94 6 Intercompany Sale of Medical DevicesIn lieu of the CUP method, we designate USP as the tested party and utilize theresale price method. We consider this approach to be the best method, given ourfact pattern, principally because we are able to draw on internal resale margins. TheU.S. transfer pricing regulations clearly favor such internal data (for good reason),relative to resale margins reported by unrelated companies:[C]omparability under [the resale price] method is particularly dependent on similarityof functions performed, risks borne and contractual terms, or adjustments to account forthe effects of such differences. If possible, appropriate gross profit margins should bederived from comparable uncontrolled purchases and resales by the reseller involved in thecontrolled sale, because similar characteristics are more likely to be found among differentresales of property made by the same reseller than among sales made by other resellers. 5As noted, USP will function as a stocking distributor on products sourced fromFS, selling directly to end-users in the U.S. market (with the assistance of agents).As such, USP should earn its standardized U.S. stocking distributor discount of40%, before adjustments. To the extent that USP performs incremental marketingand minor re-engineering functions that U.S. stocking distributors do not typicallyperform, it should be reimbursed by FS. 6 Correspondingly, if USP carries proportionatelylarger inventories of FS’ products than USP’s independent U.S. stockingdistributors are generally expected to carry, USP should be compensated for theincremental carrying costs. Lastly, because USP will sell FS’ products under itsown name, the standard distributor margin should be increased to reflect the incomeattributable thereto.The U.S. transfer pricing regulations generally do not favor adjustments to resalemargins for differences in trademark values. 7 However, in this instance, we identifiedclosely comparable uncontrolled trademark licensing arrangements, involvingtrademarks that are similar to USP’s marks in terms of field of use, term, etc. Thissample indicates that USP’s trademark and name would command a royalty rate of2.0%–4.0% of net sales on an arm’s length basis. In keeping with the Commensuratewith Income standard, we take these arm’s length royalty rates to be a measure ofall income attributable to USP’s trademark and name (and, hence, the amount bywhich USP’s standardized distributor discount should be increased).5 Treas. Reg. Section 1.482-3(c)(3)(ii)(A).6 The U.S. services regulations promulgated in 1968, in combination with the Business JudgmentRule contained in the Temporary Regulations issued in 2006, jointly determine whether acost-based intercompany services fee is warranted in 2007 (unless a taxpayer elects to apply theTemporary Regulations in their entirety). Under these rules, a markup over cost for marketing andminor re-engineering services rendered on a small scale should not be required.7 Example 7 under Treas. Reg. Section 1.482-3(c)(4) has a similar fact pattern in some respects.In this example, three of five potentially comparable uncontrolled distributors are excluded fromthe sample of comparable firms, for purposes of applying the resale price method, because theydistribute unbranded widgets, while the controlled distributor at issue resells branded widgets. Therationale given for this sample selection criterion is that the products distributed by the excludedcompanies are not sufficiently similar in value to the products distributed by the controlled distributor.Moreover, “because in this case it is difficult to determine the effect the trademark will haveon price or profits, reliable adjustments for the differences cannot reliably be made.”
6.3 Analysis Under Existing Regime 95As noted, the subset of FS’ in-hospital patient monitoring devices and systemsthat USP will sell domestically over the next 1–2 years are already FDA-approved.Hence, adjustments for the costs of obtaining FDA approval for these products arenot necessary. However, as discussed above, FS’ limited offerings of outpatientproducts have not yet been approved by the FDA for sale in the United States. IfUSP does in fact import such products for resale in its domestic market, it shouldbe compensated by FS for facilitating the FDA review process. More particularly,if a third party Contract Research Organization (CRO) is engaged to conduct thenecessary clinical trials and prepare the requisite submissions to the FDA, thesecosts should be passed through to FS (without a markup). 8 However, if USP performsthese functions internally or devotes significant resources to overseeing anunaffiliated CRO, it should mark up its internal direct and indirect costs, in thatfacilitating FDA approval does, arguably, “contribute significantly to key competitiveadvantages, core capabilities or the fundamental chances of success or failurein one or more businesses” of the controlled group.6.3.2 USP’s Sales of Tangible Property to FSConsider next USP’s sales of monitoring devices to FS. The matrix below shows thecategories of such transactions that we analyze separately.=========================================================Products Mfg’d.Products Mfg’d.by Company Xby USP-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Products soldw/in Germany CASE A CASE B-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Products soldo/s Germany CASE C CASE D=========================================================6.3.2.1 Recommendations: Case AIn Case A above, USP outsources the manufacture of certain outpatient productsfor export to FS, which the latter resells in the German market. Our analysis of thiscase is based on the CUP method. As previously noted, USP has sold its outpatientdevices in foreign markets through independent distributors for a number of years.One such distributor was based in Germany (“Company Y”). (This relationship wasrecently terminated, pursuant to USP’s acquisition of FS.) FS will carry most of the8 In principle, FS could contract directly with a CRO, and would not be willing to pay a fee overand above the CRO’s standard fees on an arm’s length basis unless USP, acting as an intermediary,added significant value.