A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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VERIFICATION SYSTEM (cont.) IAEA most logical verification entity - wouldrequire more inspectors & larger budget Non-compliance should be dealt with intimeframe consistent with threat A promptly convened Conference of State partieswould offer opportunities to consider allegationsand response of the suspected noncompliant party(or parties) Conference should have plenipotentiary powersto:refer allegations to the UNSCrecommend other measures as appropriaterequire a report from the verification entity onprogress made towards compliance by anoncompliant State.12
CONCLUSIONWilling to start negotiations without preconditions. BUT Pretoria may consider that a treaty that does not effectively addressirreversible nuclear disarmament is not worth pursuing. Likely to become more critical of attempts to restrict civilian fuel cycle;uses of fissile material, including HEU; and to make the AP a mandatorycondition of supplyCrucial to keep all negotiating options open Attempts to preempt inclusions of stocks or to create a “partial FMT” willlikely result in further deadlockFocus of future FMT should remain military use fissile material and notcivilian material in any way or form - if not it is likely to come under fire byone of its strongest supporters:Increased global interest in nuclear fuel as a sustainable energy sourcePretoria may be highly sensitive to any obligations which would implyrestrictions on civilian fissile production facilities or stocks of fissile material Judging by projected energy needs, it is estimated that by 2015 to 2020,SA plans to have more than half of its electric-power needs satisfied bynuclear energy.13
Page 5 and 6: What Are Fissile Materials?Material
Page 7 and 8: Global Stocks of PlutoniumMetric to
Page 9 and 10: FISSBAN SANS “C”A SOUTH AFRICAN
Page 11 and 12: SECURING AN INDEFINATEDEALU.S. prom
Page 13 and 14: AN OLD POLICY WITH A TWISTLinkage t
Page 15 and 16: CAPTURING FISSILEMATERIAL STOCKSCea
Page 17 and 18: A PRACTICAL & PRAGMATICAPPROACHMate
Page 19: VERIFICATION SYSTEMSet of legally b
Page 23 and 24: The FM(C)T and the SouthAsian Nucle
Page 25 and 26: Requirements No moratorium on produ
Page 27 and 28: Separation Plan Nine reactors outsi
Page 29 and 30: At the same time… Nuclear doctrin
Page 31 and 32: Prognosis India’s fissile materia
Page 33 and 34: The FM(C)T and the South AsianNucle
Page 35 and 36: Verifiable, Non-intrusive and Non-d
Page 37 and 38: Response to the US-India Nuclear De
Page 39 and 40: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 41 and 42: Design Recommendations for an FM(C)
Page 43 and 44: A Conference of States Parties(CSP)
Page 45 and 46: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 47 and 48: Five Verification Challengesin Nucl
Page 49 and 50: Challenge #2Managed Access(to confi
Page 51 and 52: Challenge #3Non-Diversion at Operat
Page 53 and 54: Novouralsk, Russia
Page 55 and 56: Challenge #5Verifying Non-Diversion
Page 57 and 58: Challenge #5Non-Diversion of HEU Se
Page 59: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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