A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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ROLE IN CD/NPT One of the 1 st to put forward concrete proposals (2002working paper): Merits of a verifiable treaty that should cover both past and futureproduction of weapons usable fissile material Emphasized that since declaration of weapons materials stocks byall nuclear-capable states would not be feasible, materialsdeclared as excess should be included as a starting point Stressed that a fissile material ban should not underminecommercial nuclear energy programsMore recent statements show that South Africa has not movedaway from this position US draft treaty seems to have further fueled SA arguments infavour of a verifiable nonproliferation & disarmament mechanism.“South Africa continues to support the placing by all thenuclear-weapon States of fissile material no longer requiredfor military purposes under international verification by theIAEA.” – Amb. Abdul S. Minty at the 2007 PrepCom4
AN OLD POLICY WITH A TWISTLinkage to efforts to reduce eliminate HEU for peaceful civilian purposesCommercial value of 400+kg former weapons grade HEU (isotope production, fuelfor partially converted research reactor, etc)Strategic value given nature of HEU removed from warheads and relevance toexcess military material stocksAt 2006 Oslo International Symposium on HEU a clear linkage was madebetween the need to minimise/eliminate civilian HEU & material declared asexcess in military stockpiles:“we cannot exclusively focus on HEU without similar attention being given toother materials used in the production of nuclear weapons, including plutonium,tritium and other transuranic elements that have a proliferation potential”“for any (FMT) to be considered as a disarmament measure, it would need toaddress, at the very least, the issue of excess stocks – that is, weapons materialdeclared as excess, as part of an ongoing and irreversible process of the verifiedelimination of all fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosivedevices”“Such a Treaty can also prevent altogether or regulate the further production ofweapons-grade materials for legitimate and non-proscribed uses, including for thefueling of research reactors and naval reactors”- Amb. Abdul S. Minty5
Page 5 and 6: What Are Fissile Materials?Material
Page 7 and 8: Global Stocks of PlutoniumMetric to
Page 9 and 10: FISSBAN SANS “C”A SOUTH AFRICAN
Page 11: SECURING AN INDEFINATEDEALU.S. prom
Page 15 and 16: CAPTURING FISSILEMATERIAL STOCKSCea
Page 17 and 18: A PRACTICAL & PRAGMATICAPPROACHMate
Page 19 and 20: VERIFICATION SYSTEMSet of legally b
Page 21 and 22: CONCLUSIONWilling to start negotiat
Page 23 and 24: The FM(C)T and the SouthAsian Nucle
Page 25 and 26: Requirements No moratorium on produ
Page 27 and 28: Separation Plan Nine reactors outsi
Page 29 and 30: At the same time… Nuclear doctrin
Page 31 and 32: Prognosis India’s fissile materia
Page 33 and 34: The FM(C)T and the South AsianNucle
Page 35 and 36: Verifiable, Non-intrusive and Non-d
Page 37 and 38: Response to the US-India Nuclear De
Page 39 and 40: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 41 and 42: Design Recommendations for an FM(C)
Page 43 and 44: A Conference of States Parties(CSP)
Page 45 and 46: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 47 and 48: Five Verification Challengesin Nucl
Page 49 and 50: Challenge #2Managed Access(to confi
Page 51 and 52: Challenge #3Non-Diversion at Operat
Page 53 and 54: Novouralsk, Russia
Page 55 and 56: Challenge #5Verifying Non-Diversion
Page 57 and 58: Challenge #5Non-Diversion of HEU Se
Page 59: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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