A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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TREATY VERIFICATIONPosition based on 3 basic principles:Notion that effective FMT verification cannot beachieved implies that the NPT is not verifiableSuccess & future credibility of an FMT would requireverified assurances that fissile material is no longerbeing produced for weapons purposesSubjecting NWS & 3 de-facto possessors tointernational monitoring of at least their civilian nuclearactivities would redress long-standing concern thatnuclear industries in NNWS are disadvantaged10
VERIFICATION SYSTEMSet of legally binding agreements between each party andthe designated verification entityidentical for all parties, but modified to reflect restrictions required byNWSlimited to fissile material subject to the treaty rather than all nuclearmaterialDeclarations within a specific timeframe of all materialcovered under the treaty upon E.I.F.Declarations should trigger inspections of decommissioned.production and (if appropriate) storage facilities Should require some form of verifiable declaration that naval fuelis not diverted to nuclear-weapon purposesMaterial declared as excess, but still in sensitive geometrical& compositional forms should be subject to appropriateverification measures Materials re-worked into non-sensitive forms, should be placedunder appropriate IAEA safeguards11
Page 5 and 6: What Are Fissile Materials?Material
Page 7 and 8: Global Stocks of PlutoniumMetric to
Page 9 and 10: FISSBAN SANS “C”A SOUTH AFRICAN
Page 11 and 12: SECURING AN INDEFINATEDEALU.S. prom
Page 13 and 14: AN OLD POLICY WITH A TWISTLinkage t
Page 15 and 16: CAPTURING FISSILEMATERIAL STOCKSCea
Page 17: A PRACTICAL & PRAGMATICAPPROACHMate
Page 21 and 22: CONCLUSIONWilling to start negotiat
Page 23 and 24: The FM(C)T and the SouthAsian Nucle
Page 25 and 26: Requirements No moratorium on produ
Page 27 and 28: Separation Plan Nine reactors outsi
Page 29 and 30: At the same time… Nuclear doctrin
Page 31 and 32: Prognosis India’s fissile materia
Page 33 and 34: The FM(C)T and the South AsianNucle
Page 35 and 36: Verifiable, Non-intrusive and Non-d
Page 37 and 38: Response to the US-India Nuclear De
Page 39 and 40: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 41 and 42: Design Recommendations for an FM(C)
Page 43 and 44: A Conference of States Parties(CSP)
Page 45 and 46: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 47 and 48: Five Verification Challengesin Nucl
Page 49 and 50: Challenge #2Managed Access(to confi
Page 51 and 52: Challenge #3Non-Diversion at Operat
Page 53 and 54: Novouralsk, Russia
Page 55 and 56: Challenge #5Verifying Non-Diversion
Page 57 and 58: Challenge #5Non-Diversion of HEU Se
Page 59: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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