Philosophical Background to the Modern World - Timothy R. Quigley

Philosophical Background to the Modern WorldTo set the stage for our readings and discussions this semester, it's important to review themetaphysical and ontological beliefs that shaped intellectual life prior to the modern period sothat we can better appreciate the revolutionary changes that occurred in the intellectual andcultural climate of Europe at the end of the Middle Ages. The challenges to traditional ways ofthinking about the nature of reality and the place of human beings in the world transformedreligious, scientific, and philosophical beliefs and gave birth to concepts and practices that wetake for granted today as "natural", "normal", belonging to common sense. It is absolutely crucialto appreciate just how radically different the pre-modern world was from both the modern andthe post-modern. We'll start by looking at three competing world views: Aristotelianism,Mechanism, and Mysticism.I. AristotelianismThere are some philosophical and existential questions that seem to appear in different forms inevery human culture. Such questions arise from the desire we feel at one time or another tounderstand ourselves and to gain a deeper insight into the natural world and our place within it.This often leads to a tension between the idea of the human being as a part of nature, and thehuman being as somehow apart from nature and the natural world of cause and effect.There was a tendency in ancient Greek philosophy going back at least to Thales (c. 585 BCE)and others (e.g. the Milesians and the later Atomists) to explain nature in purely materialistterms. Various attempts were made to define matter as essentially made up of water, air, atoms,seeds, etc. Regardless of the definition proposed, what unified the materialists was theassumption that matter was the only thing that was real.One of the problems encountered by this materialist approach was the ontological status ofvalues. Since values are not material – that is, they're not the sort of things one bumps into in thedark – it follows from the fundamental assumption of materialism that they don't exist. But giventhat human beings in every culture are concerned about the moral and ethical nature of life, andthat morality depends on value judgments, it would seem to follow that there must be a placemade for values in any comprehensive explanation of life on earth. Thus, since the materialistscould not provide an account of values, many (including Plato) concluded that the fundamentalassumption of materialism ("Everything is matter") must be wrong.Plato (427-347 BCE), of course, turned the tables on the materialists by claiming that theultimate reality was the nonmaterial world of Forms, which exist apart from the material thingswe see around us. And it was this philosophical dichotomy that Aristotle inherited and set out toreconcile. How could there be both material objects of sense and nonmaterial values – both real,yet fundamentally different from one another?Aristotle (384-322 BCE) approached his solution through another problem that had challengedwestern thinkers for centuries, and that was the problem of identity and change. How is it thatsomething can undergo numerous changes, and yet remain the same thing throughout thosechanges? Take, for example, a chair that has been painted, re-painted, had numerous legs

eplaced, etc. At each stage, regardless of the extent and number of changes made, we think ofthese as changes in the same chair even if it no longer looks like the chair we originallyacquired. A similar case can be made for our own identities, regardless of the changes that takeplace from infancy, to adulthood, and old age. No matter how much I change, it's always I whochange. How can that be?Plato's answer to this problem never satisfied Aristotle. Plato claimed that the things that are real,i.e. the Forms, are nonmaterial and, thus, are not subject to change. Rather they constitute aneternal foundation for the very possibility of existence of the things in nature that are subject tothe constant flux, i.e. the being and becoming of natural objects. Thus, it is only the imitations ofthose Forms – the material things of this world – that change. The Forms from which thesethings are derived are eternal and, hence, remain the same. And that which makes somethinggood (the highest value) is itself a nonmaterial Form. So you see that according to Plato changeis a kind of illusion – it's not real.Of course, this ingenious dualistic solution raised its own problems, some of which wereepistemological. For example, if there are two worlds, as Plato claimed – the world of Nature(appearance) and the world of Forms (reality) – and if the latter is totally nonmaterial andinvisible, two questions arise:1. How can we possibly know anything about it?2. If it is entirely non-material, how can it interact with the material world of nature?According to Aristotle, Plato had gone too far in his separation of form and matter. So Aristotleset out to correct Plato's excesses by showing that appearances are not deceiving, but that thethings that are real exist in matter and really do change. In the process he also managed to