC), was orderedto attack the missiles. He, in turn, directed BrigGen Buster C. Glosson, his director of operations,to plan and execute the attacks. Glossonsaluted smartly and immediately went to workin the tactical air control center (TACC).A package of 24 new F-15Es from the 4thTactical Fighter Wing (TFW) based at AlKharj Air Base, Saudi Arabia, was divertedfrom other preplanned missions to hit thesuspected Scud missile sites and supportingtargets in western Iraq. Coming less than sixhours before takeoff, the changes caused nearchaos among the crews as they scrambled tocollect intelligence and request support assetsto attack the sites. The area was extremelydangerous because of all the enemy defensesin the immediate vicinity.Flying as the number-three aircraft inCorvette flight was Col David W. “Dave”Eberly, the wing director of operations, andMaj Thomas E. “Tom” Griffith. Eberly was alast-minute change, having volunteered to filla hole in the schedule.As the aircrews walked to their jets, theyreceived the actual aim points, or desired meanpoints of impact (DMPI), that they were to

THE NONRESCUE OF CORVETTE 03 103use during their attacks. As they programmedtheir onboard flight computers, the assignedtime-over-targets (TOT) were changed twice.Lt Col “Scottie” Scott, Corvette flight leader,said to Colonel Eberly, “This thing is a goatrope. It’s the kind of mission that gets peoplekilled.”Silently, Eberly concurred. He knew therewere SA-2s and SA-3s in the target area, andthe ALQ-135 jamming pod on his aircraft didnot have a capability against those surface-toairmissile (SAM) systems. He would have torely on the supporting F-4Gs and EF-111s tosuppress the SAM sites. 2The situation continued to worsen aftertheir takeoff. Corvette flight had trouble findingtheir assigned refueling tankers in thethick clouds. Then they learned that theirsupporting F-4G Wild Weasels had not receivedthe new TOTs and would not be on stationwhen they entered the target area.As the strike aircraft flew west, their misfortunecontinued. Scott had requested andbeen given EF-111 jamming support. A flightof two had arrived on station and set up theirorbits to electronically jam the Iraqi missilesites. Soon afterwards, however, an Iraqi MiG­25 took off from its home base, intent ondowning them. It avoided engagement byallied air-to-air units and fired three missilesat the two EF-111s as it darted through theirorbits. Both EF-111 pilots took evasive actionand defeated the missiles. However, thosedefensive reactions forced the two aircraft outof their jamming orbits. Not knowing wherethe MiG had gone and not having anautonomous self-defense capability, the twopilots turned south and headed for the safetyof Saudi airspace. The F-15Es entered thedangerous skies of western Iraq without theirplanned F-4G and EF-111 support. 3Scott led Corvette flight toward theirassigned sites, unaware that his flight had alsolost its electronic-jamming support. Thirtymiles from the targets, they began seeing theairbursts of radar-controlled antiaircraftartillery (AAA). At 10 miles, they came underattack from SA-2 and SA-3 radar-directed missiles.Corvette 01 and 02 made their attacks.Just as Corvette 03 was about to release hisbombs, Eberly’s radar-warning receiver indicatedthat an SA-2 was tracking his aircraft.Almost immediately, he spotted a missileapproaching from the right; he aggressivelybroke into its path, defeated it, and watchedit streak by. He then rolled back to the left tocontinue his attack when the bright-whiteexplosion of an undetected second missileviolently rocked his aircraft.Eberly scanned the instrument panel andwas overwhelmed by the rapid illuminationof an ever increasing number of warninglights. The missile had ripped apart his aircraft,and it was dying fast. In the backseat,Tom Griffith tried to make a “Mayday” callon the radio. Instinctively, Eberly grabbed theejection handle and pulled it—the designedejection sequence functioned properly andimmediately ejected Griffith. After the shortbut proper delay, Eberly was ejected fromwhat was left of the aircraft. 4Both men floated down through the bitterlycold night air. Griffith landed uneventfully.Eberly, however, had been knocked outby the ejection and was confused as he cameto on the ground. He had not taken anyrefresher courses in combat survival duringDesert Shield. Nor, because of the circumstances,had he taken time to develop a premissionevasion plan with the intelligence sectionback at Al Kharj. As his head began toclear, he grabbed his parachute and movedaway from his ejection seat, leaving the rest ofhis survival kit behind.Since the two men could not see eachother, Eberly took out his PRC-90 survivalradio and made an emergency call, “This isChevy—.” He stopped, and then rememberedthat Chevy had been his call sign on aprevious mission. He started again, “This isCorvette 03 on guard. How do you read?”There was no answer. Sensing Griffith, whoalso had a PRC-90, was not too far away, hecontinued his efforts and soon made contact

104 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004with his crewmate. Visibility was good; usingvarious distinctive landmarks, they were ableto rendezvous within 15 minutes.Griffith had all of his survival gear.Together, they moved off to the southwest. Asthe sun came up, Griffith could see thatEberly had a gash in the back of his head anda bad scrape on his face. He tended to him asbest he could. Then they wrapped themselvesin the parachute and got some sleep.Corvette 01 had quickly contacted an orbitingearly warning aircraft and reported thatCorvette 03 was down. They, in turn, immediatelynotified the joint rescue coordinationcenter (JRCC). The center was physically colocatedin the TACC for good reason. GeneralHorner, as directed by USCINCCENT OPLAN1002-90, was also responsible for theater rescue,and the JRCC, under the direction of LtCol Joe Hampton, carried out that responsibility.Although each service componentretained primary responsibility for carryingout its own recoveries, they would contact theJRCC whenever they needed help. During thebuildup for the war, the Air Force did notdeploy any rescue helicopters to the theater;so, when CENTAF needed helicopter support,it would have to ask one of the components.Approval, however, was not automatic becauseeach component retained operational control(OPCON) of its own assigned assets. The AirForce Special Operations Command (AFSOC)had deployed squadrons of MH-53s andMH-60s into Saudi Arabia. These were theoptimum helicopters to fly deep recoverymissions into Iraq, but they were under theOPCON of Special Operation CommandCentral (SOCCENT).SOCCENT also had Navy and Army helicoptersassigned to it, and as those forcesarrived in theater, it spread them out overmany airfields in Saudi Arabia. The commanderof SOCCENT was Col Jesse Johnson,US Army. His top airman was Col GeorgeGray, commander of the 1st Special OperationsWing (SOW), based at Hurlburt Field,Florida, and the parent wing of the MH-53sand MH-60s. Also with him was Col BennieOrrell, his director of operations. This wasfortuitous because Orrell had been a careerrescue pilot, had received the Air Force Crossfor a daring 1972 rescue in Laos, and knewcombat rescue better than any man alive.Combat search and rescue (CSAR) wasSOCCENT’s first and primary mission duringthe entire conflict. Upon arrival, its variousassets immediately prepared to execute rescuemissions. However, Colonel Gray repeatedlyemphasized that his crews could not performthe entire CSAR mission. CSAR was aprocess that involved locating, authenticating,and recovering downed airmen. His helicopterscould not do the search-and-locate portion—especiallyin high-threat areas. Combatin Southeast Asia (SEA) had shown that helicopterswere too vulnerable to enemy missilesand guns—Iraq had untold thousands of them.During recoveries, AFSOC helicopters,equipped with highly accurate global positioningsystems (GPS), could quickly and preciselynavigate to the known location ofdowned aircrews, make the pickup, andquickly dart out of high-threat areas—butthey could not be expected to loiter there.Johnson and Gray established three criteriafor launching their helicopters on recoverymissions: (1) location of the survivor(s); (2)evidence of aircrew survival, either a visualparachute sighting or an aircrew’s authenticatedvoice transmission; 5 and (3) favorableenemy-threat analysis. 6Following the Vietnam War, the Air Forcedeveloped satellites and intelligence-collectioncapabilities, such as the RC-135V/W RivetJoint aircraft, which, theoretically, have theability to locate downed crewmen in enemyterritory with a reasonable level of accuracy.However, this capability had not yet beentested in combat. 7 On the second day of thecampaign, SOCCENT had made an unsuccessfulattempt to pick up a downed F-16pilot. Although the Iraqis had immediatelycaptured the pilot and made the recoveryimpossible, the MH-53 crews had proved that

THE NONRESCUE OF CORVETTE 03 105with good intelligence and accurate navigationaldata, they could fly into enemy territoryand operate in relative safety.The news of Corvette 03’s shoot downarrived in the JRCC at a busy time; it was a hecticnight with numerous reports of aircraftdown and emergency beacons being detected.The JRCC controllers had to sort through thedata and determine whether there were, infact, survivors and then locate them. One of themembers of Corvette flight reported that theaircraft had gone down at the approximatecoordinates of 34˚13' north, 040˚55' east,about 10 miles southwest of the target areanear Al Qaim. That was a start, but consideringthat location was reported by an aircraft whichwas itself under fire and moving at over 500miles per hour—covering a mile every sevenseconds—the confidence in the accuracy ofthe location was not good enough to launchthe vulnerable helicopters into such a highthreatarea. Search-and-rescue satellites(SARSAT) also reported location data, butthat system’s circular error probable (CEP)(the area in which 50 percent of the survivorsshould be found) was also too large to commithelicopters to a rescue attempt.Colonel Hampton, the JRCC director,remembered how the data flowed in: “We knewthey punched out. We had intel [intelligence]on them from the RC-135 that the Iraqis werelooking for them for a while and one groundgroup said that they had captured them.” 8Hampton wanted to launch helicoptersimmediately, but he did not have the authorityto do so. 9 In accordance with the theater CSARplan, the JRCC passed the data to SOCCENTwhere Colonel Gray began to intensivelystudy the situation. He could stage MH-53salong with supporting MH-130 tanker aircraftout of Arar Air Base in northwestern SaudiArabia.Gray also had the assets of Proven Force toconsider. Those were US forces that had beendeployed from Europe to Turkey to open a secondfront in the north. Its aircraft included atask force of MH-53s and MH-130 tankers. Heli­copters from either location would need thetanker support because of the long rangesinvolved. That would put more men at riskbecause that section of Iraq was one of the mosthighly defended areas in the entire countryand extremely dangerous. 10 Looking at themap, Gray divided Iraq into two sections. Abovelatitude 33˚30' north, he would task ProvenForce forces; below that latitude, he would useforces located in Saudi.JRCC did not report an accurate positionfor the aircrew, or even if they were alive andfree, when they passed the mission to theSOCCENT. Although Gray would not sendhis helicopters in to do a search, it did appearthough, that the general area in which theycould expect to find the men, if they werealive and still free, was above the dividingline. Gray, therefore, suggested to ColonelJohnson, his boss, that they pass the missionand what was known to the Proven ForceSYRIATURKEYBatman Air Base33º 33’ NorthJORDANArar Air BaseAl QaimIRAQBaghdadSAUDI ARABIAIRANKUWAITAl Kharj Air BaseDesert Storm theater of operations

