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Comments on Possibility of Knowledge 73 how-part has already been covered. So what is still at issue is to expound the idealist position more thoroughly. It may seem somewhat late to ask what it is that the Refutation-argument is designed to refute. But a more detailed exposition of idealism will serve as further confirmation and clarification of what has been said about the aim of the argument. The Refutation of Idealism is often presented with an emphasis on an alleged direct relation between the perception of things outside us and the consciousness of the temporal order of representations in inner experience. According to the view supported here, it is the idealist’s conception of the subject that raises the difficulty, which, as a consequence, undercuts the status of the series of representations and recollections as a whole. Put simply, if the subject is dubious, inner experience as somebody’s experience will be dubious too. Besides, if Kant did not consider the subjective temporal order of representations as given, it would not only be insufficient ground for determining the subject itself in time; it would be no ground at all. 80 Cassam remarks that the Refutation of Idealism won’t have any force against a sceptic who is prepared to question inner experience, and that it does not eliminate the possibility that we are brains in a vat. 81 It is, I believe, important for the comprehension of the Refutation-argument to see that this is essentially correct. It has no force against one who is sceptical about inner experience, and, for that very reason, does not eliminate the possibility of a brains-in-a-vat scenario. However, as will be argued in this paper’s conclusion, this does not leave us without means for finding out if we are brains in a vat or not. But Cassam’s remark is also relevant for our present concern, since it clearly states for whom the Refutation-argument is not designed. Before stating his theorem, Kant declares that it is directed against Descartes’s “problematic idealism”. Exploiting the first edition’s fourth paralogism, problematic or empirical idealism can be characterized using four empirical propositions: (EI1) our cognitive faculties are such that we cannot immediately perceive the existence of outer appearances but only infer it as causes of what is in us (EI2) only the existence of what is in us can be immediately perceived 80 “[A]ll grounds of determination of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations, and as such require something [permanent] … in relation to which their change … can be determined.” (B XXXIX/B 275) 81 Cassam 2007 54f.; Cassam 2008 [= “Reply to Stroud”]: 533f.
(EI3) the existence of outer appearances is doubtful (EI4) I exist as a thinking substance Bernhard Ritter 74 If we add the principle to the list that whose existence must be inferred from its effects is doubtful, the proposition (EI3), the uncertainty of the existence of outer appearances, can be justified as the conclusion of an argument. This is the argument that defines problematic idealism. Idealism is the doctrine of the doubtfulness or uncertainty of outer appearances. 82 It is this reasoning Kant referred to as a “powerful objection against [the] rules for proving existence mediately”. 83 But to recognize the target of the Refutation- argument accurately, the fourth claim is decisive—“I exist as a thinking substance”. The target is not Descartes’ altogether sceptical First Meditation, but rather the Second Meditation after securing the existence of the subject as thinking substance. Here only are both of the claims, (EI3) and (EI4), which are required for the Refutation to start, achieved. 84 According to Kant, idealism, the doctrine of the uncertainty of outer appearances, presupposes transcendental realism. Kant identifies this position with the claim that what he views as connections between certain concepts necessary for enabling experience are, according to transcendental realism, necessary connections in principles determining things in themselves. 85 In a less abstract way, transcendental realism claims that (TR1) space and time, and therefore outer appearances, are things in themselves (TR2) to cognize objects in themselves they need to be given as they are in themselves Kant does not state (TR2) explicitly, but I follow Allison in taking it to be an expression of the transcendental realist’s tacit epistemological ideal against which human cognition can never measure up. 86 What connects both claims is the notion that for things to be cognized is purely accidental and, since what things are is given independent of all cognitive activities, full cognition is mere reproduction. Now, if certainty is to be attained, things in themselves have to be grasped on the model of ideas in our own 82 A 366 – 369; A 491/B 519; Prol. 293. 83 B 274f. 84 A.T. VII: 23 – 29. 85 This description is extracted from A 297/B 353 and A 369. 86 Allison 2004: 28.
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ABSTRACTA Linguagem, Mente e Ação
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Editorial We proudly present the fo
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Precis 3 is an obstacle-dissipating
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Precis 5 priori knowledge, the key
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Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 7-
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Denis Bühler 9 A similar ambiguity
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Denis Bühler 11 successful reasoni
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Denis Bühler 13 More generally, ap
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Denis Bühler 15 And he succeeds in
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Denis Bühler 17 His answer goes as
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Denis Bühler 19 thus threaten both
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Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 21
Page 26 and 27: Daniel Dohrn 23 which can be remove
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Page 50 and 51: David Lüthi 47 the very existence
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Page 58 and 59: David Lüthi 55 We’ve seen that h
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