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5) The categories apply to the objects of knowledge. 6) We have experiential knowledge only by virtue of the categories. Daniel Dohrn 41 Of course this does not show but presuppose that we really know objects. If the aim is to show that the categories are objectively valid, the aim of the proof as achieved by this variant of the deduction cannot consist in proving that we have knowledge of objects by dint of the categories but it must rather consist in proving that, given we have knowledge, we have this knowledge by dint of the categories. The categories are valid for anything which is an object of knowledge. The deduction can be read as a classical regressive argument in this interpretation, too, as Cassam himself does. We want to know whether the categories are objectively valid. We presuppose that we have experiential knowledge and show that the categories are necessary to have such knowledge. I doubt that Kant wants to conform to a stronger notion of validity than the one that we cannot but conceptualize eventual claims to knowledge by virtue of the categories. Furthermore, Kant seems to envisage in this classical regressive argument an answer to a specific how-possible question, how subjective conditions of thinking should have objective validity, i.e. provide conditions of the possibility of any knowledge of objects… (CpR B 122) 34 This counts against Cassam´s reading of how-possible questions in Kant´s philosophy. Kant´s comprehensive how-possible question is how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible and not how experiential knowledge is possible. Thus one could interpret the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding as a contribution to level I. The deduction is not merely to show conditions of experience. By uncovering necessary conditions of experience, Kant shows and goes the pathway towards synthetic 34 I take it for granted that Kant here indirectly poses the question how knowledge of the categories as conditions of experience is possible. With Genova´s contention in mind (cf. last note) one may tend to read Kant as stating Cassam´s problem how subjective conditions of thinking can have objective validity. But how can that question be answered by the above argument? Firstly, the argument could be taken to simply say this: How can subjective conditions of thinking be conditions of objects of knowledge? Well, since knowledge requires thinking and thinking requires applying the categories to objects, the categories are not merely conditions of thinking but must apply to objects. An alternative would be to deny that the above deduction is sufficient and to recur to the further considerations outlined below according to which objects are nothing more than an x which is filled by a synthesis according to concepts.
Comments on The Possibility of Knowledge a priori knowledge regarding the categories and their applicability as necessary conditions of knowing objects. I want to conclude by opposing two interpretations of the deduction: an interpretation as a regressive argument and a stronger one which rests on the following famous quote from the first deduction: Thus the original and necessary awareness of one´s own identity is an awareness of a necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, i.e. according to rules which do not only make appearances reproducible but in this way determine an object of intuition, i.e. the concept of something in which they necessarily cohere: for the mind could impossibly a priori think its own identity in the manifold of its ideas if it did not have before its eyes the identity of the act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity and makes their connection according to a priori rules possible. (CpR A 108) From this the following argument can be derived: 1) I a priori know that I can accompany any of my representations by an “I think”. 2) In order to know this, one must be a priori aware of an act of synthesis by which one connects all representations to objects. 3) This awareness depends on one´s being a priori aware of connecting all one´s representations so as to yield objects according to concepts of objects. 4) This awareness depends on one´s a priori connecting all one´s representations so as to yield objects according to concepts of objects. 5) Concepts of objects a priori are the categories. 6) The objective validity of the categories consists in connecting all one´s representations according to them. 7) Thus the categories are valid for all objects which are synthesized from one´s own representations. Although I consider such an understanding of the deduction to be philologically cogent, I do not want to address the question how it relates to Kant´s explanation of his deduction strategy. In any case, this reading is suited to form an antisceptical argument as it rests on the Cartesian certainty of being in a position to accompany all one´s thoughts by an “I think” (cf. Henrich 1976). The further mentioned premisses are not 42
Page 2 and 3: ABSTRACTA Linguagem, Mente e Ação
Page 4 and 5: Editorial We proudly present the fo
Page 6 and 7: Precis 3 is an obstacle-dissipating
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Page 10 and 11: Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 7-
Page 12 and 13: Denis Bühler 9 A similar ambiguity
Page 14 and 15: Denis Bühler 11 successful reasoni
Page 16 and 17: Denis Bühler 13 More generally, ap
Page 18 and 19: Denis Bühler 15 And he succeeds in
Page 20 and 21: Denis Bühler 17 His answer goes as
Page 22 and 23: Denis Bühler 19 thus threaten both
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Page 26 and 27: Daniel Dohrn 23 which can be remove
Page 28 and 29: Daniel Dohrn 25 there is to be expe
Page 30 and 31: Daniel Dohrn 27 3. Problems of the
Page 32 and 33: Daniel Dohrn 29 Firstly, a means is
Page 34 and 35: Daniel Dohrn 31 knowledge, but in h
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Page 38 and 39: Daniel Dohrn 35 not always necessar
Page 40 and 41: Daniel Dohrn 37 In Cassam´s opinio
Page 42 and 43: Daniel Dohrn 39 For this reason it
Page 46 and 47: Daniel Dohrn 43 trivial but they ca
Page 50 and 51: David Lüthi 47 the very existence
Page 52 and 53: David Lüthi 49 removal on level 2
Page 54 and 55: David Lüthi 51 awkward even from w
Page 56 and 57: David Lüthi 53 general schema; and
Page 58 and 59: David Lüthi 55 We’ve seen that h
Page 60 and 61: David Lüthi 57 knowledge of object
Page 62 and 63: Comments on Possibility of Knowledg
Page 86 and 87: References Comments on Possibility
Page 90 and 91: Simon Sauter 87 2. Consider the ope
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Simon Sauter 91 or that there is so
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Simon Sauter 93 question by determi
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Simon Sauter 95 response are more c
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(HPaa) How is it possible to rule o
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Simon Sauter 99 References Cassam,
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Replies to Commentators 101 In this
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