106 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004crews. 11 Johnson concurred, and the JRCCsent an alert message to the crews in Turkey,who, in turn, began their initial planning. 12Throughout the night and next morning,the JRCC worked with various intelligenceassets to determine the status and refine theposition of the survivors. They alerted the variouscollection elements to be vigilant for anyradio calls from the two men. Such transmissionswould be dangerous for the survivors;the Iraqis had excellent homing capabilitiesand could track any calls they might makeusing their PRC-90 radios. Additionally, intelligencesources suspected the Iraqis of setting offSAR beacons as tactical deception decoys. 13The JRCC had to resolve the unknowns andrefine the data to avoid potential traps.Additionally, Gen Buster Glosson indicatedthat there were some things going onbehind the scenes, which indicated that“other” governmental agencies were alsoworking to rescue the two men. That possibilitywas discussed at SOCCENT, and the JRCCpersonnel were aware that some other possibleoptions were being considered. 14Johnson concurred with Gray’s suggestionto request access through Syrian airspace toenable a possible helicopter mission from Turkeyand forward the request up the line to UnitedStates Central Command (USCENTCOM). They,in turn, made a formal request through diplomaticchannels for authorization to use Syrianairspace. USCENTCOM expected Syrianapproval since it was an ally in the war. 15As Eberly and Griffith slept, intelligencesources picked up new signals that seemed toindicate another downed aircraft in the area.They monitored what sounded like a Maydaycall from someone using the call sign of“Crest 45A.” The JRCC quickly checked withthe TACC and the Proven Force commandcenter and determined that this call sign hadnot been used. 16 A couple of hours later, intelligencereported that Bedouins in the areahad apparently found the wreckage, but notthe crew, of Corvette 03 and had reported itto a nearby Iraqi air defense unit. 17 Also dur­ing that time period, a civilian entered theAmerican Embassy in Amman, Jordan, claimingthat he had information that Eberly wasalive and suggested that he could turn him overto the American government for a reward. Ittook time to investigate this bogus claim. 18As time passed, there seemed to be littlehappening, and some of the TACC personnelbegan to question what appeared to be a lack ofactivity by the rescue forces. Capt RandyO’Boyle, an MH-53 pilot assigned in the TACC,began to take heat from some of the fighterguys. He remembered that when some of theF-15 guys were giving him grief, he said, “Look,next time you’re out there flying around, whydon’t you just descend down to altitude, dropyour gear, drop your flaps, and just go look forsomebody on the ground in one of those spotswhere you think there is somebody. And, assoon as you get him, then you let us know. Youjust can’t go trundling into some place in ahigh threat environment without knowingexactly where the guy is.” 19 His view was sharedby Col Ben Orrell:I’m not kidding. You could see those Paves[MH-53s] 50 miles off. There was no hidingthem. That’s a big ole’ slow moving target—Iwas reluctant to go cruising in there in the daytime.There certainly may have been a situationwhere we would have done it, but if you don’thave a guy talking to you on the radio, it’s prettyhard to convince me to send another two orthree crews in there. . . . The only way we weregoing to survive as a rescue force in that environmentwas to fly at night. And, I don’t think thatthe fast movers [fighter pilots] ever acceptedthe fact that we were not just going to comeplunging in there in daytime like we had donein Vietnam. Had we done that, we’d have lostmore [crews]. 20However, that was exactly what the F-15Ecrews expected. When Eberly did not return,Lt Col Bob Ruth, his assistant, became thewing’s acting director of operations. As Ruthremembered, “When we were over in SEA, ifan airplane went down, we did dedicate justabout any air we could to try to suppress thearea to try to get the survivors out.” 21 But that

THE NONRESCUE OF CORVETTE 03 107was not happening here. The F-15Es wereheld for the anti-Scud missions. Colonel Ruthreflected on that when he said, “Everybodyjust kept doing his mission, and everythingwas handed over to the [C]SAR folks.” 22During the day, several strike flights flewthrough the Al Qaim area. As each would pass,Eberly or Griffith would attempt to make contact.One of those groups was a flight of fourF-16s from the 10th Tactical Fighter Squadron(TFS), led by its commander, Lt Col Ed Houle.As with Corvette on the previous night, hismission had also been a last-minute change.Originally, he had been part of a 40-shippackage of F-16s, F-15s, and other assortedsupport aircraft that had planned an attackagainst a target in Baghdad. Well into theplanning process, they had been broken upinto smaller packages and directed to hitScud sites in west Iraq.During Houle’s preparation and briefingsfor the new mission, no one told him that acrew had been shot down in the Al Qaim areathe day before. Approaching his target heheard, “This is Corvette 03, does anybody read?”Not expecting such a call, he let it pass andremained focused on striking his well-defendedtarget that had very active AAA and SAM sites.Upon leaving the area, he checked with the airbornewarning and control system (AWACS)aircraft and asked, “Hey, who is Corvette 03?”The controller responded, “Why, did you hearsomething?” Ed replied that he had and toldhim what he had heard; the controller thankedhim and directed him to return to his base.Landing back at his base and now fullysuspicious, he walked into intelligence forthe mission debrief and asked, “Who thehell is Corvette 03?” The intelligence officerinformed Houle that Corvette 03 was anF-15E that had been shot down in the AlQaim area during the previous night andthat rescue forces were trying to locate thecrew. Houle’s cockpit mission tape waspulled and forwarded to the 4th TFW,where unit members identified the voice asthat of Colonel Eberly.This all came as a complete surprise toHoule; neither he nor anybody in the flighthad been briefed that there was a downed aircrewin that area. If they had, they would havebeen on the lookout for them. Houle madesure that the premission briefing procedureswere changed to ensure that all of his pilotswere briefed on downed crews and CSARefforts going on in any areas in which theywould be flying. Houle went a step furtherand passed this procedure to the JRCC, whothen began to send out information on alldowned aircrews to all units, and thenupdated the report every 12 hours. Houlealso suggested to higher authorities thatdowned aircrews use the term Maydayinstead of just talking on the radio. That way,they would get the immediate attention ofany listening aircrews. 23That evening, Chevy 06, another flight ofF-15Es, was passing through the area, and oneof its crews made momentary voice contactwith one of the downed airmen. Chevy 06’sposition at that time was almost 30 milessouthwest of the target area and did notcorrelate with any other reports. Lt Col SteveTurner was the flight lead of Chevy 06 andGriffith’s squadron commander; he was certainthat he had just talked to Griffith. 24After returning from his mission, Turnercalled the JRCC and spoke with some of thecontrollers. When asked, he confirmed thathe had not asked either man any private questionsto authenticate their identities. Nevertheless,since he had served with Griffith forthree years, he was adamant and absolutelycertain that it was Griffith on the radio. Turnerthen became very insistent that more be doneto get them out. He was coming to the opinionthat the rescue forces were slow-rollingthem for some reason. When told of the difficultiesthat they were having locating theguys, he suggested, strongly, that an F-15E besent in, not as part of a strike package butspecifically to find the guys. 25 He was told thatthe F-15Es were needed to hit targets and thatCENTAF would send in F-15Cs to search. 26

108 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004The 4th TFW commander was also upset,called the JRCC, and, as quoted by one of hisyoung majors, asked, “Is this incompetence oris it just sheer cowardice?” 27 Tension wasbuilding in the TACC to do something to rescuethe aircrew. Some wanted to send the helicoptersregardless; others were more cautious.Lt Col Joe Hampton took direct actionto help find the accurate location of the survivors,saying, “Every mission that went upinto that area we tasked to make radio calls,to monitor the frequencies. We tried everythingthat we could in order to make contactwith those guys.” 28Consternation from the apparent lack ofaction spread through the 4th TFW. MajRichard Crandall, another F-15E pilot, said,“You can’t believe how angry we were thatthey were not going up there looking forthose guys. We were so angry that Al Gale andI actually proposed to take a vehicle and driveup there to get them.” 29Colonel Gray was the one who was holdingthe line. He knew that without good authenticationthat the voices on the radio were, infact, Eberly and Griffith, it could be an Iraqitrap. The North Vietnamese had done thisnumerous times in SEA, and he did not wantto lose a helicopter crew or fighter escort tothe enemy in this war. Solid procedures werein place to authenticate downed crewmen,but they were not being followed, and he hadno control over that. That was the JRCC’sbusiness. Although the pressure was buildingto do something, he did not want to commita helicopter crew until he was sure. 30Although Colonel Hampton, the JRCCdirector, was not hopeful about the chancesof recovery or even their ability to make a successfuleffort, he said,The guys could have still been down there, andif you can do it without losing anybody to do it,great. But as far as pushing for a mission at thatpoint, we weren’t in that position, and we left itup to the SOC [SOCCENT] guys to determine.If you want to go in there and do it, fine, okay—but we didn’t agree on coordinates. We had aposition that was farther to the east. Why theywent to where they did I think was based onsome cuts from an RC-135. I’m not sure thatwas a real good position on the guys. That wasprobably two-day-old data at that time, and ifyour RC-135 is down here [in Saudi] and you’redoing DF up to that position . . . I know theirgear is sophisticated; however there’s got to besome precision there. 31Up at Batman Air Base in Turkey, theProven Force MH-53 crews were busy planningcontingencies. They were collecting allavailable information, although this was avery difficult task at such a remote location.Given the general area of the survivors, it wasobvious to them that flying east in Turkey toget into Iraq and then southwest to the AlQaim area was much too long and dangerous.Capt Steve Otto, an MH-53 pilot, rememberedthe obvious and said that if we stayed in Turkishand Iraqi airspace, “We simply would nothave the range to make it down towards AlQaim. So, given the threat and that largeobstacle in the tri-border area, we knew that ifwe were going to get to Al Qaim, we weregoing to have to fly over Syria. We started askingfor overflight permission to go throughSyria.” 32But that was not all that concerned thePave Low pilots. Again, as Otto remembered,We had a call-sign, but we did not have any survivordata or any ISOPREP information. Perhapsmore disturbing was that we had three lastknown positions and they were in a trianglewhich was about 20 miles on each leg. The badpart about it is that had it been in a low-threatarea, it would have been no big deal, and weprobably would have been less intimidated. Butthe Al Qaim area had very intense AAA andSAM defenses. We knew that that was one of theearly target areas, and Corvette 03 had beenshot down striking targets in that vicinity. . . .This was really an intensely defended area. 33Back at Al Kharj, after listening to the tapethat Ed Houle had forwarded to the 4th TFW,Col Bob Ruth was convinced of Eberly’s voiceand had it flown to the JRCC. There, Hamptonand his controllers listened to it, and with theconviction of the 4th TFW guys that it really

THE NONRESCUE OF CORVETTE 03 109was their guys, they gave their assurances toColonel Gray at SOCCENT. Gray became convincedof positive voice contact, acquiesced,and directed that a mission be launched. Heformally tasked the combat rescue forces inTurkey, and the timing of his decision wassuch that those forces could still execute thatnight in the dark—their preferred method ofoperations. However, other issues existed thathad the potential to delay the mission. CaptGrant Harden and Captain Otto, the two PaveLow pilots, felt that they did not have enoughsolid data to properly plan and execute themission. They immediately elevated the matterto their squadron commander; he went towork to get them better data, especially amore precise location for the survivors. 34 Theother issue was that Turkey, still skittish aboutthe entire Proven Force operation, hadrefused them launch authority. By the timethese issues were resolved, they had lost thenight. 35Getting into the Al Qaim area in a helicopterwas a tough tactical challenge due tothe high level of enemy defenses. ColonelGray had already concluded that any approachfrom the south with his helicopters and theirtankers would be almost suicidal. From thenorth, the problem was similar; any approachthat came down out of the mountains alongthe Turkish-Iraqi border and then flew acrossthe flat midland of Iraq would be just asdangerous. However, an approach throughSyria looked much safer and was the routeGray had recommended at the beginning.Syria had not yet granted a flight clearancefor the mission and, instead, had recommendedthat they send in a Syrian team topick up the two American flyers. To add furtherconfusion, a Bedouin tribesman hadcome to the American Embassy in Jordanclaiming to have a “blood chit” from one ofthe flyers and wanted to trade the two menfor a new truck. 36 All of this political wranglingresulted in further delays.Eberly’s spirits soared the next day whenhe heard what was obviously the execution ofa CSAR effort. He called on the radio, but wasabruptly told to clear the frequency because arescue operation was going on—it just wasnot for him and his WSO. It was, in fact, for aNavy F-14 crew who had gone down well tothe east.At the JRCC, Hampton continued to taskevery aircraft going into that area to listenfor and try to locate the two men. 37 Thatevening an F-15C pilot, Mobil 41, made contactwith the men. He heard their emergencybeacon and directed them to go tothe backup frequency.Switching over, one of the downed aircrewsaid, “Go ahead.”Mobil 41 responded, “We are just trying toget hold of you to see if you’re still around.What is your physical condition?”Eberly responded, “Physical condition isgood. Alpha and Bravo are together. We areapproximately 10 miles northwest of [garbled].”Mobile 41 responded, “Corvette 03, weread you. Will be flying closer to get betterradio contact.”Anxious, Eberly asked, “Do [you] understandour position?”At that point, somebody came on the frequencyand shouted, “SAR in effect, get off ofthis frequency.”It was a repeat of what had happened earlierin the day. The interloper did not identifyhimself. But Mobil 41 was not able toreestablish contact with the crew of Corvette03, verify their position, or authenticatetheir transmissions.Eberly reluctantly concluded that theywere not going to be rescued. He talked itover with Griffith, and they decided that sincethey were so close to Syria, they wouldattempt to walk out. They had an out-of-datemap and felt that they had a fairly good ideaof where they were. They set out walkingnorth and although they encountered someBedouin camps and even some vehicles, theyremained undetected.

