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Daniel Dohrn 35 not always necessary conditions of a certain knowledge. As such they are opposed to necessary conditions which are the alleged target of transcendental arguments. But if the aim of transcendental arguments is taken into account, this opposition is too simple. For transcendental arguments are not to establish necessary conditions of knowing that q but to establish knowledge that p as a necessary condition of knowing q. Knowledge that q provides a sufficient condition of knowing that p which is the aim of inquiry. Of course we do not interpret any sufficient condition of knowing that p as a means of attaining knowledge that p. But considering the vagueness of Cassam´s notion of means, it seems arbitrary to deny that a transcendental argument can have a function at level I. It constitutes and by its very realization manifests a means to attain knowledge that p. At least the opposition of necessary and sufficient conditions as subjects of transcendental arguments respectively of the ML approach cannot be upheld in this way. This last argument shows that transcendental arguments may establish knowledge which is the subject of a how-possible question, not only uncover necessary conditions of a piece of knowledge. Taking into account the interest-relativity of epistemological questions which is emphasized by Cassam, it seems ideological to discredit transcendental arguments as superfluous or unnecessary. It is a strength and not a weakness of antisceptical transcendental arguments that they promise answers to the sceptic. It is a strength, no weakness if they provide a way, perhaps the only way of establishing a certain piece of knowledge directly. A decisive argument of Cassam´s is the generality problem. Now one could imagine to formulate disjunctively necessary conditions. Conditions of spatial vision could be turned into necessary conditions of sense perception tout court by forming part of a disjunction: 1) If sense perception is realized by visual experience, the objects perceived must occupy different positions in space (condition I). 2) If sense perception is realized by auditory experience, … (condition II). 3) Thus it is a necessary condition of sense perception that objects occupy different positions in space (condition I), or… (condition II).
Comments on The Possibility of Knowledge An alternative would be to specify premiss q of a transcendental argument, for instance by replacing the question how sense perception is possible by the question how knowledge can be obtained by dint of visual sense perception. It remains to be examined how far such arguments can lead. Cassam does not present principled objections. 31 Cassam asks what the deeper function of regressive transcendental arguments (b) is. This question can be answered by recurring to his own considerations regarding the dependence of achievements like epistemic seeing on spatial perception and categorial concepts which are presented as paradigms of a priori knowledge: 32 Firstly, the argument for the necessity of spatial perception: 1) We perceive material objects. 2) Perception of material objects requires the ability to perceive them as material objects. 3) Perception of material objects as such requires the ability to perceive their primary qualities. 4) Primary qualities of material objects are spatial properties. 5) Thus perception of material objects requires the ability to perceive spatial properties. 6) Thus we are in a position to perceive spatial properties (Cassam 2007, 121f.). 31 Cassam denies that transcendental arguments can be limited to certain ways of perceiving (Cassam 2007, 65). However, he does not say why. 32 A problem of the notion of epistemic seeing can be derived from Cassam´s handling the other minds problem. In Cassam´s opinion we may see someone´s anger in his face. Cassam uses Dretske´s analysis:: “... conditions are such that he wouldn´t look the way he looks now unless he was angry, and … believing that the conditions are like this I take him to be angry.“(Cassam 2007, 163) The difficulty is twofold. Firstly, when one considers how strongly laden with theory such a direct perception may be, it seems as if we might be able to directly perceive anything provided we entertain a suitable background theory which tells us correctly that something would not be perceived in this way if it were not… (cf. Brandom 1994, 223). Cassam aims his argument at refuting a sceptic who argues that sense perception leaves claims to knowledge underdetermined. If allegedly direct perception is revealed to be laden with theory, the sceptic might take this to confirm her distinction of what is delivered by the senses and of what is made in our theory of it. Then she may ask how the former may ground the latter. Secondly, the problem is that direct perception is too cheap. I may claim that I perceive electrons when I see water because since water is necessarily built up from electrons, it would not look that way if it were not composed of electrons. Of course, other things might look the same way. But then they are not water. And it was presupposed that we are looking at water. 36
Page 2 and 3: ABSTRACTA Linguagem, Mente e Ação
Page 4 and 5: Editorial We proudly present the fo
Page 6 and 7: Precis 3 is an obstacle-dissipating
Page 8 and 9: Precis 5 priori knowledge, the key
Page 10 and 11: Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 7-
Page 12 and 13: Denis Bühler 9 A similar ambiguity
Page 14 and 15: Denis Bühler 11 successful reasoni
Page 16 and 17: Denis Bühler 13 More generally, ap
Page 18 and 19: Denis Bühler 15 And he succeeds in
Page 20 and 21: Denis Bühler 17 His answer goes as
Page 22 and 23: Denis Bühler 19 thus threaten both
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Page 26 and 27: Daniel Dohrn 23 which can be remove
Page 28 and 29: Daniel Dohrn 25 there is to be expe
Page 30 and 31: Daniel Dohrn 27 3. Problems of the
Page 32 and 33: Daniel Dohrn 29 Firstly, a means is
Page 34 and 35: Daniel Dohrn 31 knowledge, but in h
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Page 42 and 43: Daniel Dohrn 39 For this reason it
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Page 46 and 47: Daniel Dohrn 43 trivial but they ca
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Page 50 and 51: David Lüthi 47 the very existence
Page 52 and 53: David Lüthi 49 removal on level 2
Page 54 and 55: David Lüthi 51 awkward even from w
Page 56 and 57: David Lüthi 53 general schema; and
Page 58 and 59: David Lüthi 55 We’ve seen that h
Page 60 and 61: David Lüthi 57 knowledge of object
Page 62 and 63: Comments on Possibility of Knowledg
Page 86 and 87: References Comments on Possibility
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Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 85
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Simon Sauter 87 2. Consider the ope
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Simon Sauter 89 There can be no dou
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Simon Sauter 91 or that there is so
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Simon Sauter 93 question by determi
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Simon Sauter 95 response are more c
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(HPaa) How is it possible to rule o
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Simon Sauter 99 References Cassam,
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Replies to Commentators 101 In this
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