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David Lüthi 57 knowledge of objects (cf. 88) could thus not be refuted by pointing out that, say, in a Strawsonian purely auditory world, perceptual knowledge would be possible without spatial perception – as Cassam tries to do in his ch. 3. Indeed, Cassam’s central objection against the transcendental argument approach to EHPQs is just that it tries to answer them by identifying necessary conditions (cf. e. g. vii, 52f., 58). This cannot be right, Cassam says, because an essential element in an explanation of the possibility of some type of knowledge is the specification of (one or several) means of acquiring such knowledge, and such means are never unique, but always only practical. But apart from the fact that these latter claims are doubtful even in connection with type 1 EHPQs like HPew and, especially, HPpk (cf. section 1), it should be clear that Cassam’s objection is surely wrong with regard to EHPQs of type 2: if ‘How is empirical knowledge possible?’ is taken in the type 2 sense, then the identification of preconditions for the possibility of empirical knowledge – be they necessary or not – is the proper response, and it is the Cassamian multi-levels response that would be amiss. It may be that something like a multi-levels approach à la Cassam does make for a proper response to type 1 EHPQs; but pending a more elaborate version of such an approach than the one Cassam offers us in his book, that point remains to be established. References David Lüthi Zürich University luethi@philos.uzh.ch Ameriks, K. (2003). Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument, in K. Ameriks, Interpreting Kant’s Critiques. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 51-66. Dretske, F. (1969). Seeing and Knowing. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Stroud, B. (2000). Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge, in B. Stroud, Understanding Human Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-8. Stroud, B. (2004). Perceptual Knowledge and Epistemological Satisfaction, in J. Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 165-73.
Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 58 – 84, 2009 WHAT IS KANT’S REFUTATION OF IDEALISM DESIGNED TO REFUTE? Bernhard Ritter The passage that Kant added to the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason can be approached by way of two of his designations. The first appears in a lengthy footnote to the preface and reads “a strict proof … of the objective reality of outer intuition,” or, more explicitly, “[a proof of] the existence of things outside us.” 36 The second is the actual heading of the passage: “The Refutation of Idealism.” Each instance can be taken, however heuristically, to correspond to a distinct task of clarifying the import of the argument. The passage heading suggests that it is a matter of getting clear about the idealist’s position, and how the argument is intended to disprove it. This may be termed the negative import of the Refutation of Idealism, as it consists of understanding what it refutes and how. According to the footnote in the preface, the passage is a proof of “the existence of things outside us”. This phrase seems unequivocal, although, it will be argued that there is no proof from Kant that establishes a categorical existential proposition ranging over things outside us. Because Kant’s label is misleading, spelling out the conclusion may be useful. In any case, doing this and reconstructing how it is achieved is part of the positive import of the argument. Moreover, an account of the positive import should include an explanation of why external objects are required. 1. Cassam on Kant Yet, there is a further question about the precedent step that leads to the cognition of external objects. It is not concerned with the Refutation of Idealism alone but with transcendental arguments in general: do they explain how empirical knowledge is possible? Cassim Cassam answers in the negative. 37 To see how he supports his claim it 36 B XL. 37 Cassam 2007 [= The Possibility of Knowledge]: vi, and section 2.
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ABSTRACTA Linguagem, Mente e Ação
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Editorial We proudly present the fo
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Precis 3 is an obstacle-dissipating
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Precis 5 priori knowledge, the key
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