find aplace for values in the material, ever-changing world of nature.Form and MatterTo comprehend Aristotle's general philosophical scheme of things and to understand his place inthe intellectual world of seventeenth century European philosophy and science, we need to lookbriefly at his approach to nature and scientific explanation. Aristotle was, in many ways, apragmatic thinker concerned with the actual conditions of life and how they might be improved.His search for the good was a pursuit he shared with Plato, Socrates (469-399 BCE), and others.The difference is that Aristotle was to look for his solutions in the material world of nature andnot an ideal, abstract world of immaterial forms beyond it.For Aristotle, form is a characteristic element of the material world. He agreed with Plato thatwe must appeal to the notion of form to explain what we see, identify, and recognize around usand to account for our knowledge of these things. But the form that makes, for example, a treerecognizable as a tree and which allows us to know something about the nature of trees is not sofar removed as to be in some other world, as Plato claimed. Rather, the form is embodied in thisworld and is intimately connected to matter. These forms play an important role in ourexperience of the world, even though it must be admitted that they do have some paradoxicalfeatures.Page 2 of 12 | 17thCentBkrnd.doc

Forms are distinguishable in thought but not in fact. So, for example, we can distinguish onecolored or shaded square from another,but we never experience a square with no color or shade at all, nor do we perceive a color withno shape. What happens here, according to Aristotle's doctrine, is that we separate the form fromthe material thing in our minds through intellectual abstraction and analysis. But it doesn'tfollow that forms can exist apart from the material objects.So what is the proper way to think about the relation of form and matter? First of all, we mustobserve that the world is divided into beings and becomings. Everything in the material world ofnature is in the process of "becoming", i.e. everything is undergoing continual change in theprocess of birth, growth, decay, and death. This process of change can be analyzed in the mostgeneral Aristotelian terms as a movement from the "out-of-which" (that from which a thingmoves or emerges) to the "into-which" (that toward which the thing is moving, which it isbecoming).Now, to understand and to gain knowledge of a thing we must first be able to differentiate itfrom other things, in other words it must be articulated in our experience. 1 This articulationprovides the answer to the question which thing we're looking at or talking about. As we lookinto a room, we distinguish chairs, tables, walls, and human beings from one another in virtue ofthe fact that they are different particular things. But we move quickly in our experience beyondthe mere "whichness" of a thing to a recognition of the kind of thing it is, a process that relies ona definition of the form into which the particular thing (the matter) has developed. Thus, ourability to differentiate allows us to say which thing it is; the form tells us what the thing is.But in addition to the formal classification of the thing, the definition also specifies a function orpurpose, i.e. what the thing is capable of doing and what end it serves. This is whereexplanation comes into the picture. Explanation is an attempt to account for why the thing has acertain kind of form. So, for example, according to Aristotle the function of a chair is to allowone to sit, which explains why it has the form it does; the function of a shoe is to support andprotect the foot, which explains the general form of the shoe; etc. Thus, to answer the whyquestionone must have knowledge, and knowledge according to Aristotle is always of the formof a thing, not the matter. That's because the matter can vary, but the form must be roughly thesame from shoe to shoe, chair to chair, tree to tree, etc. And since knowledge is of things thatstay the same (which accounts for its permanence and reliability), and since it is the matter thatchanges, explanation and knowledge are relative to the form of things.Take, for example, a solid rectangular object. We might ask, "What is it?" The answer could be,"It's a brick." But how would we know this? What makes it a brick? Aristotle's answer is, "Its1 Notice that our discussion is becoming increasingly abstract as we look into the metaphysical and fundamental nature of reality.This is not uncommon in philosophical analysis. But it does take some getting used to. By all means don't hesitate to ask aquestion if you feel you're getting lost in the fog.Page 3 of 12 | 17thCentBkrnd.doc

