battle-of-the-river-plate-commemorative-booklet

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 5instead, to patrol the west coast ofGRAf spee broke off from the battle and retired to the west. eXeTeR was out ofthe fight, and the German ship could concentrate on the two cruisers. AcHILLescontinued to score hits. At 7.40am the light cruisers turned away under smoke.commodore Henry Harwood, RN, commanded the squadronmade up of HMs eXeTeR, AcHILLes and HMs AJAX. He had anaggressive tactical plan whihc he immediately put into effect.AcHILLes was fortunate that she did not take a direct hit, with all casualties anddamage being due to fragments from shells which burst short. Lansdorff decidedto head to the neutral port of Montevideo to repair his ship. He was pessimisticabout breaking through the enemy ring he perceived he was faced with, and theGraf spee was scuttled by its own crew just days later.Although the battle was inconclusive all four ships were damaged,with the GRAf spee losing 36 sailors, and the British ships a total of72 fatalities (two of them New Zealanders). The GRAf spee’s withdrawal and itssubsequent scuttling made the battle a major British victory, anda welcome morale boost for the Allies.New Zealanders were especially proud of their ship, and they welcomedthe ship’s company home with cheering, parades and civic receptions inearly 1940.ACHILLES X turret bomb damageADMIRAL GRAF SPEEsouth America. The ship arrived at Valparaiso on the 12th andhaving fuelled and embarked fresh provisions, sailed the nextday for what would be a six week patrol off the coasts of chile,peru and ecuador.HMS AcHILLes’ ship’s company had been going to ActionStations every morning before it sighted the GRAf spee. Theheavily armed pocket battle ship was in the South Atlantic withthe intention of attacking merchant ships should war erupt.GRAf spee commanding Officer captain Hans Langsdorff’sorders were to cruise further north, then move to the SouthAtlantic to hunt merchant shipping.Meanwhile, with news of the pocket battleship’s severalcommercial raids, AcHILLes had been ordered to join forceswith the heavy cruiser HMs eXeTeR, and AcHILLes’ sistership HMs AJAX.The New Zealanders saw the German raider’s smoke at6.14am and moved into Action stations immediately. Therewere 321 New Zealanders on board and they heard a loud“Make way for the Digger ensign” and the NZ Blue ensign,was raised.Faced with a much more heavily armed German ship thethree Allied vessels faced the prospect of annihilation on themorning of 13 December 1939. ADMIRAL GRAf spee hadlonger ranged guns and was capable of sinking all three Britishships before they could strike back. But the enemy made atactical mistake. Instead of standing off to take advantage ofhis tactical range, captain Lansdorff, who was thought tohave mistaken the light cruisers for destroyers, closed withthe enemy.“My policy with three cruisers in companyversus one pocket battle ship – attack atonce by day or night.”He advised his cruiser commanders. He intended to divide hisforce so that the enemy warship would have to split its heavyarmament or leave one group unengaged. HMs eXeTeR headedtowards one flank, and AcHILLes and AJAX to the other.At 6.20 HMs exeter, opened fire on the GRAf spee. At first theGRAf spee responded by splitting their armament, but thenconcentrated the fire of all six 11-inch guns on eXeTeR. Withinsix minutes several shells had hit HMs eXeTeR causing heavydamage and loss of life. Despite having one turret knocked outHMs eXeTeR remained in action, and took more hits. At 6.32it fired torpedoes at the enemy ship, but they missed. In all61 members of eXeTeR’s crew were killed or wounded duringthe action.While GRAf spee concentrated on eXeTeR, AcHILLes andAJAX closed in. At 6.21am AcHILLes began firing, and twominutes later, HMs AJAX also opened fire. eye witnesseson board say in the 80 minutes of action from 6.20 to 7.40AcHILLes fired 220 broadsides. By then, according toAcHILLes veteran, the late Vince McGlone, AcHILLes’ sixinch guns were so hot and had expanded so much they weretoo tight to fit into the gun cradle.The two ships scored numerous hits, and almost 20 minuteslater the Germans again split their main armament. One 11inch gun turret fired on the light cruisers.AJAX was struck, and AcHILLes too. At 6.40 a near miss sentshell splinters tearing through the director control tower, killingfour ratings – two of them New Zealanders – and seriouslywounding three more. AcHILLes commanding Officercaptain steve parry and five other received minor wounds.ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE paintingACHILLES crewACHILLES Port No.1 gun crew

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 7In August 1939, before war was declared, HMSACHILLES deployed to South America. HistorianPeter Corbett explains what our cruiser was doing inthose long weeks before the Battle of the River Plate.ACHILLES Walrus, 1939On 23rd August 1939 the British Admiralty declared an ‘emergency situation’. The ‘PreparatoryTelegram’ was sent informing British and Dominion ships and naval commands world-wide that warwas imminent. In Auckland, HMS ACHILLES was docked, cleaned, had her underwater hull painted andthen loaded full of war stores at Devonport, Auckland. On the 28th August the ACHILLES waswar-ready and she sailed the next morning to her war station. Britain’s ultimatum to Germany expiredon 3rd September at 11.00 am, and the Admiralty telegram, ‘Commence hostilities against Germany’was sent. Shortly afterwards in New Zealand the Prime Minister’s Department confirmed the decisionto the New Zealand Naval Board. The Division was at war.BLoCKADE AND ESCoRT DuTIESAt sea when war broke out, AcHILLes was ordered to divertto Valpariso, chile, arriving there to refuel on 12th september.The strategy of blockade was as old as naval warfare, so whenwar was declared against Germany, the Admiralty instituteda blockade world-wide. AcHILLes thus bore the brunt ofblockade duties on south America’s west coast. In Valparisoshe received new orders to patrol the pacific coast of southAmerica in search of German shipping.During her brief stay in the port, as a combatant in a neutralcountry, she could only stay for one day. Nonetheless formalcourtesies were exchanged:“ACHILLES… saluted the Chilean flagwith 21 guns, and the Admiral’s flagflying from Chile’s battleship ADMIRALLATORRE with 13 guns. Both saluteswere returned.”Two German merchant ships were in the port at the time butthey could not be seized by the Royal Navy as they were inneutral territory. captain parry, after conferring with the BritishNaval Attaché in Valpariso, summarized his view on the ship’smission: “Various German merchant ships then sheltering inports on the west coast of South America were capable ofbeing armed and were therefore a potential threat to our trade.“The more active at the moment were those in peruvianwaters, which were endeavouring to obtain supplies of fuel oil.The Naval Attaché considered that the presence of HMNZs[sic] AcHILLes would be reported at once along the coast andmight induce these ships to intern themselves.”Over a six-week period she searched the area, callingat sixteen ports and anchorages, the most northerlyBuenaventura in Colombia, to the most southerly PuertoMontt in chile. During this time a number of German shipswere encountered, all within neutral waters, and thus could notbe seized. The sight of the cruiser along the south Americanpacific coast, however, had the desired effect, as only afew German ships put to sea and a large number internedthemselves for the duration of the war.The south American navies were impressed with boththe conduct of the cruiser and her Captain: “Captain Parrylater heard from the Naval Attaché in Valparaiso thatthe ...authorities were impressed with AcHILLes’ strictobservance of their neutrality laws in sailing within 24 hoursafter... a busy day in harbour.”During the time off the west coast of south America,AcHILLes also escorted several British-flagged merchantships. The Naval staff Narrative summarised this period:“Yet the mere presence of theACHILLES in South American waterswas sufficient to keep German trade ata standstill and virtually to immobilisesome 17 enemy merchant ships totaling84,000 tons in neutral ports from thePanama Canal to the Strait of Magellan,along a coastline of 5,000 miles.”AcHILLes then sailed around the Horn for the falklandIslands, arriving there on 22rd October. Arriving atPort Stanley no time was wasted in refuelling and reprovisioningthe ship. However, “opportunity was taken togive as much shore leave as possible”. efforts were made toaccommodate the crew: The 22nd being a sunday, specialarrangements were made to open the public houses, butlocal opinion would not tolerate a cinema performance”.Scrubbing the decks on ACHILLESEn route ACHILLES, April 1939

