The Tragedy of the Commons - The Garrett Hardin Society

Fall 2001T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTThe Tragedyof the Commonsby Garrett HardinAt the end of a thoughtfularticle on the future ofnuclear war, Wiesner andYork 1 concluded that: “Both sidesin the arms race are…confrontedby the dilemma of steadilyincreasing military power andsteadily decreasing nationalsecurity. It is our consideredprofessional judgment that thisdilemma has no technicalsolution. If the great powerscontinue to look for solutions in thearea of science and technologyonly, the result will be to worsen thesituation.”I would like to focus yourattention not on the subject of thearticle (national security in aGarrett Hardin, Ph.D. isProfessor Emeritus of HumanEcology in the Department ofBiological Sciences at theUniversity of California,Santa Barbara. “The Tragedyof the Commons” wasoriginally given as an addressto the Pacific Division of theAmerican Association for theAdvancement of Science, iscopyrighted by the AAAS, andis reprinted with theirpermission from Science, 13December 1968, vol. 162, pp.1243-48.nuclear world) but on the kind ofconclusion they reached, namelythat there is no technical solution tothe problem. An implicit and almostuniversal assumption of discussionspublished in professional and semipopularscientific journals is that theproblem under discussion has atechnical solution. A technicalsolution may be defined as one thatrequires a change only in thetechniques of the natural sciences,demanding little or nothing in theway of change in human values orideas of morality.In our day (though not in earliertimes) technical solutions arealways welcome. Because ofprevious failures in prophecy, ittakes courage to assert that adesired technical solution is notpossible. Wiesner and Yorkexhibited this courage; publishing ina science journal, they insisted thatthe solution to the problem was notto be found in the natural sciences.They cautiously qualified theirstatement with the phrase, “It is ourconsidered professionaljudgment…” Whether they wereright or not is not the concern of thepresent article. Rather, the concernhere is with the important conceptof a class of human problems whichcan be called “no technical solutionproblems” and, more specifically,with the identification anddiscussion of one of these.It is easy to show that the classis not a null class. Recall the gameof tick-tack-toe. Consider theproblem, “How can I win the gameof tick-tack-toe?” It is well knownthat I cannot, if I assume (inkeeping with the conventions ofgame theory) that my opponentunderstands the game perfectly.Put another way, there is no“technical solution” to the problem.I can win only by giving radicalmeaning to the word “win.” I canhit my opponent over the head; or Ican drug him; or I can falsify therecords. Every way in which I“win” involves, in some sense, anabandonment of the game, as weintuitively understand it. (I can also,of course, openly abandon the game— refuse to play it. This is whatmost adults do.)The class of “No technicalsolution problems” has members.My thesis is that the “populationproblem,” as conventionallyconceived, is a member of thisclass. How it is conventionallyconceived needs some comment. Itis fair to say that most people whoanguish over the population problemare trying to find a way to avoid theevils of over-population withoutrelinquishing any of the privilegesthey now enjoy. They think thatfarming the seas or developing newstrains of wheat will solve theproblem — technologically. I try toshow here that the solution theyseek cannot be found. Thepopulation problem cannot besolved in a technical way, any more26

Fall 2001T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTthan can the problem of winning thegame of tick-tack-toe.What Shall WeMaximize?Population, as Malthus said,naturally tends to grow“geometrically” or, as we wouldnow say, exponentially. In a finiteworld this means that the per capitashare of the world’s goods muststeadily decrease. Is ours a finiteworld?A fair defense can be putforward for the view that the worldis infinite; or that we do not knowthat it is not. But, in terms of thepractical problems that we mustface in the next few generationswith the foreseeable technology, itis clear that we will greatly increasehuman misery if we do not, duringthe immediate future, assume thatthe world available to the terrestrialhuman population is finite. “Space”is no escape. 