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Daniel Dohrn 37 In Cassam´s opinion the conclusion of this argument can be, given the first premiss, attained a priori. Cassam emphasizes that we do not always perceive material objects spatially, for instance when we hear them. Any non-spatial perception of material objects presupposes that we have the ability of directly perceiving such objects spatially. The argument depends on the assumption that we perceive material objects and elucidates necessary conditions of this perception. Since this presupposition is not resilient to scepticism, it may be understood as premiss of a regressive transcendental argument which ascends from given experiential knowledge to its a priori conditions. An analogous role plays Cassam´s argument that perception presupposes applying the categories. This argument can be regarded as replacing the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding whose original function is questioned by Cassam. 1) We have perceptual knowledge of objects. 2) Perceptual knowledge of objects requires the possibility of applying empirical concepts to them. 3) The application of empirical concepts presupposes that such concepts can be related to more basic concepts which specify e.g. the causal behaviour of objects. 4) In order to achieve this, these basic concepts must be applied to the objects of perceptual knowledge. 5) These basic concepts are the categories. 6) Thus the categories are applicable to the objects of perceptual knowledge (cf. Cassam 2007, 148-150). This argument, too, can, given the first premiss, be known a priori. The explicit role of the above arguments in Cassam´s theory is metaepistemological. Cassam wants to show that level-III arguments may play a role in answering epistemological how-possible questions notwithstanding their being dispensable. What is the function of regressive transcendental arguments? If the above arguments are regressive transcendental arguments, Cassam must envisage a function for regressive transcendental arguments as he attributes it to level III. This function is to uncover
Comments on The Possibility of Knowledge interesting background conditions of knowledge. Thus one function of regressive transcendental arguments is to uncover interesting background conditions of knowledge. As already shown, they may play a role at level I and level II, too. However, it seems doubtful that the above arguments merely have a metaepistemological function. Cassam does not choose these arguments at random. They capture central subjects of Kant´s thought, namely his a priori accounting for the role of space and of the categories as necessary conditions of perceptually knowing objects. They are what remains from these subjects when they are soberly analysed. Furthermore Cassam uses them in order to further develop his theory of directly perceiving that… The upshot is that Cassam himself construes essential parts of Kant´s epistemology in a way which characterizes them as regressive transcendental arguments. Furthermore, these arguments are of great interest to Cassam´s own approach. The greater the interest, the more doubtful the claim that they are optional and less important than in other epistemologies. 5. Remnants of Kant In this section I want to criticize Cassam´s reception of Kant from a more philological perspective. There is a principled tension between Cassam´s claim of following Kant´s intentions and the way in which he presents Kant´s arguments. Decisive arguments as the refutation of idealism, the a priori proof that spatial perception is necessary for experiential knowledge, and the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding are presented as transcendental arguments and not as necessary conditions of answering the original question how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. Cassam´s understanding of these arguments allows to subsume them under level-III arguments. But the question is where the level-I and level-II –arguments are to be found which according to Cassam are necessary in order for Kant to adequately pursue his own basic question how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. Thus Cassam´s criticism of transcendental arguments seems to amount to a principled criticism of Kant´s epistemology. 38
Page 2 and 3: ABSTRACTA Linguagem, Mente e Ação
Page 4 and 5: Editorial We proudly present the fo
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Page 12 and 13: Denis Bühler 9 A similar ambiguity
Page 14 and 15: Denis Bühler 11 successful reasoni
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Page 18 and 19: Denis Bühler 15 And he succeeds in
Page 20 and 21: Denis Bühler 17 His answer goes as
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Page 26 and 27: Daniel Dohrn 23 which can be remove
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Page 58 and 59: David Lüthi 55 We’ve seen that h
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Simon Sauter 87 2. Consider the ope
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Simon Sauter 89 There can be no dou
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Simon Sauter 91 or that there is so
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Simon Sauter 93 question by determi
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Simon Sauter 95 response are more c
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(HPaa) How is it possible to rule o
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Simon Sauter 99 References Cassam,
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