110 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004As they approached what they thoughtmight be the Iraqi-Syrian border, Eberly tookout his radio and unsuccessfully attempted tomake some more calls. He then spotted whatappeared to be an abandoned building; bothmen were cold soaked and the idea of beinginside, sheltered from the wind, was veryappealing. Eberly was also very dehydratedand needed some clean water. As he lookedthrough one of the windows to see if it wassafe, a dozen soldiers ran out of the building,and on that cold, early morning they werecaptured. 38Eberly and Griffith’s capture was unknownto the rescue forces, who did realize, however,that no one had been able to contact the twodowned airmen. Throughout the day, the strikeflights that hit targets in the Al Qaim area hadcontinued to call for Corvette 03 with no result.Intelligence assets kept an ear tuned for anysign of the men but detected nothing. ColonelJohnson, the SOCCENT commander, discussedthe mission and reviewed all the known datawith the Special Operations Command, UnitedStates European Command (SOCEUR) commander.Finally satisfied that the mission had areasonable chance of success, Johnson directedthat the rescue mission be executed, contingenton the Syrians’ approval to use their airspace.The Proven Force crews were primed andready to go in that night. Captain Harden andCaptain Otto would again fly the two MH-53s,but this time with better intelligence and thenecessary data on the survivors. They plannedto make the flight through Syria, escorted byMC-130 tanker aircraft. Their arrival in the AlQaim area would be coordinated with severalair strikes designed to divert the attention ofthe SAM and AAA sites. SOCCENT and theplanners at Batman felt that the supportingair strikes and use of Syrian airspace wouldgive the rescue helicopters and crews the bestchance of success and survival.At launch time, Otto, Harden, theircrews, and their massive MH-53s were ready.On board each helicopter were two pilots,two flight engineers, two door gunners, twopararescuemen (PJ), a combat controller,and an Army special forces team for groundsecurity. Although the Syrians had still notapproved the use of their airspace, Otto andHarden received direction to launch whenthey reported ready.They started engines and took off; as theyapproached Syrian airspace the commandcenter told them to press on to the objectivearea, without receiving the necessary clearance.Twenty minutes later Otto andHarden were notified that Syrian approvalhad been received; that message was confirmedby numerous additional satellitecommunication (SATCOM) radio calls,which soon became a distraction.They flew south toward Al Qaim for twohours at about 100 feet above the ground andon a flight path that paralleled the Iraqi-Syrianborder. There was no moon, but starlight illuminationwas enough for their night-visionequipment to be effective. Capt Matt Shozdawas serving as Harden’s copilot and found theflying that night to be very challenging. Theyhad not yet gotten used to flying blacked outover shifting sand dunes and having theirattention refocused every time the radaraltimeter indicated less than 10 feet above theground. 39 Approaching the Euphrates River, aSyrian SA-6 site, off their right side, locked-onand tracked them before they turned todefeat it. 40Captain Harden remembered, “Our plan wasto hit a final IP [initial point] and then make arun in. The run in to the exact location wouldbe based on contact. If there were no contact,we would not go beyond the final area.” 41The mission was being watched as it proceededby nervous commanders back in theUnited States. Brig Gen Dale Stovall, then thevice commander at AFSOC, remembers that“we held our breath. There was a tremendousamount of pressure to send [the helicopters]in to search when we didn’t have a good fixedposition on those guys.” 42 He was well aware ofthe risks as it brought back powerful memoriesof Jolly Green crews sent in to North Viet­

THE NONRESCUE OF CORVETTE 03 111nam to look for downed fighter crews in1972. The high losses on those missions hadbeen suffered by Stovall’s squadron mates—men whose faces he could still see.The two blacked-out helicopters nowturned southeast, parallel to the EuphratesRiver, entered Iraq, and approached the welldefendedarea of Al Qaim. Low and slow, theymoved toward the hold point. CaptainHarden had requested that air strikes againstthe defending Iraqi SAMs and AAA precedetheir arrival. He had also requested that onefighter would arrive just ahead of the helicopters,act as an on-scene commander(OSC); that pilot would contact the survivors,authenticate their identities, and have themready for a quick pickup. In spite of thoserequests, Harden recalled that “the entiresequence, as always happens, did not comeoff as planned. There was supposed to be adiversionary covering air strike. It was lateand short. When we went in, we were supposedto have a high bird make contact. Thatnever happened.” 43Without an OSC, they were on their own.Captain Otto describes how the mission proceeded:We got down to the hold point and we startedholding in kind of a “figure eight,” not to fly overthe same ground track. We were about a mile intoSyria. Our ROE [rules of engagement] from oursquadron commander was that we were notgoing to fly or commit into the threat areaaround Al Qaim unless the survivors came up onthe radio. We noticed that there was a slight riseand we could stay somewhat masked. As all of thisis going on, the giant light show is going on withthe AAA. It was towards the strike aircraft butrandomly. It wasn’t guided toward us. It was justfired up into the air. Which is kind of the way theyseemed to do things. We eventually got there andrealized that the fighters were not going to getCorvette 03 up on the radio.We orbited for about 5 minutes and expected tohear them call. We were on time as we got tothe orbit point. It coincided perfectly with thestrikers getting there.Then eventually, Grant and his copilot MattShozda realized that it was just getting screwedup, and we were going to have to do our ownauthentication. And Grant told us to stay downlow. He climbed up a couple of hundred feet,maybe 500 feet, and just started talking on theradio . . . trying to get them up on the radio.Probably after about a minute delay, we startedto notice that the Iraqi AAA started to get realintense, once we had talked on the radio. Andeven in the aircraft, we felt that they were interceptingand DFing us. Then the fighters joinedin trying to get them up on the radios. Corvette03 only had PRC-90s. And we knew as long as wewere there and talking on the radio, the odds ofthe mission being compromised were greater.Bottom line is that we stayed down there foralmost 30 minutes orbiting and calling on theradio. Never heard a word from Corvette 03.Then, reluctantly, without radio contact, wewere done. We flew back to Turkey. 44Captain Shozda in the other aircraft hadsimilar memories:I got on the radio and started trying the differentfrequencies to contact him. Somewhere atthat point, we realized that the SAR net wasnothing more than a radio-controlled AAA,pilot-controlled AAA. We would key the mikeand they would start firing. I told Harden,“Look! They’re DFin’ us. Watch this!” So I madea radio call and they started shooting again. Hetold me, “Cut that out!” They definitely had atrap set up for us. They were waiting for us,because the final location that we got . . . [was]in the same general area . . . [and is] where allthe AAA was coming from. 45With no contact, the two Pave Lows leftthe area and returned to base. Arriving atBatman, both crews went into crew rest. Thenext day, they were back on the alert schedule.Within a few days, their unit had establisheda communications link with higher headquartersthat enabled them to get daily intelligenceupdates and a copy of the air taskingorder. Whenever allied crews were flying overIraq, MH-53 crews at Batman were on alertfor combat recovery—it was their primarymission.A few days later, the MH-53 crews at Batmangot a chance to see the CNN footage taken inBaghdad on the first night of the war. Theycould not help concluding that the AAA

112 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004seemed much less intense in Baghdad thanwhat they had seen near Al Qaim. 46For the next several days, flights into the AlQaim area continued to call and listen forCorvette 03. Those efforts were to no availsince, unfortunately, that aircrew had been captured,as mentioned previously, and was ontheir way to Baghdad. However, the saga ofCorvette 03 was not over, and the men of the4th TFW were now very bitter about the nonrescueof their mates. Those feelings peaked afew weeks later when they saw Eberly’s face onCNN—as a POW; it hurt to see him in those,perhaps avoidable, circumstances. To a man, theyhad been more than ready to help in the rescueeffort. Colonel Ruth remembered thinking that“if they [JRCC] had called down and said ‘HeyI need a 4-ship. Can you round up enoughpeople?’ We would have had people . . . theplanes . . . could easily have done along thoselines without impacting the ATO [air taskingorder]. But we were never asked.” 47On a more personal level, a pilot expressedthe feelings of the wing’s aircrews: “Our DO[director of operations] and backseater wereon the ground for three and a half days inwestern Iraq. Nobody would go in and pickthem up; and they eventually became prisonersof war. Before the war, the special operationsguys came down to talk to us. ‘No sweat,’they said, ‘We’ll come and get you anywhereyou are.’ That from my perspective was a biglie. Nobody was going to come and get you.” 48The 4th TFW commander said,It seemed to me that the forces running theSAR wanted a perfect situation. Before theywould launch they wanted to know exactlywhere they were, that they had been authenticated,on, and on. I mean, when we got the tapeI had [Kenneth M. “Mike”] “Slammer” DeCuir,Griff’s roommate and supervisor when theywere running stan eval, listen to the tape andverify that it was Griff. But those guys at JRCCwould not take our word for it. So we fly thetape to Riyadh and they say, finally, “Yep nowthat we have heard the voice, we believe whatyou heard is in fact true.” I mean it was frustrating,beyond belief, that we had to prove to othersthat, yes, there were people out there whoneeded to be picked up. What frustrated methe most was that I couldn’t push the right buttonsto get the SAR going. Horner and Glosson,my bosses, would have broken their necks to getup there, but they were running the air campaignand had no control over the SAR effort. 49Gen Buster Glosson was also frustrated bythese events and remembered some heateddiscussions that he and Capt Randy O’Boylehad about SOCCENT’s response. O’Boylerepeated that there were places that helicopterscould not safely go. As Glosson recalled,Randy is 100% correct on that issue unless Imade the decision I was willing to lose them. IfI’m willing to lose them as the commander, Ishould have the prerogative to send a helicopter,or send two, or three, understanding I may loseone of them. That’s my decision. It should notbe someone else’s decision. I am not saying yousend people into harm’s way just to say you didit. But many times . . . you can assist the CSAReffort with distractions in a way that a helicoptercan sneak in and not have near the exposure.During Desert Storm, AFSOC [SOCCENT]wanted to look at everything in isolation. Theywanted to say, “Oh, helicopter[s] can’t get in.”Randy and I had a few conversations on this. Isaid, “Randy, stop letting those guys, if you can,look at this in isolation. I can make all hellbreak loose a quarter of a mile from where wewant to pick the pilot up, I can make sure thepeople on the ground are only concerned aboutsurvival.” Bottom line, you can’t look at CSAR,or anything else during a war, in isolation. 50Neither Horner nor Glosson could launchthe rescue helicopters because Gen H. NormanSchwarzkopf had given that responsibility andauthority to the commander of SOCCENT,Colonel Johnson. Johnson’s air commanders,well schooled in the realities of rescue behindenemy lines, delayed the effort until they feltthat they had the best chance of rescuing themen and not losing their helicopter crews inthe process. It was an unfortunate misunderstandingfueled by the “fog of war.” Thefighter guys expected to be picked up. Foryears, they had heard the stories of the oldVietnam vets who “knew” the rescue guyswould come. However, when they did not, for

