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Daniel Dohrn 31 knowledge, but in how far does it enlighten the nature of knowledge? Cassam achieves the transition to the question Wk (What is knowledge?) by dint of the question (Wek) What is empirical knowledge? (Cassam 2007, 81) The epitheton “empirical” in fact offers a good starting point for Cassam´s two-levelapproach as it creates a certain conversational context. It already involves an answer to the means-question (by experience) which can be further enlightened by further specification (by sense perception, seeing, hearing). However, the transition from the specific question what empirical knowledge is to the general question what knowledge is is problematic. The defendant of the definitional tradition could argue that the latter issue does not reduce to emphasizing certain means and to removing certain obstacles but requires explaining what factive mental states arising in many different ways have in common such that they deserve to be called knowledge. It is not at all clear what the status of the question what knowledge is could be in a scientific endeavour of answering how-possible questions. Thus it would be more consequent for Cassam to pursue his therapeutic approach and to discredit what-is questions as obsolete metaphysics: “Do not ask what-is questions but concrete how-possible questions.” These worries are confirmed by Cassam´s comment on how-possible questions by which he argues against the attempt of removing level-III arguments from epistemology: What counts as a philosophically satisfying answer to (HPpk) is always a matter of one´s philosophical interests, and while one might think that explaining how perceptual knowledge is possible is fundamentally a matter of knowing what makes it possible, one might also think that explaining how perceptual knowledge is possible is fundamentally a matter of overcoming apparent obstacles to its existence. (Cassam 2007, 128) Cassam relativizes the answer to how-possible questions. When we ask how knowledge by perception is possible –a paradigm case of a how-possible question- sometimes the issue is what makes such knowledge possible, i.e. a level-I argument, sometimes the issue is to remove obstacles, depending on one´s interests. But how can Cassam at the same time claim that any how-possible question somehow requires level-I and level-II arguments and that these arguments exhaust what is required of an epistemology? It
Comments on The Possibility of Knowledge seems rather as if level-I- and level-II arguments are relevant depending on philosophical interests of answering certain such questions. Regarding these concessions and the difficulty of showing that level-I- and level-II arguments both are necessary and sufficient to answer how-possible questions, Cassam probably would do better not to distinguish between necessary and optional elements of epistemology but between more and less relevant issues in light of epistemological interests. As already said, the status of level III is problematic. Level III does not seem necessary. Nevertheless Cassam spends a lot of acumen to show that there are valid a priori arguments which are to be placed on level III: The important point, therefore, is not that we must say something about a priori enabling conditions... but that there are a priori enabling conditions and that philosophical reflection can tell us what they are if we are interested. (Cassam 2007, 128) While Cassam originally maintained a sharp contrast between necessary level-I and -II and optional level-III arguments, all these arguments now seem to be relative to interests one may have or not. One final worry: If Cassam´s program is to replace the definition project, it must claim general validity. Level I and level II both must be applicable to knowledge as such. But how do they relate to knowledge we claim to have without being in a position to specify means of attaining it at all? Thomas Reid considers the eventuality of an immediate knowledge which is not conveyed by “instruments” or “means”(Reid 1983, 186a-187b). 28 In fact we seem to have many convictions without our being able to name means how they were or could be acquired or tested, for instance because they are so basic. Probably I know that there won´t open an abyss in front of my chamber door when no one is looking, but it might prove difficult to tell how I know it. These examples indicate that there are cases of immediate knowledge which cannot be subject to a two-level approach as endorsed by Cassam. A sceptic could point to obstacles of such immediate knowledge. But how can we hope to discard these obstacles by recurring to means of acquiring immediate knowledge? 28 Hegel´s criticism of any epistemology drawing on “means”, “instruments”, “media” of knowledge most probably relates to these passages of Reid´s (Hegel 1980, 53). 32
Page 2 and 3: ABSTRACTA Linguagem, Mente e Ação
Page 4 and 5: Editorial We proudly present the fo
Page 6 and 7: Precis 3 is an obstacle-dissipating
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Page 12 and 13: Denis Bühler 9 A similar ambiguity
Page 14 and 15: Denis Bühler 11 successful reasoni
Page 16 and 17: Denis Bühler 13 More generally, ap
Page 18 and 19: Denis Bühler 15 And he succeeds in
Page 20 and 21: Denis Bühler 17 His answer goes as
Page 22 and 23: Denis Bühler 19 thus threaten both
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Page 26 and 27: Daniel Dohrn 23 which can be remove
Page 28 and 29: Daniel Dohrn 25 there is to be expe
Page 30 and 31: Daniel Dohrn 27 3. Problems of the
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Page 50 and 51: David Lüthi 47 the very existence
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Page 56 and 57: David Lüthi 53 general schema; and
Page 58 and 59: David Lüthi 55 We’ve seen that h
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Comments on Possibility of Knowledg
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References Comments on Possibility
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Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 85
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Simon Sauter 87 2. Consider the ope
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Simon Sauter 89 There can be no dou
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Simon Sauter 91 or that there is so
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Simon Sauter 93 question by determi
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Simon Sauter 95 response are more c
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(HPaa) How is it possible to rule o
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Simon Sauter 99 References Cassam,
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Replies to Commentators 101 In this
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