Der Fuehrer - Hitler's Rise to Power (1944) - Heiden

668 DER FUEHRERported. They provide a faulty picture of the sums paid, received, orowed; but this they are intended to do; their aim is to penetrate the 'veilof money' and reveal the true quantity of goods turned over.And here a remarkable fact comes to light. In 1932, when everyonestopped lending Germany money, Germany had been obliged to curbher imports drastically, for otherwise she would have been unable to payfor them by her reduced exports, blocked by new customs barriers. Inthis year the financial yield of German exports had crashed to5,700,000,000 marks from 9,600,000,000 in the previous year; and thevalue of imports fell accordingly to 4,700,000,000. These were theuncorrected figures for German foreign trade. But if these sums weretransposed in terms of the standard price of 1928, so that they clearlyrepresented the real quantities, it turned out that German exports in 1932amounted to 8,100,000,000 marks — that is, the quantity of goodsexported would have brought in 8,100,000,000 marks if the prices of1928 had still prevailed; by the same scale, the imports of 1932amounted to 9,500,000,000 marks instead of only 4,700,000,000. Inother words, according to the prices actually prevailing, exportsexceeded imports; according to the prices prevailing in 1928, importswould have been higher. This meant that the goods that Germanyimported or purchased since 1928 had decreased in price more than thegoods that she exported or sold. This disparity in prices was Germany'sgain from an ap-parendy desperate situation. German exports consistedlargely of finished manufactures; her imports largely of raw materials.The variation in the decline of export and import prices can be seen bycomparing the two pairs of figures: 8,100,000,000 and 5,700,000,000for export; 9,500,000,000 and 4,700,000,000 for import; the prices ofthe goods sold by Germany had fallen by 29.9 per cent, or less than athird; while the prices of the goods purchased by Germany, largely rawmaterials, had fallen by more than half, or 50.5 per cent.This was the unexpected advantage which the crisis brought to acountry like Germany, operating with foreign raw materials: despitegreater difficulties and reduced profits in selling her own products, sheobtained easier and cheaper access to raw materials.