form." The fact that it's made of clay is largely irrelevant. Its being clay is not what makes it abrick, but rather the uses to which the clay is put, viz. to build a wall. Vases can be made of clay,and so can toys, cups, and tiles. What makes these things the kind of things they are is the formtaken by the clay, and the form is determined by the function and purpose of the thing.It's the form that gives a thing its unity and wholeness. The matter, on the other hand, containswithin it the possibility of being a certain kind of thing, whether brick, vase, cup, or tile. Thissuggests the "relativity of form and matter". The bricks can be formed into a wall – they containthat as a possibility. And when the wall is built, we say the matter is made up of the bricks, andthe form is the wall whose purpose is to provide an enclosure. Now when the walls are used tobuild a house, then the walls become the matter and the house becomes the form. Thus, at everystage of becoming we look back to the matter and forward to the form, structure, and function. Inthis sense, the world is a hierarchy of individuals related in such a way so that each thing is boththe fulfillment of a purpose – an actuality – and the possibility of a future development – apotentiality.So far we've been talking mostly about things made by human beings – things such as chairs,shoes, bricks, and walls. But Aristotle applied this way of thinking based on form and matter toall things including objects, which acquire their purposes and functions "naturally". So, forAristotle, it makes sense to ask about the function of the heart, which is to pump blood. This is afunction it has by nature, not through human intervention and design (unless, of course, it's anartificial heart). This marks another major distinction in Aristotle's ontology, i.e. between thosethings that arise and change spontaneously (by nature) and those that come into beingartificially (by art). Thus, "nature" (physis) is defined as the totality of sensible objects capableof spontaneous change. A "natural object" has its principle of motion within it, as opposed to anartifact (e.g. a bed, a chair, a rug), which does not. In other words, an artifact changes into thething it is because of an action coming from outside of it. Thus, rocks fall naturally; hammers aremade.But hammers fall too. Does that mean that they're natural objects after all? Not really, but thedistinction needed here is an important one. When the hammer that's made of metal and woodfalls from the workbench to the floor, it is not "as a hammer" that it falls, but as metal and woodwhich are natural. Thus, the object can also be analyzed into its natural and artificialcomponents. If you bury a wooden bed in the ground, a new bed will not grow spontaneouslyfrom the soil. If anything grows it will be a tree. That's because the natural part of the bed is thewood, and the artificial part is the form the wood takes and that which makes the wood a bed.Finally, we should note that according to Aristotle all things belong to a hierarchy of purposesand goals. The oak tree is the "form" of the acorn in the sense that it is its "coming-to-be" or"into-which". The acorn contains the potentiality of there being an oak tree. Thus, the form isactualized by matter (which is what makes it this acorn) which comes to be what its form andfunction determine it to be. In the case of the oak tree, this happens spontaneously and naturally.In the case of the brick wall, it does not.The ultimate driving force behind this motion from one state to another is called an entelechy –that which manifests itself as an innate impulse toward growth and development in the naturalPage 4 of 12 | 17thCentBkrnd.doc

world. Every change is thus a coming-to-be of some latent potentiality. God lies at the end (andbeginning) of the entire process as the complete actualization of all things.Substance and ChangeThe distinction between form and matter and the role it plays in our knowledge and explanationof things may seem relatively straightforward when dealing with bricks, chairs, and even shoesand trees. But what about human beings? To say that Socrates is the combination of matter(flesh and blood) and human form says very little about the nature of the individual person.Socrates was surely more than just a single form. He was a male, a husband, the son of amidwife, a philosopher, the teacher of Plato, snub-nosed, Athenian, etc., etc. The particular thing(Socrates) was all these things and more. He was also a thing constantly undergoing change, e.g.from youth to old age, from happy to sad, from thin to portly, from alive to dead, etc. Yet wewant to say it was "the same thing" that embodied these properties and endured such changes.So now we confront not only the complexity of form and matter, but once again the problem ofidentity and change. What is the nature of the thing that changes? How is it that one thingchanges in so many ways and yet retains its identity as the same thing? According to Aristotle,that which changes is the particular substance – and the substance is matter that has or embodiesvarious characteristics or properties, e.g. it may be round, tall, red, lying down, twelve yearsold, etc.Properties are what particular things share with one another. Many things can be red and sharethe property redness. That's because redness is a general, not a particular, thing. Many differentpeople (particular things) can be philosophers, lovers, wives, dishonest, twenty-four years old,etc. That is to say, they can share the same properties or "whatness" with other particulars. Butlisting all the properties a thing has will never lead us to the individuality of this thing (thishorse, this person, this chair) that has these properties (brown, twenty-four years old, in thecorner, etc.) Thus, the "thisness" (substance or matter) of a thing is distinct from its "whatness"(property or form).Aristotle's Four CausesFrom the analysis of a thing into its formal and material components, it's a short step to a morecomplete Aristotelian explanation. Everything, Aristotle says, aims at some end or goal whichgives meaning and purpose to the thing. To understand a thing one must understand its functionand goal. This is what he calls its final cause. But it may also be helpful to understand how thegoal or final cause is reached. The means of achieving its goal is what Aristotle called the meansor the efficient cause of a thing. 