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 9FoRCE GCoMMoDoRE HARWooDAcHILLes sailed the next day for the Rio Del plata area, torendezvous with ships of the south Atlantic Division, underthe command of commodore Henry Harwood RN. His forcewhen at sea was also known as Force G (one of several taskforces formed to hunt for enemy raiders). This divisioninitially comprised two cruisers HMs AJAX (8 x 6-inch guns)a sister ship to AcHILLes, and eXeTeR (6 x 8-inch guns).The two cruisers had been operating in the area since thewar’s outbreak. eXeTeR left the division for a short time toescort British shipping, while AJAX intercepted and sanktwo German merchant ships.9 shortly afterwards force Gwas further reinforced by the heavy cruiser cUMBeRLAND(8 x 8-inch guns) and two destroyers, HAVOcK andHOTspUR. for over a month this formation patrolled thearea concentrating between Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Riverplate. Their dual role was to protect British shipping in thearea as well as intercepting German merchant ships andsearching for enemy warships. One major problem facingCommodore Harwood was the supply of stores and fuel,considering the vast sea area he had to cover. The Navalstaff Narrative notes:“They were operating off the neutralcoasts of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina,which fringed the Atlantic for 3,000 miles.His nearest British base, the FalklandIslands, was 1,000 miles to the southwardof the River Plate and the selection ofsuitable anchorages for refuelling was adifficult matter.”He was further restricted in that the only two British FleetAuxiliary tankers in the area—OLWYN and OLYNTHUs—were ‘station tanker”. To refuel, the cruisers had to raftalongside the tanker in a sheltered anchorage. At thatstage of the war the Royal Navy had not developed theequipment to refuel underway at sea.ACHILLES torpedo crew9 shipssunkWith the outbreak of war two German ‘pocket battleships’(panzerschiff) had began to operate against Britishmerchant shipping. One of these, the ADMIRAL GRAf speehad the south Atlantic as her intended operating area. shehad sailed on 21st August from Wilhelmshaven, reachingthe South Atlantic (via the North Sea, Greenland Sea andNorth Atlantic) on 26th september. During this time herorders were not to attack any shipping but to concealherself and she commenced her attacks upon arrival.Between sinking her first victim on 30th september andher last on 7th December, she accounted for nine ships.Operating far and wide in the south Atlantic, GRAf speeeven ventured for a short period into the Indian Ocean.On 2nd October, the Admiralty in London informedHarwood that his force would be reinforced by AcHILLes.In the meantime Harwood had shifted his flag to AJAX,and in company with the destroyers, provided escorts forBritish shipping in the area, while the two 8-inch cruiserswere detached, serving as an independent hunting group.On 20th October, the destroyers were ordered away to theWest Indies and Harwood then awaited AcHILLes’ arrivalin the area. AcHILLes sighted eXeTeR, again Harwood’sflagship, early on the morning of 26th October off the Riverplate. They joined up with cUMBeRLAND on the 27th, andthat day, Harwood again transferred his flag to AJAX, whileeXeTeR left for the falkland Islands to undertake minorrepairs. The three cruisers operated together, but Harwoodordered cUMBeRLAND into Buenos Aires to refuel, leavingjust the two 6-inch ships at sea. eXeTeR had sailed from theFalklands on the 4th and rejoined the force, when Harwoodagain split his force up, with the two 8-inch armed shipsoperating together.AJAX and AcHILLes operated independently, the formerpatrolling the River Plate area, and the latter further alongthe Atlantic coast. from the 7th to the 16th, AcHILLesoperated independently in a similar way to her originaldeployment off the pacific coast – a combination of portvisits while searching for German ships. AcHILLes enteredRio de Janeiro on the 10th, saluting the Brazilian flag flyingfrom fort Villegagon.Captain Parry and RAD Sir H HarwoodCAPTAIN PARRycaptain parry made a number of official calls including:the British Ambassador, the British consul, the BrazilianMinister of Marine, chief of Naval staff, and senior NavalOfficer Afloat, and parry and his ship’s officers had cocktailswith the ambassador that night. Despite being at war therequirements of defence diplomacy still had to be met.Leave was granted and as Captain Parry noted in a pressrelease it was a ‘most popular city and there were noleave breakers’.Leaving on the 12th, the Brazilian admiral’s flag, flyingfrom the battleship sAO pAULO, was saluted with fifteenguns. AcHILLes proceeded to patrol the shipping lanesoff the coast until the 22nd when she met up with AJAXoff the River plate, sailing separately later that day toSan Borombon Bay to refuel and take in three months ofprovisions from OLYNTHUs, with AcHILLes sailing latethat night, under orders to show herself off Brazilian ports.This she did, sometimes too close for Brazilian comfort.While approaching Rio Grande de sol, a Brazilian militaryaircraft overflew her. Later a formal complaint was made bythe Brazilian chief of Naval staff about her movements offthe harbour.On 4th December AcHILLes was ordered south to refuelat Montevideo, arriving there on the 8th. During her solomission she encountered many ships, indicating theamount of sea traffic on the south American sea routes:‘AcHILLes had sighted at sea 58 ships of foreign nationality– United states, french, Belgian, Norwegian, Danish, Dutch,swedish, Greek, spanish, Italian, Japanese, Brazilian,Argentinean, and Panamanian – as well as many Britishmerchant ships. A list of defects was provided to justify herstay in the port over the normal one day limit. captain parrymade no official calls during the stay but leave was grantedto the ship’s company. charabanc (bus) tours, dances andsuppers, visits to sports events, were all arranged and againthere was good behaviour and no leave breaking.AcHILLes sailed late on the 9th to rendezvous withHarwood off the River plate where he had decided toconcentrate his force. AcHILLes joined AJAX the next dayand they were joined by eXeTeR on the 12th. commodoreHarwood believed the German raider was heading to theRiver plate area, as he later wrote: “I decided that thePlate, with its larger number of ships and its very valuablegrain and meat trade, was the vital area to be defended.I therefore arranged to concentrate there my availableforces in advance of the time it was anticipated the raidermight start operations in that area.” Harwood was correct;on the morning of 13 December, the south AtlanticDivision, intercepted the ADMIRAL GRAf spee some200 nautical miles off the estuary of the Rio Del plata.The Battle of the River Plate had begun.ReferencesW.D. McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares for War, Christchurch: University ofCanterbury Press, 1988.S.D. Waters, The Royal New Zealand Navy: Official History of NewZealand in the Second World War 1939-45, Wellington: War HistoryBranch Department of Internal Affairs, 1956.Admiralty, Naval Staff Narrative; Operations of HMS Achilles, August1939 – February 1940, London.

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 15GRAF SPEE on fireSPEE uNSEAWoRTHyIt was against this threat that the German’s secondaryarmament should have proven effective, but the British reportsall state that the 150 mm gunfire was ragged and inaccurate.In part that would be due to the eight hits amidships on theGRAf spee, which knocked out one gun and smashed theammunition hoists for the forward secondary armament.As the range closed, spee’s 105 mm anti-aircraft guns alsojoined in against the light cruisers, but two of the three twinmountings were soon knocked out. By 0740, the battlehad settled into a westerly chase. The two British cruisers,concerned at the rate they were using ammunition, openedthe range to shadow the spee, putting more room betweenthem and the enemy. The panzerschiffe had full power available(although she was never plotted at more than 24 knots) andher main armament was intact - still a formidable opponent.But, exactly as Langsdorff had earlier feared, sufficient damagehad been done to end the raider’s career: 36 men dead, 60wounded, only 40 percent of 11-inch ammunition remaining,nearly 50 percent of the secondary ammunition used up, sixtorpedoes available, and only one-third of the anti-aircraftarmament operational. The galleys were smashed and theship’s flour store was flooded. The hits on the hull forward atthe front of the ship made the spee unseaworthy for a returnto Germany across the winter North Atlantic.DIPLoMATIC DRAMALangsdorff took his damaged ship into Montevideo, Uruguay,seeking respite for repairs. The arrival of a damaged Germanbattleship in this neutral port caused a media sensation, withradio reporters from the United states giving constant coverageas the subsequent diplomatic drama unfolded. forced by theinternational rules to leave within 72 hours, unwilling to havehis ship interned, and believing that more British ships weregathering off the plate estuary, Langsdorff scuttled his ship insight of Montevideo on 17 December. It was world-wide news.BLoW To GERMAN PRESTIGEThe battle proved that the German commerce raiders wereindeed formidable opponents. The Royal Navy would haveto spend much effort throughout the remainder of the warto contain Germany’s heavy ships. At the River plate it wasa close-run battle, spee very nearly sank the eXeTeR. IfLangsdorff had kept the range open from the light cruisershis panzerschiffe would have had a better chance of scoringmore damaging hits while staying immune from the Britishsix-inch shells. If the cruisers had been forced to abandon theaction, it would have been a tremendous blow to morale in theRoyal Navy and throughout the empire. Instead, Langsdorffcommitted “a tactical blunder of the first magnitude,”according to a 1940 Admiralty analysis. The River plate actionwas a blow to the prestige of the German Navy, not least in theeyes of Hitler. At year’s end, in conference with Admiral Raeder,the Fuehrer reiterated the fact that the eXeTeR should havebeen completely destroyed.As the war progressed, Hitler lost confidence in the surfacefleet, restricting their operations and so giving a pricelessadvantage to the Allies.GRAF SPEE in harbourGRAF SPEE burnt out aircraft

