104 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK <strong>XX</strong> ŠTEVILKA 5/6into a new era of its development, from socialism to capitalism, from postwardemocratization into transition, from ‘Dayton to Brussels’.Any media text analysis can be seen as an analysis of cultural texts andKellner (2003) proposes a useful three-pillar cultural research structureconsisting of:• Political economy and production of culture (cultural texts) throughstudying ownership of media conglomerates, which subsequentlymeans ownership of messages;• Cultural texts such as pamphlets, ads, and even OHR’s press releases.Textual analyses such as content analysis and discourse and criticaldiscourse analysis (CDA) explain these texts through concepts of ideology,discourse type, narratives, semiotics, topics, formal linguisticcharacteristics etc.• Audience analysis (audiences are seen as heterogeneous and multiple):audience members are recipients of texts, which mean differentthings to different people, and cultural studies is interested in howaudiences receive them.This research has to do with the second pillar as a preliminary step for athorough CDA approach whose advantages were helpful in later more detailedanalyses of the OHR press releases. As a press release is a borderlinegenre between interpersonal and mass communication (Jacobs, 1999:31), press release can be viewed as a genre or even media channel with astrong albeit not yet fully realized meaning potential.3. Contextualizing the IC role in BiH- A Job without AlternativeThe ‘new democracies’ were seen as dysfunctional for many reasons suchas deep cultural barriers and Bosnian democratization as a needed ‘nobleexperiment’ (Denitch, 1996: 60). There are different opinions about internationalinvolvement in BiH, but they are mainly divided into those who thinkthere was no other alternative and those who think although there may havenot been alternatives, the actual democratization process has been catastrophic.Because of so much blood spilt in the name of nationalistic ideals,some critics say Western outsiders ‘are far better representatives of the genuineinterests of the Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian peoples and states thantheir patriotic leaders’ (Denitch, 1996: 32). The pretext for this is that newdemocratic societies are just inept, with ‘remarkably few legal, political, and
THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTHORITY - CONTENT CHARACTERISTICS ...105civic skills...deep-seated prejudice...and have yet little willingness to reconceptualizetheir prejudices or anxieties in language familiar to Westerners’(Fine, 1996: 559). Both of these opinions favor international intervention inBiH, which is seen as a course of action ‘without an alternative’.More recent and rather different opinions emerged later critiquingthe ‘noble experiment’ as ‘a mockery of any meaningful concept of democracy’and a ‘grotesque parody of democratic principles’ (Carpenter,1997 in Chandler, 2000: 158, 190). Paddy Ashdown has received much criticismregarding his colonial-style politics, ‘running Bosnia like Raj’, and‘making much greater use of his untrammeled powers as a ‘benevolentdespot’ than his predecessors (Traynor, 2003). The critique of the ‘evangelicbelief’ in imposing democracy from above and its similarities withthe British East India Company was a theme of Knaus and Martin’s article‘Travails of the European Raj’ (2003).With a great deal of caution and diffidence there has, however, beensome systematic critique against the OHR policy in the realm of internationalrelations but little in discourse and media studies. Western politicianshave been blamed for their lack of accountability to BiH citizens. Theyhave been forcing statehood upon the divided Bosnian ethnic groups atall costs and at the expense of society. Ten years after Dayton, there is no‘positive peace’, as a form of cooperation and integration (Galtung, 1968in Roach, 1993), but ‘negative peace’, as a mere lack of organized violencebetween the main ethnic groups. A more detailed insight into the inadequaciesof the Western efforts in terms of society building in Bosnia andHerzegovina and their subsequent inability to guarantee the BiH stabilityis given by Yordan (2003), who says the initial intervention of the EU andUSA were led by their personal interests and not humanitarian ideals.American negotiators wrote the GFA with the assistance of Western Europeans andRussian diplomats. While the parties to the peace talks could debate these provisions,they were not allowed to make any substantive changes. Through diplomatic armtwisting, the U.S. forced the parties to sign the peace agreement, even though someof its provisions contradicted their self-interest. In the end, the GFA can be seen asan instrument of conflict settlement, rather than one of conflict resolution. It didnot permit the leaders of ethno-national group to negotiate an ending to their warand it did not provide an incentive for Bosnia’s political leaders to address the veryproblems that had led them to war. Instead a settlement was forced upon them,angering many of Bosnia’s politicians and stripping them of their right to create asociety that best represents their needs and interests (Yordan, 2003: 62).The Dayton Peace Agreement (GFA) in newly built Bosnian state wasdesigned to stop the war and introduce capitalism and democracy as a
- Page 3:
VSEBINA LETNIK XX ŠTEVILKA 5/6 Z
- Page 7 and 8:
UVODNA NOTICAIgor Ž. ŽagarTole pi