2A finite world can support onlya finite population; therefore,population growth must eventuallyequal zero. (The case of perpetualwide fluctuations above and belowzero is a trivial variant that need notbe discussed.) When this conditionis met, what will be the situation ofmankind? Specifically, canBentham’s goal of “the greatestgood for the greatest number” berealized?No — for two reasons, eachs ufficient by itself. The first is atheoretical one. It is notmathematically possible tomaximize for two (or more)variables at the same time. Thiswas clearly stated by von Neumannand Morgenstern, 3 but the principleis implicit in the theory of partialdifferential equations, dating back atleast to D’Alembert (1717-1783).The second reas on springsdirectly from biological facts. Tolive, any organism must have asource of energy (for example,food). This energy is utilized fortwo purposes: mere maintenanceand work. For man, maintenance oflife requires about 1,600 kilocaloriesa day (“maintenancecalories”). Anything that he doesover and above merely stayingalive will be defined as work, andis supported by “work calories ”which he takes in. Work caloriesare used not only for what we callwork in common speech; they arealso required for all forms ofenjoyment, from swimming andautomobile racing to playing musicand writing poetry. If our goal is tomaximize population it is obviouswhat we must do: We must makethe work calories per personapproach as close to zero aspossible. No gourmet meals, novacations, no sports, no music, noliterature, no art …I think thateveryone will grant, withoutargument or proof, that maximizingpopulation does not maximizegoods. Bentham’s goal isimpossible.In reaching this conclusion Ihave made the usual assumptionthat it is the acquisition of energythat is the problem. The appearanceof atomic energy has led some toquestion this assumption. However,given an infinite source of energy,population growth still produces aninescapable problem. The problemof the acquisition of energy isreplaced by the problem of itsdissipation, as J. H. Fremlin has sowittily shown. 4 The arithmetic signsin analysis are, as it were, reversed;but Bentham’s goal is stillunobtainable.The optimum population is, then,less than the maximum. Thedifficulty of defining the optimum isenormous; so far as I know, no onehas seriously tackled this problem.Reaching an acceptable and stablesolution will surely require morethan one generation of hard“The optimumpopulation is, then,less than themaximum. Thedifficulty of definingthe optimum isenormous; so far asI know, no one hasseriously tackledthis problem.”analytical work — and muchpersuasion.We want the maximum good perperson; but what is good? To oneperson it is wilderness, to another itis ski lodges for thousands. To oneit is estuaries to nourish ducks forhunters to shoot; to another it isfactory land. Comparing one goodwith another is, we usually say,impossible because goods areincommen-surable.Incommensurables cannot becompared.27

Fall 2001T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTTheoretically this may be true;but in real life incommensurablesare commensurable. Only acriterion of judgment and a systemof weighting are needed. In naturethe criterion is survival. Is it betterfor a species to be small andhideable, or large and powerful?Natural selection commensuratesthe incommensurables. Thecompromise achieved depends on anatural weighting of the values ofthe variables.Man must imitate this process.There is no doubt that in fact healready does, but unconsciously. Itis when the hidden decisions are“…by anyreasonablestandards, themost rapidlygrowingpopulations onearth today are (ingeneral) the mostmiserable.”made explicit that the argumentsbegin. The problem for the yearsahead is to work out an acceptabletheory of weighting. Synergisticeffects, nonlinear variation, anddifficulties in discounting the futuremake the intellectual problemdifficult, but not (in principle)insoluble.Has any cultural group solvedthis practical problem at the presenttime, even on an intuitive level?One simple fact proves that nonehas: There is no prosperouspopulation in the world today thathas, and has had for some time, agrowth rate of zero. Any peoplethat has intuitively identified itsoptimum point will soon reach it,after which its growth ratebecomes and remains zero.Of course, a positive growthrate might be taken as evidencethat a population is below itsoptimum. However, by anyreasonable standards, the mostrapidly growing populations on earthtoday are (in general) the mos tmiserable. This association (whichneed not be invariable) casts doubton the optimistic assumption thatthe positive growth rate of apopulation is evidence that it hasyet to reach its optimum.We can make little progress inworking toward optimum populationsize until we explicitly exorcize thespirit of Adam Smith in the field ofpractical demography. In economicaffairs, The Wealth of Nations(1776) popularized the “invisiblehand,” the idea that an individualwho “intends only his own gain” is,as it were, “led by an invisible handto promote… the public interest.” 