A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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Challenge #1Verifying Shutdown ofEnrichment and Reprocessing Plants• Satellite monitoring• Remotely monitored video cameras andsensors and seals on key equipment• Short-notice random inspectionsCost would not be highPotential sensitivities aboutqualitative indicators of past production(e.g. HEU and plutonium isotopics)The U.S. Portsmouth gaseous-diffusion uranium-enrichment plantstopped operating in 2001, but has not yet been decommissionedA Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - Geneva, May 2, 2008
Challenge #2Managed Access(to confirm no undeclared enrichment or reprocessing in military nuclear facilities)Managed-access procedures have been developed for OPCW inspectionsU.S. DOE has instructed its facilities and U.S. NRC has instructed its licenseesto prepare for managed access in connection with possible IAEA questions about thecompleteness and accuracy of U.S. Additional Protocol declarationsIPFM has been examining how managed access could be used to verify FM(C)TA Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - Geneva, May 2, 2008
Page 5 and 6: What Are Fissile Materials?Material
Page 7 and 8: Global Stocks of PlutoniumMetric to
Page 9 and 10: FISSBAN SANS “C”A SOUTH AFRICAN
Page 11 and 12: SECURING AN INDEFINATEDEALU.S. prom
Page 13 and 14: AN OLD POLICY WITH A TWISTLinkage t
Page 15 and 16: CAPTURING FISSILEMATERIAL STOCKSCea
Page 17 and 18: A PRACTICAL & PRAGMATICAPPROACHMate
Page 19 and 20: VERIFICATION SYSTEMSet of legally b
Page 21 and 22: CONCLUSIONWilling to start negotiat
Page 23 and 24: The FM(C)T and the SouthAsian Nucle
Page 25 and 26: Requirements No moratorium on produ
Page 27 and 28: Separation Plan Nine reactors outsi
Page 29 and 30: At the same time… Nuclear doctrin
Page 31 and 32: Prognosis India’s fissile materia
Page 33 and 34: The FM(C)T and the South AsianNucle
Page 35 and 36: Verifiable, Non-intrusive and Non-d
Page 37 and 38: Response to the US-India Nuclear De
Page 39 and 40: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 41 and 42: Design Recommendations for an FM(C)
Page 43 and 44: A Conference of States Parties(CSP)
Page 45 and 46: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 47: Five Verification Challengesin Nucl
Page 51 and 52: Challenge #3Non-Diversion at Operat
Page 53 and 54: Novouralsk, Russia
Page 55 and 56: Challenge #5Verifying Non-Diversion
Page 57 and 58: Challenge #5Non-Diversion of HEU Se
Page 59: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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