A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...
A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ... A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...
The Verification Challenge“ ‘Effective verification’ of an FMCT cannot be achieved … evenwith … verification mechanisms and provisions … so extensivethat they could compromise the core national securityinterests of key signatories, and so costly that many countrieswill be hesitant to accept them.”Bush Administration at Conference on Disarmament, May 17, 2006But the FMCT would require of the weapon states the same thingthat the IAEA is supposed to verify in NPT non-weapon statesA Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - Geneva, May 2, 2008
Five Verification Challengesin Nuclear Weapon States1. Shutdown status of enrichment & reprocessing plants2. No undeclared enrichment or reprocessing in military nuclear facilities3. Non-diversion of plutonium at previously operating reprocessing plants(not designed for safeguards and without verified design information)4. Non-production of HEU at previously operating enrichment plants5. Non-diversion of material declared excess for weapons purposes(plutonium and HEU in classified form, and HEU to be used as naval fuel)Minimizing additional IAEA Safeguards costsA Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - Geneva, May 2, 2008
- Page 5 and 6: What Are Fissile Materials?Material
- Page 7 and 8: Global Stocks of PlutoniumMetric to
- Page 9 and 10: FISSBAN SANS “C”A SOUTH AFRICAN
- Page 11 and 12: SECURING AN INDEFINATEDEALU.S. prom
- Page 13 and 14: AN OLD POLICY WITH A TWISTLinkage t
- Page 15 and 16: CAPTURING FISSILEMATERIAL STOCKSCea
- Page 17 and 18: A PRACTICAL & PRAGMATICAPPROACHMate
- Page 19 and 20: VERIFICATION SYSTEMSet of legally b
- Page 21 and 22: CONCLUSIONWilling to start negotiat
- Page 23 and 24: The FM(C)T and the SouthAsian Nucle
- Page 25 and 26: Requirements No moratorium on produ
- Page 27 and 28: Separation Plan Nine reactors outsi
- Page 29 and 30: At the same time… Nuclear doctrin
- Page 31 and 32: Prognosis India’s fissile materia
- Page 33 and 34: The FM(C)T and the South AsianNucle
- Page 35 and 36: Verifiable, Non-intrusive and Non-d
- Page 37 and 38: Response to the US-India Nuclear De
- Page 39 and 40: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
- Page 41 and 42: Design Recommendations for an FM(C)
- Page 43 and 44: A Conference of States Parties(CSP)
- Page 45: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
- Page 49 and 50: Challenge #2Managed Access(to confi
- Page 51 and 52: Challenge #3Non-Diversion at Operat
- Page 53 and 54: Novouralsk, Russia
- Page 55 and 56: Challenge #5Verifying Non-Diversion
- Page 57 and 58: Challenge #5Non-Diversion of HEU Se
- Page 59: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
The <strong>Verification</strong> Challenge“ ‘Effective verification’ of an FMCT cannot be achieved … evenwith … verification mechanisms <strong>and</strong> provisions … so extensivethat they could compromise the core national securityinterests of key signatories, <strong>and</strong> so costly that many countrieswill be hesitant to accept them.”Bush Administration at Conference on Disarmament, May 17, 2006But the FMCT would require of the weapon states the same thingthat the IAEA is supposed to verify in NPT non-weapon statesA <strong>Fissile</strong> <strong>Material</strong> (<strong>Cutoff</strong>) <strong>Treaty</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>its</strong> <strong>Verification</strong> - Geneva, May 2, 2008
Change language