- Page 9 and 10:
ZA KAJ GRE V KAD - PREGLEDZGODOVINE
- Page 11 and 12:
ZA KAJ GRE V KAD - PREGLED ZGODOVIN
- Page 13:
ZA KAJ GRE V KAD - PREGLED ZGODOVIN
- Page 17 and 18:
ZA KAJ GRE V KAD - PREGLED ZGODOVIN
- Page 19 and 20:
ZA KAJ GRE V KAD - PREGLED ZGODOVIN
- Page 21 and 22:
ZA KAJ GRE V KAD - PREGLED ZGODOVIN
- Page 23 and 24:
ZA KAJ GRE V KAD - PREGLED ZGODOVIN
- Page 25 and 26:
ZA KAJ GRE V KAD - PREGLED ZGODOVIN
- Page 27 and 28:
DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TERZAPOPA
- Page 29 and 30:
DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TER ZAPOP
- Page 31 and 32:
DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TER ZAPOP
- Page 33 and 34:
DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TER ZAPOP
- Page 35 and 36:
DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TER ZAPOP
- Page 37 and 38:
DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TER ZAPOP
- Page 39 and 40:
DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TER ZAPOP
- Page 41 and 42:
DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TER ZAPOP
- Page 43 and 44:
DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TER ZAPOP
- Page 45 and 46:
DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TER ZAPOP
- Page 47 and 48:
DISKURZ: FOUCAULT, LACLAU TER ZAPOP
- Page 49 and 50:
TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 51 and 52:
TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 53 and 54:
TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 55 and 56: TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 57 and 58: TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 59 and 60: TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 61 and 62: TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 63 and 64: TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 65 and 66: TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 67 and 68: TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 69 and 70: TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 71 and 72: TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 73 and 74: TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 75 and 76: TOPOI IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSI
- Page 77 and 78: University of Queensland, Centre fo
- Page 79 and 80: JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HIST
- Page 81 and 82: JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HIST
- Page 83 and 84: JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HIST
- Page 85 and 86: JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HIST
- Page 87 and 88: JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HIST
- Page 89 and 90: JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HIST
- Page 91 and 92: JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HIST
- Page 93 and 94: JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HIST
- Page 95 and 96: JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HIST
- Page 97 and 98: JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HIST
- Page 99 and 100: JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HIST
- Page 101 and 102: JOURNALISTIC (RE)PRODUCTION OF HIST
- Page 103 and 104: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTINGAUTHO
- Page 105: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 109 and 110: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 111 and 112: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 113 and 114: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 115 and 116: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 117 and 118: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 119 and 120: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 121 and 122: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 123 and 124: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 125 and 126: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 127 and 128: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 129 and 130: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 131 and 132: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 133 and 134: THE VOICE OF AN AGENDA-SETTING AUTH
- Page 135 and 136: ‘68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGAZ
- Page 137 and 138: ‘68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA
- Page 139 and 140: ‘68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA
- Page 141 and 142: ‘68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA
- Page 143 and 144: ‘68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA
- Page 145 and 146: ‘68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA
- Page 147 and 148: ‘68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA
- Page 149 and 150: ‘68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA
- Page 151 and 152: ‘68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA
- Page 153 and 154: ‘68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA
- Page 155 and 156: ‘68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA
- Page 157 and 158:
‘68 KOT HKRATNA KRIZA EVROPSKEGA
- Page 159 and 160:
POVZETKI/ABSTRACTSZA KAJ GRE V KAD
- Page 161 and 162:
POVZETKI / ABSTRACTS159NOVINARSKA (
- Page 163 and 164:
POVZETKI / ABSTRACTS161‘68 AS PAR
- Page 165 and 166:
AVTORJI/AUTHORSRuth WodakRuth Wodak
- Page 168 and 169:
166 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEV
- Page 170 and 171:
168 ŠOLSKO POLJE LETNIK XX ŠTEV
- Page 172:
ZAHVALARevija Šolsko polje izhaja