A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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UNDERSTANDING PRETORIA’SPOSITION: FMCT vs. FMTUnique practical experience Built & dismantled NW program IAEA verified completeness of stocks declaration Largest (former) military stockpile of weapons grade HEU outside theweapon statesRole in “Shannon Mandate” “negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally andeffectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materialfor nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” SA argued that FMT should not only cap production but should alsocover existing stockpiles 1995 Shannon Report did not preclude any delegation from raisingthe issues of scope and verification within the Committee Necessary to get consensus in time for ‘95 NPT RevExtCon2
SECURING AN INDEFINATEDEALU.S. promise linked to NPT indefinite extensionCentral element of 1995 package of integral decisions:P&O disarmament action plan called for “immediate commencement andearly conclusion of negotiations” of a fissile material treaty in accordancewith the Shannon Report and “the mandate contained therein”At 2000 RevCon SA argued:to be an effective disarmament measure, treaty should have both nuclearnonproliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives“cut-off” treaty would only freeze status quo of nuclear capable countries,not reduce nuclear weapons over time Key among 13 practical steps adopted in 2000:Step 3: Conclusion within 5yrs of negotiations “in accordance with thestatement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate containedtherein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclearnon-proliferation objectives.”Also related to principle of irreversibility (step 5); unequivocal undertaking(step 6); IAEA Trilateral Initiative (step 8) & transparency (step 9b)3
Page 5 and 6: What Are Fissile Materials?Material
Page 7 and 8: Global Stocks of PlutoniumMetric to
Page 9: FISSBAN SANS “C”A SOUTH AFRICAN
Page 13 and 14: AN OLD POLICY WITH A TWISTLinkage t
Page 15 and 16: CAPTURING FISSILEMATERIAL STOCKSCea
Page 17 and 18: A PRACTICAL & PRAGMATICAPPROACHMate
Page 19 and 20: VERIFICATION SYSTEMSet of legally b
Page 21 and 22: CONCLUSIONWilling to start negotiat
Page 23 and 24: The FM(C)T and the SouthAsian Nucle
Page 25 and 26: Requirements No moratorium on produ
Page 27 and 28: Separation Plan Nine reactors outsi
Page 29 and 30: At the same time… Nuclear doctrin
Page 31 and 32: Prognosis India’s fissile materia
Page 33 and 34: The FM(C)T and the South AsianNucle
Page 35 and 36: Verifiable, Non-intrusive and Non-d
Page 37 and 38: Response to the US-India Nuclear De
Page 39 and 40: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 41 and 42: Design Recommendations for an FM(C)
Page 43 and 44: A Conference of States Parties(CSP)
Page 45 and 46: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Page 47 and 48: Five Verification Challengesin Nucl
Page 49 and 50: Challenge #2Managed Access(to confi
Page 51 and 52: Challenge #3Non-Diversion at Operat
Page 53 and 54: Novouralsk, Russia
Page 55 and 56: Challenge #5Verifying Non-Diversion
Page 57 and 58: Challenge #5Non-Diversion of HEU Se
Page 59: A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

A Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty and its Verification - International ...

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