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Comments on The Possibility of Knowledge
for all antisceptical arguments in favour of synthetic a priori knowledge (Cassam 2007,
56). Cassam´s result is that antisceptical transcendental arguments do not contribute to
answering how-possible questions. Their function lies in their antisceptical role. Rather
they might contribute to uncovering relevant background conditions at level III. But it is
doubtful that they are suited to do so as level-III arguments are not aimed at refuting
scepticism. It would be a mere coincidence if antisceptical arguments selected relevant
background conditions.
Cassam doubts that b) regressive arguments have a function at all. In order to
discuss their alleged function, he recurs to Kant´s transcendental deduction of the pure
concepts of understanding which he considers to be a regressive argument. One
eventual function of regressive arguments is revelatory. They show something about our
way of thinking, for example the use of a priori concepts. Yet Cassam is right to argue
that we should know the fact that we use a priori concepts independently of a
transcendental argument. (Cassam 2007, 68). Kant´s own aim seems to be to show the
validity of the categories. Cassam´s decisive argument against this proposal is that the
deduction would have the following structure: Starting from the way in which we must
think, objective validity of the categories is inferred. Cassam finds this inference faulty:
“Kant doesn´t explain why proving the indispensability of the categories in his sense
amounts to a proof of their objective validity.“(Cassam 2007, 78) 24 The third alternative
considered by Cassam is an explanatory one. By uncovering a priori conditions,
transcendental arguments explain our way of thinking. Cassam doubts that there is an
explanatory function which is not better performed by the ML approach. If the latter
really fulfils Cassam´s expectations, the above doubts seem justified.
24 Cf. Stroud´s general criticism that transcendental arguments fail to show that subjective necessities of
thinking amount to knowledge (Stroud, Barry: “Transcendental Arguments“. In: The Journal of
Philosophy 65. 1968, 291-356).
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