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Comments on Possibility of Knowledge 61 empirical means of knowledge-acquisition. Since seeing that the tub is dipped is a means of coming to know that the tub is dipped, we have explained how knowing that the tub is dipped is possible by pointing out that seeing is an appropriate means for acquiring this piece of knowledge. This is a means-response, and Cassam believes that it is “in no obvious sense incomplete”. 42 As a result, it is not necessary to go into transcendental reasoning to explain how perceptual knowledge is possible. Cassam recommends an approach he terms a multi-levels response. It consists of adding specifications of obstacle-removal to the means-response, as well as background conditions necessary for the means to be a source of knowledge. 43 To avoid the instrumentalistic implications of “means of knowing” Cassam newly prefers the term “ways of knowing”. 44 I see a difficulty in maintaining that a means-response is “in no obvious sense incomplete” and that how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent. 45 A how-possible question is related to the statement claiming that the state of affairs holds which the how-possible question questions. Let’s call it statement s. That the question is obstacledependent means that it arises out of a conflict between s and a set of statements held true. The way in which s is precarious is determined by its relation to that set of statements. Consequently, for a means-response (with or without indications for obstacle-removal) to be “in no obvious sense incomplete” presupposes an obstacle. Given that the obstacle is ‘worries about appropriate means of knowing’, a meansresponse is in no obvious sense incomplete. But let s be “there is mathematical knowledge” and the set of statements the following: 1. mathematical knowledge is synthetic a priori 2. experience yields synthetic but not a priori judgments 3. analysis of concepts yields a priori but not synthetic judgments 4. intuition cannot precede the intuited object Given the above, merely identifying pure intuition as a means for acquiring synthetic a priori knowledge is certainly an incomplete answer. It amounts to the bold assertion that it is possible by a “kind of experience before experience”. But that cannot be clear from 42 This phrase occurs repeatedly (cf. Cassam 2007: 48, 127, 218). 43 Cassam 2007: 8f., 35, 51, 63 – 65. 44 Lecture on the “Possibility of Self-Knowledge” at the University of Konstanz on 26th June 2008. 45 Cf. Cassam 2007: 2.
Bernhard Ritter 62 intuition; or at least Kant would maintain that asking a philosophical question about the possibility of mathematical knowledge is not asking how mathematical calculations themselves work; instead, it means asking for a valid explanation of their objectivity. If, in addition, it is correct that in philosophy one proceeds a priori by means of concepts and not by intuitions, 46 only an argument could possibly yield an answer. Thus, the more abstract propositions that you add to the list and the more intricate the obstacle, the more likely a means-response will look incomplete. That the example above was based on mathematics and not perceptual knowledge 47 should not matter, since what is to count as a complete answer is dependent on the obstacle, and thus, on the set of statements (perceptual or not) that are held true. Still, given that the obstacle is ‘worries about appropriate means’, the Kantian approach is not necessary, and this is what Cassam claimed. However, it is doubtful whether Cassam actually wanted to claim this, because it would be arbitrary to assume that if Kant were asked e.g. how it was possible to know from the number of guests how many times they will clink glasses, he would add a transcendental deduction to his answer, or would think of it as incomplete if he did not. It is open to him to admit that there are other obstacles besides philosophical problems. But if both the obstacle and the alternative answer, such as the multi-levels response, are philosophical, then the matter is not so straightforward. It will be argued later in this paper that toning down the instrumentalistic implications and talking more generally of “ways of knowing” deprives Cassam of the conceptual means for giving reasons for why the Kantian approach should not be a kind of a multi-levels response, since the difference depends on being means-specific or not. Certainly, this does not preclude that transcendental arguments may not be necessary for answering epistemological how-possible questions. But, if they are not, still they could be relevant for answering them. How does Cassam support his claim that transcendental arguments are not sufficient to answer the question “how is perceptual knowledge possible?” (HPpk)? In Cassam’s interpretation, the Kantian approach accounts for the possibility of synthetic a 46 According to Kant, this is what distinguishes mathematical from philosophical cognition (cf. A 723f. /B 751f.). 47 In response to Cassam 2007: 56.
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ABSTRACTA Linguagem, Mente e Ação
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Editorial We proudly present the fo
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Precis 3 is an obstacle-dissipating
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Precis 5 priori knowledge, the key
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Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 7-
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Denis Bühler 9 A similar ambiguity
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Page 18 and 19: Denis Bühler 15 And he succeeds in
Page 20 and 21: Denis Bühler 17 His answer goes as
Page 22 and 23: Denis Bühler 19 thus threaten both
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Page 26 and 27: Daniel Dohrn 23 which can be remove
Page 28 and 29: Daniel Dohrn 25 there is to be expe
Page 30 and 31: Daniel Dohrn 27 3. Problems of the
Page 32 and 33: Daniel Dohrn 29 Firstly, a means is
Page 34 and 35: Daniel Dohrn 31 knowledge, but in h
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Page 38 and 39: Daniel Dohrn 35 not always necessar
Page 40 and 41: Daniel Dohrn 37 In Cassam´s opinio
Page 42 and 43: Daniel Dohrn 39 For this reason it
Page 44 and 45: 5) The categories apply to the obje
Page 46 and 47: Daniel Dohrn 43 trivial but they ca
Page 50 and 51: David Lüthi 47 the very existence
Page 52 and 53: David Lüthi 49 removal on level 2
Page 54 and 55: David Lüthi 51 awkward even from w
Page 56 and 57: David Lüthi 53 general schema; and
Page 58 and 59: David Lüthi 55 We’ve seen that h
Page 60 and 61: David Lüthi 57 knowledge of object
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Page 86 and 87: References Comments on Possibility
Page 90 and 91: Simon Sauter 87 2. Consider the ope
Page 92 and 93: Simon Sauter 89 There can be no dou
Page 94 and 95: Simon Sauter 91 or that there is so
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Page 98 and 99: Simon Sauter 95 response are more c
Page 100 and 101: (HPaa) How is it possible to rule o
Page 102 and 103: Simon Sauter 99 References Cassam,
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Replies to Commentators 111 by exte
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