ABBOTTS. RIPTON '. - The Railways Archive

T& REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY, 

HELD IN PURSUANCE OF ORDER OF THE BOARD OF TRADE, 

. DATED THE BUD JANUABY 1876, 

lNT0 THE CIECUMST~CES AlTENDIAG THE DOUBLE COLLI5ION ON THE 

GREAT NORTHEEN RAILWAY 

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wmc~ ~WRED AT 

ABBOTTS. RIPTON '. 

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On the 2lst January 1876. 

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LONDON: 

pRlNTED Bfil GEORGE EDWaRD EYRE AND W$LUM .WOT"l'ISW001)E, . ' 

- . + I ' R ~ ~ 

THE QUREN'S MOW IcXCI'RLlrWNT MAJWY. . 

FOll RER UAJEbTY'S BTATIONERY O~ICE. 

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THE..REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY 

lIECD IN PUnSUANCE OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF TRADE, DATED THE 

7 2 2 JAN~JABY ~ ~ 1876, INN +RE CIRCUhtSTANCES ATTENDING THE 

Double Collision on the Great Northern Railway which occurred 

at Abbotts Ripton on the 2lst January 1876. 

L Board of fiade, 

(Railway Departmmt,) 

SIR, Whitehull, 23d February 1876. 

IN compliance with 'the instructions contained in the Order of the 22d January, 

l have now the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, the result 

of the public inquiry into the circumstances which attended the double collision thut 

occurred on the 21st Jai~uary. at Abbotts-Ripton, on the Great-Northern Railway. 

This inquiry was -held at Peterborou h, under the ItsiIways Regulation Act of 1871, 

34 & 3? Vict. c;.% ss. 7 and 8, with tfe assistance of Mr. C. S. L. hwen, barristerat-law, 

and extended from the 24th January to the 17th February, during which time 

four sitting8 %re: held, and 46 witnesses were eximined. The Town-Hall and New- 

(Courts-Hall were kindly placed at our disposal, and we are indebted to the c0urtes.v of 

Mr. Gaches, the town-clerk of Peterborough. 

In this case the Scotch-express passehger-train, due to leave Peterborough for Loudon 

at 6.18 p.m., and consisting of an engine and tender and 10 vehicies, came into collision, 

whilst approaching the Abbotts-Ripton signal-cabin at full speed, and with the steam 

still on, with a coal-train due to leave Peterborough in front of it at 5.35 pm., which, 

having left Peterborough at 5.53, was being shunted out of its way into the Abbotts- 

Ripton siding. The down-main-line having become obutmcted by the ,&b& from thi.~ 

first collision, the Leeds-and-York express passenger-train, 5.30 p.m. from London, after 

passing Huntingdon at 6.59 pm., came into col1ision;first with the tender and ahrwards 

w~th certain damaged carriages of the Scotch-express-train. . 

Thirteen passengers have unfortunately lost their lives in consequence of these collisions, 

and up to the present time 53 additional passengers have been ascertained 

to be more or less injured. The engine-driver, fireman, and head-guard of the Scotchexpress-trsin, 

and the engine-driver and fireman and frontguard of the Leeds-expresstrain, 

were A130 injured. 

The accompanying plan and section of the line, which Mr. Johnson, the engineer of 

the Railway Cornpan?, haa been good enough to furnish, will give an excellent idea, not 

only of the positions of the stations and cabins principally referred to, with their signals, 

and the.gradients on which they are situated, but also of the results of the collisions; and 

a further description of the localities will be found in the evidence of Mr. Johnson, which 

with the other evidence was taken during the inquiry as follows :- 

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. . ~ e n c e , 

Rkllrard Joitum (worn). I m the Engineer of the 

Great Northern Wwa and have been so for 144 

yews. The ruling &rnt betareen Peterhoro' aod 

Huntiogdon is 1 in 200. Commencing Emm nuntiugdon 

them is first a gradient of 1 in 200 for three 

miles, then the line is level for th~ee-pusrte~n of a 

mile, e,nd then for one mile south.of Abbotta Ripton 

sigud-station the line falls 1 in 200 to~vards the 

north 88 far W four miles beyond the signal-cabin. 

l+om the foot of that gradient the line is level for 

41 miles tllmugh Holmo E'en; it then rises up to 

$hey signd station for a mile 1 in 200, and thence 

,to I~otcrboro', a* miles, the line is nearly level. The 

Abbous Ripton signaleobin i. st a point 63 miles 

35 ehios f'mm' London; tha-aorth distant-signal is 

950 yards, and the nouth-distant-nignd 1,057 yards 

flom the din ; the north home-signal is 140 pards 

and the south home-signal 145 ynrds, fmm the cabin. 

