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Network Working Group R. Fielding Request for Comments: 2616 ...

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serious security considerations. Content-Disposition is not part ofthe HTTP standard, but since it is widely implemented, we aredocumenting its use and risks <strong>for</strong> implementors. See RFC 2183 [49](which updates RFC 1806) <strong>for</strong> details.<strong>Fielding</strong>, et al. Standards Track [Page 154]RFC <strong>2616</strong> HTTP/1.1 June 199915.6 Authentication Credentials and Idle ClientsExisting HTTP clients and user agents typically retain authenticationin<strong>for</strong>mation indefinitely. HTTP/1.1. does not provide a method <strong>for</strong> aserver to direct clients to discard these cached credentials. This isa significant defect that requires further extensions to HTTP.Circumstances under which credential caching can interfere with theapplication's security model include but are not limited to:- Clients which have been idle <strong>for</strong> an extended period followingwhich the server might wish to cause the client to reprompt theuser <strong>for</strong> credentials.- Applications which include a session termination indication(such as a `logout' or `commit' button on a page) after whichthe server side of the application `knows' that there is nofurther reason <strong>for</strong> the client to retain the credentials.This is currently under separate study. There are a number of workaroundsto parts of this problem, and we encourage the use ofpassword protection in screen savers, idle time-outs, and othermethods which mitigate the security problems inherent in thisproblem. In particular, user agents which cache credentials areencouraged to provide a readily accessible mechanism <strong>for</strong> discardingcached credentials under user control.15.7 Proxies and CachingBy their very nature, HTTP proxies are men-in-the-middle, andrepresent an opportunity <strong>for</strong> man-in-the-middle attacks. Compromise ofthe systems on which the proxies run can result in serious securityand privacy problems. Proxies have access to security-relatedin<strong>for</strong>mation, personal in<strong>for</strong>mation about individual users andorganizations, and proprietary in<strong>for</strong>mation belonging to users andcontent providers. A compromised proxy, or a proxy implemented orconfigured without regard to security and privacy considerations,might be used in the commission of a wide range of potential attacks.Proxy operators should protect the systems on which proxies run as

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