5Adam Smith did not assert that thiswas invariably true, and perhapsneither did any of his followers. Buthe contributed to a dominanttendency of thought that has eversince interfered with positive actionbased on rational analysis, namely,the tendency to assume thatdecisions reached individually will,in fact, be the best decisions for anentire society. If this assumption iscorrect it justifies the continuanceof our present policy of laissez-fairein reproduction. If it is correct wecan assume that men will controltheir individual fecundity so as toproduce the optimum population. Ifthe assumption is not correct, weneed to reexamine our individualfreedoms to see which ones aredefensible.Tragedy of Freedomin a CommonsThe rebuttal to the invisible handin population control can be found ina scenario first sketched in a littleknownpamphlet 6 in 1833 by amathematical amateur namedWilliam Forster Lloyd (1794-1852).We may well call it “the tragedy ofthe commons,” using the word“tragedy” as the philosopherWhitehead used it 7 : “The essenceof dramatic tragedy is notunhappiness. It resides in thesolemnity of the remorselessworking of things.” He then goeson to say, “This inevitableness ofdestiny can only be illustrated interms of human life by incidentswhich in fact involve unhappiness.For it is only by them that the futilityof escape can be made evident inthe drama.”The tragedy of the commonsdevelops in this way. Picture apasture open to all. It is to beexpected that each herdsman willtry to keep as many cattle aspossible on the commons. Such anarrangement may work reasonably28

Fall 2001T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTsatisfactorily for centuries becausetribal wars, poaching, and diseasekeep the numbers of both man andbeast well below the carryingcapacity of the land. Finally,however, comes the day ofreckoning, that is, the day when thelong-desired goal of social stabilitybecomes a reality. At this point, theinherent logic of the commonsremorselessly generates tragedy.As a rational being, eachherdsman seeks to maximize hisgain. Explicitly, or implicitly, moreor less consciously, he asks: “Whatis the utility to me of adding onemore animal to my herd?” Thisutility has one negative and onepositive component.1) The positive component isthe function of the increment ofone animal. Since the herdsmanreceives all the proceeds from thesale of the additional animal, thepositive utility is nearly +1.2) The negative component is afunction of the additionalovergrazing created by one moreanimal. Since, however, the effectsof overgrazing are shared by all theherdsmen, the negative utility forany particular decision-makingherdsman is only a fraction of -1.Adding together the componentpartial utilities, the rationalherdsman concludes that the onlysensible course for him to pursue isto add another animal to his herd.And another, and another …Butthis is the conclusion reached byeach and every rational herdsmansharing a commons. Therein is thetragedy. Each man is locked into asystem that compels him toincrease his herd without limit — ina world that is limited. Ruin is thedestination toward which all men“Education cancounteract thenatural tendency todo the wrongthing, but theinexorablesuccession ofgenerationsrequires that thebasis for thisknowledge beconstantlyrefreshed.”rush, each pursuing his own bestinterest in a society that believes inthe freedom of the commons.Freedom in a commons brings ruinto all.Some would say that this is aplatitude. Would that it were! In asense, it was learned thousands ofyears ago, but natural selectionfavors the forces of psychologicaldenial. 8 The individual benefits asan individual from his ability to denythe truth even though society as awhole, of which he is a part,suffers. Education can counteractthe natural tendency to do thewrong thing, but the inexorablesuccession of generations requiresthat the basis for this knowledge beconstantly refreshed.A simple incident that occurreda few years ago in Leominster,Massachusetts, shows howperishable the knowledge is. Duringthe Christmas shopping season theparking meters downtown werecovered with plastic bags that boretags reading: “Do not open untilafter Christmas. Free parkingcourtesy of the mayor and citycouncil.” In other words, facing theprospect of an increased demandfor already scarce space, the cityfathers reinstituted the system ofthe commons. (Cynically, wesuspect that they gained more votesthan they lost in this retrogressiveact.)In an approximate way, the logicof the commons has beenunderstood for a long time, perhapssince the discovery of agriculture orthe invention of private property inreal estate. But it is understoodmostly only in special cases whichare not sufficiently generalized.Even at this late date, cattlemenleasing national land on the westernranges demonstrate no more thanan ambivalent understanding, inconstantly pressuring federalauthorities to increase the headc ount to the point where overgrazingproduces erosion and weeddominance. Likewise, the oceans ofthe world continue to suffer fromthe survival of the philosophy of thecommons. Maritime nations stillrespond automatically to theshibboleth of the “freedom of theseas.” Professing to believe in the“inexhaustible resources of theoceans,” they bring species afterspecies of fish and whales closer toextinction. 9The National Parks presentanother instance of the working outof the tragedy of the commons. Atpresent, they are open to all,without limit. The values thatvisitors seek in the park are steadilyeroded. Plainly, we must soon29