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 17The following is an excerpt from a letter written by ACHILLES gunnery officer Lieutenant Richard Washbournto his friend in England, shortly after the Battle of the River Plate. In it he describes the battle in detail, thetactics and the emotional impact.My Dear BillI have been wondering how this littlepicnic is affecting you and yours…It was a fine moment when I, being thePrinciple Control Officer on watch at thetime, inspected the smudge of smoke onthe port beam and came to the unshakeableconclusion that at last we had bumpedup against the enemy, and that all one’straining and thought was about to be put tothe test.ACHILLES to AJAX signalsThe three of us separated into two groups, the 8 inch ship out onto one flank,and we two six inch ships went off to the other. All three opened fire withina minute or two of the other. The job was the destruction or fixation of theenemy raider, and we went straight at it regardless. It was a proper ding-dongbattle on the old principles of warfare. The Hun was under the usual delusionof the decadence of the Royal Navy, and came on at us for the first ten minutes,which was just what we wanted to get into good effective fighting range withinour cannon. Thereafter, when we showed no sign of conforming to his expectationsand bolting from his undoubtedly superior force, he turned around and boltedhimself, and never again showed any inclination for a fight.We engaged him hotly, having the superior speed, for nearly an hour and a half.Poor old EXETER having the bigger guns and therefore being the more dangerousfoe, received the benefit of his attention mostly for the first three quartersof an hour, and she was unlucky. It was gratifying to hear that she was stillafloat at the end. I didn’t for a moment expect to see her alive. When last seenby us she was still gallantly holding on within range with only one of her gunsin action, and then, shrouded in smoke, she retired to the southeast leaving uswith a still very lively pocket battleship.We continued to lose until we reached the point blank range of four miles… wehad opened fire at about 11 miles. And then, with not very much food for ourcannon left, we hauled off and shadowed.That is what happened from the tactical point of view. Now from the personalpoint of view. You know of course that I seat myself up on top of all things inmy little Control Tower, in the company of ten others, and with their assistanceI am in complete control of all the Main Armament, even to the extent of havingthe Layer who actually presses the trigger and aims the guns within the reach ofmy right toe.There was something of a thrill of excitement. I think that is only natural.She looked very fierce and most menacing through my optical instruments. I have avery clear picture of her fixed in my memory. Her hull is just above the horizon,waterline still down. A great grey shape twisting and turning and making smoke,Right:Divisions on board ACHILLESand surrounded by the whitecolumns of water thrown up byour broadsides. Her great 11 inchguns belching forth a brilliantred flash followed by a thickopaque black cloud of smoke.My guns came into action verysmoothly and well, and weestablished hitting early on.It was just like a practice,only here was no crippling limitto the ammunition we fired, andthe target was a bit more difficult.Controlling the guns I was much too busy to worry about what was going on aroundme. I remember being most grateful to EXETER from time to time when I saw thosedamned great guns speaking in her direction, and leaving us to the ineffectiveattention off her secondary armament, although this was the same size as our ownto all intents and purposes.Occasionally when the splash of a short 11 inch shell intruded upon my line ofsight I realised that we were being fired at, and I felt a strangely illogicalresentment, and I was amused at my illogic.“It is all very interesting and impersonal. There is no hatred of theother fellow at all. It is a game of great skill, for high stakes, andone in which courage and resolution play a big part.”About 20 minutes after fire had been opened we were straddled by the 11 inchand the short shells burst on the surface of the water and peppered this shippretty thoroughly from truck to waterline. There were a few casualties amongthe goofers on the upper deck, the A.A guns crew who had nothing else to do, andthe bridge was penetrated by a splinter or two. One made a couple of holes inthe captain’s legs, both of them and then went on and shattered the knee of theChief Yeoman of Signals. Up in my little box we were unlucky. We had more thanour share. There was a hellish din, and I remember crouching down and nursing ahead streaming with blood. An undamaged officer on my left passed me up a bandagewhich permitted me to make running repairs. I wasn’t as dead as I had firstsurmised. A couple of light scalp wounds, and a small hole in the left shoulder.I didn’t notice this latter until some time later when it dawned upon me thatthe growing stiffness in that part of my anatomy might be worth looking in to.Looking round me I found the right side of the Control Tower was a shambles. Itresembled a slaughterhouse on a particularly busy day. I won’t harrow you withdetails. Five of my crew were out, three for keeps. Two who were actually inphysical contact with me were very dead. Two within a couple of feet of me wereshockingly wounded, and one down in the region of my right foot had been in theway of two large splinters.Six splinters in all had come inside. We are packed so closely in thatcompartment that we have to go inside in the right order or it is impossibleto find one’s own position. I have no complaints myself; I bear a very charmed

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 19life. The little square window fourinches directly in front of my headwas shattered. My binoculars throughwhich I was looking were wrecked.And the right upper corner of theback of my chair was removed.My damage was so superficial I wasback again controlling the firewithin a minute.It is comforting to realise thereis no suffering whatsoever. Thedead were dead before they knewthat anything had happened. Thesuddenness is merciful, and so isthe shock. My two severely woundedhad very little pain, which was agood thing because the exit wasjammed by splinters and we had tokeep them with us for some timeuntil they could be evacuated.It would have been difficult inthose cramped quarters had theymade a fuss.The others were magnificent. Theytook over the extra jobs and carriedon with the battle. One youngster,just turned eighteen, found thatthe dead and very mutilated body ofhis predecessor was in the way andthere wasn’t room to shift him, so hesat on top of this unpleasantness andoperated his most important instrumentfor the remaining hour of the actionwithout batting an eyelid.Personally I was completelyunaffected by the carnage around me.I admit I have always rather dreadedthe show down: one never knows untilone has experienced it how one willreact, and I’m, though you might notthink it, a rather sympathetic type.Top:ACHILLES followed by AJAXBottom:Upper deck damageTop:ACHILLES’ blistered guns.Right:ACHILLES’ crew during alull in the battle.Bottom: ACHILLES’ sailor kit.When, after an hour and a half’s hot firingwe turned away under smoke to await a morefavourable opportunity to use up the smallremainder of our ammunition I felt a bitdisappointed and baulked of my prey. Itwas nevertheless exactly the right moment.She was utterly defeated, morally, and,probably, materially too. It didn’t look like that at the time and we were fullof conjectures as to why she was bolting from us and what her plan was. It wasincredible she should be running away from two small and rather battered sixinch cruisers. AJAX had only three guns left in action by this time.…We hung about from Wednesday until Sunday, awaiting renewal of the action,not perhaps with relish as Winston might suppose, because the odds were tooobvious to all of us, but certainly with determination. We got our loaded gunson her smoke smudge, clearly visible at 25 miles. It was all very cold bloodedand deliberate, but the spirit of everyone was excellent. We went in to polishher off but were disappointed. She blew herself up. I didn’t see the burstmyself but others on board did. We cleared lower deck and everyone came up andclambered upon every point of vantage to see the last of the old enemy. Therewas then the most amazing spontaneous expression of feeling, and relief, I everhope to hear.”Richard