2By extending the notion of cause to the formal, material, efficient, and final aspects of a thing,Aristotle arrived at this rather unusual theory of causation. 3 Consider, for example, the marblesculpture of a discus thrower. As we saw above with the brick, any attempt to understand a thing2 The concept of efficient cause will be very important in our discussions of seventeenth century philosophy and science.3 Note that Aristotle's use of the word "cause" is quite different from the way we use it today. We would only refer to the efficientcause as a cause.Page 5 of 12 | 17thCentBkrnd.doc

egins with the questions, "What is it?" and "Why does it look the way it does?" According toAristotle, the answer always involves four "causes".1. material: because it's made of marble.2. efficient: because it was made in this particular way, by a sculptor with a hammer andchisel, rather than some other way, e.g. by modeling in clay.3. formal: because it has the form it has, i.e. an athlete throwing a discus.4. final: because it has a purpose or goal, e.g. to present an ideal type of human being, or topay tribute to a great athlete, etc.This analysis of a thing into its four causes wasapplied to natural as well as artificial objects.Unfortunately, the division seems less plausible whenit's applied to certain elements of nature, say, forexample, stone or fire. What's the purpose of a stone?Aristotle would say its purpose is to fall toward thecenter of the earth. The purpose of fire? To rise towardthe heavens. The problem here is that such claimsseem arbitrary, contrived, and not terribly useful orenlightening. Thus, while it's easy enough to specifythe material, formal and in some cases the efficientcause of a natural object, it often requires a stretch ofthe imagination to formulate a final goal or purpose forit.CosmologyFinally, I want to look very briefly at Aristotle's viewof astronomical order and motion since this will be theview that various scholars will use to reject theinsights of Copernicus (1473-1543) and Galileo (1564-1642) in the Renaissance.As we have seen, for Aristotle, all change is movement toward an end. This is known as ateleological view (and will be easily incorporated in the Middle Ages, by Thomas Aquinas(1224-1274) and others, into a Christian theology which sees the world as "God's plan".)"Teleology" comes from the Greek word telos which means goal. The "-logy" in "teleology"comes from logos which, in this context, we can translate roughly as "the theory or study of".Thus psychology is the study of the psyche; sociology the study of social forms; and teleology,the study of goals or goal-directed behavior.But it seems natural to assume that if everything has an end toward which it moves, there mustalso be a "place" from which it comes. In other words, it makes sense to ask about the ultimateends and starting points for the things that exist. Is there a final resting place for all things – anultimate stasis in which all things come to a stop and change no more? And was there abeginning of all things – a time prior to the existence of things and before any changes occurred?Page 6 of 12 | 17thCentBkrnd.doc

One way to approach this problem of origins and goals is through a particular aspect ormanifestation, e.g. that of motion. According to Aristotle, everything that is in motion must havebeen put in motion by something which was itself in motion. This is true on a microscopic aswell as a macroscopic scale. The principle assumption here is that every particular movementcan be traced back to a prior movement. But if this is true, what could possibly have put the firstthing into motion? Aristotle reasoned that there must be a first mover which is itself unmoved.That unmoved mover constitutes the ultimate and eternal God in Aristotle's scheme of things.Not a personal God – just a logical necessity – but eternal nonetheless.Aristotle also argued that the unmoved mover is immaterial and that it initiates an eternalcircular motion which is both the basis of all the motions of natural objects in the universe andis the most perfect motion. Thus, the universe, he claimed, was composed of a set of concentricspheres at the center of which was a stationary earth. The motion of the stars and planets wasexplained in terms of the motion of these concentric spheres.These are some of the fundamental components of Aristotle's view of the physical andintellectual world around us. For