Fall 2001T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTcease to treat the parks as acommons or they will be of novalue to anyone.What shall we do? We haveseveral options. We might sell themoff as private property. We mightkeep them as public property, butallocate the right to enter them.The allocation might be on the basisof wealth, by the use of an auctionsystem. It might be on the basis ofmerit, as defined by some agreeduponstandards. It might be bylottery. Or it might be on a firstcome,first-served basis,administered to long queues. These,I think, are all the reasonablepossibilities. They are allobjectionable. But we must choose— or acquiesce in the destructionof the commons that we call ourNational Parks.PollutionIn a reverse way, the tragedy ofthe commons reappears in problemsof pollution. Here it is not a questionof taking something out of thecommons, but of putting somethingin — sewage, or chemical,radioac tive, and heat wastes intowater; noxious and dangerousfumes into the air; and distractingand unpleasant advertising signsinto the line of sight. Thecalculations of utility are much thesame as before. The rational manfinds that his share of the cost ofthe wastes he discharges into thecommons is less than the cost ofpurifying his wastes beforereleasing them. Since this is true foreveryone, we are locked into asystem of “fouling our own nest,”so long as we behave only asindependent, rational, freeenterprisers.“The pollutionproblem is aconsequence ofpopulation. It didnot much matterhow a lonelyAmericanfrontiersmandisposed of hiswaste.”The tragedy of the commons asa food basket is averted by privateproperty, or something formally likeit. But the air and waterssurrounding us cannot readily befenced, and so the tragedy of thecommons as a cesspool must beprevented by different means, bycoercive laws or taxing devices thatmake it cheaper for the polluter totreat his pollutants than to dischargethem untreated. We have notprogressed as far with the solutionof this problem as we have with thefirst. Indeed, our particular conceptof private property, which deters usfrom exhausting the positiveresources of the earth, favorspollution. The owner of a factory onthe bank of a stream — whoseproperty extends to the middle ofthe stream — often has difficultyseeing why it is not his natural rightto muddy the waters flowing pasthis door. The law, always behindtimes, requires elaborate stitchingand fitting to adapt it to this newlyperceived aspect of the commons.The pollution problem is a30consequence of population. It didnot much matter how a lonelyAmerican frontiersman disposed ofhis waste. “Flowing water purifiesitself every ten miles,” mygrandfather used to say, and themyth was near enough to the truthwhen he was a boy, for there werenot too many people. But aspopulation became denser, thenatural chemical and biologic alrecycling processes becameoverloaded, calling for aredefinition of property rights.How to LegislateTemperance?Analysis of the pollutionproblem as a function of populationdensity uncovers a not generallyrecognized principle of morality,namely: The morality of an act isa function of the state of thesystem at the time it isperformed. 10 Using the commonsas a cesspool does not harm thegeneral public under frontierconditions, because there is nopublic; the same behavior in ametropolis is unbearable. A hundredand fifty years ago a plainsmancould kill an American bison, cutout only the tongue for his dinner,and discard the rest of the animal.He was not in any important sensebeing wasteful. Today, with only afew bison left, we would beappalled at such behavior.In passing, it is worth noting thatthe morality of an act cannot bedetermined from a photograph. Onedoes not know whether a mankilling an elephant or setting fire tothe grassland is harming others untilhe knows the total system in whichhis act appears. “One picture isw orth a thousand words,” said an

