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Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 85 – 99, 2009 THE ROLE OF OBSTACLES AND THEIR ELIMINATION IN CASSAM'S MULTI-LEVELS FRAMEWORK Simon Sauter 1. Even though the title may suggest otherwise, The Possibility of Knowledge 106 is not so much a book about the tenability of scepticism but rather about the nature of knowledge. This is due to the fact that Cassam is not primarily concerned with establishing the possibility of knowledge but with explaining it. Accordingly, the central question of the book is not “Is knowledge possible?” but rather, given that knowledge is possible: (HP) How is knowledge possible? Cassam tackles this question in a piecemeal fashion by answering more restricted questions such as: (HPew) How is knowledge of the external world possible? (HPpk) How is perceptual knowledge possible? (HPom) How is knowledge of other minds possible? (HPapk) How is a priori knowledge possible? Cassam calls questions of this kind how-possible questions or, in the case of epistemology, epistemological how-possible questions. As knowledge is not something we just have but rather something we have to acquire first, what makes knowledge possible are means of acquiring knowledge. An appropriate answer to an epistemological how-possible question will therefore have to name a means of acquiring knowledge. Cassam calls this a Means Response to a how-possible question. But the story doesn’t end here. In general, according to Cassam, how-possible questions arise only when we are baffled by the fact that something that seems impossible to us is still the case. If there is no reason to be surprised by something, we don’t usually ask how it is possible. This, of course, applies to epistemological how-possible questions as well. They are therefore 106 All page references are to this book.
Comments on Possibility of Knowledge obstacle-dependent, which is to say that they arise only when there seems to be an insuperable obstacle preventing the kind of knowledge in question. Due to this obstacle- dependence a Means Response alone won’t do. In addition, the apparent obstacle has to be eliminated. This can either be accomplished by what Cassam calls an obstacle- dissipating strategy, i.e. by showing that the apparent obstacle is not a real obstacle after all, or by what Cassam calls an obstacle-overcoming strategy, i.e. by showing that the obstacle, though real, is not as insuperable as it may appear at first glance. A further question that can be asked, given a Means Response, is: what makes it possible to acquire knowledge by the given means? An appropriate answer to this question would list enabling conditions for the acquisition of knowledge via the means in question. Because of the tripartite nature of this kind of answer to a how-possible question Cassam calls this a multi-levels response. 107 On the first level, in the Means Response, a means for acquiring knowledge is identified. On the second level the apparent obstacles to acquiring knowledge by the means in question are removed by either an obstacledissipating strategy or by an obstacle-overcoming strategy. On the third level enabling conditions for acquiring knowledge by the means in question are identified. Cassam offers an extensive discussion of Level 3 and its relation to Level 2, arguing that Level 3 responses are possible but usually not necessary (p. 36-50) and that the distinction between Level 2 and Level 3 may not always be sharp (see e.g. p. 20-21). In section II I will try to show that the distinction between Level 1 and Level 2 responses isn’t always sharp either and that on occasion no (separate) Level 2 response is necessary. In section III I will argue that theories which offer obstacle-overcoming responses are more conservative than theories which offer obstacle-dissipating responses. 107 Cassam introduces his notion of a multi-levels response in section 1.1 of The Possibility of Knowledge and explains and discusses it throughout the whole book. For a crisp summary see p. 9-10. 86
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ABSTRACTA Linguagem, Mente e Ação
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Editorial We proudly present the fo
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Precis 3 is an obstacle-dissipating
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Precis 5 priori knowledge, the key
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Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 7-
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Denis Bühler 9 A similar ambiguity
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Denis Bühler 11 successful reasoni
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Denis Bühler 13 More generally, ap
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Denis Bühler 15 And he succeeds in
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Denis Bühler 17 His answer goes as
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Denis Bühler 19 thus threaten both
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Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 21
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Daniel Dohrn 23 which can be remove
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Daniel Dohrn 25 there is to be expe
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Daniel Dohrn 27 3. Problems of the
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Daniel Dohrn 29 Firstly, a means is
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Daniel Dohrn 31 knowledge, but in h
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4. Transcendental Arguments Strike
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Page 50 and 51: David Lüthi 47 the very existence
Page 52 and 53: David Lüthi 49 removal on level 2
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Page 56 and 57: David Lüthi 53 general schema; and
Page 58 and 59: David Lüthi 55 We’ve seen that h
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Page 62 and 63: Comments on Possibility of Knowledg
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Page 90 and 91: Simon Sauter 87 2. Consider the ope
Page 92 and 93: Simon Sauter 89 There can be no dou
Page 94 and 95: Simon Sauter 91 or that there is so
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Page 98 and 99: Simon Sauter 95 response are more c
Page 100 and 101: (HPaa) How is it possible to rule o
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Page 104 and 105: Replies to Commentators 101 In this
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Page 112 and 113: Replies to Commentators 109 are bot
Page 114 and 115: Replies to Commentators 111 by exte
Page 116: Replies to Commentators 113 Stroud,
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