THE NONRESCUE OF CORVETTE 03 113reasons that they could not know or understand,they lost faith and condemned thoseresponsible.Yet, Colonel Gray was adamant in his logic.“I wasn’t going to send guys into a situationwhere we were automatically going to lose ahelicopter and 5 more guys.” 51Lt Col Pete Harvell, a CENTCOM staffofficer in the J-3 recovery section, watched allof this and was somewhat dismayed by theattitude of Air Force officers who, in theirenthusiasm, were so quick to send specialoperations forces (SOF) helicopters intosuch a high-threat area. He said that “this isan issue of recurring special operations’ concernin that non-SOF people have a tendencyto commit SOF forces in unrealistic ways.This is a recurring theme that the SOF guyshave got to fight. They say, ‘Send the SOFguys.’ It’s not a SOF mission. It’s easy forthem to say, ‘Mount up the SOF guys andhave them do this.’ They don’t understandwhat our strengths and weaknesses are andwhat we can and cannot do.” 52Concerned about the failure and itsimpact, the commanders in CENTAF tried toaddress the problem. Analysis indicated thatthe PRC-90 radio used by the crews wasclearly inadequate for the conflict. It had theability to use only two frequencies, which theIraqis easily exploited and compromised. ThePRC-112 was a newer and better radio, availablein limited numbers. It had more frequenciesand a covert transponder identificationand navigation aid that provided SARaircraft with range and bearing informationout to 100 miles. Prior to the war, more than1,000 PRC-112s were bought for SOF andNavy troops. Although the Air Force had notbought any before the war, they realized theirmistake, and the director of operations forCENTAF sent a message to the Pentagon askingfor several hundred radios for aircrewsand homing receiver-modification kits to equipmore helicopters. The MH-53 and Navy HH-60were already modified. 53Interestingly, the message did not ask formodification kits for any fighter aircraft—notthe F-15s or even the A-10s assigned to rescuesupportduty. Perhaps an even better choicewould have been the 72 block-40 F-16 C/Ds,which were being used in the war and wereequipped with integrated GPS navigation systems.Modified with that homing gear, theycould locate survivors by locking their sensorson the survivor’s PRC-112 transponder. Theirnavigation system would then determine theprecise GPS coordinates of the downed aircrew’slocation, which they could pass to theMH-53s. 54Although never explicitly stated, it seemsthat those aircraft were needed for other missions—huntingScuds and destroying theRepublican Guard divisions. As incredible asit seems, the availability of aircraft wasincredibly tight. One scheduler noted that“with all the aircraft available in theater, Ifound it difficult to believe that we were actually‘short’ [of available aircraft to strike theScud sites]. We did, however, have that problem.With the number of packages and individualmissions scheduled in the ATO, thereare, in fact, very few unscheduled aircraftavailable.” 55Colonel Ruth and his men were ready tofly. However, unlike in the Vietnam War,where almost-unlimited sorties were availableto service very few important targets, therewere limits on the number of sorties thatcould be produced during Desert Storm, andalmost every sortie had a designated targetthat was a critical part of the campaign plan.Like the F-111 crew 19 years before, ColonelEberly and Major Griffith had not been rescued.In both cases, the aircrews had beenshot down in high-threat areas, and a combinationof factors had combined to preventsuccessful rescues. Nevertheless, rescue forceshad made the effort and kept faith with theirmotto, “These things we do so that othersmay live.” ■

114 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004Notes1. Chris Hobson, Vietnam Air Losses (Hinkley,England: Midland Publishing, 2001), 244; and Col JerryShipman, USAF, retired, interview by the author, June 13,2002.2. David W. “Dave” Eberly, e-mail to author, April 14,2002.3. Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Per­sian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), 126.4. Ibid. 5. Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor,The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf(New York: Little, Brown, 1994), 250.6. Brig Gen George Gray, USAF, retired (formercommander of the 1st SOW), interview by the author,May 3, 2001; and United States Special Operations CommandHistory, HQ USSOCOM/SOCS-HO, MacDill AFB, FL,November 1999, 36. 7. ICAO Circular 185-AN/121, Satellite Aided Searchand Rescue–The COPAS SARSAT System (Montreal: Inter-national Civil Aeronautical Organization, 1986), 17; BrigGen Rich Comer, interview by the author, July 19, 2000;and Supporting Document I-79, US Air Force Rescue ForceStructure Plan, September 22, 1989. 8. Lt Col Joe Hampton (former director of theJRCC), interview by the author, March 21, 2000.9. Ibid.10. United States Department of Defense, Conduct ofthe Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington,DC: Department of Defense, April 1992), 177.11. Gray, interview.12. Lt Col Matt Shozda (Harden’s MH-53 copilot),interview by the author, September 12, 2002. 13. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 258.14. Lt Col Randy O’Boyle (MH-53 pilot assigned tothe TACC), interview by the author, March 20, 2000;Hampton, interview; and Comer, interview. 15. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 258.16. Time Sequence for CSAR, Corvette 03 SAR, andassorted notes. Desert Storm Box no. 2, Joint PersonnelRecovery Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA.17. Ibid. 18. Lt Col Pete Harvell (CENTCOM staff officer inthe J-3 recovery section), interview by the author, January29, 2002.19. O’Boyle, interview.20. Col Ben Orrell, USAF, retired (1st SOW’s direc­tor of operations and combat rescue expert), interviewby the author, January 17, 2002. 21. Col Bob Ruth, USAF, retired (assistant director ofoperations, 4th TFW), interview by the author, March 24,2001.22. Ibid. 23. Col Ed Houle, USAF, retired (commander, 10thTFS), interview by the author, March 28, 2001. 24. Time Sequence for Corvette 03.25. Ibid.26. William L. Smallwood, Strike Eagle (Washington,DC: Brassey’s, 1994), 124.27. Ibid., 123.28. Hampton, interview.29. Smallwood, Strike Eagle, 124.30. O’Boyle, interview.31. Hampton, interview. DF is an acronym for direc­tion finding.32. Lt Col Steve Otto (MH-53 pilot during rescueattempt), interview by the author, April 30, 2001. 33. Otto, interview. ISOPREP is the acronym for the“isolated personnel report” that documents unique infor­mation on an aircrew to allow for positive identificationduring a search-and-rescue operation.34. Ibid. 35. Benjamin Schemmer, “No USAF Combat Rescuein Gulf; It Took 72 Hours to Launch One Rescue,” ArmedForces International, July 1991, 37.36. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 259.37. Hampton, interview.38. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 260; andHistory, 4th TFW, January–December 1991, 77.39. Shozda, interview. 40. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 261; andOtto, interview.41. Lt Col Grant Harden (MH-53 pilot during rescueattempt), interview by the author, May 2, 2001. 42. Brig Gen Dale Stovall, USAF, retired (vice com­mander, AFSOC), interview by the author, September 3,2001. 43. Harden, interview.44. Otto, interview; and Harden, interview. 45. Shozda, interview.46. Otto, interview.47. Ruth, interview. 48. Tom Clancy with Gen Chuck Horner, Every Mana Tiger (New York: Putnam, 1999), 410.49. Smallwood, Strike Eagle, 123.50. Lt Gen Buster Glosson (director of operations,CENTAF), interview by the author, September 25, 2002. 51. Gray, interview.52. Harvell, interview. 53. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 262.54. Stan Morse, Gulf Air War Debrief (London: Aero­space Publishing Ltd., 1991), 194.55. Williamson Murray with Wayne Thompson, Air Warin the Persian Gulf (Baltimore: The Nautical and AviationPublishing Company of America, 1996), 172.

APJJayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War byStephen A. Bourque. Center of Military History(http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg), 103 Third Avenue,Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC20319-5058, 2002, 528 pages, $52.00 (softcover).We airmen sometimes play down the roles ofother services in joint missions. The dazzling displayof airpower during Operation Desert Stormdrew much attention to the stealthy F-117, theplucky A-10, and the veteran B-52. To be sure, theArmy basked in the praise directed at the capabilitiesof the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2/M-3Bradley fighting vehicles, and the high-mobilitymultipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) becamethe darling of several civilian new-car lots. Despiteall that praise and backslapping, one never trulyappreciates the trip “there” unless one has a commonframe of reference. Enter Stephen A.Bourque’s historical coverage of the Army’s VIICorps in the Gulf War. Bourque sits the readerright next to key VII Corps leaders, providing firsthandimpressions and views of events on the frontand in the tactical operations centers of the corps,division, and brigade.Most striking about this book is its ease of reading.One doesn’t have to be an expert on Armydoctrine, tactics, and jargon to appreciate Jayhawk!The author does a fantastic job of walking the readerthrough some VII Corps history, background ofdeployment exercises, and evolution of AirLandBattle doctrine before launching into the recordof the corps’s deployment and combat operations.And what a read it is! Unless people have “beenthere, done that,” they can’t fully appreciate thescale and complexities involved in assembling, moving,and controlling 145,000 moving parts (i.e., individualsoldiers) and supporting equipment.Bourque guides us step-by-step through receivingthe initial notification, preparing for deployment,deploying and arriving in-theater, moving to assemblyareas, and finally jumping off to war into Iraq.My deployment exercises and operational experienceswith the 1st, 3d, and 5th Infantry Divisions,US Army Europe, and with the 12th AviationBrigade all helped color my reading of Jayhawk!Bourque hits it dead-on, capturing in great detailthe steps individual soldiers must take to prepareand deploy equipment. Moving an Air Force combatwing is nothing like moving an Army brigade.His commentaries on the trials and tribulations ofthe corps’s senior leadership help bring a humanside to what can easily seem an impersonal deploymentmachine.But it’s not until VII Corps launches into Iraqthat the reader fully appreciates what its troopswent through. For these soldiers, the 100-hour warwas just that: 100+ hours, perhaps with an hour ortwo of sleep, of enduring the sharp staccato ofcombat in seemingly endless seas of sand. Bourqueclearly tells the reader that the “Desert war in 1991was not the clean, high-technology conflict portrayedby the news media. It was dirty, confusing,and bloody” (p. 315). He also investigates breakdownsin communication and staff actions as fatiguefinally takes hold at the end of the ground action(p. 380). Few airmen can fathom a missionlasting more than 30 hours, during which a stop atthe club, a shower, and a few hours’ rest may awaitthe combatants; for VII Corps’s soldiers, few hadmore than a catnap while they slogged forwardeach day in some of the wettest weather Iraq hadto offer from February 23 to March 1, 1991.Naturally, Bourque trumpets the outstandingcapabilities of the Army’s equipment, the soldiers’training and leadership, and the ways that this synergyovercame a capable foe. Time and again, hedigs into historical records to dispel the impressionthat the Iraqi army just put down its weaponsand surrendered. On the contrary, at times—suchas the Battle of 73 Easting (pp. 325–44)—the Iraqiarmy put up a formidable defense. If the Iraqis hadbeen better prepared through training and leader­115