Fall 2001T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTancient Chinese, but it may take tenthousand words to validate it. It isas tempting to ecologists as it is toreformers in general to try topersuade others by way of thephotographic shortcut. But theessence of an argument cannot bephotographed: It must be presentedrationally — in words.That morality is system-sensitiveescaped the attention of mostcodifiers of ethic s in the past.“Thou shalt not…” is the form oftraditional ethical directives whichmake no allowance for particularcircumstances. The laws of oursociety follow the pattern of ancientethics, and therefore are poorlysuited to governing a complex,crowded, changeable world. Ourepicyclic solution is to augmentstatutory law with administrativelaw. Since it is practicallyimpossible to spell out all theconditions under which it is safe toburn trash in the back yard or to runan automobile without smog-control,by law we delegate the details tobureaus. The result is administrativelaw, which is rightly feared for anancient reason — Quis custodiesipsos custodes? — “Who shallwatch the watchers themselves?”John Adams said that we musthave “a government of laws andnot men.” Bureau administrators,trying to evaluate the morality ofacts in the total system, aresingularly liable to corruption,producing a government by men,not laws.Prohibition is easy to legislate(though not necessarily to enforce),but how do we legislatetemperance? Experience indicatesthat it can be accomplished bestthrough the mediation ofadministrative law. We limitpossibilities unnecessarily if wesuppose that the sentiment of Quiscustodiet denies us the use ofadministrative law. We shouldrather retain the phrase as aperpetual reminder of fearfuldangers we cannot avoid. The greatchallenge facing us now is to inventthe corrective feedbacks that areneeded to keep custodians honest.We must find ways to legitimate theneeded authority of both thecustodians and the correctivefeedbacks.Freedom to BreedIs IntolerableThe tragedy of the commons isinvolved in population problems inanother way. In a world governedsolely by the principle of “dog eatdog” — if indeed there ever wassuch a world — how many childrena family had would not be a matterof public concern. Parents whobred too exuberantly would leavefewer descendants, not more,because they would be unable tocare adequately for their children.David Lack and others have foundthat such a negative feedbackdemonstrably controls the fecundityof birds. 11 But men are not birds,and have not acted like them formillenniums, at least.If each human family weredependent only on its ownresources; if the children ofimprovident parents starved todeath; if, thus, overbreeding broughtits own “punishment” to the germline — then there would be nopublic interest in controlling thebreeding of families. But oursociety is deeply committed to thewelfare state, 12 and hence isconfronted with another aspect ofthe tragedy of the commons.In a welfare state, how shall wedeal with the family, the religion, therace, or the class (or indeed anydistinguishable and cohesive group)that adopts overbreeding as a policyto secure its ownaggrandizement? 13 To couple theconcept of freedom to breed withthe belief that everyone born has anequal right to the commons is tolock the world into a tragic courseof action.Unfortunately this is just thecourse of action that is beingpursued by the United Nations. Inlate 1967, some 30 nations agreedto the following 14 :The Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights describes thefamily as the natural andfundamental unit of society.It follows that any choiceand decision with regard tothe size of the family mustirrevocably rest with thefamily itself, and cannot bemade by anyone else.It is painful to have to denycategorically the validity of thisright; denying it, one feels asuncomfortable as a resident ofSalem, Massachusetts, who deniedthe reality of witches in theseventeenth century. At the presenttime, in liberal quarters, somethinglike a taboo acts to inhibit criticis mof the United Nations. There is afeeling that the United Nations is“our last and best hope,” that weshouldn’t find fault with it; weshouldn’t play into the hands of thearchconservatives. However, let usnot forget what Robert LouisStevenson said: “The truth that is31

Fall 2001T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTsuppressed by friends is thereadiest weapon of the enemy.” Ifwe love the truth we must openlydeny the validity of the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, eventhough it is promoted by the UnitedNations. We should also join withKingsley Davis 15 in attempting toget Planned Parenthood-WorldPopulation to see the error of itsways in embracing the same tragicideal.Conscience IsSelf-EliminatingIt is a mistake to think that wecan control the breeding of mankindin the long run by an appeal toconscience. Charles Galton Darwinmade this point when he spoke onthe centennial of the publication ofhis grandfather’s great book. Theargument is straightforward andDarwinian.People vary. Confronted withappeals to limited breeding, somepeople will undoubtedly respond tothe plea more than others. Thosewho have more children willproduce a larger fraction of thenext generation than those withmore susceptible cons ciences. Thedifference will be accentuated,generation by generation.In C. G. Darwin’s words: “Itmay well be that it would takehundreds of generations for theprogenitive instinct to develop in thisway, but if it should do so, naturewould have taken her revenge, andthe variety Homo contracipienswould become extinct and would bereplaced by the variety Homoprogenitivus.” 