reasons that were both politically and theologically motivated,his ideas had to be reckoned with in most philosophical discussions throughout the modern age.We'll encounter them again and again in our readings and discussions this semester.Next we turn to two other aspects that shaped scientific and philosophical thinking going into theseventeenth century – Mechanism and Mysticism.II. MechanismThe fifteenth and sixteenth centuries brought a renewed interest in the observation of nature andthe quantification of natural phenomena. For example, the rediscovery of perspectival drawing –geometrical and optical techniques that allow a convincing rendering of space in two dimensions– contributed to a transformation in our relation to, and representation of, the visual world. Andthe use of mathematics to characterize the constitution, motion, and behavior of both terrestrialand astronomical objects challenged the role of deductive logic as the primary tool of scientificinvestigation.The importance accorded to mathematics during the scientific revolution of the sixteenth centurygoes back to Pythagorean, Platonic, and Arabic traditions. The emerging influence of the Arabworld on European scholarship during the Middle Ages, the rebirth of interest in Plato, andtranslations of the works of Archimedes (287 ? -212 BCE) all contributed to an intellectual climatethat made possible the work of Copernicus, Kepler (1571-1630), Galileo, and the rise of a highlymechanistic and technological view of the universe.There were also practical and technological uses to which the new science could be put which,no doubt, stimulated a good deal of support and financial backing. So, for example, themathematical study of the use of cannons increased the efficiency of warfare, and significantimprovements in navigational and optical instruments led to more effective travel and moreaccurate medical research. The collaboration of philosophers, scientists, artists, and artisansPage 7 of 12 | 17thCentBkrnd.doc

produced a rapid increase in technology and experimentation. 4When the new emphasis on mathematics was fused with some of the ideas of Plato and the neo-Platonists, what resulted was a modern notion of "God the Mathematician" and celestial engineerwho set the clockwork of the universe in motion. To study nature, then, was to study the mind ofGod. What more divine justification could there be for the new science?In the sixteenth century, the ingenious but convoluted system of Ptolemy (85-165) wasoverthrown by the heliocentric system of Copernicus, a scholar trained in canon law, astronomy,medicine and the arts, who argued that the earth revolves on its axis and turns in a circular patharound the sun between Mars and Venus carrying the moon with it on an epicycle.Copernicus was reluctant to publish his theory due to a well-founded fear of Church reaction. Itwas not until 1543, the year of his death, that his findings were made public with the publicationof De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium. Even then, his book contained a preface (written bysomeone else) claiming that Copernicus did not believe the theory and was not putting it forth astrue.While publication of the theory actually aroused little interest, it's truth was confirmed byJohannes Kepler's observations and detailed calculations of planetary motion. (Kepler, by theway, was influenced by Pythagorean mysticism, which may have given him the beliefs andfortitude necessary to continue his difficult analysis of Tycho Brahe's extensive data). Kepler'sobservations also provided support for the emerging mathematical approach to scientificexplanation, which involved hypothesis formation and the testing of hypotheses againstempirical data. The one thing still missing, however, was an overarching theory or "rationale".Galileo and the New ScienceAristotle acquired his great authority only because of the strength of his proofs and the profundity ofhis arguments. Yet one must understand him, and not merely understand him, but have such thoroughfamiliarity with his books that the most complete idea of them may be formed, in such a manner thatevery saying of his is always before the mind... There is no doubt that whoever has this skill will beable to draw from his books demonstrations of all that can be known; for every single thing is inthem."Simplicius" (Galileo) 5Galileo, who was born the same year as William Shakespeare, was a contemporary of JohannesKepler, Tycho Brahe, Francis Bacon (1561-1626), William Gilbert (1544-1603), ThomasHobbes (1588-1679), and René Descartes (1596-1650). Isaac Newton (1642-1727), who was4 Galileo's remarks are instructive here: "The constant activity which you Venetians display in your famous arsenal suggests tothe studious mind a large field for investigation, especially that part of the work which involves mechanics; for in this departmentall types of instruments and machines are constantly being constructed by many artisans, among whom there must be some who,partly by inherited experience and partly by their own observations, have become highly expert and clever in explanation." FromDiscourse and Demonstrations Concerning Two New Sciences (1638), in Allen G. Debus, Man and Nature in the Renaissance,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 10.5 Galileo, "Dialogues Concerning the Two Chief World Systems", The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy (ed. MichaelR. Matthews), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989, 64.Page 8 of 12 | 17thCentBkrnd.doc

