The Tragedy of the Commons - The Garrett Hardin Society

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Fall 2001T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTthan can the problem of winning thegame of tick-tack-toe.What Shall WeMaximize?Population, as Malthus said,naturally tends to grow“geometrically” or, as we wouldnow say, exponentially. In a finiteworld this means that the per capitashare of the world’s goods muststeadily decrease. Is ours a finiteworld?A fair defense can be putforward for the view that the worldis infinite; or that we do not knowthat it is not. But, in terms of thepractical problems that we mustface in the next few generationswith the foreseeable technology, itis clear that we will greatly increasehuman misery if we do not, duringthe immediate future, assume thatthe world available to the terrestrialhuman population is finite. “Space”is no escape. 2A finite world can support onlya finite population; therefore,population growth must eventuallyequal zero. (The case of perpetualwide fluctuations above and belowzero is a trivial variant that need notbe discussed.) When this conditionis met, what will be the situation ofmankind? Specifically, canBentham’s goal of “the greatestgood for the greatest number” berealized?No — for two reasons, eachs ufficient by itself. The first is atheoretical one. It is notmathematically possible tomaximize for two (or more)variables at the same time. Thiswas clearly stated by von Neumannand Morgenstern, 3 but the principleis implicit in the theory of partialdifferential equations, dating back atleast to D’Alembert (1717-1783).The second reas on springsdirectly from biological facts. Tolive, any organism must have asource of energy (for example,food). This energy is utilized fortwo purposes: mere maintenanceand work. For man, maintenance oflife requires about 1,600 kilocaloriesa day (“maintenancecalories”). Anything that he doesover and above merely stayingalive will be defined as work, andis supported by “work calories ”which he takes in. Work caloriesare used not only for what we callwork in common speech; they arealso required for all forms ofenjoyment, from swimming andautomobile racing to playing musicand writing poetry. If our goal is tomaximize population it is obviouswhat we must do: We must makethe work calories per personapproach as close to zero aspossible. No gourmet meals, novacations, no sports, no music, noliterature, no art …I think thateveryone will grant, withoutargument or proof, that maximizingpopulation does not maximizegoods. Bentham’s goal isimpossible.In reaching this conclusion Ihave made the usual assumptionthat it is the acquisition of energythat is the problem. The appearanceof atomic energy has led some toquestion this assumption. However,given an infinite source of energy,population growth still produces aninescapable problem. The problemof the acquisition of energy isreplaced by the problem of itsdissipation, as J. H. Fremlin has sowittily shown. 4 The arithmetic signsin analysis are, as it were, reversed;but Bentham’s goal is stillunobtainable.The optimum population is, then,less than the maximum. Thedifficulty of defining the optimum isenormous; so far as I know, no onehas seriously tackled this problem.Reaching an acceptable and stablesolution will surely require morethan one generation of hard“The optimumpopulation is, then,less than themaximum. Thedifficulty of definingthe optimum isenormous; so far asI know, no one hasseriously tackledthis problem.”analytical work — and muchpersuasion.We want the maximum good perperson; but what is good? To oneperson it is wilderness, to another itis ski lodges for thousands. To oneit is estuaries to nourish ducks forhunters to shoot; to another it isfactory land. Comparing one goodwith another is, we usually say,impossible because goods areincommen-surable.Incommensurables cannot becompared.27
Fall 2001T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTTheoretically this may be true;but in real life incommensurablesare commensurable. Only acriterion of judgment and a systemof weighting are needed. In naturethe criterion is survival. Is it betterfor a species to be small andhideable, or large and powerful?Natural selection commensuratesthe incommensurables. Thecompromise achieved depends on anatural weighting of the values ofthe variables.Man must imitate this process.There is no doubt that in fact healready does, but unconsciously. Itis when the hidden decisions are“…by anyreasonablestandards, themost rapidlygrowingpopulations onearth today are (ingeneral) the mostmiserable.”made explicit that the argumentsbegin. The problem for the yearsahead is to work out an acceptabletheory of weighting. Synergisticeffects, nonlinear variation, anddifficulties in discounting the futuremake the intellectual problemdifficult, but not (in principle)insoluble.Has any cultural group solvedthis practical problem at the presenttime, even on an intuitive level?One simple fact proves that nonehas: There is no prosperouspopulation in the world today thathas, and has had for some time, agrowth rate of zero. Any peoplethat has intuitively identified itsoptimum point will soon reach it,after which its growth ratebecomes and remains zero.Of course, a positive growthrate might be taken as evidencethat a population is below itsoptimum. However, by anyreasonable standards, the mostrapidly growing populations on earthtoday are (in general) the mos tmiserable. This association (whichneed not be invariable) casts doubton the optimistic assumption thatthe positive growth rate of apopulation is evidence that it hasyet to reach its optimum.We can make little progress inworking toward optimum populationsize until we explicitly exorcize thespirit of Adam Smith in the field ofpractical demography. In economicaffairs, The Wealth of Nations(1776) popularized the “invisiblehand,” the idea that an individualwho “intends only his own gain” is,as it were, “led by an invisible handto promote… the public interest.” 5Adam Smith did not assert that thiswas invariably true, and perhapsneither did any of his followers. Buthe contributed to a dominanttendency of thought that has eversince interfered with positive actionbased on rational analysis, namely,the tendency to assume thatdecisions reached individually will,in fact, be the best decisions for anentire society. If this assumption iscorrect it justifies the continuanceof our present policy of laissez-fairein reproduction. If it is correct wecan assume that men will controltheir individual fecundity so as toproduce the optimum population. Ifthe assumption is not correct, weneed to reexamine our individualfreedoms to see which ones aredefensible.Tragedy of Freedomin a CommonsThe rebuttal to the invisible handin population control can be found ina scenario first sketched in a littleknownpamphlet 6 in 1833 by amathematical amateur namedWilliam Forster Lloyd (1794-1852).We may well call it “the tragedy ofthe commons,” using the word“tragedy” as the philosopherWhitehead used it 7 : “The essenceof dramatic tragedy is notunhappiness. It resides in thesolemnity of the remorselessworking of things.” He then goeson to say, “This inevitableness ofdestiny can only be illustrated interms of human life by incidentswhich in fact involve unhappiness.For it is only by them that the futilityof escape can be made evident inthe drama.”The tragedy of the commonsdevelops in this way. Picture apasture open to all. It is to beexpected that each herdsman willtry to keep as many cattle aspossible on the commons. Such anarrangement may work reasonably28
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