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 21There were, of course, a number of notableelements of the Battle of the River Plate.One of these is that among the RoyalNavy participants were two officers, bothonboard HMS ACHILLE S, who weredestined to lead the Royal New ZealandNavy as its Chief of Naval Staff. The first ofthe officers was the Commanding Officer ofthe ACHILLE S– Captain W.E (Edward) Parry.and submarine aspects of naval warfare when there was an‘elemental’ change in 1932 as he was posted to the aircraftcarrier HMs eAGLe as the executive Officer – as a fairlysenior commander.parry must have performed pretty well because he left eAGLehaving been promoted to captain at the age of 41. In early 1936he assumed command of the Royal Navy’s Anti-Submarineschool at HMs OspReY and after 15 months at OspReY, captainparry spent most of 1938 undergoing higher Defence training atthe Imperial Defence college.A WELL RouNDED oFFICERFormer Chief of Navy David Ledson, writeshere about Parry’s outstanding career.captain parry was no stranger to war. He had joined theRoyal Navy in 1905 at the tender age of 12 and served at seathroughout World War I. After the war, between 1917 and 1929,he specialised as a ‘Torpedo Officer’ in various posts includingHMs VeRNON, the Torpedo school at portsmouth; the Atlanticfleet and HMs DOLpHIN, the submarine Depot ship. He hadspent around 30 years of his career focused on the torpedoconsequently, he was what could be considered a ‘well-rounded’officer when he took command of HMs AcHILLes in January1939 before the outbreak of war some nine months later inseptember. He brought with him his four years of World War Iservice and a good mix of operational experience in a varietyof maritime dimensions, two of which were directly related todecisive areas in the coming war – the U-Boat threat and thethreat and exploitation of air power. It can be assumed, too, thathis ‘torpedo’ specialty and his most recent postings had givenhim some familiarity with the importance of technology to thedevelopment and evolution of military capabilities.Captain Parry with Deputy PM FraserCaptain and Mrs ParryWhen captain parry assumed command of AcHILLes theship had just completed an extensive refit. so, two monthslater when the ship left the United Kingdom to sail back toNew Zealand it was, presumably, in a good material condition– and morale would have been high as the large number ofNew Zealand sailors among the crew were on their way home.However, war with Germany was inexorably drawing closer andon 29 August 1939 captain parry was ordered to sail AcHILLesto her assigned war station with Royal Navy forces on the WestIndies station.five hours after the sailing Orders were received, AcHILLesslipped away from Devonport, Auckland, and sailed towardsthe ship’s and crew’s moment of drama and victory at sea –a moment of which Captain Parry later said, ’New Zealand hasevery reason to be proud of her seamen during their baptism offire.’ The Battle of the River plate probably presented captainParry with his greatest challenge – and greatest success – atthe ‘tactical’ level. He was made a companion of the Bath (cB)for his performance.the GRAf spee. parry commented later on the GRAf spee’smanoeuverability, “ she appeared to turn as quickly as a shipone-half her size and she made the fullest use of her mobility...On several occasions, when her situation was becomingunhealthy, she turned 180 degrees away, using smoke to coverher turn.”Parry was proud of his seamen and Rear-Admiral Harwood,concurring, wrote to the New Zealand Naval Board, “TheAcHILLes was handled perfectly by her captain and foughtmagnificently by her captain, officers and ship’s company.”By all accounts the AcHILLes was a happy ship, captain parrylater wrote.He was obviously enjoying his time in AcHILLes. However, lessthan three months after the ship returned to New Zealand hewas to be required to ‘step up’ and perform at the operationaland strategic levels.A WIDE PoRTFoLIoBATTLE oF THE RIvER PLATEDuring the battle an 11 inch shell from the GRAf spee hit thewater near AcHILLes’ bridge. The resulting shrapnel seriouslywounded two ratings and killed four others. captain parry washit in the legs and knocked out. Regaining consciousness herealised the guns were not being fired at the GRAff spee andusing the voicepipe he called the gunnery officer, LieutenantWashbourn, to rectify this. Washbourn had been hit in the headand was just coming to but quickly took action and soon theDirector Tower was back in action with their guns focused onOn 1 May 1940 captain parry was made a commodore 2ndClass and posted as the First Naval Member of the NewZealand Naval Board, chief of Naval staff, commodorecommanding New Zealand squadron and commanding OfficerHMs AcHILLes. This range of tasks would have been a heavyload in peace time – it is hard to imagine their weight duringwar. parry, however, was clearly determined to make thingswork and was clear that it was the strategic role that was themost important; although there are indications that he wouldhave preferred to remain at sea.Left: Captain Parry was wounded in the leg

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 23Briefing on ACHILLESDIvISIoN oF RESPoNSIBILITIESIn september 1940 he sensibly recommended to theGovernment that combining the chief of Naval staff and NewZealand squadron command responsibilities be separated andthat the chief of Naval staff should be based in Wellington. TheGovernment agreed and on 15 October parry left AcHILLeswith, I am sure, a heavy heart. However, he quickly set aboutorganising the Naval staff to meet the demands of the war –clearly drawing on his experience in the United Kingdom andhis education at the Defence college.There is no more appropriate summary of his contribution aschief of Naval staff than that in s.D. Waters’ Official History,‘New Zealand was fortunate to have had the services ofcommodore parry as chief of Naval staff during a criticalperiod of the war. When he took up that appointment he foundNavy Office ill- prepared to cope with many urgent problems…By the time Japan entered the war…he had organised anadequate and balanced naval staff, as well as a sound recruitingand training scheme. His foresight in these and many othermatters was confirmed by the march of events. When the timefor his departure came, the Government was loath to lose him.’Nevertheless, on 16 June 1942, after more than two years aschief of Naval staff and having seen the birth of the RNZN,and, in the process, become its first chief, commodore parryreturned to Royal Navy service. for almost all of 1943 heserved in command of the Battleship HMs ReNOWN and, afterpromotion to Rear Admiral in January 1944, he was the ‘Navalcommander of force L for the Allied landings at Normandy.PoST WW2At the conclusion of the war Rear Admiral Parry was appointedchief of staff (post Hostilities) to the British Naval commanderin-chief, headquartered in London, and then as the DeputyHead of Naval Division, control commission for Germany,based in Berlin.In July 1946 he took up duties as Director of Naval Intelligence.After almost two years in the post, and by then a Vice Admiral,parry moved on to his final Naval posting - in India as thecommander-in-chief of the Royal Indian Navy, a post whichwas so reminiscent of his New Zealand service. This must havedelivered him one of the most nostalgic moments of his longand distinguished career because, here, he encountered theAcHILLes again– commissioned in 1948 with the Indian Navyas DeLHI.In January 1950 India became a Republic and, so, Admiral parryhad the unique privilege of becoming not only the first chief ofNaval staff of one Navy, but the first commander- in-chief ofanother, as the Royal Indian Navy then became the Indian Navy.Leaving India in 1951, he was promoted to Admiral, and with aKnighthood from the 1950 New Year’s List, Admiral sir edwardparry, Knight commander of the Bath(KcB), retired in January1952. He was to live for another 20 years – dying in London on21 August 1972 aged 79.By Dr Ian K WalkerLT Toby Harper, a young RNVR TorpedoSpecialist, was probably the only manaboard the three British cruisers withtechnical and highly secret knowledgeabout radar. He knew that his friends inEngland were attempting to reduce radarto a size that would fit into a ship’s gundirectors but as far as he knew, the solutionwas still a long way off. Yet as he lookedat a group of aerials, looking like a bedmattresson its side fastened to the GRAFSPEE’s Director Control Tower, he realisedtheir significance. An aerial array on theDirector’s Control Tower could only be agunnery control radar set. Toby gaspedas he realised the narrow margin by whichACHILLES had escaped destruction.A fire-control radar should have been decisivein the gunnery duel at the River Plate.Above: ACHILLES radarLT Harper went to the captain of AcHILLes and told him whathe knew. captain parry informed the Admiral, the newlypromotedR.A Harwood, who promptly signalled the Admiralty.subsequently the British purchased the wreck of GRAf speefrom the Uruguayan Government and sent a civilian radarexpert to inspect the aerials. He used a hacksaw to dismantlethe radar set and sent the pieces to england for examination.SEETAKTOne must go back to the Battle of Jutland to understand therole of radar on the German ships. During that action on 31 May1916, most ships on both sides had the doubtful experience oftheir optical range-finders being obscured by mist and driftingsmoke. The future Head of the German Navy, Admiral Raeder,pondered on this battle and realized that a better method offire control might have led to victory. He knew that soundranginghad been successful with land-based artillery so heasked his chief scientist, Dr Kuhnhold, to develop soundrangingfor naval use. Kuhnhold realised that radio waveswould be more suitable than sound waves for this purpose.In July 1935 he demonstrated to Admiral Raeder, a radar setthat could direct naval gun-fire with an accuracy matchingthe best optical rangefinder. The Germans first mounted thisradar, which they called seeTAKT, aboard Torpedo Boat G 10to gain some sea experience. The prominent aerials becamea dominating feature of the small ship. A German publisherissued an annual pocketbook similar to “Jane’s fighting ships”illustrating the world’s naval ships and it included a photographof G 10.Admiral Raeder had seeTAKT fitted to all his capital shipsgiving them lethal superiority in any gun duel, especially under

