Complete Issue in PDF - Abstracta

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 21 – 44, 2009 TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS, HOW-POSSIBLE QUESTIONS, AND THE AIM OF EPISTEMOLOGY Daniel Dohrn 1. Cassam´s Approach to Epistemology I want to start with resuming Cassam´s approach in its motivational structure. In The Possibility of Knowledge, Cassam develops his multi-level-approach (ML approach) by which he reacts to questions how a certain kind of knowledge is possible. How-possible questions arise in connection with considering obstacles which could interfere with the acquisition of knowledge. Faced with such obstacles, how is it possible for us to acquire a certain knowledge? An epistemological how-possible question requires at least two kinds of answers (Cassam 2007, 9-10): Level I: Means are specified how the respective knowledge can be acquired. Level II: The alleged obstacle is removed by showing how it can be overcome or dissipated. There is a third level which has a somewhat precarious status: Level III: Necessary enabling background conditions of knowledge are specified. Cassam wants to show that the third level is not required to answer how-possible questions, but that it may under appropriate circumstances contribute to answering them. It may enrich our reflective perspective on our knowledge. Cassam´s motive is to evade the Scylla of a minimalist account as provided by Timothy Williamson (2000) which restricts epistemology to level I, and the Charybdis of a maximalist theory which is to systematically capture necessary a priori conditions of knowledge. Cassam explicitly draws on Kant´s question how knowledge is possible. According to Kant, the subject of his Critique of Pure Reason is the following:
Comments on The Possibility of Knowledge The real task of pure reason is contained in the question: How are synthetic a priori judgements possible? (CpR, B 19, my translation, Kant´s emphasis) Cassam does not want to make a merely historical philological point but to provide a philosophical theory of knowledge which is Kantian in spirit. This becomes obvious when he describes his approach as answering the question “What is knowledge”: (Wk) What is knowledge? …The Means Response to questions like (Wk) and (Wek) is different from other popular responses. In particular, it is different from the analytic response to (Wk), according to which the way to explain what knowledge is is to analyse the concept of knowledge with a view to uncovering non-circular necessary and sufficient conditions. The Means Response doesn´t imply that the concept is unanalysable in this sense, but it does suggest that analysing the concept of knowledge into more basic concepts is not the only or the best way of explaining what knowledge is. (Cassam 2007, 83f.) Cassam maintains that the best way to tackle the most basic question of epistemology, the issue of the nature of knowledge, is not a definition specifying necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge, for instance “knowledge is justified true belief“. In doing so he opposes the tradition in analytic philosophy which focused on problems of definitions and especially with regard to the Gettier problem developed more and more refined versions of necessary and sufficient conditions. In rejecting the definitional task, Cassam joins the company of Williamson who considers knowledge as an unanalysable factive mental state (Williamson 2000, Cassam 2007, 44). A particular strength of Cassam´s approach is its flexibility. We may say that he replaces an overambitioned project by a more pedestrian one. The task is not to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge but certain sufficient conditions of a certain kind of knowledge which is threatened by concrete obstacles (cf. Cassam 2007, 13). Then these obstacles are removed. In the end, relevant necessary background conditions are provided at level III. Cassam rejects the demand of solving sceptical problems (Cassam 2007, 170). His referring to obstacles can be understood as a sober surrogate of antisceptical argument programs. This is illustrated by Cassam´s discussing the question of the possibility of perceptual knowledge: “The object of the exercise is simply to explain how perceptual knowledge is possible, given that it is possible.“(Cassam 2007, 34) Sceptical doubts are replaced by apprehending obstacles 22
Page 2 and 3: ABSTRACTA Linguagem, Mente e Ação
Page 4 and 5: Editorial We proudly present the fo
Page 6 and 7: Precis 3 is an obstacle-dissipating
Page 8 and 9: Precis 5 priori knowledge, the key
Page 10 and 11: Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 7-
Page 12 and 13: Denis Bühler 9 A similar ambiguity
Page 14 and 15: Denis Bühler 11 successful reasoni
Page 16 and 17: Denis Bühler 13 More generally, ap
Page 18 and 19: Denis Bühler 15 And he succeeds in
Page 20 and 21: Denis Bühler 17 His answer goes as
Page 22 and 23: Denis Bühler 19 thus threaten both
Page 26 and 27: Daniel Dohrn 23 which can be remove
Page 28 and 29: Daniel Dohrn 25 there is to be expe
Page 30 and 31: Daniel Dohrn 27 3. Problems of the
Page 32 and 33: Daniel Dohrn 29 Firstly, a means is
Page 34 and 35: Daniel Dohrn 31 knowledge, but in h
Page 36 and 37: 4. Transcendental Arguments Strike
Page 38 and 39: Daniel Dohrn 35 not always necessar
Page 40 and 41: Daniel Dohrn 37 In Cassam´s opinio
Page 42 and 43: Daniel Dohrn 39 For this reason it
Page 44 and 45: 5) The categories apply to the obje
Page 46 and 47: Daniel Dohrn 43 trivial but they ca
Page 48 and 49: Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 45
Page 50 and 51: David Lüthi 47 the very existence
Page 52 and 53: David Lüthi 49 removal on level 2
Page 54 and 55: David Lüthi 51 awkward even from w
Page 56 and 57: David Lüthi 53 general schema; and
Page 58 and 59: David Lüthi 55 We’ve seen that h
Page 60 and 61: David Lüthi 57 knowledge of object
Page 62 and 63: Comments on Possibility of Knowledg
Page 74 and 75:
Comments on Possibility of Knowledg
Page 76 and 77:
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83:
Page 84 and 85:
Page 86 and 87:
References Comments on Possibility
Page 88 and 89:
Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 85
Page 90 and 91:
Simon Sauter 87 2. Consider the ope
Page 92 and 93:
Simon Sauter 89 There can be no dou
Page 94 and 95:
Simon Sauter 91 or that there is so
Page 96 and 97:
Simon Sauter 93 question by determi
Page 98 and 99:
Simon Sauter 95 response are more c
Page 100 and 101:
(HPaa) How is it possible to rule o
Page 102 and 103:
Simon Sauter 99 References Cassam,
Page 104 and 105:
Replies to Commentators 101 In this
Page 106 and 107:
Replies to Commentators 103 simply
Page 108 and 109:
Replies to Commentators 105 answer
Page 110 and 111:
Replies to Commentators 107 which I
Page 112 and 113:
Replies to Commentators 109 are bot
Page 114 and 115:
Replies to Commentators 111 by exte
Page 116:
Replies to Commentators 113 Stroud,
show all

Complete Issue in PDF - Abstracta

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?