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Der Fuehrer - Hitler's Rise to Power (1944) - Heiden

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FRANCE IS TO BLAME 695be an exaggeration <strong>to</strong> say that the French military rejoiced over Germanrearmament; but they obviously were of the opinion that France shouldattempt <strong>to</strong> reach an understanding about the purpose and limits of thisrearmament directly with Germany, without the intermediary of thecumbersome Disarmament Conference. In November and December,there were negotiations between Hitler and Francois-Poncet, the Frenchambassador <strong>to</strong> Germany. Hitler proposed a solemn Franco-Germanagreement which would proclaim the reconciliation of the two nationsfor all time <strong>to</strong> come, after the model of the agreement which he tried,about the same period, <strong>to</strong> reach with Poland. This proposal <strong>to</strong> Francewas formulated in terms that went far beyond the cool peacedeclarations which Pilsudski finally agreed <strong>to</strong> make. Hitler suggestedthat he was even willing <strong>to</strong> renounce Italian friendship in return; heexpected that France, as a sign of her concilia<strong>to</strong>ry attitude, wouldrenounce the Saar without a plebiscite. And since France intended <strong>to</strong>maintain her strong armaments, she surely could not object <strong>to</strong> a modestGerman army of three hundred thousand men.From France came a curiously encouraging reply in the form of anobviously inspired article in he Temps of December 17, which said:Either the German proposals will be rejected, which would meansanctions and war, but England was against this; or 'It will be grantedthat Herr <strong>Hitler's</strong> proposals, although unacceptable on many points,offer a possible basis for discussion on many other points.' What was'unacceptable' was doubtless the demand of a three-hundred-thousandmanarmy; but is it not the purpose of all diplomatic negotiations <strong>to</strong> try<strong>to</strong> reach an agreement on 'unacceptable points'?However, the party which believed in the League of Nations andcollective security gained the upper hand in France. Foreign MinisterJoseph Paul-Boncour, one of the chief spokesmen of this party,announced this in the League Council on January 20, 1934, when herejected in resounding terms <strong>Hitler's</strong> demand for the Saar. The League'sinterest in the Saar, he said, was more important for France than herown interest in it; <strong>to</strong> be sure, France could reach a direct understandingwith Germany, but it was her duty <strong>to</strong> enable the inhabitants of the Saar<strong>to</strong> make a free decision. This was more

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