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Researchof national and sufficiently large local contingencyfunds to implement these plans rapidlyon a large scale. The lack of effective coordinationbetween district and national levelsmeant that these contingency plans did notform the basis of wider national and internationalresponses. As a result, internationalactors largely bypassed national structures ineach country. Since international actors alsolacked pre-existing emergency plans for collectivework, there was little consensus onthe balance to be struck in the emergencyresponse between preventive livelihoodsinterventions and food assistance.Capacity imbalances between foodand livelihoods programmingA key weakness was the lack of capacity forassessing, designing and implementing livelihoodsinterventions. Assessments were generallylacking the hard data that food assessmentswere able to provide to demonstratepotential life-saving impact. In addition, thereappear to have been significant delays inplanning for large-scale livestock relatedlivelihoods interventions. Many donors, especiallyin Kenya, felt that plans for de-stockingwere being submitted at a time when it wasno longer appropriate to intervene to acceleratelivestock off-take. Some agencies, particularlyinternational relief organisations, alsomentioned a lack of capacity to implementthese programmes. Both implementing agenciesand donors reported a dearth of innovativeapproaches: many claimed that the crisiswas so severe that less established programming,such as cash transfers, were too risky.However, well-designed and timely livelihoodsinterventions were possible whereagencies had longer-term programmes andan intimate understanding of the local context.Funding constraintsFunding for livelihoods interventions wasmuch lower than for food assistance. The difficultyof attracting donor funding for livelihoodsprojects was widely reported byhumanitarian agencies, with donors in returnindicating a lack of receptivity at headquartersto such interventions. This was reportedlydue to an overload of requests for non-foodresources globally, as well as a lack of contingencyfunding. Although the ConsolidatedAppeal for the Horn of Africa focused primarilyon non-food interventions, it was notlaunched until April 2006 and was, in anycase, critically under-funded.ConclusionEffective early warning does not ensure anadequate and timely response in slow onsetdisasters. Where agencies had a long-termpresence and were flexible in redeployingfunds earmarked for long-term activities,livelihoods interventions were implementedin a timely manner. It is essential that relevantnational preparedness plans are in place incontexts where vulnerability is chronic andwhere acute crises are likely to develop. Inorder for these plans to be effectively put intooperation, there must be investment innational capacity to implement emergencylivelihoods programming on a large scale.USAID in publicprivateallianceinitiativeSummary of published research 1The United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) established the publicprivatealliance initiative - the GlobalDevelopment Alliance (GDA) - approximatelyfour years ago. The initiative reflected the factthat over the past 30 years, resource flows fromthe United States (US) to the developing worldhad shifted from being predominantly government-led,to a situation where now 85% ofresources come from fixed capital investment,remittances and various forms of private funding.According to a recent article in OECDObserver, there are many examples of how theGDA has successfully forged partnershipsbetween the public and private sector.Under the GDA in Malawi, a non-governmentalorganisation (NGO) called ProjectPeanut Butter (PPB) teamed up with Nutriset toestablish a production facility for Ready to UseTherapeutic Food (RUTF). Nutriset donatedfinancing and shared its intellectual property,i.e. the recipe. USAID gave $130,000 to PPB tofinance the production facility and training ofMalawian staff. PPB and Nutriset providedcumulative funding and in-kind resourcesworth $450,000. Nutriset did not make a profit.The production facility uses local raw materialsand will soon have its capacity expanded. Otherexamples of successful partnership cited in thearticle include work with the Dutch company‘Royal Ahold’, which is one of the largest buyersof food in the world. As well as bringing itsknowledge of agricultural quality to the table,Royal Ahold co-funds projects with NGOs onthe ground in Ghana. The company has foundopportunities to encourage new businesses,such as cosmetic product lines from shea butter.USAID has contributed more than $2 million tothe alliance, which Royal Ahold has more thanmatched through cash contributions and technicalexpertise.There is also the Sustainable Forest ProductsGlobal Alliance with the Swedish firm Ikea,Home Depot and other large buyers of forestproducts to which USAID has contributed over$7.5 million since 2002. Alliance partners haveA malnourished childhelps herself to locallyprodued RUTF in Malawimore than matched this amount to the tune ofover $27.5 million in funding.GDA is, however, not the only governmentagency building alliances. In recent years, otherOECD countries have also become involved,e.g. GTZ, DFID and CIDA. In spite of the manysuccesses, the article highlights the fact thatthere are important lessons to learn from thisway of working.First, grant mechanisms rather than budgetsupport work best. Typically, USAID and privatepartners fund the implementing organisation,usually NGOs. Second, partnerships canboost aid effectiveness in some sectors. In agriculture,productivity appears to have beenenhanced by bringing market disciplines andexpertise about cultivation and quality standardsto bear.There are also lessons of warning. Partnersshare risk but do not make that risk disappear.Good projects have been known to comeunstuck late in the process because of suddenshortage of business funds. Also, there are lobbiesagainst partnerships seeing them as effortsto standardise global markets thereby creatinglosers, e.g. local farmers that do not make thecut. Partners, therefore, need to think abouthow farmers who do not meet productivityrequirements in particular markets can diversifyinto other agribusinesses, such as food processingand packaging, or even switch to otherareas such as tourism.1Runde. D (2006). How to make development partnershipswork. OECD Observer, No 255, May 2006, pp 35-37Mothers feeding theirchildren local RUTF,produced throughProject Peanut ButterM Manary, Malawi, 2003M Manary, Malawi, 20031Saving lives through livelihoods: critical gaps in theresponse to the drought in the Greater Horn of Africa. HPGbriefing note. May 20068