Complete Issue in PDF - Abstracta
Complete Issue in PDF - Abstracta
Complete Issue in PDF - Abstracta
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Denis Bühler 13<br />
More generally, apply<strong>in</strong>g the 3LM to some HPQ seems to make sense only if we<br />
have a grip on the means that is supposed to play a central role <strong>in</strong> the discussion. That<br />
presupposes an understand<strong>in</strong>g of the means. I th<strong>in</strong>k that this understand<strong>in</strong>g should<br />
<strong>in</strong>clude hav<strong>in</strong>g an idea of the cognitive activity that´s go<strong>in</strong>g on. But it should surely<br />
imply hav<strong>in</strong>g some understand<strong>in</strong>g of the epistemological aspects of the means to<br />
knowledge, that is, hav<strong>in</strong>g some understand<strong>in</strong>g of how the subject is warranted <strong>in</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g<br />
that means. This seems not only the m<strong>in</strong>imum we need <strong>in</strong> order to make sure that we<br />
know what we´re talk<strong>in</strong>g about. It also seems essential <strong>in</strong> order to f<strong>in</strong>d obstacles to the<br />
possibility of knowledge by the proposed means. For how could we f<strong>in</strong>d an obstacle to<br />
x without hav<strong>in</strong>g some understand<strong>in</strong>g of x?<br />
3.<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ally, I would like to discuss Cassam's conception of level 3 of his 3LM <strong>in</strong> the context<br />
of epistemic reason<strong>in</strong>g. I th<strong>in</strong>k that a similar vagueness can be found here.<br />
I th<strong>in</strong>k we can detect a certa<strong>in</strong> tension <strong>in</strong> even the few remarks on level 3<br />
explanations that we get. There are several aspects to a level 3 explanation. Thus we are<br />
told that (a) what is be<strong>in</strong>g answered on level 3 is a "what-makes-it-possible question<br />
rather than a how-possible question. How-possible questions are obstacle-dependent but<br />
what-makes-it-possible questions are explanation-seek<strong>in</strong>g. What they seek is not a way<br />
round some specific obstacle but, as it were, a positive explanation of the possibility of<br />
acquir<strong>in</strong>g a certa<strong>in</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d of knowledge by certa<strong>in</strong> specified means" (p.16). Next (b) we<br />
are told that two different th<strong>in</strong>gs may be <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> a level 3 explanation. The<br />
explanation may be a type A explanation, an explanation "that seeks to expla<strong>in</strong> the<br />
possible occurrence of a certa<strong>in</strong> cognitive activity" (ibid). Or it may be a type B<br />
explanation: what makes an explanation a type B explanation is "that it seeks to expla<strong>in</strong><br />
the epistemological significance of a certa<strong>in</strong> cognitive activity" (ibid). The nature of<br />
type A explanations is further specified (c) as giv<strong>in</strong>g enabl<strong>in</strong>g conditions of the<br />
cognitive activity M (for means) <strong>in</strong> question. Those are held to be a subclass of<br />
necessary conditions for M. They are hence not just any necessary conditions for M, but<br />
are "more specific" (p.17), and they are background conditions. Cassam doesn't further<br />
explicate what dist<strong>in</strong>guishes background enabl<strong>in</strong>g conditions from other necessary<br />
conditions for M. He refers to Burge's usage of that term<strong>in</strong>ology, but doesn't give an