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Field ArticleS Roughneen, Dafur, 2006dence in NGO services, particularly in ruralareas. Caretakers become less willing to travelto the SFP site after a service interruption,resulting in high rates of programme default.The interruption also has a negative effect onthe growth and recovery of the child, especiallyduring periods of ongoing insecurity, whenthey may not receive supplementary food forsix weeks or more.GOAL nutrition worker Hawaida Tijaniexplains TFC rations for under-5s tomothersNutrition programmes are affected by interruptionsof other services as well. Medical serviceclosures can reduce the number of beneficiariesavailable for screening, lowering the programme’scoverage. Suspensions or delays ingeneral food distributions cause food to beshared among other family members, loweringcure rates.Reduced programme effectivenessMost agencies providing SFP and CTC servicesin Darfur report low levels of attainment ofinternational standards for feeding programmes.In the current context, achieving the acceptablecure rates of more than 70% and default rates ofless than 15% is extremely difficult.Although much of the conflict-affected populationis concentrated in IDP camps, mostlysituated near major towns, hundreds of thousandsof conflict-affected people are still livingin rural communities. It is these populationsthat are most difficult to reach with nutritionalservices (see table 1). Even under more stableconditions, nutrition programmes often haveproblems with caretakers defaulting due tolong distances between homes and services,poor understanding of the importance and purposeof feeding programmes, and seasonalmigration. In Darfur, all those problems exist aswell, but are compounded by the problem ofcaretakers who are often afraid to walk to SFPor CTC sites because of the threat of physicalviolence or harassment. In some areas ofDarfur, African Union (AU) peacekeepingforces escort people twice a week from localcommunities to the market, or guard women asthey collect firewood because the danger ofrape or physical attack is so high. Caretakersmay also have little confidence in the programmebecause the agency has previouslybeen absent. In short, the costs of attendingnutritional services often outweigh the perceivedbenefits.Risk of sudden programme closureOne of the biggest problems with providingnutritional services in insecure areas is the possibilityof a complete evacuation and abandonmentof services in the event of a large-scaleoutbreak of fighting. The agency will not onlylose capital assets, such as vehicles, computers,and office facilities, but less tangible resourcesas well, such as programme information andthe training that has been invested in local staff.The community being served will suddenly becut off from needed aid, and may be angry orresentful at the agency for pulling out, makingre-entry into an area more difficult if the securitysituation improves sufficiently to allow for it.Even smaller programme suspensions canpresent serious challenges to nutrition programmes.In December 2005, an attack on oneof GOAL’s key focal areas in West Darfurcaused a shutdown of services in the vicinity.Numerous local field-based staff fled with theirfamilies to distant villages, including nutritionoutreach workers. The food store located in thetown was abandoned, all supplies and foodcommodities lost. Approximately 10,000Darfurians were displaced to villages scatteredthroughout the area, including nearly 600 malnourishedchildren who were enrolled inGOAL’s SFP.A rapid response was essential to ensure thata nutritional crisis did not emerge. GOAL conductedsecurity assessments to determine thelocation of the majority of the new IDPs, andconducted rapid nutrition assessments withintwo weeks of the attack to determine where SFPservices could be moved in order to reach thegreatest number of displaced beneficiaries.An additional problem was locating missingstaff. In each village visited, sheikhs were askedto locate any displaced GOAL staff that hadrelocated to the area. The sheikhs were giventhe date and location of GOAL’s next visit sothat staff could receive pay and be returned towork in a new site if they so wished.Although SFP supplies and staff were availablein the area, the conflict was so disruptivethat providing health or nutrition services wasimpossible. However, in another scenario, itmay have been possible for SFP services to continuein this location, as all the required inputs– staff, food, and facilities – were already positionedin the field. Based on the lessons learnedfrom this experience, GOAL is planning to testthe option of self-sufficient field-based locationsin its programme in North Darfur so thatservices can be continued for a short time, evenif the location gets cut off from the programmebase by fighting.Strategies for dealing with insecurityDecentralising servicesDecentralising nutrition services allows for betteraccess into local communities, and, if suppliesand staffing are sufficient, can allow SFPand CTC services to continue even in the eventof a suspension of travel to the field.GOAL’s nutrition programme in Jebel Maraoperated out of one central hub, with four primaryprogramme centres. In each, a food storewas built to hold SFP supplies and food.Enough food was stored to cover at least twodistributions, or one month, of food. From eachof the programme hubs, two or three SFP siteswere served. Every two weeks, nutrition workerstravelled by car from the primary town inthe region. They stayed in secure overnightlocations, set up with bedding and shelters ineach of the four programme hubs, which werethen used as a base to provide SFP services tothe surrounding sites.Each programme hub was used as a base toserve 2-3 nearby SFP sites, and all sites wereserved during 3-4 day overnight visits. Thisstrategy increased the amount of time availableat each SFP distribution, allowing womenenough time to walk from their homes to theproject site. However, additional logistical andsecurity planning was required to ensure thatcommunication systems were in place and thatsupplies were pre-positioned and sufficient forthe whole stay.Overnight visits also increased the risk thatstaff could be stranded in a field location iffighting erupted between the field site and theprogramme base. This happened in January2006, when the base town of Golo was attacked,and staff working in the field had to be evacuatedby airlift. This underscored the importanceof good communication systems, clearlydefinedevacuation plans, and advance preparation– for example, one way to prepare forthis scenario is to identify potential helicopterlanding sites in all programme locations, andcollect GPS data for each site.Although it carries risks, the strategy ofdecentralising services could be taken one stepfurther, by hiring local nutrition staff, who arethen fully trained in providing SFP or CTCservices. In the case of Jebel Mara, field-basednutrition staff had already been identified, andSelma Abdullah of GOAL distributingTFC rations at Fata Borno Clinic/IDPCamp, north Darfurthe storage capacity for food commodities andsupplies was adequate. Caretakers kept theirregistration cards with them so record-keepingwas also decentralised.With additional training,the field-based nutrition staff could havecontinued SFP services even if the headquartersstaff were unable to reach the location.S Roughneen, Dafur, 200611