16The argument assumes thatconscience or the desire forchildren (no matter which) ishereditary — but hereditary only inthe most general formal sense. Theresult will be the same whether theattitude is transmitted through germcells or exosomatically, to use A. J.Lotka’s term. (If one denies thelatter possibility as well as theformer, then what’s the point ofeducation?) The argument here hasbeen stated in the context of thepopulation problem, but it appliesequally well to any instance inwhich society appeals to anindividual exploiting a commons torestrain himself for the generalgood — by means of hisconscience. To make such anappeal is to set up a selectivesystem that works toward theelimination of conscience from therace.Pathogenic Effectsof ConscienceThe long-term effects ofconscience should be enough tocondemn it; but serious short-termdisadvantages exist as well. If weask a man who is exploiting acommons to desist “in the name ofconscience,” what are we sayingto him? What does he hear? —not only at the moment but also inthe wee hours of the night when,half asleep, he remembers notmerely the words we used butalso the nonverbal communicationcues we gave him unawares?Sooner or later, consciously orsubconsciously, he senses that hehas received two communications,and that they are contradictory: (i)(intended communication) “If youdon’t do as we ask, we will openlycondemn you for not acting like aresponsible citizen”; (ii) (theunintended communication) “If youdo behave as we ask, we willsec retly condemn you for asimpleton who can be shamed intostanding aside while the rest of usexploit the commons.”Every man then is caught inwhat Bateson has called a “doublebind.” Bateson and his co-workershave made a plausible case forviewing the double bind as animportant causative factor in thegenesis of schizophrenia. 17 Thedouble bind may not always be sodamaging, but it always endangersthe mental health of anyone to“Those who havemore children willproduce a largerfraction of the nextgeneration thanthose with moresusceptibleconsciences. Thedifference will beaccentuated,generation bygeneration.”whom it is applied. “A badconscience,” said Nietzsche, “is akind of illness.”To conjure up a conscience inothers is tempting to anyone whowishes to extend his control beyondthe legal limits. Leaders at thehighest level suc cumb to thistemptation. Has any Presidentduring the past generation failed tocall on labor unions to moderatevoluntarily their demands for higher32

Fall 2001T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTwages, or to steel companies tohonor voluntary guidelines onprices? I can recall none. Therhetoric used on such occasions isdesigned to produce feelings of guiltin non-cooperators.For centuries it was assumedwithout proof that guilt was avaluable, perhaps even anindispensable, ingredient of civilizedlife. Now, in this post-Freudianworld, we doubt it.Paul Goodman speaks from themodern point of view when he says:“No good has ever come fromfeeling guilty, neither intelligence,policy, nor compassion. The guiltydo not pay attention to the objectbut only to themselves, and noteven to their own interests, whichmight make sense, but to theiranxieties.” 18One does not have to be aprofessional psychiatrist to see theconsequences of anxiety. We in theWestern World are just emergingfrom a dreadful two-centuries-longDark Ages of Eros that wassustained partly by prohibition laws,but perhaps more effectively by theanxiety-generating mechanisms ofeducation. Alex Comfort has toldthe story well in The AnxietyMakers 19 ; it is not a pretty one.Since proof is difficult, we mayeven concede that the results ofanxiety may sometimes, fromcertain points of view, be desirable.The larger question we should askis whether, as a matter of policy,we should ever encourage the useof a technique the tendency (if notthe intention) of which ispsychologically pathogenic. Wehear much talk these days ofresponsible parenthood; the coupledwords are incorporated into thetitles of some organizations devotedto birth control. Some people haveproposed massive propagandacampaigns to instill respons ibilityinto the nation’s (or the world’s)breeders. But what is the meaningof the word “responsibility” in thiscontext? Is it not merely a synonymfor the word “conscience?” Whenwe use the word “responsibility” inthe absence of substantialsanctions, are we not trying tobrowbeat a free man in a commonsinto acting against his own interest?Responsibility is a verbal counterfeitfor a substantial quid pro quo. It isan attempt to get something