(There are also star@-signals in each direetion, the 

8tartingsignnl at one ond'being in each ease on the 

post applying to the home-signal at the other end.) 

They am aomsphoresipals of the ordinary construe 

tion. At Abbotts Ripton siggsi-station there are up 

and down ehuntiq-sidinge, and the pinta leading to 

and from those sidings are worked by a signalman 

by mems of levers in his cabin. Thosepint-leven, 

are interlocked with the signal-levers. The levers 

are so interlocked that the points eannot be opened 

to oommnnicnte between the siding and the main-line 

unlw the sigmln are at "dnnger." Time is s crew 

over rand htween the two main-lines nppasitz to tho 

cabin, the pointa of which aro similarly iiteloeked 

38474. 7. 

A 2

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with the signale. (There are nlso block-telegraphinstruments 

for each direction, and n double-needle 

spenking-instrnment) On the northof AhhttsRipton 

there is n eahin called Wocd Walton, at n d:stancc of 

I mil. 1,376 yards; it is provided wit11 up nnd down 

distantsignnls, 950 ynrds from tho cabin in ench 

direction, and.wit1~ a, donblc home-signal, which nets 

hr both lincq 20 yards north of the cnhin. The 

Conington signal-cabin is 2 miles 132 yardsnorth of put in. .I put in nlso the working time table, con 

Wood Walton, nt the foot of the above 1 in 200 ing regulntions as to tl~c londs and brcnk poyr to 

gmlicnt. It is ximilar to the Wow1 Waltoo ahin provided. I also put in instructions for signalling 

ns m&s the signal nmngcmcnts, and they nro both fast trains by elcctric telcggph; also specid q&,tid 

provi&xl with telqraph-block-instmments and belle. for working during fan und snowstorm& With refpr 

At the Holme ststion, I mile 1,667 yn~ls on the norih cnce to the hlock~wo~king, the 

of the Conington whin, there is a signdabin with n other trains, is tcle,mphed from b 

locking-fmme of 30 1cwu.s. nnd the whole of thc cabin; and nrter itsdepnrturcfmm t 

win& nod sign& in the neigbhurbood of Holmc no other trnin should benllcwed to 

station arc worked from this cobin. With the line of rails until it hnr reached 

cxception.of the sigods.on thc aorth of the Hohc nhcad, nnd telcgrnphic informati 

signal-eabin, which enn only he 6ccn when the man been hansmiUcd bnek to the blc 

opens the window and puts his head out for the This system of working is in 

purpose, they are all visible fmm the cnhin in clear whether pnsscnger, goods, m' 

wcnthcr. The next signal-cabin sonth of Abbotts The cad trnin leaving @ood 

Riptoe-is Stukeley. 2 miles 737 ya& fmm it., There Abbtts Ripton would he protcc 

are home nnd distant-siignals in both direction% The until ic was on the wth side 

up distant-signnl is 910 yards fmm the cabin, and the Ahbotts Ripton, nud was under 

down distant-signd 850 ynrds from, it. The home- signal. Io addition to the gene 

signal post in 87 yards south of iho signal-eabiii. durilig fogg or snowy weather 

These aigoale arc iilsibk from the eahin iu both be given until a train or enzine 

direction!. There nre block-telcpph-instruments hns either proccedcd on 

and bells in this eabin similar to those in the W 4 intoa siding; hut in 

eing opened mon Tor tnrtlic, and inquired of thow 

M y on the spot whether thew w ~ s reaaon Is 

beliere that nny who were passengers in the tmn 

were still under the wrecked wtrriogw. About thnt 

time I met Mr. Johnson, who h~g given cridenm; 

we looked very carefully nt the spot where it as 

evident that at least two carringev lnd ben broken 

up in the follisiin. We ore told that vcry soon 

after the collision took place threc bodies hnd hen 

removed, nod we felt, each remnfking to the other, 

that there must he other pcaengers there We hnd 

at thnt time closed the Iinc against trnffic; nnd the 

Inrge stuff of men who hnd arrived from I'ctcrboro', 

Hitehin, nnd clsewhero, aqd who had nlre.ady wmord 

severs1 broken vchiclq were eonmntmxtd un I h t 

spot. After that, Mr. Johnson nnd I went to*.cthcr 

to the signnl-lmr, and found tho locking-hme in the 

stnte clcwrihed by Mr. Johnson. The only rtntemeut 

mde by Mr. Johnsnn which is not quite conrrt is n8 

- to the numlrer of the wngzons in the CM~ tn~in. 