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 25Few people aboard the British ships had even heard of radar,which was top secret at that time. But by a happy mischance,the German radar was out of action for most of the battle,resulting in victory for the three British cruisers.SPEED AND AGILITyWhat happened next must be pure speculation. The lossof seeTAKT would have been devastating to gun crewsbrought up on the accuracy of radar-directed fire. Theharried electronic technicians must have spent all day gettingseeTAKT back in action but by this time the Germans had lostthe battle.When GRAf spee eventually entered Montevideo Harbourafter the battle she was granted 72 hours to repair damage.Her eventual scuttling made world wide news. In februaryAcHILLes arrived in New Zealand to a hero’s welcome.The crew paraded up Queen street in Auckland to deliriousacclamation from crowds.conditions of poor visibility or long range. At the outbreak ofWorld War II the Royal Navy was well behind in the race sincethe British regarded radar primarily as an air warning systemto detect approaching bombers. Germany had begun therebuilding of the German surface fleet by designing a uniqueclass of ships, dubbed “pocket battleships” by the world’spress, that had sufficient speed to run away from any ship thatcould out-gun them. By using diesel engines and an electricallywelded hull to save weight, three ships each displacing 14,000tons were built - ADMIRAL GRAf spee, ADMIRAL scHeeRand DeUTscHLAND. each had high speed (26 knots), longcruising range (a radius of 10,000 nautical miles at 20 knots), aheavy armour belt (5½ inches = 140 mm), and 11-inch guns (280mm). They were also fitted with seeTAKT fire-control radar from1938. HMs HOOD was to learn the deadly efficiency of seeTAKTdirected gun-fire when she was destroyed by BIsMARcK with herfifth salvo on 24 May 1941.DESIGN FLAWSBut Admiral Raeder did not realise until too late that hehad incorporated two incompatible features in his pocketbattleships. The diesel engines were essential for long cruisingrange but they caused more vibration than turbines, especiallywhen driven hard. This vibration shook the copper wires ofthe seeKAKT radar causing them to break. Gunfire had thesame effect. Moreover the designers had installed seeTAKTin massive cast aluminum water-tight cabinets makingaccess difficult and making rapid repairs almost impossiblewhen vibration or gunfire broke the wires, GRAf spee’sseeTAKT radar enabled her to quickly gain an accurate rangewhich helped conserve ammunition when sinking merchantships. The seeTAKT may also have facilitated location ofsupply ships at remote ocean rendezvous. from the Britishperspective, if the enemy had radar, he would be able to tracktheir manoeuvering even in smoke and have his turrets trainedand ready to fire when the British ships emerged. Worsestill, the seeTAKT radar should have enabled GRAf spee tofire accurately while the small cruisers were still hidden insmoke! This ability was inconceivable at this stage of the war.At outbreak of World War II Admiral Raeder turned GRAfspee and ADMIRAL scHeeR loose in the world’s oceansas commerce raiders. spee went on to sink 80,000 tons ofBritish merchant shipping. The Royal Navy and the frenchNavy both responded by deploying several task forces, someof them groups of fast cruisers, intending that their speed,agility and numbers would compensate for their smallerguns and thin armour. One such task force included the NewZealand cruiser HMs AcHILLes in company with her sistership HMs AJAX and the two 8-inch gunned cruisers HMseXeTeR and cUMBeRLAND. Unfortunately, on the day ofbattle, cUMBeRLAND was in port stanley, in the falklands,undertaking a boiler clean.Admiral Harwood was imaginative. He realized that speedand agility were the only advantages possessed by hisundergunned and under-armoured ships. He assigned asuicidal role to eXeTeR. she was to close with GRAf spee at fullspeed to bring her smaller guns within effective range and thusdivert fire from AJAX and AcHILLes. They were to attack fromdifferent directions, making smoke, and manoeuvering at fullspeed. Much to their surprise, GRAf spee would aid them bymaking smoke herself - no doubt secure in the knowledge thatthis would enhance the advantage conferred by her seeTAKTradar. AJAX and AcHILLes would dash out of the smoke froman unexpected direction and swing their nimble 6-inch turretsto loose off a couple of salvoes before the ponderous turretsof the battleship could turn in their direction. They then woulddisappear back into the smoke.captain Langsdorff of GRAf spee began the battle by dividinghis main armament between eXeTeR and AJAX, not alwaysa wise policy in a gun duel especially when it was discoveredpostwar that seeTAKT was not capable of engaging twotargets simultaneously. The fire against eXeTeR was deadlyaccurate, suggesting that she was “enjoying” the full attentionof seeTAKT. Within a few minutes both forward turrets ofeXeTeR were destroyed, both aircraft had been hit and hadto be man-handled overboard, most of the bridge crew hadbeen killed and eXeTeR was being controlled from the aftersteering position. Deciding that she was finished, captainLangsdorff turned his seeTAKT-directed fire on AJAX. To hishorror, eXeTeR then turned towards him and attempted totorpedo him. This bold attack so unsettled captain Langsdorffthat he turned away and never again regained the initiative.simultaneously, the accuracy of GRAf spee’s gun-firedeteriorated. When subsequently analyzing the battle backin New Zealand, the Allies believed that a lucky shell splinterhad hit the seeTAKT radar set but with the benefit of post-warexamination of German records, it seems more likely that theover-driven diesel engines had proved too much for the flimsywires of the seeTAKT radar.GRAF SPEE’S vuLNERABILITyAJAX and AcHILLes manoeuvered at full speed through theirsmoke and dashed out to fire broadsides at the battleship.By the end of the day AJAX had fired 820 rounds of 6-inchammunition, and AcHILLes 1240 rounds. But GRAf spee’sengines, guns and ammunition were safe behind armour plateand there seemed no way of hurting her. captain parry ofAcHILLes was heard to remark “We might as well be peltingher with snow-balls!” However GRAf spee was vulnerable in anunexpected way. Not all her crew could shelter behind armourplate. Bridge crew were unprotected, look-outs were postedall around the ship to watch for torpedoes and the Directorcontrol Tower crew spotting fall-of-shot1 had only thin steelplate between them and incoming shells. When 36 of his crewlay dead and 60 wounded,Captain Langsdorff realised that his crew’smorale was collapsing. A career of sinkingdefenceless merchant ships had notprepared the Germans for an enemy whoactually fired back. He had no alternativebut to seek shelter in a neutral port so withdiesels hammering,GRAf spee made a bee-line for Montevideo at 23 knots,followed at a respectful distance by AJAX and AcHILLes, likea pair of pekinese threatening a mastiff.SALvoES AT SuNSETcommodore Harwood took AJAX south around the englishBank to cut off possible escape. He ordered AcHILLes to followGRAf spee which was now silhouetted against a setting sun, aperfect mark for the optical range-finder on AcHILLes whichwas in relative darkness and safe from GRAf spee’s optical range– finding. At 8.50 pM GRAf spee fired 3 salvoes at 22,000 yardsrange, all accurate for line, the first two short and the third over.It appears likely that seeTAKT was again operating. The straddledemonstrated to Captain Parry that destruction was not faraway. AcHILLes replied with five rapid salvoes and retired fast,making smoke. Between 9.30 pm and 9.45 pm GRAf spee fired afurther three salvoes, all falling short. We can perhaps speculatethat AcHILLes was now protected from radar-directed fire byechoes from adjoining land.ToBy HARPERLT Toby Harper saw little cause for celebration. Heconsidered AcHILLes had escaped annihilation by a veryslender margin and resolved that the Royal Navy wouldnever again have to fight blind. He approached NavyOffice in Wellington and offered to build a radar set thatcould control the fire of the guns of AcHILLes in smokeor darkness and warn of the approach of other ships.He did not realise that there was already an active radarprogramme in New Zealand albeit aimed at supplying theArmy with radar to control the fire of fortress guns andhelping the Air force to detect surface ships. No work wasbeing done for the Navy.The Navy Office detached Harper from AcHILLes andsent him to canterbury University where he helped designand build a simple radar warning set which was installedaboard AcHILLes in the incredibly short time of 4 months.He then built a fire-control radar to measure target rangeand hopefully observe fall-of-shot to correct range. Animproved version was fitted in August 1941 together with adedicated set for simple ship warning.Overall, our Navy embraced radar with a much greaterenthusiasm than did its sister services, the Army andRNZAf. Of 180 radar sets built in New Zealand, almost halfwent to the Navy. In Wellington, Navy Office embarked ona 5-pronged programme of staff Training, coast Watching(CW), Ship Warning (SW), Ship Warning and Gunnery (SWG)and Aid to Allies.A specialist radar officer was appointed to Navy Office tosupervise this programme, first, LT Harper, then cDR Gilesand finally LTcDR Marklew. These officers establisheda close and cordial liaison with the civilian organisationcharged with radar design and construction. civilianscientists were given honorary commissions and invitedaboard naval ships so they could appreciate technicalaspects of naval needs and view operational problemsdirectly. This programme was successful but it was not untillate in the war that the RNZN turned to the Royal Navy tosupply its ships with radar sets.