fornothing.If the word “responsibility” is tobe used at all, I suggest that it be inthe sense Charles Frankel uses it. 20“Responsibility,” says thisphilosopher, “is the product ofdefinite social arrangements.”Notice that Frankel calls for soc ialarrangements — not propaganda.Mutual CoercionMutually AgreedUponThe social arrangements thatproduce responsibility arearrangements that create coercion,of some sort. Consider bankrobbing.The man who takes moneyfrom a bank acts as if the bankwere a commons. How do weprevent such action? Certainly notby trying to control his behaviorsolely by a verbal appeal to hissense of responsibility. Rather thanrely on propaganda we followFrankel’s lead and insist that a bankis not a commons; we seek thedefinite social arrangements thatwill keep it from becoming acommons. That we will therebyinfringe on the freedom of would-berobbers we neither deny nor regret.The morality of bank-robbing isparticularly easy to understandbecause we accept completeprohibition of this activity. We arewilling to say, “Thou shalt not robbanks,” without providing forexceptions. But temperance alsocan be created by coercion. Taxingis a good coercive device. To keepdowntown shoppers temperate intheir use of parking space weintroduce parking meters for shortperiods, and traffic fines for longerones. We need not actually forbid acitizen to park as long as he wantsto; we need merely to make itincreasingly expensive for him to doso. Not prohibition, but carefullybiased options are what we offerhim. A Madison Avenue man mightcall this persuasion; I prefer thegreater candor of the wordcoercion.Coercion is a dirty word to mostliberals now, but it need not foreverbe so. As with the four-letterwords, its dirtiness can be cleansedaway by exposure to the light, bysaying it over and over withoutapology or embarrassment. Tomany, the word coercion impliesarbitrary decisions of distant andirresponsible bureaucrats; but this isnot a necessary part of its meaning.The only kind of coercion Irecommend is mutual coercion,mutually agreed upon by themajority of the people affected.To say that we mutually agreeto coercion is not to say that we arerequired to enjoy it, or even topretend we enjoy it. Who enjoystaxes? We all grumble about them.But we accept compulsory taxesbecause we recognize that33

Fall 2001T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTvoluntary taxes would favor theconscienceless. We institute and(grumblingly) support taxes andother coercive devices to escapethe horrors of the commons.An alternative to the commonsneed not be perfectly just to bepreferable. With real estate andother material goods, the alternativewe have chosen is the institution ofprivate property coupled with legalinheritance. Is this system perfectlyjust? As a genetically trainedbiologist I deny that it is. It seems tome that, if there are to bedifferences in individual inheritance,legal possession should be perfectlycorrelated with biologicalinheritance — that those who arebiologically more fit to be thecustodians of property and powershould legally inherit more. Butgenetic recombination continuallymakes a mockery of the doctrine of“like father, like son” implicit in ourlaws of legal inheritance. An idiotcan inherit millions, and a trust fundcan keep his estate intact. We mustadmit that our legal system ofprivate property plus inheritance isunjust — but we put up with itbecause we are not convinced, atthe moment, that anyone hasinvented a better system. Thealternative of the commons is toohorrifying to contemplate. Injusticeis preferable to total ruin.It is one of the peculiarities ofthe warfare between reform andthe status quo that it is thoughtlesslygoverned by a double standard.Whenever a reform measure isproposed it is often defeated whenits opponents triumphantly discovera flaw in it. As Kingsley Davis haspointed out, 21 worshipers of thestatus quo sometimes imply that noreform is possible withoutunanimous agreement, animplication contrary to historicalfact. As nearly as I can make out,automatic rejection of proposedreforms is based on one of twounconscious assumptions: (i) thatthe status quo is perfect; or (ii) thatthe choice we face is betweenreform and no action; if theproposed reform is imperfect, wepresumably should take no action atall, while we wait for a perfectproposal.But we can never do nothing.That which we have done forthousands of years is also action. Italso produces evils. Once we areaware that the status quo is action,we can then compare itsdiscoverable advantages anddisadvantages with the predictedadvantages and disadvantages ofthe proposed reform, discounting asbest we can for the lack ofexperience. On the basis of such acomparison, we can make a rationaldecision which will not involve theunworkable assumption that onlyperfect systems are tolerable.Recognitionof NecessityPerhaps the simplest summaryof