116 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004ship, the toll in coalition lives may have been significantlyhigher.Using combat records, Bourque also questionsairpower’s effectiveness against Iraqi tactical units,tossing aside the Air Force’s claim that airpowerwon the Gulf War. Although he does not discountthe Air Force’s participation (the A-10 was an aircraftthe Iraqi army didn’t like to see), Bourquepoints out that several Republican Guard units—one of the key targets of the Gulf War—movedwithout much, if any, interdiction from the air duringthe entire war. In fact some units were at orabove 70 percent of their effective strength whenthey engaged VII Corps at the start of the Battle of73 Easting. It was the corps’s soldiers who ultimatelydestroyed several of these units. According to anIraqi battalion commander from the TawakalnaRepublican Guard Division, “When the air operationsstarted, I had 39 tanks. After 38 days of the airbattle, I had 32 tanks. After 20 minutes against the2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, I had zero tanks”(p. 364).Indeed, citing VII Corps’s records, Bourquepoints out that although the Iraqi army feared theA-10 and B-52, they were in shock over the Apachehelicopter. Negotiations to hold the cease-fire talksat Safwan Airfield nearly came to a standstill untila flight of Apache helicopters flew low overheadduring the discussions. The Iraqi delegation quicklyagreed to terms for the cease-fire site, knowingfrom very recent experience that a flight of fourApaches could destroy an entire battalion of Iraqiarmor in minutes (p. 403).I have only two criticisms of this book. First,Bourque glosses over the psychological effects ofthe previous four weeks of aerial bombardment.Some of the Republican Guard units were relativelyunaffected, but other frontline forces hadbeen beaten up by air attacks and were not effectivein countering the American ground forces.Overwhelming ground-combat power may haveadministered the finishing blow, but many of thesefrontline Iraqi troops were ready to give up, seeminglyfiring only token shots of resistance so theycould surrender with honor. Second, although itwas not incumbent upon Bourque to address otherAmerican and coalition ground operations, onemay get the impression that VII Corps won theGulf War by itself. Jayhawk! is an excellent story ofVII Corps in the war, touching on the progress ofother units as the tale unfolds. But the reader mustkeep in mind that VII Corps was indeed an importantchess piece—but only one of several on GeneralSchwarzkopf’s sandy chessboard.I strongly recommend Jayhawk! as a must-readfor all airmen, especially those whose jobs takethem to work with Army units. Bourque capturesvaluable combat lessons and illustrates the finetether that holds command relationships together.Finally, he reminds us that even in these days ofpush-button technology, ground war will still bedirty, confusing, and bloody. We all would do wellto march a day in these combat boots.Maj Paul G. Niesen, USAFMaxwell AFB, AlabamaThe Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli Attack onthe U.S. Navy Spy Ship by A. Jay Cristol.Brassey’s, Inc. (http://www.brasseysinc.com/Books/157488414X.htm), 22841 QuicksilverDrive, Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2002, 320 pages,$27.50 (hardcover), $18.95 (softcover).On June 8, 1967, aircraft and torpedo boats ofthe Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) struck the USSLiberty, a small warship, also known as a “spy ship,”that collected signals intelligence for evaluation bythe National Security Agency (NSA). A US Navycrew operated the ship, and NSA employees collectedthe electronic signals. The ship had been orderedto monitor signals in the eastern Mediterranean,but, when war broke out between Israeland its Arab neighbors on June 5, the Navy sentfive messages to the Liberty, ordering it to stay outof the now-hostile waters off Egypt and Israel. Unfortunately,only one of these messages reachedthe Liberty—and that one arrived 30 minutes afterthe attack. As the ship reached its designated listeningpost, Headquarters IDF had received reportsof an Egyptian warship shelling Israeli positionsalong the Sinai coast. The two events nowbecame cloaked in Clausewitz’s “fog of war,” combiningto produce the tragic attack that killed 34Americans and wounded 171 others aboard the illfatedship.Since then, great controversy has surrounded theIsraeli attack on the USS Liberty. Did the Israelis deliberatelyattack a warship of their best and onlyfriend in 1967? Did the governments of both theUnited States and Israel deliberately cover up theattack? Have investigations by both governmentswhitewashed the incident for some secret nationalsecurityreason? Did Moshe Dayan, the war hero ofprevious Israeli-Arab conflicts and the minister ofdefense in 1967, personally order the attack?These and other questions have haunted thistragic occurrence for the past 35 years. This most

NET ASSESSMENT 117recent addition to the historiography of the Libertyincident is probably the most comprehensive andunbiased account of this event and has the potentialto put these questions to rest.A former naval aviator and currently a federaljudge, Dr. Jay Cristol is uniquely qualified to examinethe Israeli attack on the Liberty. He bringshis personal experience as a flyer and his professionalskills as a legal expert to bear in reviewing allthe available evidence. For 14 years, he examinedinvestigation reports of various US governmentcommissions and Israeli investigations, the testimonyof Liberty crew members, recently unclassifieddocuments, and Israeli audiotapes of the attack.Additionally, he conducted interviews withkey, high-ranking American and Israeli officialsand several former members of the Liberty’s crew.He weaves this wealth of information into a highlyreadable and persuasive narrative.The author carefully examines the conspiracytheories and tall tales that sprang up in the wake ofthe attack and that have continued to thrive, despiteall the evidence to the contrary. For years, variouspeople, including several crew members of theLiberty, have persisted in propagating the theorythat the Israelis deliberately attacked the ship andthat the two governments covered up the incidentfor some nefarious reason. These individuals haveconsistently debunked the findings of the many investigationsconducted by the US Navy, US Congress,and the Israeli government. Cristol carefullyexamines all the extant evidence, concluding thatthe IDF did not deliberately attack the Liberty andthat neither government tried to cover up the incident.Although some reports were classified, mostwere not and have been available to citizens whosought them. Virtually all of the formerly classifiedreports are now readily available. Through his careful,detailed, documented, and objective analysis ofthese reports and information from other sources,the author persuasively counters the conspiracytheories and tales.After completing Cristol’s book, the truly objectivereader should reach the same conclusions asdid the numerous investigations and the author—that the tragic attack on the Liberty was a grievouscase of mistaken identity and nothing more. Killingand injuring friendly forces have always been unfortunateconsequences of war—witness the fatalshooting of Gen Stonewall Jackson in 1863 by hisown troops at Chancellorsville, Virginia; the EighthAir Force bombing of American troops at Saint-Lô,France, in 1944; and the shootdown of two USArmy Black Hawk helicopters in Iraq by two US AirForce F-15s in April 1994. Furthermore, both governmentsmade complete and honest investigationsto determine the causes of the incident. Ifanything, the US Navy should shoulder the preponderanceof responsibility for the attack becauseits inadequate communications system of1967 failed to give the Liberty timely notice to stayaway from the war zone—if it had not been therein the first place, it would not have been attacked.This book should put to bed the notions of a deliberateIsraeli attack and cover-up. Unfortunately,human nature being what it is, some people willcontinue to believe these ideas. Hopefully, thisbook will persuade others that the attack on theLiberty was truly a case of mistaken identity.Lt Col Robert B. Kane, USAFMaxwell AFB, AlabamaMalta Spitfire: The Diary of a Fighter Pilot byGeorge Beurling and Leslie Roberts. StackpoleBooks (http://www.stackpolebooks.com), 5067Ritter Road, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055­6921, 2002, 260 pages, $19.95 (softcover).Critics often look at movies like Casablanca andsay, “They sure don’t make them like that anymore.” Similarly, aviation nuts like me swoon whenthey see a P-51 Mustang or Spitfire fly overhead,declaring, “They sure don’t make planes like thatany more.” In the world of military history books,the memoir occupies a special niche because itstone and sense of urgency make it unique and interestingto read: “They don’t write books like thisany more.”Originally published in 1943, Malta Spitfirechronicles the flying career of a superior Canadianfighter pilot who rose to fame and notoriety overthe skies of Malta in the summer of 1942. Hisrecord of destroying 27 German and Italian aircraft,damaging eight others, and scoring threeprobable kills in a 14-day period stands as one ofWorld War II’s memorable aerial-combat achievements.Impressive though these numbers may be,it is his account of learning to fly, trying to join theRoyal Canadian Air Force, and fighting the Luftwaffeas a Royal Air Force pilot that makes thisstory so interesting.Although sometimes labeled a cold-bloodedkiller, Beurling was more accurately a frustrated,desperate man whose hatred for the enemy is reflectedthroughout the book in his vitriolic, disparagingremarks about the Germans. Such emotionsare difficult to imitate and can come only from

118 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004the pen of someone intimately involved in this typeof conflict. Beurling’s explosive personality, however,often got him in trouble with his superiors—so much so, that even with 31 confirmed aerial victoriesand even at the height of the war in October1944, the Canadians allowed Beurling to “retire”from military duty.In addition to its ample illustrations and 12black-and-white photographs, the book features awonderful foreword and minibiographies of Beurling’sfellow pilots by noted historian ChristopherShores. As with many memoirs, the writer often doesnot provide historical context, but that is no obstacleto readers who want to understand the thoughtsand read the words of men embroiled in combat.Beurling and his squadron’s contribution to beatingback the German and Italian “blitz” of Maltaand his expertise as a fighter pilot and master of deflectionshooting make this story worth reading.The study of battles and accumulation of detailedknowledge about aircraft obviously have theirplace in historical analysis. Too often, however, wetend to ignore the human element of warfare—yetanother reason to read this book. Although $19.95may be a bit steep for a paperback, Malta Spitfirewill not disappoint its readers.Lt Col Rob Tate, USAFRMaxwell AFB, AlabamaOn Target: Organizing and Executing the StrategicAir Campaign against Iraq by Richard G. Davis.Air Force History and Museums Program(http://www.air forcehistor y.hq.af.mil/publications.htm), 200 McChord Street, Box94, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20332-1111,2002, 385 pages, $45.00. Available online athttp://www.air forcehistor y.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/OnTarget(Davis).pdf.On Target is a stunningly well documented anddetailed book on Operation Desert Storm’s strategicair campaign. Readers may wonder, however,“Since we just finished the second Gulf War, whyread about the first?” In light of the success of OperationIraqi Freedom, On Target provides a worthwhileread for air and space power professionals ofall services as well as military-strategy enthusiasts asthey prepare to delve into analyses of the more recentconflict. After all, one can’t hope to understandIraqi Freedom without understandingDesert Storm. Moreover, this book’s surprisingdepth and detail make it well worth the effort.In the book’s Desert Shield section, reminiscentof Richard T. Reynolds’s excellent Heart of theStorm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign against Iraq,published by Air University Press, Davis effectivelypresents both the situation in Iraq before the warand the convoluted planning process and backroomdiscussions that resulted in the air campaignplan. Dr. Davis’s easy-to-read style captures many ofthe machinations of briefings and command personalitiesthat play into campaign planning. Heconcisely and evenhandedly discusses John Warden’srevolutionary concepts and Maj Gen DaveDeptula’s construction of a master air-attack planunder Gen Buster C. Glosson and Gen Charles A.Horner, as well as the many interactions and conflictsbetween planners and commanders. The factthat he interviewed many of the principal playersadds to the veracity of the account.Although other books, such as Michael R. Gordonand Bernard E. Trainor’s classic The Generals’War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, discussthe major political players in more detail, On Targetexpounds upon the intrigue and philosophiesbehind the emotions of warriors who debated howbest to use the air component in this transitional war.Davis also adroitly mixes in operational details—who went where and when—during the initial confusionfrom deployment to combat.In the Desert Storm section, Dr. Davis goes twosteps further than most authors in terms of documentationand depth. For example, he even citesmission reports from the 4th Fighter Wing (Provisional),commanded by Hal Hornburg, a colonelat that time. Although his fleshing out of a few detailsleaves some gaps, Davis goes through the targetsets selected by planners for attacks designed tobring Saddam Hussein to his knees in 1991.Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen’s Gulf WarAir Power Survey offers more statistics, but Davis’sunclassified recounting covers most of the key pointsbehind the air campaign plan. Initially called InstantThunder, the strategic air campaign forDesert Storm was based upon Col John Warden’sfamous “five rings” theory for the application ofstrategic airpower. Many readers, however, will preferthe brief but rich stories of battle that tie thetheory to combat action.Although On Target is a bold addition to the historyof war-fighting strategy, it suffers from two deficiencies.First, it gives short shrift to effects-basedoperations, which represent a critical departurefrom the AirLand Battle doctrine of the Cold War.The success of the Desert Storm air campaignhelped make effects-based theory palatable to old­