orn the year Galileo died, considered him a "giant" whose achievements made Newton's owndiscoveries possible.One of Galileo's first discoveries was his law of pendulum motion (which he discovered, whilestill a medical student, as he watched the lighting of lamps hanging from the ceiling in thecathedral at Pisa.) Using his pulse as a timing device, he found that the periods of the lamp'smotion were of equal duration, regardless of the distance covered.Galileo taught mathematics at the University of Pisa from 1588 to 1592. He taught Aristotelianphilosophy and was enthusiastic about the recently translated works of the Greek philosopherArchimedes (287-212 BCE). However, due to his sharp questioning of Aristotelian dogmasconcerning motion, together with his critique of a royal engineering project, his teachingappointment at Pisa was terminated.In 1592 he moved to the University of Padua where he taught mathematics and physics. TheVenetian government, actively distancing itself from papal authority, provided a more suitablelocation for Galileo's teaching and research. Galileo's physics became increasingly mathematical,prompting many Aristotelians to claim that while his work in mathematics was impressive, hiswork in physics left much to be desired. His application of mathematics to physics wasapparently too abstract and modern for them.In 1609 he heard about a toy invented by a Dutchman that, through the proper alignment oflenses in a tube, made distant objects appear closer than they are in reality. Galileo knew enoughabout optics at the time so that he was able to construct his own version of this "toy" (telescope)and aimed it at the night sky. Soon afterwards he observed the moons of Jupiter. With thisdiscovery, he became an avid supporter of Copernicus' heliocentric theory, publishing the resultsof his observations in The Sidereal Messenger in 1610.Galileo's astronomical investigations confirmed the Copernican model and added to the numberof heavenly bodies, which was considered heresy to the conservatives. So entrenched wasmedieval dogma that certain of his colleagues declined to even look through the telescopebecause they "knew" the number of celestial objects had to be seven – a sacred number. Forexample, in an early seventeenth century "refutation" of Galileo's claims, his critics claimed thatThere are seven windows given to animals in the domicile of the head, through which the air isadmitted to the tabernacle of the body, to enlighten, to warm and to nourish it. What are theseparts of the microcosmos? Two nostrils, two eyes, two ears, and a mouth. So in the heavens, asin a macrocosmos, there are two favourable stars, two unpropitious, two luminaries, andMercury undecided and indifferent. From this and from many other similarities in nature, suchas the seven metals, etc., which it were tedious to enumerate, we gather that the number ofplanets is necessarily seven. 6Remember, in 1610 facts were not just facts but were still considered divine symbols to beinterpreted – scientific explanations had to be deduced from theological premises, not inferredfrom empirical observations.6 Taken from Charles Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 4.Page 9 of 12 | 17thCentBkrnd.doc

Galileo moved to Florence in 1610 where he became "Chief Mathematician and Philosopher" inthe court of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Meanwhile, the publication of Galileo's observationsduring the Inquisition and his support of the Copernican view proved controversial. While therewere some supporters among the clergy, the level of tension and sensitivity was high and theChurch's authority was under increasing attack. To complicate matters, Galileo was activelycampaigning for and publicizing his views. He even went to Rome in 1615 to argue withtheologians and to defend his scientific principles. The result was that the opposition hardened,publication of his book was suspended, and he was told not to teach these new theories unless hestated clearly that they were merely speculations and false ones at that.In 1632, after publishing Dialogue on the Two Principle Systems of the World, which had apreface stating he was not advocating the heretical views contained in the work, Galileo had toface the Inquisition a second time. His own sympathies were hardly concealed in the text,however, as he positioned the character named "Simplicio" as the chief advocate of thetraditional (and weak) Aristotelian view. Now he was called back to face the Inquisition a secondtime, threatened with torture, and forced to renounce on his knees the heliocentric view. He musthave felt lucky to escape with his life given that many other "heretics" of the day were oftenexecuted for contradicting received doctrines.In 1638 Galileo published Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences. In this work, the generalassumption ("rationale") underlying the behavior of material objects was taken to be geometric.Since geometry is a deductive science, Galileo was clearly suggesting that, in principle at least,physics must also be an exact science.The Methodological LegacyWhat was the scientific legacy of this rich period of discovery? At least three principles emergedfrom it:1. To advance scientific knowledge, one must experiment rather than appeal to authority.2. One should proceed cautiously and adopt a healthy skepticism – it's better to be ignorantthan wrong.3. Scientific explanation arises from the coordination of reason, quantification, andobservation.There was also an emphasis on that which is observable and measurable. Thus, primaryqualities (extension, figure, motion) are taken to be more real than secondary qualities (color,sound, etc.), which are nothing more than subjective appearances. Galileo put the matter in thefollowing way:Now, whenever I conceive of any material or corporeal substance, I am necessarilyconstrained to conceive of that substance as bounded and as possessing this or that shape, aslarge or small in relationship to some other body, as in this or that place during this or thattime, as in motion or at rest, as in contact or not in contact with some other body, as being one,many, or few – and by no stretch of imagination can I conceive of any corporeal body apartPage 10 of 12 | 17thCentBkrnd.doc

from these conditions. But I do not at all feel myself compelled to conceive of bodies asnecessarily conjoined with such further conditions as being red or white, bitter or sweet,having sound or being mute, or possessing a pleasant or unpleasant fragrance. On the contrary,were they not escorted by our physical senses, perhaps neither reason nor understanding wouldever, by themselves, arrive at such notions. I think, therefore, that these tastes, odors, colors,etc., so far as their objective existence is concerned, are nothing but mere names for somethingwhich resides exclusively in our sensitive body (corpo sensitivo), so that if the perceivingcreatures were removed, all of these qualities would be annihilated and abolished fromexistence. But just because we have given special names to these qualities, different from thenames we have given to the primary and real properties, we are tempted into believing that theformer really and truly exist as well as the latter. 7Typical of the "new scientist" was the view that physical reality is characterized by matter inmotion. The behavior of matter conforms to simple mathematical laws. Thus, a mechanistic andquantitative view of nature must replace the teleological and qualitative view.This new approach to the understanding of nature also raised the issue of free will anddeterminism, as well as questions about the relation and priority of phenomenal experience(appearance) and objective relations (reality), leading to a re-emergence of dualism as one wayof reconciling materialism with Christian doctrine.III. Mysticism, Platonism, and the Great Chain of BeingIn addition to the developments in applied mathematics and scientific experimentation during theRenaissance, the revival of Pythagoreanism and Platonism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuriesalso stimulated an interest in various forms of mysticism and the occult sciences (astrology,numerology, alchemy, etc.) To separate these elements from the scientific concepts and practicesof the time would be to ignore an important aspect of late medieval and renaissance thinkingabout human experience, the natural world, and their place in the "Great Chain of Being". 8The case of mathematics is of special importance because of the significance of quantificationin the rise of modern science, but the occult or mystical influence of late Hellenisticphilosophy had a much deeper impact on sixteenth-century thought than this alone. Implicit inneo-Platonism and the Christian traditions was the belief in a unity of nature, a unity thatencompassed God and the angels at the one extreme and man and the terrestrial world at theother. Along with this was a continued belief in the truth of the macrocosm-microcosmrelationship, the belief that man was created in the image of the great world, and that realcorrespondences do exist between man and the macrocosm. 9Neo-Platonism also emphasized beauty, order and the importance of the sun as the source oflight, nutrition, and life on earth. Such views contributed to a "climate of opinion" in which itwas quite natural to think of the universe as based on mathematical relations, and to conceive of7 Galileo, The Assayer (1623), in Michael R. Matthews (ed.), The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy: SelectedReadings, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1989, 56f.8 Debus, op. cit., 11-15.9 Ibid., 12.Page 11 of 12 | 17thCentBkrnd.doc

the sun as the source around which earthly life revolves, both physically and spiritually. Thus, itshould come as no surprise that in this context Copernicus, Kepler, and others were motivated bymystical as well as a scientific ideas in the construction of a heliocentric view of the universe.Timothy R. Quigley, 1997Page 12 of 12 | 17thCentBkrnd.doc