Contents - AL-Tax

Contents - AL-Tax Contents - AL-Tax

eduart0.tripod.com
from eduart0.tripod.com More from this publisher
11.07.2015 Views

20 3 Overview and Critique of Existing Transfer Pricing Methods3.2.4 Critique of Economic ReasoningAs previously discussed, there is no reason to expect gross margins or gross markupsto be equalized across firms, and, therefore, no good reason to compare an affiliateddistributor’s (or manufacturer’s) resale margin (or gross markup) with thecorresponding results reported by its unaffiliated counterparts. Therefore, as withthe CPM, the resale price and cost plus methods, as applied to external transactions,are not founded on valid economic principles.Absent suppliers’ manufacturing capacity constraints and the potential for pricediscrimination, comparisons of an individual distributor’s resale margins on productsourced from related and independent suppliers, respectively, makes a certainamount of sense. On an arm’s length basis, the distributor would source exclusivelyfrom the lowest cost supplier if its suppliers’ selling prices differed, thus forcingthem to charge the same price (or similar prices, in the case of similar products).Therefore, if the distributor cannot freely choose to price discriminate, and its customersdo not insist on different prices (where “price” encompasses co-op advertisingarrangements, volume discounts, etc.), it should earn similar resale marginsacross suppliers on an arm’s length basis. Similarly, an individual manufacturer producingsimilar products for related and independent customers will generally usethe same facilities (and, therefore, the same or similar manufacturing technologiesand processes), absent dedicated production lines. If the manufacturer cannot freelychoose to price discriminate, and its customers would not insist on different pricesat arm’s length, it should earn similar gross markups across customers on an arm’slength basis. Such internal comparisons do not depend on theoretical concepts ofmarket equilibrium (although certain market structure assumptions are implicit),but rather, the profit-maximizing behavior of a single firm.However, as a practical matter, the circumstances that permit such internal comparisonsare relatively unlikely to arise. If we do not require internal arm’s lengthtransactions to take place in the same geographic market as the parallel intercompanytransactions, price discrimination will often be feasible. Most geographicmarkets are segmented to one degree or another, and both demand and supply conditionsin individual markets will likely differ. For obvious reasons, this possibilityundermines the reliability of comparisons across geographic markets. Conversely,if we require the transactions being compared to take place in the same geographicmarket, the fact patterns permitting internal comparisons will rarely arise. Manufacturersare unlikely to sell to both affiliated and unaffiliated distributors in the samegeographic market, because doing so would undermine the affiliated distributor.The same reasoning applies to distributors sourcing from affiliated and independentsuppliers (unless affiliated suppliers are capacity-constrained, usually a temporarystate of affairs). Moreover, price discrimination within geographic markets may takeplace: Large merchandisers possess considerable market power in certain markets(notably, the United States) and routinely negotiate exceptionally favorable pricingarrangements with their suppliers. Stated differently, large retailers often havethe power to impose certain advantageous forms of price discrimination on theirsuppliers.