NET ASSESSMENT 119school ground-power strategists, and the jointworld now considers such thinking standard.Dr. Davis treats the story of the theory’s developmentbetter than he does in the postwar assessment.Maj Gen David A. Deptula’s monograph Firingfor Effect: Change in the Nature of Warfare providesa simpler explanation of how and why we use effectsbasedoperations—an evolutionary leap in planningthat, together with our new precision-strikecapabilities, allowed coalition air and space powerin conjunction with only cavalry and special operationsto crush the Taliban regime in Afghanistanand then support conventional forces in themarch to Baghdad 18 months later. These hugelydifferent operations shared a theory that enabledthe same platforms and warriors to succeed in bothcases. Flexibility is indeed the key to airpower.Davis comments that “it is difficult to conceiveof any bombing plan that will release the grasp ofa police state on its populace” (p. 317). But as GeneralDeptula writes, the goal of effects-based operationsis “control,” not simple attrition. Moreover,modern air and space power strategists don’t planto win wars through aerial bombardment alone—that idea went out with Billy Mitchell. On the otherhand, perhaps Operation Allied Force and SlobodanMilosevic demonstrated that we should never say“never.”Second, examining the desired effects is criticalto effective campaign planning—not shooting fora specific body count or a magic number of tanksdestroyed. So it’s important to remember that whatmany people traditionally think of as tactical targets—convoys,troops, and old-fashioned interdictionand close-air-support targets—can (and oftendo) yield strategic effects. The highway leadingnorth from Kuwait City is a case in point. On February26–27, 1991, F-15Es, A-10s, and a host of othercoalition aircraft wreaked havoc on the Iraqi army’sarmed retreat. Dr. Davis doesn’t even mention thisevent, even though other sources point to it as akey reason that some allied leaders sought a quickend to the ground campaign. Strategic target setsare critical, but effects can cause unintended consequencesthat ripple far beyond the battlefield.I’m not sure that I buy the author’s conclusionthat “the strategic bombing campaign against Iraqwas a decisive factor. . . . When joined to the tacticalair effort against Iraqi forces in Kuwait . . . airpower was the decisive factor” (p. 320, emphasis inoriginal). I strongly feel that the “which is more decisive”debate is both futile and tired. Yet, this criticismdoesn’t take away from the fine scholarly effortby Dr. Davis, who has a gift for capturing awildly complicated plan and making sense of it onpaper. Furthermore, his documentation and levelof specificity are outstanding. Many unique sources,including mission reports that probably only aircrewsand intelligence officers have read, are availableto the average reader solely through thisbook. I also like On Target because it may set youngand old warriors alike to thinking about why we dowhat we do—and how we do it.Lt Col Merrick E. Krause, USAFWashington, DCSecret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century editedby Heike Bungert, Jan Heitmann, and MichaelWala. Frank Cass Publishers (http://www.frankcass.com), 5824 NE Hassalo Street, Portland,Oregon 97213-3644, 2003, 200 pages, $84.95(hardcover).Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the openingof archives in the former East Germany, a torrentof information has appeared in the popularpress. The scholastic approach of Secret Intelligencein the Twentieth Century examines German intelligencestructures and policy as well as the attemptsof other powers to gather intelligence about Germanstates. Some of the early essays in the bookcover issues already known to most intelligence researchers,but one also finds real gems dealt withfor the first time in print. An account of the attempteduse of ethnic Germans during World WarII makes for interesting reading, for example.What makes this book unique, however, are thepost–World War II pieces, such as the one that addressesthe ability of Gen Reinhard Gehlen ofFremde Heere Ost, one of the intelligence arms ofthe German High Command, to foresee the demiseof the World War II–era Anglo-Soviet bondand Germany’s emergence as a vital part of theWestern defense alliance. Not only does one finddetails concerning Gehlen’s influence on Germannational-security making and policy development,but also information about his ties to the CIA andthe US Army’s G-2 in Heidelberg. A KGB officer’sviewpoint of KGB and East German penetration ofthe Gehlen organization and its successor, theBND (German Intelligence), makes the whole periodcome alive. The establishment of East Germansecurity services and their role in the East-West spygame show that the Soviets were intimidated byGehlen’s successes but that the KGB also lackedthe skills to be successful in a Western-orientedGermany.

120 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004For Air Force readers, the essay on the WringerProject is the first entry in what undoubtedly willbecome a new subfield in East-West Cold War history:the use of German former prisoners of warand detainees to build an intelligence and targetdatabase on the closed Soviet Union. Run by theAir Force to gather target data, Wringer showedthe feasibility and indispensablity of the mass exploitationof human intelligence sources. The inabilityof the United States to obtain a good intelligencepicture of events inside East Germany,especially during the 1953 revolt, may have led topolicy decisions in Washington that ultimatelycaused the uprising to fail. West Berlin, the islandinside East German territory, proved a valuable listeningand observation point for the CIA in theearly years of the Cold War. The book includes accountsof the experiences and successes of formeragents in charge there.Because of the scarcity of intelligence texts, anycontribution to the field is welcome, especially onethat covers Germany and the early Cold War. SecretIntelligence in the Twentieth Century contains much ofinterest to both Air Force historians and intelligencehistorians.Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, RetiredFairfax, VirginiaCorporate Warriors: The Rise of the PrivatizedMilitary Industry by P. W. Singer. Cornell Studiesin Security Affairs, Cornell University Press(http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu), SageHouse, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York14850, 2003, 352 pages, $39.95 (hardcover).In the past 10 years, in the aftermath of the ColdWar, military forces and military budgets have becomesmaller. The superpower standoff has disappeared,allowing former client states to engage ininternal and external wars with impunity. Wars aremore frequent, and those who would intervenehave less capacity to do so. Militaries are also tryingto maximize tooth and minimize tail. Filling all thegaps are corporate warriors, private armies willingto go anywhere and do almost anything—for a price.P. W. Singer traces the history of mercenariesand other private forces, noting that the traditionis as old as civilization—beginning in Ur thousandsof years ago. Given that the “modern” nationalstate military dates back only 200 years, the privatizedmilitary industry (PMI) is not the departurefrom tradition that it first seems. But PMIs are notpurely mercenaries. They come in three generaltypes: providers, consultants, and support services.Executive Outcomes was a provider (i.e., a combatforce). Consultants are more accurately designatedmilitary advisors and trainers; for example, MilitaryProfessional Resources Incorporated (MPRI),a spin-off from the Lockheed-Loral merger, builtthe Croat army. A representative support PMI isBrown & Root Services, the Halliburton subsidiarythat is currently a major contract rebuilder in Iraq.PMIs are problematic. For one thing, the commanderloses disciplinary control over contractemployees; the penalty for breach of contract differsgreatly from that for being absent withoutleave. For another, the fact that these companiesgenerally have cost-plus contracts and proprietaryinformation makes it hard to determine whetheror not the PMI is really providing the right service.In the worst case, governments can lose the abilityto handle their own defense. Furthermore, there isreason to worry about the implications for nationstatesin a world of extremely well armed globalcorporations.Corporate Warriors breaks new ground as the firstserious study of a decade-old phenomenon thatevolves with each merger and absorption of thePMI into a global conglomerate. It should be requiredreading for military professionals and anyoneelse concerned about the unfolding of ourAmerican experiment in civilian control of themilitary and the state control of force.John H. BarnhillTinker AFB, OklahomaSpace Policy in the 21st Century edited by W.Henry Lambright. Johns Hopkins UniversityPress (http://www.press.jhu.edu), 2715 NorthCharles Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21218,2003, 272 pages, $49.95 (hardcover).Space Policy in the 21st Century is not really aboutspace policy in the twenty-first century. It is about afar more specialized topic—civil space (i.e., theNational Aeronautics and Space Administration[NASA])—in an increasingly distant (in substanceas well as time) era: the end of the twentieth century.Although the book carries a copyright date of2003, it is clear that the writing of its nine articlespredates two important events in the national spacearena: (1) September 11, 2001, and (2) the loss ofspace shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003. Thiscombination of too narrow a scope and a focus onyesterday’s issues serves to make this collection

NET ASSESSMENT 121more historical artifact than useful guide to contemporarynational space policy.The book’s primary shortcoming is its almostexclusive focus on civil space; it gives short shrift tocommercial space ventures and virtually no attentionto national-security space activities. This isparticularly frustrating in the post-9/11 and post-Columbia environment. This book treats NASA andits missions as the centerpiece of national space policy,whereas a central issue in today’s broader spacepolicycircles is, indeed, the very relevance of NASA,which finds itself on the verge of being squeezedout between commercial endeavors on the one sideand national-security pursuits on the other.The global positioning system is a case in point.This technological wonder that enables precisionwarfare and also provides the bedrock for civil navigationand even financial transactions worldwidereceives minuscule attention here. Similarly, theEvolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program,which saw two successful maiden flights by separatelaunch providers in 2002 and which may be(in the post-Columbia era) man-rated for NASAmissions in the years to come, is not even mentionedin the chapter on “Space Access.” Even more surrealis Ronald J. Deibert’s claim in his chapter regardingfuture uses for remote sensing that “theone [use] that is likely to generate the greatestneed for satellite monitoring technologies indecades to come is studies of global warming andclimate change” (p. 97). If only, in the post-9/11world, this could truly be our greatest informationcollectionneed!Ironically, the chapters least anachronized by9/11 and Columbia are those that would likely havebeen considered most fanciful at the turn of thiscentury (e.g., Daniel H. Deudney’s treatise on asteroidutilization and avoidance and Christopher F.Chyba’s discussion of the search for extraterrestriallife). The book winds up with commentaries byJohn M. Logsdon and Howard E. McCurdy; theserelatively skeptical assessments on the future ofNASA programs, also somewhat dated, at leastseem prescient in their cautionary themes.Even in the late twentieth century, NASA couldhardly be considered the solitary leader of nationalspace policy; this truth is only more pronounced inthe aftermath of 9/11 and Columbia. Despite thewishful thinking that runs in torrents throughthese pages, the real space-policy questions, for theforeseeable future, will address partnering by theDepartment of Defense (DOD)/NASA/industryto attain assured access, employing space capabilitiesto meet national-security needs, and strengtheningspace industry. Such questions will includethe following: How can the DOD and NASA bestpartner to develop true assured access to space?What balance of regulation of commercial spaceactivities will preserve security (both national and industrial)while maximizing commercial growth andinvestment? What are the proper technology roadmaps to produce space capabilities that will meetfuture national-security needs, future commercialinfrastructuredemands, and space-exploration objectives?Readers looking for possible answers tothese contemporary questions will not find themin this book. What they will find is history: musingson the future of NASA from a more lighthearted era.Maj John E. Shaw, USAFMaxwell AFB, AlabamaDer Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg,1940–1945 by Jörg Friedrich. Propyläen Verlag(http://www.propylaeen-verlag.de), Bayerstrasse71-73, 80335 Munich, Germany, 2002, 591 pages(hardcover), Euro [D] 25.00.*For decades, mainstream German historiansand authors have trod carefully when discussingGerman victims of the Combined Bomber Offensivelest they be accused of relativizing Germany’saggression and the Holocaust. Yet, for an entiregeneration of Germans, the World War II experienceis intimately linked to childhood memories ofair raids, nights spent in bomb shelters, and theflight from the cities to the countryside. JörgFriedrich’s Der Brand (The Fire), which appearedshortly before the acrimonious German-Americandebate concerning the use of force against Iraq,generated an unprecedented level of public interestabout the civilian and cultural costs of the Alliedurban-bombing campaign against Germany, withcommentators frequently drawing upon Germany’sexperience in World War II to comment about thepotential impact of an air campaign against Iraq.German historians, literati, and public intellectualscontributed reviews and newspaper commentaries*A fuller version of this review, including notes to current literature, appeared online last year: Douglas Peifer, “Review of JörgFriedrich, Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg, 1940–1945,” H-German, H-Net Reviews, November 2003, http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=277121069229925. For additional reviews, links, and commentaries on Friedrich’s book, see “World War II Bombing:Rethinking German Experiences,” H-German Forum, http://www.h-net.org/~german/discuss/WWII_bombing/WWII-bombing_index.htm.