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 27By Kelly Ana MoreyOn the 19 December 1939, two days after scuttling theADMIRAL GRAf spee, captain Hans Langsdorff, havingconsidered his options, sat down in his room at theNaval Hotel in Buenos Aires and wrote letters to hisfamily and superiors.I am convinced… he wrote to the GermanAmbassador… that under the circumstances, no othercourse was available to me, once I had taken my shipinto the trap of Montevideo. For with the ammunitionremaining, any attempt to fight my way back to openand deep water was bound to fail. ...For a captainwith a sense of honour, it goes without saying thathis personal fate cannot be separated from that ofhis ship. ...I can do no more for my ship’s company.Neither shall I any longer be able to take an active partin the present struggle of my country. …I alone bearthe responsibility for scuttling the pocket-battleshipADMIRAL GRAF SPEE. I am happy to pay with my lifefor any possible reflection on the honour of the flag.I shall face my fate with firm faith in the cause and thefuture of the nation and of my Führer...In 1937 Langsdorff was promoted to captain. In late 1938he was given command of the vessel. Within months of thishappening Germany was at war with Britain and Langsdorff wasissued with orders to steam the ADMIRAL GRAf spee for thesouth Atlantic to disrupt enemy commercial shipping. Oncethe vessel arrived off the south American coast Langsdorff andhis crew had a productive 10 weeks, stopping and sinking nineBritish merchant ships with no loss of life.However, the German ship’s run of luck came to an end onthe morning of 13 December when it engaged the AJAX,AcHILLes and eXeTeR at the Battle of the River plate.With his correspondence taken care of, Langsdorff lay downon a German Naval ensign and shot himself. It was a dramaticand tragic end to the life of a naval officer who had alwaysconducted himself with great loyalty, honour and integrity.GRAF SPEE dead on ammunition bargeAWARDED THE IRoN CRoSSLangsdorff, the eldest son of a family with a history in legaland religious quarters, was born in Bergen in 1894. At 18, andvery much against his parent’s wishes, he entered the KielNaval Academy and quickly acquitted himself, gaining rapidpromotion. His talents as an officer during the first World Warsaw the then 22-year-old, Lieutenant Langsdorff awarded theIron cross 2nd class in 1916, for his role in the Battle of Jutlandand later receiving the Iron cross 1st class. It wasn’t all aboutthe navy though. In early 1924 Langsdorff, then 30, marriedRuth Hager. A son, Johann, was born exactly nine months later.ADMIRAL GRAF SPEEThe outbreak of the spanish civil War in 1936 saw Langsdorffposted for a little over a year, to the then brand new battleshipADMIRAL GRAf spee.Captain Langsdorff with the German AmbassadorCaptain Langsdorff’s funeral

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 2972 hoursrespiteWith the battle over, GRAf spee sought the normal24 hours allowed. This allowed Langsdorff to see to his injuredand casualties, consult with his superiors and consider hisoptions. Ultimately, under duress from Germany, Langsdorffelected to scuttle his vessel. When the ADMIRAL GRAf spee’stime ran out, the vessel was steamed slowly out of the estuarytowards open water. On reaching the limit of Uruguayan territorialwaters Langsdorff and his crew were taken off by Argentinebarges. Langsdorff had requested permission to go down withhis ship but had been denied by the Uruguayan authorities whodidn’t want his blood on their hands. As the sun set, the crew ofthe ADMIRAL GRAf spee watched in silence as a series of plantedcharges blew up the pocket battle ship and it settled into theshallow water mud of the River plate tidal estuary.A MAN oF HoNouRHans Langsdorff was buried in the German section of theLa Chacarita Cemetery in Buenos Aires, Argentina and washonoured by both his own people and the British and her allies forhis honourable conduct. Langsdorff died a captain’s death; havingfollowed his orders and faithfully fulfilled his duty while maintainingat all times his own personal code of honour and decency.BibliographyWaters, S.D., Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War-The Royal New Zealand Navy, Government Printer, Wellington,New Zealand, 1956.C. Peter Chen, ‘Hans Langsdorff”, ww2db.comADMIRAL GRAF SPEE sunkCaptain Langsdorff at the funeral of his menBy Kelly Ana Morey“The first thing I saw was a blobof smoke on the horizon.…It was about 6.30 in themorning…. honestly I thinkeverybody was relieved at last,the weight was off our shoulders,here it was. It was on …. “chief Yeoman of signals Lincoln “Bully” Martinson joined theNew Zealand Division of the Royal Navy in 1921 at 16 as a signalboy. He had been serving on board the Leander class cruiserHMs AcHILLes since early in 1939. He was quietly drinking acup of tea when the German raider the ADMIRAL GRAf speecame steaming into view shortly after dawn on 13 December1939. As a result of a discussion the night before betweenMartinson and captain parry, the Battle ensign along with theNew Zealand flag was hoisted, much to the delight of her crewas they secured the ship for action and prepared to do battle.GRAF SPEE on fireACHILLES followed by AJAX

