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4Revisiting Police Lawsinstitutions. Consequently, due consultation could never take place and consent of the provinces was never sought. 26The provinces generally did not own the new law and were not motivated to implement some of its essential features,such as the provisions prescribing public oversight of the police functions.Second, it was tagged with the local government project of the military regime of the time. This createdproblems as the local government project ran into severe resistance from the provincial governments that wereelected later that year. 27 Also, the provincial political executive resisted any idea of granting autonomy, howsoevernominal, to the police. Bowing to the pressure, amendments had to be introduced to the Police Order, which dilutedthe original intent of the legislation. As if depriving the provinces of the power to enact police related laws was notenough, the military ruler played another trick on the people by including the Police Order, 2002 in the constitutionallist of protected laws (under Sixth Schedule of the Constitution) which could not be altered or repealed by anyprovincial legislature without his prior permission. It is another matter that the unelected ruler did not hesitate toamend the law to suit the demands of his collaborators in the provinces.The reluctance of the political executive to accept the reforms propounded in the Order of 2002 led first tothe dilution of its original provisions and later to its tardy and half-hearted implementation. The Police Order haddiluted the powers of provincial governments to exercise control over the police by conferring powers on the ZilaNazim and by prescribing formation of District and Provincial Public Safety Commissions. The provincial governments,therefore, showed unwillingness to implement the reforms envisaged in the Order. The Federal Government couldnot resist the pressures and came out with an Amendment Ordinance known as the Police Order (Amendment)Ordinance, 2004, that restored some of the powers to control police forces to the provincial political executive. 28The Amendment Ordinance was re-promulgated innumerable times. However, it was never passed by theParliament. It was promulgated as the Police Order (Amendment) Ordinance, 2007 by the Musharraf-led governmentin July 2007 and was given protection under the Provisional (Constitution) Order, 2007. The Ordinance lost itsvalidity after the Supreme Court in its famous judgment of 31 July 2009, directed all the ordinances protected underthe Provisional (Constitution) Order, 2007, to be laid before the Parliament for validation. The ordinance was laidbefore the National Assembly as a bill in November, 2009; however, it never passed through the stage of considerationby the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on the Interior. 29 This has created a serious legal confusion andvacuum. This shows the priority and the level of importance attached to issues of policing in the highest politicalechelons of this country.Third, mechanisms of public oversight and accountability provided in the new law were resisted by thebureaucracy within the police and without. The Police Order, 2002 provided two mechanisms for police oversightand accountability. The first pertained to the superintendence powers of the government that related to oversight atthe institutional level. 30 The second set of mechanisms related to public oversight of police through the Zila Nazim 31and the District Public Safety Commissions and Complaints Authorities. 32 The main domain of such institutions waspolice accountability at local level on a case-to-case basis.The Police Order of 2002 proposed the establishment of Public Safety Commissions at the federal, provincialand district levels. One of the important functions of the commissions at the provincial and district levels was to “takesteps to prevent the Police from engaging in any unlawful activity arising out of compliance with unlawful or malafide orders” 33 .Another important function of the Commissions was oversight of the police. The District Public SafetyCommission comprising six elected (members of Zila Councils, national and provincial assemblies) and three nonelectedmembers was mainly responsible for: 34a. Disposal of complaints pertaining to incidents of police neglect, excess or failure or against a federallaw enforcement agency when acting in aid of civil power;b. Approval of local policing plan and while doing so ensuring that the policing priorities and allocationof police resources is in line with the citizen’s requirements. The Commissions are also required to monitor performanceagainst targets set in the policing plans;c. Preventing collusive relationship between Zila Nazim and the district police;d. Disposal of unclaimed properties taken in possession by the district police;