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Precis 5 priori knowledge, the key is to recognize that, like empirical knowledge, it has a range of sources. I discuss three non-experiential means of knowing and explain how they work to give us a priori knowledge. I argue, in opposition to Kant, that it is possible to explain how non-empirical knowledge is possible without any commitment to idealism, transcendental or otherwise. My talk of the different levels of a philosophical response to a how-possible question should not be taken too literally. As I stress in the preface to my book, it is more a matter of a satisfactory response to a how-possible question having to do several different and interconnected things in the course of a single evolving enquiry. Talk of the different levels of a response to a how-possible question is simply a convenient way of describing and keeping track of the different aspects of such an enquiry. The multilevels model is an attempt to capture the explanatory structure of Kant’s approach to one of his central how-possible questions, and I argue that mainstream epistemology has a lot to learn from Kant’s conception of what needs to be done to answer his question. While my response to epistemological how-possible questions is clearly Kantian in inspiration it nevertheless parts company with Kant on one major issue. The disagreement concerns the role of transcendental arguments in connection with howpossible questions. Rightly or wrongly, Kant has been read as maintaining that an effective way of tackling such questions is to argue transcendentally. Suppose that the question is: how is outer experience – perceptual knowledge of spatial objectspossible? A transcendental response to this question is one that identifies the necessary conditions for outer experience or tries to demonstrate that there must be outer experience because without it something else whose existence cannot be doubted – say inner experience- would not be possible. My claim is that neither style of transcendental argument can be said to explain how outer experience is possible. Quassim Cassam University of Warwick q.cassam@warwick.ac.uk
References Quassim Cassam Cassam, Q. (2007b), ‘Ways of Knowing’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. ________. (forthcoming) ‘The Basis of Self-Knowledge’, to be published in Erkenntnis. Dretske, F. (1969) Seeing and Knowing, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Stroud, B. (2000) Understanding Human Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ________. (2000a) ‘Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge’, In Understanding Human Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6
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Page 12 and 13: Denis Bühler 9 A similar ambiguity
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