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 31signalman came down and put me in touch with what wasgoing on.”Later in the battle Captain Parry came down to the Sick Bay tocheck on Martinson and convey some extremely bad news thathad come through on the Wireless Telegraph from Navy Officein Wellington, when the AJAX had broken radio silence at thestart of the action. “He came down and he asked me how I felt,”remembers Martinson. I told him I didn’t feel good, naturally.He said, ‘well I have got a piece of news for you’ …and I thought,what the devil can the piece of news be? …I wasn’t in the stateto receive bad news or good news or any old bloody news, Iwas just in a state where I wanted to sleep and finish with it.However, the captain sat along side me and he said, ‘I mustgive you the news. It is my duty to do so.’ And he burst outcrying. He was a fine man you know; he was a man of feelingand emotion, he said, ‘I’m sorry to tell you that your eldestdaughter Joan has passed away.’The HMs eXeTeR was ordered to investigate and withinminutes the German vessel was on the attack. The RoyalNavy vessel responded with three salvos in quick succession,before sustaining a direct hit on B turret which Martinson inhis signals capacity was witness to: “I watched the captain ofthe ADMIRAL GRAf spee knock eXeTeR amidships, bang herabout aft, but he didn’t finish the job. He didn’t finish her off.Why he didn’t, I don’t know. Then he took us on and he tookthe AJAX on too. He damaged the AJAX and we got some verynear misses, but he didn’t actually damage us. We had a fewholes here and there, shrapnel holes…”“Then of course I got mine,” continues Martinson. “Langsdorffput one 11-inch very close, it was a beautiful shot, it onlywanted another 10 feet and we would have gone to glory onthe bridge, the whole lot of us, but it just dropped short. Theshot got me … and captain parry, he got shrapnel wounds inthe leg. The shot should have really got the lot of us, but itdidn’t.” The AcHILLes in actual fact sustained two hits in thisbarrage from the ADMIRAL GRAf spee and four men on boardwere killed and several others in addition to Martinson andparry were injured.A ToT oF RuMMartinson was taken down to the Boy’s Mess and was laying ontop of the lockers, “…thinking, well this is it, well so be it”, whenone of his signalmen arrived with a tot of rum. “Now it wasn’tan ordinary tot of rum,’ recounts Martinson in his oral history.“It was about three tots of rum in one bottle and I will neverforget it, it was neat. Anyway I took the tot of rum. I think thathelped me to fight everything that happened because after Ihad that tot of rum I was ready for the world.”Soon after Martinson was transferred to the sick bay and theship’s doctor did his best to save his leg that had been veryseriously injured. “My knee was mangled to glory,’ recallsMartinson. “They couldn’t give me a new knee… andI was hit in various other parts, a bit in the right hip and soon. ...Up top I could hear the occasional boom, boom and theMartinson was patched up on board the AcHILLes and sentdirectly to the Navy hospital on the ship’s return to NewZealand but ultimately lost his leg. He received a DistinguishedService Medal for his role in the Battle of the River Plate, andstayed on in the service as a non-combatant, as a trainer untilthe end of the war. “I was proud of my uniform,” concludesMartinson. “And I was damned proud of the boys that foughtat the plate. so I thought to myself well if I can do somethingthat’s going to help, well I will do it, so I did and I finished off myservice in 1945 in pHILOMeL. I put many signalmen through,good and bad, but all for the same reason to, fight a war andthat was that.”ReferenceChief Yeoman of Signals L.C. MARTINSON D.S.M.DLA 0012 AUG 0246Wounded Trimble and Matinson being lowered on to a barge to betransported ashore to the hospital.By Russ GlackinWhen Captain Langsdorff took his damaged‘Panzerschiff” into Montevideo Harbour in neutraluruguay to repair battle damage, he sparked off anintense diplomatic incident that ultimately led tohis decision to scuttle GRAF SPEE in the sightof Montevideo.Langsdorff’s decision brought World War II, then only threemonths old, to a neutral Uruguay that was far distant from themajor theatres of military operations. They were suddenly facedwith the need to arbitrate a very tense situation between two ofthe main antagonists in the war. The British wanted to get thedamaged GRAf spee out of Montevideo Harbour to finish off thethreat she posed to their vital Atlantic supply line. The Germanswanted to repair their pocket-battleship to enable her to escapethe Royal Navy and run for home to fight another day.It was a daunting task for the Uruguayan Government who hadonly the Articles of the international Hague convention of 1907to guide their decision-making, the terms of which were wellknownto both Britain and Germany.72 HouRS REPRIEvEWhile Langsdorff worked feverishly to repair the damage to theGRAf spee and the Royal Navy was rushing reinforcements to theRiver plate, the Uruguayan Government, acting on the advice oftheir Technical commission who were overseeing repairs to theship (as per Article 17 of the Convention which permitted them todo so) decided that the Germans be given 72 hours to effect thenecessary repairs. faced with the supposed approaching arrivalof powerful Royal Navy reinforcements, a threat heightenedby constant German surveillance out to sea, Admiral Raeder,German Naval High Command, conferred with Adolf Hitler andthen authorised Langsdorff‘s break-out to Buenos Aires. Raedercountenanced a scuttling so long as the destruction of GRAFspee was effective but opposed internment of the pocketbattleship. Langsdorf’s options were fast disappearing.LANGSDoRFF’S CHoICES NARRoWWhen the Uruguayan Government adhered to its decisionthat GRAf spee must put to sea by 2000 hrs on sunday, 17thDecember or be interned, then scuttling was the only optionleft. Langsdorff made the decision to scuttle the GRAf speebut the watching world did not know that. The departure ofGRAf spee drew closer. Would Langsdorff take the batteredGRAf spee out of the River plate in a glorious fight to thedeath? Would he make a dash through territorial waters toBuenos Aires, only four hours away?GRAf spee was the centre of world attention as thousandsgathered to watch and millions listened to radio broadcastsfrom overseas commentators who had been gathering fordays. At 1800 hrs a Nazi ensign was flown on GRAf spee’sforemast and she headed out to sea but then altered courseto the west before slowing and stopping. she put up a smokescreen followed soon after by a small flash and then a massiveexplosion. ADMIRAL GRAf spee was soon ablaze from end toend. The ship burned for a whole week.Langsdorff had done all he could to ensure the safety of hisship’s company and he felt, for his country. from his hotel roomin Buenos Aries he wrote to the city’s German ambassador toexplain why he had reached the decision to scuttle the spee:“After a long inward struggle I reached the grave decision toscuttle the pocket-battleship GRAf spee in order to preventthat she should fall into the hands of the enemy.” He lay downon the spee’s ensign and shot himself.The funeral procession filled the streets and thousands ofpeople filed past Langsdorff’s coffin. A poignant end to thedramatic sequence of events which had followed the Battle ofthe River plate.References1 Sir E. Millington-Drake, The Drama of GRAF SPEE and the Battle of the RiverPlate; A Documentary Anthology 1914-1964, Surrey: Peter Davies Ltd, 1964,p. 368Above: Graf Spee leaving Montevideo

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 33CAT AND MouSEfrom then on. recalls Beesley taking up the story again, “…itwas catch-as-catch-can. Running in towards the GRAf spee,firing a few, running out again. The way that ship was handledwas marvellous …It was flung about like a motor-boat you knowand it was really marvellous.”After a period of playing cat and mouse at sea during which theGRAf spee was holding its own, the German vessel abruptlyturned for shore, heading up the estuary and into the nominallyneutral Uruguayan harbour at Monte Video. “Why the ADMIRALGRAf spee turned and went into Montevideo,” continuesBeesley,”I do not know. I don’t think anybody will know to this day.’AJAX and AcHILLes followed the German vessel as far into shoreas they could. Beesley remembers that the GRAf spee ‘…wasin the shadow of the setting sun. she was running in to the westand you could see her silhouette into the setting sun and as sheentered harbour we peeled off and waited outside.”SuRPRISE SCuTTLINGThe ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE’s life may havecome to a premature end in the shallowmuddy waters of the Rio del Plata estuary,but, for Harry Beesley who was a seamangunner on board HMS ACHILLES duringthe River Plate battle, ‘the war was still onand we had to carry on with our duties.’Remembering the scuttling of the GRA FSPEE, ‘action started, action carried on andaction finished,’ concludes the veteran.HARRy BEESLEy-CABIN BoyIn 1932 16-year old Huia “Harry” Beesley, a cabin boy in theMerchant Navy, answered the call for young recruits for theNew Zealand Division and was lucky to be one of 10 chosenfrom a pool of some 500 applicants. He subsequently trainedas a seaman gunner and was on board the Leander-classcruiser AcHILLe s in that capacity when the vessel set sailfrom New Zealand just two days before the outbreak of war.The vessel had been on patrol duty in the waters off the westcoast of South America for some six weeks with a number ofRoyal Naval vessels before the fateful day it encountered theGerman pocket-battle ship.Above: ACHILLES A turret crewoNE oR TWo CLoSE MISSES“About 6.10, on the 13th December,” recollects Beesley, “thealarms went and it was all go. It was the GRA f spee, sightedin the horizon about 14-15 miles away. The tip of her mast wasthe only thing to be seen. It was full action stations. eXeTeRwas despatched out to the port and within minutes there wasa flash on the horizon and in a suitable time the shells startedlanding. My action station was on the open p1HA gun which isdown on the iron deck, just below and aft [of ] the bridge. Wecouldn’t do much at all really [on our gun] because of the rangedistance. …We just had to stay at our action stations until suchtime as things ceased. We fired a couple of shots, but to noavail at all.”“There were one or two close misses,” continues Beesley,somewhat understatedly bearing in mind that his actionstation was hit. “Unfortunately young Ian Grant who was alongside of me copped it in the chest. He died immediately. A chapcalled, I think his name was Marr or Marra, I have just forgottenhis name, he dropped to the deck. He was shot all around thebuttocks. I picked him up, threw him over my shoulders like asack of coal to get him down to the sick Bay.”This initial engagement of approximately an hour and20 minutes, between the German and Royal Navy ships sawHMs eXeTeR sustain substantial damage and record a totalof 61 dead, and a further 23 injured. The other two Royal Navyvessels were moderately damaged in the engagement: HMSAJAX had seven dead and 15 wounded and AcHILLe s had lostfour men with a further nine, including captain parry, wounded.ACHILLES c1944AJAX and AcHILLes, both low on fuel and ammunition,and HMs cUMBeRLAND which joined them after the battle,patrolled the harbour entrance for four nights awaitingthe German ship’s next move which came on the 17thof December.‘Well eventually, I think it was a Sunday,”says Beesley, remembering that latesummer afternoon 70 years ago, “when wegot news that the GRAF SPEE had sailed.Well that was it! It was tense! We closedup at action stations. I might add we neverhad much ammunition left anyway. I thinkthere was only about ten rounds a gun leftas I recall. She could have blown us rightout of the water had she known. Then allof a sudden there was a mighty flash onthe horizon where ADMIRAL GRA F SPEEhad run herself on to the English Bank, setcharges and had exploded BOOM!”“The next day,’ continues Beesley, “wecruised up close to her, dipped the flag.Yeah we dipped the flag to what was then aburned out hulk and then went on about ourbusiness.”ACHILLES battle damageReferenceAble Seaman Huia Beesley DLA 0010