3.2 Resale Price and Cost Plus Methods 21There are certain instances in which internal comparisons may be feasible. Forexample, an affiliated distributor may be appointed in place of a predecessor unaffiliateddistributor in a particular geographic market, seek to round out its productofferings by sourcing from related and unrelated suppliers, or make a strategic decisionto dual-source. An affiliated manufacturer may seek to reach different typesof customers in the same geographic market, or the same types of customers indifferent locales, and employ both affiliated and independent distributors to theseends. However, in many of these instances, comparisons of resale margins or grossmarkups will still not be valid. If an affiliated distributor is stepping into the shoesof an unaffiliated predecessor, it may incur start-up costs. If an affiliated distributordual-sources as a matter of course, it may be doing so in part to limit its exposureto country-specific risks (e.g., strikes, natural disasters, political instability, etc.).Therefore, its affiliated and independent suppliers will probably not operate in thesame geographic market. If a manufacturer sells to both affiliated and unaffiliateddistributors in the same geographic market, they in turn will likely sell to distinctcustomer bases (e.g., large discount chains and small independent companies), andobtain different volume discounts or otherwise insist on different purchase prices,consistent with their disparate selling costs.3.2.5 Summary and Practical ImplicationsIn sum, comparisons of an individual distributor’s resale margins or an individualmanufacturer’s gross markups on internal transactions with related and unrelatedparties, respectively, are valid in certain hypothetical circumstances, but are rarelyfeasible in practice. Comparisons of resale margins or gross markups across firmshave the same shortcomings as comparisons of accounting rates of return, operatingmarkups, and other accounting measures of performance.As previously noted, both IRS agents in the field and IRS personnel in theNational Office hold prospective comparable companies to a higher standard ofcomparability than the U.S. regulations themselves would seem to require underboth the resale price and the cost plus methods. As a result, U.S. firms and the IRSuse these methods very sparingly. On the other hand, the OECD Guidelines looksubstantially more favorably on these transactions-based methods than the CPMand TNMM, and favor internal comparable uncontrolled transactions over externalcomparable uncontrolled transactions. The aforementioned series of Draft IssueNotes released by the OECD’s Center for Tax Policy and Administration reiteratethe OECD’s negative view of the CPM and TNMM, insofar as they entail “mechanicalcomparisons of financial indicia.”Just as there is no reason to expect close correlations in accounting rates ofreturn, gross margins and gross markups across firms, there is no compelling reasonto believe that two unafffiliated companies with similar accounting rates of returnwill also have similar gross margins or gross markups. Hence, if OECD membercountries apply the resale price and/or cost plus methods to the same intercompany

3.2 Resale Price and Cost Plus Methods 21There are certain instances in which internal comparisons may be feasible. Forexample, an affiliated distributor may be appointed in place of a predecessor unaffiliateddistributor in a particular geographic market, seek to round out its productofferings by sourcing from related and unrelated suppliers, or make a strategic decisionto dual-source. An affiliated manufacturer may seek to reach different typesof customers in the same geographic market, or the same types of customers indifferent locales, and employ both affiliated and independent distributors to theseends. However, in many of these instances, comparisons of resale margins or grossmarkups will still not be valid. If an affiliated distributor is stepping into the shoesof an unaffiliated predecessor, it may incur start-up costs. If an affiliated distributordual-sources as a matter of course, it may be doing so in part to limit its exposureto country-specific risks (e.g., strikes, natural disasters, political instability, etc.).Therefore, its affiliated and independent suppliers will probably not operate in thesame geographic market. If a manufacturer sells to both affiliated and unaffiliateddistributors in the same geographic market, they in turn will likely sell to distinctcustomer bases (e.g., large discount chains and small independent companies), andobtain different volume discounts or otherwise insist on different purchase prices,consistent with their disparate selling costs.3.2.5 Summary and Practical ImplicationsIn sum, comparisons of an individual distributor’s resale margins or an individualmanufacturer’s gross markups on internal transactions with related and unrelatedparties, respectively, are valid in certain hypothetical circumstances, but are rarelyfeasible in practice. Comparisons of resale margins or gross markups across firmshave the same shortcomings as comparisons of accounting rates of return, operatingmarkups, and other accounting measures of performance.As previously noted, both IRS agents in the field and IRS personnel in theNational Office hold prospective comparable companies to a higher standard ofcomparability than the U.S. regulations themselves would seem to require underboth the resale price and the cost plus methods. As a result, U.S. firms and the IRSuse these methods very sparingly. On the other hand, the OECD Guidelines looksubstantially more favorably on these transactions-based methods than the CPMand TNMM, and favor internal comparable uncontrolled transactions over externalcomparable uncontrolled transactions. The aforementioned series of Draft IssueNotes released by the OECD’s Center for <strong>Tax</strong> Policy and Administration reiteratethe OECD’s negative view of the CPM and TNMM, insofar as they entail “mechanicalcomparisons of financial indicia.”Just as there is no reason to expect close correlations in accounting rates ofreturn, gross margins and gross markups across firms, there is no compelling reasonto believe that two unafffiliated companies with similar accounting rates of returnwill also have similar gross margins or gross markups. Hence, if OECD membercountries apply the resale price and/or cost plus methods to the same intercompany

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!