A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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The Verification Challenge“ ‘Effective verification’ of an FMCT cannot be achieved … evenwith … verification mechanisms and provisions … so extensivethat they could compromise the core national securityinterests of key signatories, and so costly that many countrieswill be hesitant to accept them.”Bush Administration at Conference on Disarmament, May 17, 2006But the FMCT would require of the weapon states the same thingthat the IAEA is supposed to verify in NPT non-weapon statesA Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - Geneva, May 2, 2008
Five Verification Challengesin Nuclear Weapon States1. Shutdown status of enrichment & reprocessing plants2. No undeclared enrichment or reprocessing in military nuclear facilities3. Non-diversion of plutonium at previously operating reprocessing plants(not designed for safeguards and without verified design information)4. Non-production of HEU at previously operating enrichment plants5. Non-diversion of material declared excess for weapons purposes(plutonium and HEU in classified form, and HEU to be used as naval fuel)Minimizing additional IAEA Safeguards costsA Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - Geneva, May 2, 2008
Page 5 and 6: What Are Fissile Materials?Material
Page 7 and 8: Global Stocks of PlutoniumMetric to
Page 9 and 10: FISSBAN SANS “C”A SOUTH AFRICAN
Page 11 and 12: SECURING AN INDEFINATEDEALU.S. prom
Page 13 and 14: AN OLD POLICY WITH A TWISTLinkage t
Page 15 and 16: CAPTURING FISSILEMATERIAL STOCKSCea
Page 17 and 18: A PRACTICAL & PRAGMATICAPPROACHMate
Page 19 and 20: VERIFICATION SYSTEMSet of legally b
Page 21 and 22: CONCLUSIONWilling to start negotiat
Page 23 and 24: The FM(C)T and the SouthAsian Nucle
Page 25 and 26: Requirements No moratorium on produ
Page 27 and 28: Separation Plan Nine reactors outsi
Page 29 and 30: At the same time… Nuclear doctrin
Page 31 and 32: Prognosis India’s fissile materia
Page 33 and 34: The FM(C)T and the South AsianNucle
Page 35 and 36: Verifiable, Non-intrusive and Non-d
Page 37 and 38: Response to the US-India Nuclear De
Page 39 and 40: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 41 and 42: Design Recommendations for an FM(C)
Page 43 and 44: A Conference of States Parties(CSP)
Page 45: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 49 and 50: Challenge #2Managed Access(to confi
Page 51 and 52: Challenge #3Non-Diversion at Operat
Page 53 and 54: Novouralsk, Russia
Page 55 and 56: Challenge #5Verifying Non-Diversion
Page 57 and 58: Challenge #5Non-Diversion of HEU Se
Page 59: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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