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 35On the 23 February 1940 ACHILLESreturned to Auckland to a heroes’welcome. The newly named AchillesPoint flew the New Zealand Ensignand signalling flags spelt outNelson’s famous Trafalgar Signal.The town hall resurrected the lightsfrom the King’s coronation andthe Auckland Electric Power Boardaugmented this with a display whichincluded a 30 foot (10 metres)model of the ACHILLES.The parade route was alive with colour and there was a carnivalatmosphere in the air. The route was decorated with buntingand Queen street shop owners had decorated their shopfrontages. Queen street had been cleared of all traffic bypolice and traffic officers. senior cadets from High schoolsand Territorials lined the sides of the route. Much to the schoolchildren’s delight, Auckland and suburban schools had beengranted a day off. school children from country districts werenot to miss out and could get to the parade on special trainswhich had been put on for the day. Many offices, shops andfactories granted their staff a few hours holiday to attend theparade. Auckland was alive with anticipation.Of course as Auckland is the city of sails Auckland boatiesmet the AcHILLes long before she got into harbour.Tugs, launches and private boats met and escorted her in.At Narrow Neck Beach and North Head 600 troops greetedher. At 6.30am she passed a silent Devonport Naval Base whensuddenly cheers rang out, every merchant ship in port soundedtheir sirens, trains whistled, and thousands of cars lining thewharf tooted. The lads were home! AcHILLes berthed at thecentral wharf and the ship’s company met with their family andfriends. captain parry then received calls from the GovernorGeneral, Viscount Galway, and Government and local authorityrepresentatives.ACHILLES’ welcome home parade, Queen StreetACHILLES arriving home in AucklandACHILLES homecomingAucklanders began to line the street for the parade from 9.30am onwards.every place with a view was occupied and at ground level people stood ten deep.On the side streets which had a slight elevation people jostled for a better position.About 1000 ex-servicemen and women began the parade, followed by the RoyalMarines Band, then the Navy and the second New Zealand expeditionary force.captain parry and his wife were next, riding in an official car as parry’s leg wound stilltroubled him. When the AcHILLes ship’s company appeared flags and handkerchiefswere waved and confetti and streamers were thrown. Throughout the parade thecrowd clapped and cheered. The AcHILLes sailors certainly knew they were theheroes of the day.

BATTLE OF THE RIVER PLATE ◊ 37ACHILLES welcome home paradeACHILLES arriving into Auckland, 23 September 1940ACHILLES welcome home ceremony in AucklandACHILLES crew on arrival in AucklandACHILLES civic mealOn reaching the Town Hall the ship’s company was surrounded by yet more members of the public. speeches from Auckland’smayor sir ernest Davis and the deputy prime Minister peter fraser were enthusiastically received by the crowd and when captainparry prepared to speak he had to wait while the crowd serenaded him with “for he’s a jolly good fellow”. The National Anthem wassung and the crew moved into the Town Hall for a civic function. Their families lunched next door in the concert chamber.The lunch was not a stuffy affair as the orchestra played new and old war tunes throughout accompanied by singing from thesailors. But in a more solemn moment captain parry received a gift from Mr Tai Marshall on behalf of local Maori – a beautiful Kiwikorowai (cloak). In addition the Mayor presented a laurel wreath on behalf of the people of Auckland and this was later hung on thefore bridge of AcHILLes.The crew were granted shore leave for several days. Later when she travelled to Wellington, christchurch and Dunedin the crewwere also received as national heroes.Above: Welcome home boardACHILLES River Plate Veterans Association

Battle of the river plate ◊ 39Battle experiences are traumatic and onboard ships are naval chaplains, officerswithout rank, who care for the spiritualneeds of the ship’s company and pray overthe dead.They live through the same circumstances yet extend comfortand support. Unlike all other officers in the service, the navalchaplain has no rank as his parishners may range from Admiralto Seaman Boy. We do not have a record of the chaplain whoserved in ACHILLES at the Battle of the River Plate. ChaplainGordon Melville McKenzie was the chaplain who served inAchilles from June 1940. In January 1941 he was posted toHMS TAMAKI, the training establishment on Moutihi Island. Helater became Bishop of Wellington. Among the Navy Museum’scollection items from naval chaplaincy is Chaplain Robson’scommunion set, complete with communion wafers.In 1926 thefirst chapel wasestablished onthe Naval Basein the SeamanBoys’ classroom.When the basewas significantlyupgraded inthe mid 1930’s,Chaplain G.T.Robson requesteda better chapelthan the small schoolroom he was using.St Christopher’s Chapel was completed in1943, finally meeting the Chaplain’s request.The first service was held in May 1943 anddedicated on 20 June 1943 and named forthe former patron saint of sailors.Various stained glass windows have beenincorporated into the chapel, for instanceHMNZS TAMAKI and TASMAN. When it wasoriginally built it was divided into a chapel anda gymnasium. This has subsequently beenconverted into a seminar room and doublesthe seating space if there is large service tobe held in the chapel.Above: Achilles Point in Auckland and the St ChristopherChapel window at entrance.The chapel is also home to a number of historicitems which are on display in and around thechapel, all of which have links with ACHILLES.These include:HONOURS BOARD: HMS ACHILLES’ Battle Honours Board.Plaque: Remember HMS ACHILLES. The first men of theNZ Division RN to be Killed in Action. Battle of the River Plate13th December 1939.SANCTuary Memorial Window WW2: The centralstained glass window in the Chapel Sanctuary depicts thenames of all the New Zealand ships which suffered lossesin WW2 including ACHILLES in the top left. The surround isfrom the steering wheel of HMS Philomel.BATTLE Ensign: ACHILLES’ Battle Ensign was housed inthe Chapel for many years but is now housed within the NavyMuseum collection for safe keeping.Chapel ENTRANCE: The stained glass window on the rightof the covered entrance way depicts St Christopher andbelow it has the ACHILLES’ ships badge with the words“In all time of danger be their defence.”ACHILLES Road: The road on the naval base which leadspast the front of the Chapel is called ACHILLES Roadhonouring ACHILLES’ Ships’ companies.TREES WITH PLAQUES: Trees planted at the front of theChapel with commemorative plaques have two associatedwith ACHILLES. One tree is “In Memory of all River PlateVeterans 1939” and the other tree is “In memory of all whosailed in HMNZS ACHILLES” Lest we forget.CANDLESTICKS AND CROSS: Presented by ChaplainRobson who served on board ACHILLES.