122 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004on the Allied air campaign against Germany fromthe perspective of the bombed. German television,the popular press, and the book industry capitalizedon public interest by airing documentaries,publishing serials on the aerial destruction of Germany’scities in World War II, and spurring booksales on firebombing, bomb shelters, airpower,and civilian casualties. British historians joined thefray, with the British popular press lambastingFriedrich’s work and warning of German revisionism.Despite mixed reviews, Der Brand provedwildly successful in Germany because it addressedan issue where history, memory, and current securitydebates intersected—namely, the use and misuseof airpower.Der Brand engendered this amount of attentionand debate not because it unveiled startling newrevelations or called for fundamental reinterpretationsof the historical record, but because it touchedseveral sensitive points of contention. First, thebook is one of several in which the German Lefthas rediscovered events from the past that havenever faded from the memory of the conservativeRight: the German civilian casualties of the Anglo-American air campaign, the maritime evacuationof Germans from East Prussia, and the post–WorldWar II expulsions of Germans from the Sudetenland,Poland, and elsewhere. The German Left’sreacquisition of a portion of the memory spectrum,long voluntarily ceded to conservatives, has raisedconcern that Germans may embrace a cult of victimhoodthat relativizes Germany’s role in the outbreakof war, in the implementation of the Holocaust,and in the Wehrmacht’s deliberate violation of rulesof warfare on the Eastern Front.Second, the book has stirred interest because ittackles a long vein of scholarship on the issue ofmorality in war—specifically, a long-running debateabout jus in bello criticisms of Allied areabombardmentstrategies during World War II. TheBritish reaction to Friedrich’s work focuses on thisissue, with the British boulevard press particularlyenraged by the author’s assertion that Churchillwas responsible for the death of tens of thousandsof innocent women and children. In addition,Friedrich correctly points out that from the groundperspective, the much-publicized contrast betweenBritish nighttime area bombardment and Americanhigh-altitude precision daylight bombing was oftenmoot, with American bomber groups exacting ahigh casualty rate among civilians. AlthoughFriedrich’s analysis of the brutalization of the airwar presents nothing new, his previous work examiningWehrmacht crimes and Nazi justice en­ables him to approach the subject without riskingautomatic dismissal as a right-wing apologist. For aGerman public sensitized to the distinction betweenlegal and illegal conduct in war as a result of decadesof scholarship on German war crimes, Der Brand offeredthe opportunity to broaden focus and subtlyreengage German Nuremberg-era rebuttals of tuquoque (legal defense of “you did likewise”).Tied to this historical analysis of the morality ofthe Anglo-American air campaign against the ThirdReich is a related third debate—namely, what lessonsone can draw from the past that have current relevanceand applicability. Der Brand was published inNovember 2002, shortly before the high-water markof the Bush administration’s effort to garner internationalsupport for the forcible removal of SaddamHussein. German peace activists frequently proclaimedthat history proved that force was not an answer,with commentators such as Hans Mommsennoting that no one should be surprised at the Germans’opposition to war, given their historical experience.Friedrich echoed similar sentiments elsewhere,commenting that since 1945 Germans haveempathized more with the bombed than thebomber. Evidence linking sales of Der Brand to thencurrentdiscussions of war against Iraq is circumstantial,but numerous interviews make connections betweenthe two, suggesting that the interactionamong history, memory, and current affairs increasedinterest in and readership of Der Brand.Despite all the attention it has garnered,Friedrich’s 591-page work is problematic, approachingthe subject in an impressionistic, suggestivemanner that leaves the reader with a sense of unease.He divides his work into seven main parts,with the first two (“Weapons” and “Strategy”) accountingfor approximately a third of the book,the next section (“The Land”) accounting for anotherthird, and the final four parts (“Refuge,”“We,” “I,” and “Stone”) accounting for the finalthird. Throughout, he eschews traditional citationmethods, simply listing his largely secondarysources for each page without the use of endnotenumbers. His thematic approach tends to blur thechronological sequence of events, and his use ofterminology deeply associated with the Holocaustand National Socialism (e.g., cellars as “crematoria,”the Royal Air Force’s 5th Bomber Group as an“Einsatzgruppe,” cities as “execution sites,” and theincidental destruction of libraries as “book burning”)is deliberately provocative.Friedrich’s treatment of the weapons and strategyof the air campaign against Germany provides a fairintroduction to the topic for nonmilitary historians

NET ASSESSMENT 123and the public. He commences his work with a detached,technical discussion of the weapons andplatforms that made a strategic-bombing campaignpossible: explosive and incendiary bombs, longrangebombers, radar technology, and bombercrews. Moving to strategy, he traces the evolutionof strategic air war from its World War I rootsthrough the Combined Bomber Offensive againstGermany, although his propensity to move backand forth in time and his conflation of strategicand tactical air raids make it difficult to follow theoverall evolution of the bombing campaign. Othershave written better and more detailed analyses ofweapons development and airpower strategies inWorld War II. What Friedrich does well, however, isto translate what these weapons and strategies meantto the citizens of Lübeck, Cologne, Hamburg, theRuhr, Berlin, and some 158 midsize towns similarto Pforzheim, Würzburg, and the like. His imageryof women stuck in the melting tar of a street likeflies on flypaper, of families recovering the charredremains of their loved ones in buckets, and of cellarsbaking their inhabitants alive is stirring andunforgettable. Friedrich writes in terms of images,experience, and emotion, providing graphic depictionsof human suffering at the expense of a careful,chronological reconstruction of the air waragainst Germany.He devotes over one-third of his study to discussionof the German land. Loosely following thechronology of an air campaign limited by rangeand front line, he first discusses air attacks on thecities of North Germany, then shifts to the Westand the Ruhr attacks. He subsequently examinesthe fate of South German cities and ends his cityby-cityexamination with a discussion of Berlin andthe East. Friedrich’s approach is relentless and detailed:with each city or town, he presents a briefaccount of its history, heritage, and main culturaltreasures before examining its demise and destruction.The entire section is marked with a sense ofsadness and loss—not just for the miserable deathof thousands of innocents, described in vivid andunrelenting specificity, but for a cultural loss thatcan never be restored.The chapters on “Refuge” and “We” are themost intriguing sections of his study. In “Refuge”Friedrich describes the hierarchy of refuge (fromblast trenches to cellars to elaborate bunkers),civil-defense measures, the recovery and disposalof bodies, and the state’s role in aiding bombingvictims and evacuating nonessential personnelfrom Germany’s cities. Rather than driving athreatened population to revolt, the bombing ofcities initially brought the people closer to thestate. Using both positive and negative tools of persuasion,the same state that gave out butteredbread and soup to bombing-raid survivors wasready to ruthlessly execute plunderers and thosewho subverted the military spirit (Wehrkraftzersetzer).Friedrich develops this theme in greater detail inhis discussion of the collective “We.” He notes howas the situation worsened, the repressive state focusedon the issue of Haltung (conduct) over Stimmung(morale). German propaganda emphasizedgrim perseverance, promising that wonder weaponswould soon allow Germany to strike back at theAllies and exact a bloody revenge. Each of thesetopics has been treated in greater detail elsewhere,and Friedrich overlooks much of the most recentscholarship in German and English. Nonetheless,these sections succeed in laying bare the interactionbetween protection and repression in theindividual/state relationship.Der Brand’s final two sections are less effective.In the chapter “I,” Friedrich attempts to describethe individual’s sensory and psychological reactionto bombardment. His discussion of the physical reactionof the body to extreme stress rests on ahandful of books and memoirs, overlooking thewealth of literature on the related phenomenon ofcombat stress, war neurosis, and shell shock. In“Stone,” Friedrich examines German efforts to rescuecultural sites, works of art, libraries, andarchives. Placing this discussion at the end of thework, however, violates the book’s overall frameworkof decreasing concentric rings (strategy, theland, refuge, we, I) and proves disconcerting byfollowing several chapters devoted to group andindividual suffering. The section would have beenmuch more effective as part of Friedrich’s earlierdiscussion on “The Land,” which focused on history,heritage, and destruction.Overall, Der Brand is an evocative book, heavyon imagery, eyewitness accounts, and impressions.Highly effective as a literary dirge and lamentation,it comes up short when judged by the standardsof the history discipline. Friedrich blurschronology, overlooks the newest scholarship onmany of his topics, skims over the broader contextin which the strategic air war developed, and employsterminology in a careless or deliberatelyprovocative manner. Most troubling to historianswill be his narrow focus and lack of context: althoughhe briefly mentions Warsaw, Rotterdam,Coventry, and the Holocaust, they fade from viewthroughout much of the book as Friedrich examinesGerman suffering and loss in unrelenting de­

124 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004tail. The topic itself—the German experience at thereceiving end of a prolonged and costly strategicbombingcampaign—is a valid and important areaof historical inquiry that should not be taboo toGerman scholars. Indeed, a body of German scholarshipdoes exist on the topic, ranging from detailedanalyses of Freiburg, Münster, and numerousother German cities during the Bombenkrieg(the German term for the Allied aerial bombingcampaign in World War II) to studies focusing onpopular opinion, the evacuation of children, life inthe bunker, flak helpers, and the mechanisms ofrelief and repression. One might even concedethat some of the military history on the strategicbombingcampaign focuses too heavily on operations,aircraft, technologies, and the war in the air,with insufficient description of the human costs ofwar. Thus, Friedrich’s work performs a valuablefunction of redirecting attention to war’s terriblecost in lives, suffering, and cultural treasures. Whatmakes one uneasy about the book is that it addressesonly one dimension of the human aspect, focusingsharply on German loss but scarcely acknowledgingthe death and devastation that Germans inflictedon others during World War II.Given these flaws, the prospect of Der Brand’sbeing translated into English appear dim. Yet, forthose willing to make the effort, reading the pieceis worthwhile. Friedrich’s comment in one interviewthat since 1945 Germans have identified withthe bombed rather than the bomber explains in partGermany’s opposition to the war in Iraq. Overall,Der Brand is deeply moving as a literary work, troublingas a work of historical scholarship, and mostuseful as an illustration of the interplay among history,memory, and current affairs in present-dayGermany.Dr. Douglas PeiferMaxwell AFB, AlabamaWhen Thunder Rolled: An F-105 Pilot over NorthVietnam by Ed Rasimus. Smithsonian InstitutionPress (http://www.sipress.si.edu), 750Ninth Street NW, Suite 4300, Washington, DC20560-0950, 2003, 272 pages, $27.95 (hardcover).One would have thought that the market forVietnam air-war stories is saturated, but now I haveanother book to recommend to the professionalair warrior. Not much in When Thunder Rolled isnew: flying the Thunderchief in combat overNorth Vietnam in the mid-1960s was hazardous toone’s health; the theory of gradualism wasted airmen’slives without having much impact on enemydecisions; and micromanagement of field leadershipfrom afar had similar effects. Yet, Ed Rasimusmanages all of that in an engaging way with readableprose and obvious pride in what he enduredand achieved—but without the excessive chestthumping commonly found in such books.Professor Rasimus, who now teaches politicalscience in Colorado, claims to have been motivatedin childhood by the romantic lure of aviationand airplanes. He tried to get in the Air ForceAcademy, but by the time he won an appointment,he was already a year into his AFROTC program—so he decided to stick with that. On entering theAir Force, he did well in pilot school, thus winninga choice assignment directly to what was then theAir Force’s first-line fighter—the F-105. In his firsttour as a second lieutenant, Rasimus served as a“Thud” pilot in the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing atKorat Royal Thai AFB, where he arrived in thespring of 1966 on the eve of the most fearsome partof the air war over Vietnam. After flying 100 missions,he came back to the United States in the fall.In his book Rise of the Fighter Generals, Brig GenMichael Worden emphasizes that the first flyingtour, especially in combat, tends to have a formativeeffect on the mind-set of officers. If the generalneeded any more affirmation of this idea, EdRasimus could provide it. Rasimus does not pretendto be fearless, admitting to having grappledwith genuine dread during his early missions andto doubts about his ability to continue. Yet he didcarry on, even though electronic countermeasuresand Wild Weasel defense-suppression units hadnot yet been developed to diminish the hazards hefaced. Rasimus laments the loss of his flying buddiesand speaks with admiration of the toughnessand professionalism of rescue forces who, eventhen, were plucking some of them from the jaws ofPOW camps or worse. He even avoids the usualtemptation to denigrate multiengine pilots retrainedto fill the cockpits of lost warriors—a vicecommon among purebred fighter drivers. Yet, heis bold enough to condemn US leaders for placingat risk flights of multimillion-dollar airplanesagainst a few insignificant fuel drums and to callpolitical leaders liars when they asserted that nobomb shortage existed in Vietnam.However, one of the qualities that makes thebook more engaging than the usual memoir is itsuse of the microview without pontificating abouthow somebody else lost the war. Rather, Rasimuseffectively provides everyday details of life in flightoperations and on the ground. I was not a fighter

