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Daniel Dohrn 43 trivial but they can at least be suggested to a sceptic. If this consideration correctly conveys Kant´s intentions, it is tempting to read the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding to which Kant accords a central importance for understanding discoursive capacities as an antisceptical transcendental argument. 35 Such a reading does not necessarily require Kant to target a sceptic. It is sufficient that he does not presuppose knowledge of objects as he would if he offered a regressive transcendental argument drawing on the possibility of knowing objects of experience. By the way, if this argument can really be read as an antisceptical transcendental argument, it shows that even with regard to Kant, the available premisses of such arguments should not be confined to experience or inner experience. To summarize: Cassam is right to point to a certain tension between howpossible questions and transcendental arguments as they are usually interpreted. However, it seems questionable that his multi-level approach is suited to attain his ambitious epistemological aims. Cassam systematically underrates the principal resources of transcendental arguments. Furthermore the outlook of basing the multilevel approach and the criticism of transcendental arguments on Kant´s historical position does not seem promising. Daniel Dohrn Konstanz University Daniel_Dohrn@yahoo.com References Ameriks, K. (2003). Interpreting Kant´s Critiques. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Benacerraf, P. (1973). Mathematical Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 70: 661-679. Brandom, R. (1994). Making it Explicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discoursive Commitment. Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard University Press. 35 “I do not know any enquiries which would be more important to scrutinizing the faculty which we call understanding and to determining the rules and limits of its use than that which I… pursued under the title of a deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding.” (CpR A XVI)
Comments on The Possibility of Knowledge Cassam, Q. (2007). The Possibility of Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Dummett, M. (1978). Truth, in: Truth and other Enigmas, London: Duckworth, pp. 1- 24. Fairweather, A., Zagzebski, L. (2001) (eds.), Virtue Epistemology. Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Genova, A.C. (2008). Transcendentally Speaking, Kant-Studien 99, pp.13-29. Gram, M. (1971). Transcendental Arguments, Nous 5, pp. 15-26. Hegel, G. W. F. (1980). Phänomenologie des Geistes, Bonsiepen, Wolfgang, Heede, Reinhard, ed., Gesammelte Werke 9, Hamburg: Meiner. Henrich, D. (1976). Identität und Objektivität. Eine Untersuchung über Kants transzendentale Deduktion, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Heidelberg: Winter, pp. 9-108. Kant, I. (1900 -). Gesammelte Schriften, Herausgegeben von der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Reimer 1900- (the Critique of Pure Reason is cited as CpR, pages of the original two editions A and B) McDowell, J. (1996). Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Reid, T. (1983). Philosophical Works, Bracken, H.M., ed., 2 vols., Hildesheim: Olms. Rorty, R. (1971). Verificationism and Transcendental Arguments, Nous 5, pp. 3-14 Stroud, B. (1968). Transcendental Arguments, The Journal of Philosophy 65, pp. 291- 356 Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press 44
Page 2 and 3: ABSTRACTA Linguagem, Mente e Ação
Page 4 and 5: Editorial We proudly present the fo
Page 6 and 7: Precis 3 is an obstacle-dissipating
Page 8 and 9: Precis 5 priori knowledge, the key
Page 10 and 11: Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 7-
Page 12 and 13: Denis Bühler 9 A similar ambiguity
Page 14 and 15: Denis Bühler 11 successful reasoni
Page 16 and 17: Denis Bühler 13 More generally, ap
Page 18 and 19: Denis Bühler 15 And he succeeds in
Page 20 and 21: Denis Bühler 17 His answer goes as
Page 22 and 23: Denis Bühler 19 thus threaten both
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Page 26 and 27: Daniel Dohrn 23 which can be remove
Page 28 and 29: Daniel Dohrn 25 there is to be expe
Page 30 and 31: Daniel Dohrn 27 3. Problems of the
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Page 34 and 35: Daniel Dohrn 31 knowledge, but in h
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Page 38 and 39: Daniel Dohrn 35 not always necessar
Page 40 and 41: Daniel Dohrn 37 In Cassam´s opinio
Page 42 and 43: Daniel Dohrn 39 For this reason it
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Page 58 and 59: David Lüthi 55 We’ve seen that h
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Simon Sauter 93 question by determi
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Simon Sauter 95 response are more c
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(HPaa) How is it possible to rule o
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Simon Sauter 99 References Cassam,
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