Them wrc 33 in all, and cithcr two or three v4~iell 

were unmjuml lmnd Iq my instructions been moved 

south of the signal-box, and, in the clnrkuesn, these 

wonld not bc.observcd by Mr. Johown. Exccpt ns 

to that, the evidence I henrd given is correct. Seven 

more lmsengcra wels tnken from onder the cnrringes, 

rod this prcccnted me from examining the stuk of 

the signals. The uight of Fridny, the 2lst Jnnun~y, 

wM one of the wildest 1 hnve known, with sleet and 

snow nnd fmst, and I believe the snow to hnve been 

nt I mt four iochos deep nt the ti~nc. 

Joseplr Bray (sworn). I nm an enginedriver in the 

service of the G mt Northern Railmy Compnny, nnd 

hnvc hen so forseven or oight yenre. 1 left New Eng- 

ldnd on the 21et Janunry at 5.53 1o.m. with nn en$ne 

and tender, 33 wagonaof a, 11. nnd a break-van.. 1 wns 

due to leovc at 5.35. My engine wnu n littlc late out 

of the shed nflcr mshing out, and I wns nlso turd 

tho wrong any in starting in the first instnnm, nnd NIL9 

so lntc in getting nwny. I mn nt my usud spcd 

fmm New Engl~nd to l'ctorboro'. nnd so on to Abbot.ta 

Ripton. I found tl~e signnls all showing white lights 

np to ancl including the distnnt.si,rmnl from Ahlwtts 

Ripton. I (lid not see the homesignal from Abbot- 

Ripten; owing, I snppose, to the snow nnd smoke in 

the cutting. It wns snowing very hard ns I renchnl 

Abbotta Ripton. I cxj,eeted thnt my train wonld 

la shunted nt Ahbotb Ripton for the cxpmsm to 

pnnq so I looked out for thc signal cabin. I snw the 

signnlmsh wnving me on 'wlth his hnnd-lump, nnd 

lc gnve me to understand that I wm to nhunt into 

the siding. I said to him, Whnt is it, Bobby 7" nnd 

he mid, Siding." Whilst I was sitting bnck into 

the siding la mid to me, '' O+me on back ; look 

~1u11.p ; you R1.3 stopping the cxprc%" As 800ll ns he 

bml wid those words t.hc expms mn into me. The 

&a MW me in that train. We had not then reachad 

the distant-signal. We then went to Huntingdon. 

I saw a red-light nt the advanced signnl nt Abbot- 

Ripton, which NW the only rod light thnt I snw on 

n signal-pt betwecn Potcrlmm' and tiuntirrgdon. 

I heliew I renchcd Ablatts Ripton nt 6.47 p.~r. 

The \rc+er wns very had whcn I left New Englnnd. 

T hd no orders for shunting at Holm. If the 

,Scotch trnin had hccn punctual the rig,udtnnn at 

Iiolnle wonld llnvc shuntnl me there, as I W% 18 

minutes late. I noticcd thnt the Holmc signnls 

shoral whits lights nt tho home, distant, and stwting 

1wsts. I m t my firemnn nwny with fog-sign& boforc 

Mr. Urhcr cnnoe to my endnc ; and ps swn as I had 

rocovclr~l myself nikr the vhock of the fiwt collision, 

I asked him, whcn I picked him up, whethcr hc hml 

put doan the fog-signals, nnd he snid " Yes." I erw 

the driver of the down-cxprcss shut OR his rtcnm, 

md I tlionght he did so in msrvcr to my n11u.m. 

Erlwrrrrrl Fuulk~tcr (sworn). I nno n tin:mnn ia the 

Grent Northcrn Compnny's service, and 1,ni.e hm W 

for fire yenrs. I left NCN Englnnd 011 thc 21st 

.January, with Brny m engiocdrirer. l did not 

notice the timc of ntnrring or of reaching Ahlmtls 

Riptan. I saw U white light at the Holmc distant- 

signnl in pusing. I saw whits aignnls nt all the 

posta nt Cwington nud at Wual WiJ1011. The 

disumt-signnl from Abbotta Ripton showed n white 

light; I did not look for the home-signal there. 