NET ASSESSMENT 125pilot, but I did follow him in the 388th FighterWing at Korat; I know from experience that thoseeveryday details lend authenticity to the rest of thestory and make it ring true for me.One part of his life there that I could not sharewas the terror of flying against the most fearsomedefensive system in history. Rasimus explains thatat the end of the day, he had contained his fearsand, unexpectedly, had come to enjoy the exhilarationof surviving a trip into the lion’s den, likeningthe experience to youthful episodes of stealinghubcaps on the streets of Chicago. Vietnamseemed to produce the same kind of thrill, magnifiedmany times over, that emerged from doingsomething essentially useless but potentially dangerous.It was a feeling that only a very few peoplecould enjoy (either then or now). Certainly we cantake him at his word—even having survived thefirst tour, in 1972 he volunteered to go back to participatein the last battle: Linebacker II.Readers interested in air war at the operational,strategic, or political levels should take a look atWayne Thompson’s To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. AirForce and North Vietnam, 1966–1973. But for an enjoyableread on what combat is like for companygradeofficers, I recommend When Thunder Rolled.Dr. David R. MetsMaxwell AFB, AlabamaAPJIn this section of “Net Assessment,” you will find additional reviews of aviation-related books and CD-ROMs but in a considerably briefer format than our usual offerings. We certainly don’t mean to imply thatthese items are less worthy of your attention. On the contrary, our intention is to give you as many reviewsof notable books and electronic publications as possible in a limited amount of space.Fortress Ploesti: The Campaign to Destroy Hitler’sOil Supply by Jay A. Stout. Casemate Publishers(http://www.casematepublishing.com), 2114Darby Road, Havertown, Pennsylvania 19083,2003, 224 pages, $32.95 (hardcover).Ploesti. The very mention of this area in Romaniabrings up visions of intense flak, nightmarish B-24bombing raids, and a living hell. As a high schoolsenior, I had a history teacher who had beenwounded by flak over Ploesti. I remember his storiesvividly.Fortress Ploesti is not so much a recount of theoperational aspect of the campaign as it is a collectionof the experiences of people who livedthrough it. Although the author, Jay Stout, doesdiscuss the mission background to some extent,the strength of his writing lies in relating what thecombatants went through. Stout’s research also includedinterviewing and examining the journals ofGerman and Romanian military personnel who defendedPloesti. These sources clearly illustrate thedetermination and, in some cases, the desperationof these men as they faced wave after wave ofbombers and their escorting fighters.My advance copy needed more maps and picturesto illustrate Stout’s points. Even without theadditional illustrations, however, anyone generallyfamiliar with the Ploesti campaign can easily followthe text. Readers looking for a book that covers theoperational mission and details of the campaignplan to dismantle Ploesti will be disappointed, aswill proponents of strategic bombing who want abroader discussion of Ploesti’s role in the developmentof US strategic-bombing doctrine. But thoseof you who like to learn history and doctrine firsthand—fromthe people who lived through thisharrowing campaign—should read this book.Maj Paul G. Niesen, USAFMaxwell AFB, Alabama

APJAir and Space Power Journal is always lookingfor good articles written by our readers.If you have something to say, send it to us.The Journal focuses on the operationaland strategic levels of war. We are interestedin articles that will stimulate thought on theconduct of warfare and the impact of leadership,training, and support functions on operations.We encourage you to supply graphics andphotos to support your article, but don’t letthe lack of those keep you from writing! Weare looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000words in length––about 15 to 25 pages. Pleasesubmit your manuscript via electronic filein either MS Word or Word Perfect format.Otherwise, we need two typed, double-spaceddraft copies.As the professional journal of the Air Force,ASPJ strives to expand the horizons and professionalknowledge of Air Force personnel.To do this, we seek and encourage thoughtprovokingarticles. Please submit yours by mailto the editor, Air and Space Power Journal, 401Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112­6428, or by e-mail to aspj@maxwell.af.mil.... But How Do I Subscribe?EASY . . .• Just write New Orders, Superintendentof Documents, P.O. Box 371954, PittsburghPA 15250-7954; call (202) 512-1800 (voice) or(202) 512-2250 (fax); or visit http://bookstore.gpo.gov/subscriptions/alphabet.htmlon the Internet.• Say that you want to subscribe to AFRP10-1, Air and Space Power Journal, stock number708-007-00000-5.• Enclose a check for $32.00 ($44.80 forinternational mail).• Spend a year enjoying four quarterly issuesmailed to your home or office.Basis of IssueAFRP 10-1, Air and Space Power Journal, isthe professional journal of the Air Force.Requirements for distribution are based onthe following:One copy for each general officer on activeduty with the US Air Force and Air ReserveForces.One copy for every five (or fractionthereof) active duty US Air Force officers inthe ranks second lieutenant through colonel.One copy for each US Air Force or Air ReserveForces office of public affairs.Three copies for each Air Reserve Forcesunit down to squadron level.Three copies for each air attaché or advisorygroup function.One copy for each non–US Air Force, USgovernment organization.One copy for each US Air Force or US governmentlibrary.If your organization is not presently receivingits authorized copies of the Air and SpacePower Journal, please contact our staff to verifyyour address. To obtain the latest informationor to contact us, visit our Web site at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil.The Editor126

OUR CONTRIBUTORS Col Steven C. Suddarth (USAFA; MSEE, PhD,University of Washington) is the Air Force ResearchLaboratory (AFRL) commander’s representativeto Air University. He previouslyserved as chief of the Air Force Materiel Commandcommander’s action group at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; deputy chief, AerospaceComponents Division, Sensors Directorate,AFRL, Wright-Patterson AFB; program integratorfor special programs, Ballistic MissileDefense Organization, Washington, DC; programmanager, Neural Networks and AdvancedComputing, Air Force Office of ScientificResearch, Arlington, Virginia; exchangeengineer, French National Aerospace Labs,Paris, France; and project officer, GroundSystems, Defense Meteorological SatelliteProgram, Los Angeles. Colonel Suddarth is agraduate of Squadron Officer School and AirWar College, as well as Escola de Comandoe Estado-Maior da Aeronáutica (ECEMAR)(Brazilian Air Force Command and GeneralStaff School).Lt Col Ross T. McNutt (USAFA; MS, MS, PhD,Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is aninstructor of joint warfare at Air Commandand Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Hepreviously served as director of the Air ForceCycle Time Reduction Program, AssistantSecretary of the Air Force for Acquisition(SAF/AQ), Washington, DC; Air Force strategicbusiness planner, SAF/AQ; researchfellow/assistant, Lean Aerospace Initiative,Massachusetts Institute of Technology; GlobalPositioning Satellite engineer, 2d Space OperationsSquadron, Schriever AFB, Colorado;and research physicist, Air Force GeophysicsLaboratory, Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. Theauthor of a number of publications, ColonelMcNutt is a graduate of Squadron OfficerSchool and Air Command and Staff College.Maj William T. Cooley (BS, Rensselaer PolytechnicInstitute; MS, University of NewMexico; MMOAS, Air Command and StaffCollege; PhD, Air Force Institute of Technology)is program element monitor of militarysatellite communications programs,Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC.He previously served as staff officer at theWarrior Preparation Center, EinsiedlerhofAir Station, Germany; chief of the SemiconductorLaser Branch, Air Force ResearchLaboratory, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico; andresearch engineer at Wright Laboratory,Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. A graduate ofSquadron Officer School and Air Commandand Staff College, Major Cooley has publishedarticles in several journals.Maj Eric Braganca (BSEE, Rutgers University;MS, Troy State University) is an AirForce MH-53 pilot currently assigned toSpecial Operations Command, Joint ForcesCommand in Norfolk, Virginia, as a jointspecial-operations observer/trainer for jointfires, personnel recovery, and operations. Hehas served in numerous special-operationspositions for exercises and contingencies,most recently as a staff officer for operationsin Afghanistan and Iraq at both specialoperationsand air-component headquarters.Major Braganca is a graduate of SquadronOfficer School, Air Command and Staff College,and Joint Forces Staff College.Lt Col David P. Blanks (USAFA; MBA, Universityof Phoenix; MS, Air Force Institute ofTechnology; MMOAS, Air Command andStaff College) is chief of the TransformationIntegration Branch, Headquarters UnitedStates Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein AirBase, Germany. Colonel Blanks previouslyserved as deputy commander, Cadet Group 2,and as air officer commanding, CadetSquadron 4, at the US Air Force Academy, aswell as flight commander, Analysis, 17th TestSquadron, Schriever AFB, Colorado.Igor G. Plonisch (MS, MSEE, Syracuse University)is chief of the Strategic Planning andBusiness Operations Division at the Air ForceResearch Laboratory’s Information Directorate,Rome, New York. Mr. Plonisch is adoctoral candidate in management.127

128 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2004Dr. Paul W. Phister Jr. (BSEE, University ofAkron; MS, Saint Mary’s University; MSEE,Air Force Institute of Technology; PhD, CaliforniaCoast University) is the air and spacestrategic planner at the Air Force ResearchLaboratory’s Information Directorate, Rome,New York, where he develops the directorate’smid-to-long-term technology-investments portfolio.A retired lieutenant colonel, he served25 years in the Air Force, working primarilyin space-systems development and operations.Dr. Phister is a recognized space expert and asenior member of the Institute of Electricaland Electronics Engineers, as well as a licensedprofessional software engineer from the stateof Texas.Maj Michael F. Kelly, USAF, retired (APA,Community College of the Air Force; BA,Southwest Texas State University; MA, Universityof Oklahoma), is the executive directorof military communications at the UnitedServices Automobile Association. Major Kellyserved in wing through major command publicaffairs positions and received the 1999 Secretaryof the Air Force Public Affairs CompanyGrade Officer Excellence Award. Hewas the chief of internal communication atAir Force Materiel Command prior to his retirementin 2002 and then worked for UniversalTechnology Corporation, a contractorsupporting the Air Force Research Laboratory’sPropulsion Directorate. He has authorednumerous articles in Leading Edge Magazineand AFRL Technology Horizons magazine.Major Kelly is a distinguished graduate ofOfficer Training School, Defense InformationSchool’s Basic Journalist Course, and thePublic Affairs Officer Course. He is also agraduate of Squadron Officer School, AirCommand and Staff College, and several professionalcourses.Col Darrel Whitcomb, USAFR, retired(USAFA), is a contractor analyst with theTATE Corporation at the Joint Personnel RecoveryAgency. He served three tours as acargo pilot and forward air controller inSoutheast Asia and subsequently flew the A-37and A-10 with the 926th Fighter Wing and the442d Fighter Wing. He also served tours infighter plans on the Air Staff and in mobilizationplans on the Joint Staff. Most recently, heserved on the faculty at Air Command andStaff College and as the mobilization assistantto the commander of the Air Force DoctrineCenter at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. A previouscontributor to Aerospace Power Journal, he haspublished in several other journals and is theauthor of The Rescue of Bat 21 (US Naval InstitutePress, 1998). His newest book, CombatSearch and Rescue in Desert Storm, has been acceptedfor publication by the Air UniversityPress. Colonel Whitcomb is a graduate ofSquadron Officer School, Army Commandand General Staff College, and National WarCollege.

EDITORIAL BOARDLt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, RetiredMaj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University (professor emeritus)Dr. J. Douglas Beason, Colonel, USAF, Retired, Los Alamos National LaboratoryDr. Alexander S. Cochran, National War College, National Defense UniversityProf. Thomas B. Grassey, Naval War CollegeLt Col Dave Mets, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesCol Bobby J. Wilkes, USAF, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and EducationThe Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 0897-0823), Air Force Recurring Publication 10-1, is publishedquarterly. You may subscribe by writing New Orders, Superintendent of Documents, P.O.Box 371954, Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954; calling (202) 512-1800 (voice) or (202) 512-2250 (fax); or visitinghttp://bookstore.gpo.gov/subscriptions/alphabet.html. Annual rates are $32.00 domestic and$44.80 outside the United States. The GPO stock number is 708-007-00000-5. See Air and SpacePower Journal online. Visit Air and Space Power Chronicles at http://www .airpower.maxwell.af. mil/.The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts. Address them to Editor, Air and Space Power Journal,401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. E-mail or submit your manuscript via electronicfile in either MS Word or WordPerfect format to aspj@maxwell.af.mil. All submissions will beedited in accordance with the standards set forth in the Air University Style Guide for Writers andEditors (available online in the Air and Space Power Jour nal section of Air and Space Power Chroniclesat http://www.au.af.mil/au/oas/aupress/style). Journal telephone listings are DSN 493-5322 andcommer cial (334) 953-5322.