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Simon Sauter 99 References Cassam, Q. (2007). The Possibility of Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dretske, F. (1971). Conclusive Reasons, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49, pp. 1- 22. Dretske, F. (2005). The Case against Closure, IN Steup & Sosa: Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publisher, pp. 13-26. Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Abstracta SPECIAL ISSUE IV, pp. 100 – 113, 2009 THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE: REPLY TO DENIS BUEHLER, DANIEL DOHRN, DAVID LÜTHI, BERNARD RITTER AND SIMON SAUTER Quassim Cassam I thank Denis Bühler, Daniel Dohrn, Daniel Lüthi, Bernhard Ritter and Simon Sauter for their responses. They are all, to varying degrees, sceptical about the central ideas of my book. I will not try to address all their objections here but will focus instead on three major areas of concern: (1) the clarity and applicability of the multi-levels model, (2) my account of means of knowing, and (3) my discussion of transcendental arguments. 1. The Multi-Levels Model To be more precise, they worry that the multi-levels model is less illuminating than I suppose (Buehler, Dohrn, Lüthi, Sauter), that my account of means of knowing is not adequate (Buehler, Dohrn), and that I underestimate what transcendental arguments can achieve (Dohrn, Lüthi, Ritter). I am unpersuaded by their arguments in relation to (1) and (3) but agree that more needs to be said about means of knowing. In this section I will defend the multi-levels model. In the next section I will flesh out the notion of a means of knowing. Finally, I will take another look at transcendental arguments. Here are three specific concerns about the multi-levels models: (a) One or other of the first two levels of a multi-levels response to an epistemological how possible question is superfluous. (b) There isn’t a clear distinction between Level 1 and Level 2. (c) The model doesn’t apply smoothly to some of the actual how-possible questions that I discuss in the book. Starting with (a), Dohrn writes that ‘the question is why level 1 questions must be answered at all’ (p. 7). His point is that if how-possible questions are obstacledependent then surely all we need to do in order to answer the question is to tackle the obstacle. This is something that happens at Level 2 rather than Level 1 so why is Level 1 necessary at all? One reason is that the obstacles that get tackled at Level 2 are precisely obstacles to the acquisition of knowledge by the means identified at Level 1.
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ABSTRACTA Linguagem, Mente e Ação
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Editorial We proudly present the fo
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Denis Bühler 9 A similar ambiguity
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Denis Bühler 15 And he succeeds in
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Daniel Dohrn 23 which can be remove
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Daniel Dohrn 27 3. Problems of the
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Daniel Dohrn 29 Firstly, a means is
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Daniel Dohrn 39 For this reason it
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5) The categories apply to the obje
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David Lüthi 47 the very existence
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