this analysis of man’s populationproblems is this: The commons, ifjustifiable at all, is justifiable onlyunder conditions of low-populationdensity. As the human populationhas increased, the commons hashad to be abandoned in one aspectafter another.First we abandoned thecommons in food gathering,enclosing farm land and restrictingpastures and hunting and fishingareas. These restric tions are stillnot complete throughout the world.Somewhat later we saw that thecommons as a place for wastedisposal would have to beabandoned. Restrictions on thedisposal of domestic sewage arewidely accepted in the WesternWorld; we are still struggling toclose the commons to pollution byautomobiles, factories, insecticidesprayers, fertilizing operations, andatomic energy installations.In a still more embryonic state isour recognition of the evils of thecommons in matters of pleasure.There is almost no restriction on thepropagation of sound waves in thepublic medium. The shopping publicis assaulted with mindless music,without its consent. Ourgovernment is paying out billions ofdollars to create supersonictransport which will disturb fiftythousand people for every oneperson who is whisked from coastto coast three hours faster.Advertisers muddy the airwaves ofradio and television and pollute theview of travelers. We are a longway from outlawing the commonsin matters of pleasure. Is thisbecause our Puritan inheritancemakes us view pleasure assomething of a sin, and pain (that is,the pollution of advertising) as thesign of virtue?Every new enclosure of thecommons involves the infringementof somebody’s personal liberty.Infringements made in the distantpast are accepted because nocontemporary complains of a loss.It is the newly proposedinfringements that we vigorouslyoppose; cries of “rights” and“freedom” fill the air. But whatdoes “freedom” mean? When men34

Fall 2001T HE S OCIAL C ONTRACTmutually agreed to pass lawsagains t robbing, mankind becamemore free, not less so. Individualslocked into the logic of thecommons are free only to bring onuniversal ruin; once they see thenecessity of mutual coercion, theybecome free to pursue other goals.I believe it was Hegel who said,“Freedom is the recognition ofnecessity.”The most important aspect ofnecessity that we must nowrecognize, is the necessity ofabandoning the commons inbreeding. No technical solution canrescue us from the misery ofoverpopulation. Freedom to breedwill bring ruin to all. At the moment,to avoid hard decisions many of usare tempted to propagandize forconscience and responsibleparenthood. The temptation must beresisted, because an appeal toindependently acting consciencesselects for the disappearance of allconscience in the long run, and anincrease in anxiety in the short.The only way we can preserveand nurture other and moreprecious freedoms is byrelinquishing the freedom to breed,and that very soon. “Freedom is therecognition of necess ity” — and itis the role of education to reveal toall the necessity of abandoning thefreedom to breed. Only so, can weput an end to this aspect of thetragedy of the commons. NOTES1. J. B. Wiesner and H. F. York, Sci.Amer. 211 (No. 4), 27 (1964).2. G. Hardin, J. Hered. 50, 68 (1959); S.vonHoernor, Science 137, 18 (1962).3. J. von Newmann and O. Morgenstern,Theory of Games andEconomic Behavior (PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton, N.J.,1947), p.11.4. J. H. Fremlin. New Sci. No. 415(1964), p.285.5. A. Smith. The Wealth of Nations(Modern Library, N.Y. 1937) p.423.6. W. F. Lloyd, Two Lectures on theChecks to Population (OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, England,1833), reprinted (in part) inPopulation, Evolution, and BirthControl, G. Hardin, Ed. (Freeman, SanFrancisco, 1964, p.37.7. A. N. Whitehead, Science and theModern World (Mentor, New York,1948), p.17.8. G. Hardin, Ed. Population,Evolution, and Birth Control,(Freeman, San Francisco, 1964), p.56.9. S. McVay, Sci. Amer. 216 (No. 8), 13(1966).10. J. Fletcher, Situation Ethics,(Westminster, Philadelphia, 1966).11. D. Lack, The Natural Regulationof Animal Numbers (Clarendon Press,Oxford, 1954).12. H. Girvetz, From Wealth toWelfare (Stanford University Press,Stanford, California, 1950.13. G. Hardin. Perspectives in Biologyand Medicine, 6, 366 (1963).14. U. Thant. International PlannedParenthood News, No. 168 (February1968), p.3.15. K. Davis, Science 158, 730 (1967).16. S. Tax, Ed., Evolution AfterDarwin (University of Chicago Press,Chicago, 1960) vol. 2, p.469.17. G. Bateson, D. D. Jackson, J. Haley,J. Weakland, Behav. Sci. 1, 251 (1956).18. P. Goodman, New York Review ofBooks, 10 (8), 22 (23 May 1968).19. A. Comfort, The Anxiety Makers(Nelson, London, 1967).20. C. Frankel, The Case for ModernMan (Harper, New York, 1955), p.203.21. J. D. Rolansky, Genetics and theFuture of Man (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1966), p.177.35