A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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A NONPROLIFERATION &DISARMANT FISSBANA treaty that covers existing stocks would: Meet the objectives of Art VI, particularly in terms oftransparency, accountability, and irreversibility Further enhance nonproliferation objectives by preventingtransfers from NWS or de facto nuclear weapons possessorsto any NNWS Be “non-discriminatory” & equalize safeguards burden Avoid a potential loophole for declaring military fissilematerial produced after treaty’s entry into force as paststocks Would help prevent diversion of materials to non-stateactors8
A PRACTICAL & PRAGMATICAPPROACHMaterial declared as excess should be included in a starting inventory of astate upon E.I.F. and be subject to verification - add. excess materialwould be added to the starting inventory in an irreversible waywithout obligation to declare "completeness and correctness" of historicalproductionSome excess material in sensitive geometrical or compositional formswould rule out direct verification IAEA Trilateral Initiative provides a modelDeclared excess materials reworked into insensitive forms can beintroduced into the verification system as new materialDowngrade HEU or used for production of MOX fuel as the need arisesPu could be mixed with high-level radioactive waste for direct disposal.Rest of material stored under normal verification conditionsLack of agreement on scope should not stall negotiations until such timeas agreement is reachedShould be addressed during negotiations, in the same manner as other aspectsof the treaty9
Page 5 and 6: What Are Fissile Materials?Material
Page 7 and 8: Global Stocks of PlutoniumMetric to
Page 9 and 10: FISSBAN SANS “C”A SOUTH AFRICAN
Page 11 and 12: SECURING AN INDEFINATEDEALU.S. prom
Page 13 and 14: AN OLD POLICY WITH A TWISTLinkage t
Page 15: CAPTURING FISSILEMATERIAL STOCKSCea
Page 19 and 20: VERIFICATION SYSTEMSet of legally b
Page 21 and 22: CONCLUSIONWilling to start negotiat
Page 23 and 24: The FM(C)T and the SouthAsian Nucle
Page 25 and 26: Requirements No moratorium on produ
Page 27 and 28: Separation Plan Nine reactors outsi
Page 29 and 30: At the same time… Nuclear doctrin
Page 31 and 32: Prognosis India’s fissile materia
Page 33 and 34: The FM(C)T and the South AsianNucle
Page 35 and 36: Verifiable, Non-intrusive and Non-d
Page 37 and 38: Response to the US-India Nuclear De
Page 39 and 40: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 41 and 42: Design Recommendations for an FM(C)
Page 43 and 44: A Conference of States Parties(CSP)
Page 45 and 46: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 47 and 48: Five Verification Challengesin Nucl
Page 49 and 50: Challenge #2Managed Access(to confi
Page 51 and 52: Challenge #3Non-Diversion at Operat
Page 53 and 54: Novouralsk, Russia
Page 55 and 56: Challenge #5Verifying Non-Diversion
Page 57 and 58: Challenge #5Non-Diversion of HEU Se
Page 59: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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