Complete Issue in PDF - Abstracta
Complete Issue in PDF - Abstracta
Complete Issue in PDF - Abstracta
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Bernhard Ritter 78<br />
himself but that he cannot avoid relat<strong>in</strong>g it to too many th<strong>in</strong>gs at once. Consequently, no<br />
backdrop rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> relation to which the subject could determ<strong>in</strong>e itself as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the<br />
present.<br />
Put another way, the idealist claimed that he has immediate consciousness of<br />
himself as a substance <strong>in</strong> time, and argued that he must be a persistent th<strong>in</strong>g as long as<br />
he perceives someth<strong>in</strong>g. This “as long as” is <strong>in</strong>tended to determ<strong>in</strong>e his subjecthood <strong>in</strong><br />
time and to prove that he has immediate consciousness of himself. But this appears<br />
compell<strong>in</strong>g only because he treats the th<strong>in</strong> concept of the ego as if it were an empirical<br />
person. If the ego is already an empirical person, the idealist could view experience as<br />
the temporally structured totality of modifications to his substance, that is, as mere ideas<br />
or representations. But s<strong>in</strong>ce the ego is only an empty, determ<strong>in</strong>able someth<strong>in</strong>g and<br />
everyth<strong>in</strong>g else (i.e. the whole “world”) is its “modifications”, it is no help to say that as<br />
long as these modifications occur it has to be “present”, s<strong>in</strong>ce these are viewed <strong>in</strong> turn<br />
as be<strong>in</strong>g relative to the subject. Consequently, the result of his reason<strong>in</strong>g amounts to no<br />
more than this: “I perceive, therefore I am—the world.”<br />
In order to determ<strong>in</strong>e itself as a substance <strong>in</strong> time, the problematic idealist, <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>ner sense, needs to dist<strong>in</strong>guish changes that are due to him from changes that are due<br />
to the way an <strong>in</strong>dependent world is. This is precisely the role of the analogies of<br />
experience. Kant describes them as “pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of the determ<strong>in</strong>ation of the existence of<br />
appearances <strong>in</strong> time”. S<strong>in</strong>ce the application of the analogies results <strong>in</strong> acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g<br />
spatial objects, the problematic idealist would cease to be one. But if he refuses to<br />
dist<strong>in</strong>guish objective from subjective change, he is left without the possibility of<br />
determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g himself as a substance <strong>in</strong> time, simply because there is no other th<strong>in</strong>g left <strong>in</strong><br />
relation to which that could be done.<br />
The idealist may reply: “I can compound sets of <strong>in</strong>tuitive ideas to theoretical<br />
objects, and determ<strong>in</strong>e myself as a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g substance with regard to them.”<br />
To this one would reply that assum<strong>in</strong>g hypothetical objects is viable, if the<br />
idealist’s subject was an empirical person, and the posited objects were <strong>in</strong> accordance<br />
with the unity of experience. But, s<strong>in</strong>ce the th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g substance is a theoretical object<br />
itself, it cannot be determ<strong>in</strong>ed through other theoretical objects compounded of ideas,<br />
that is, if the possibility of <strong>in</strong>dependent confirmation rema<strong>in</strong>s precluded.