Umny celled to the signalmun to ask whether the 

signals were or, nod the signnlmnn snid, "Dnrw 

up nnd shunt." We drew up, to the starting 

signal, which showed a littlc speek of red light 

when we got up to it. The glnss wns a,veml with 

snow. The slgnnlmnu erne to the window, nnd snid 

to Bhy ann me, "Come on back, you n~r: stopping 

the trniu at the other box;" and W soon as hc had 

mid the words the expreas pitched into us direetJr. 

The cnpino wns knocked forward a fen ynnls, nnd I 

remained on it. I rcm~ered myself iu thrdc or-four 

minute, and then went to the tenderbox, ancl took 

uut two fog-signnls, nnd went on with them towards 

Ifnntingdon nt the request of my. d~ivcr. l ran 

forwnrd to the distunl-signnl, nnd put down tho two 

fog-sigods about 50 ynrcls inside of it, and rtturned 

to meet my engine which I snw coming totvards me. 

I got on the cndnc, and we hnd just cot into mot.io6 

asin, when I diw the cxprw c&o; nnd pm over 

the fog+ipnls I had put down. I did not henr them 

explocle, hot I enw fire from then ay the cnrrinc mused 

. ovEr thkm. I uaw the driver of the exp& sl;lot olF 

stem just beforo he p~uisxl our enginc. .I don't 

know cxnctly whers our engiut: was on rile l$e at 

that timc The signals nll the wuy to Auntingdoo, 

crccpt the home-signal nenr the bridge at Huntingdon, 

NCro OK 

bxpraw-cnginc atruck the fourth, fifth. or sixth wagon WiNianr Hunt (sworn). I um n go~~pn~rl ill 

from t11e cngine ; my ~II~~IIO wrm knmked forwnld, tl~e Great Northern Compnny's service, and will hnve 

nod the injector stopped working. I did not rcwver been safor six years norrt July. I left New England 

myself for five or air minutes, but I remnined all that at 5.53 pm.. and mhod Abbotts Riptnn at 6.40. 

time on the engine, and then &fr. Usher, a relief- My watoh \nu not two minutes out thnt dny, I nm 

dcrk in the tnffic depnrtmmt, came to my engine eertnin. I heard the signnlmnn there order us to 

nnd =id, "Let us IB off to IInntinfflon to get nssis shunt, ood enw the points opened for us to do SO, nod 

tune!" I toldhim to go to the signnlmnn to mk snw a man exnmining them to see they were clenr of 

ppmmisaion; he went, nod rctnrocd nnd snid, "AU snow, and in proper order for us t6 pas back through 

nght for us to go;" nnd tbcn n gentleman nud them. I rode back in my brenk-van nt the I-r of 

the ml-lrain pnrd - got on the engino to go to the train, and whilst doing so I hcnrd a trnin coming. 

Nuotiugdoh, nud the gnnrd ntmd on the ~ff.side of I thought at first it wns n down trnin, but on looking 

the engine with his hnnd-lnmp rcndy to show a red out of the van 1 saw the up Scotch train pass at full 

light to any train coming. in thc opposite direction. speed with its sham on, nnd immedintely akterwa~ds 

I htd previously sent my firemnn with two fopignnls the engino of thnt train struck the fourth or fifth 

towards Huotingdon. We proceeded towards Nunt- waggon from my engine. 1 took Up riome fogsignnle, 

in$on I hcttd noy firemnn shout out, and we picked jumpcd ont of my vnn, nnd met Chsrles Ihy, tile 

him up; that \ws somewhere between the bridge,ovcr pwsenger yard of the Sooteh train. My ides wns 

tlrc line and the distant-signnl from Abhotts ltlpton to pmtcct the wleck from the direction of l'etcrbom', 

(rlaut 500 yards f m Abbatta Ripton). We Imd but finding Duy wns going towards Pcterbm', I 

l~rdly started when I snrv thArvn erprcas went towards the wreck. TI1c1.e I met s gentlemnn, 

mink I opened my wvhiatla, nnd kcpt sounding it who offered nwistnncc, nnd 1 wveut to the signnl-cnbio 

to ottmet the nttcntion nf the driver of the down to see if both linos were hloeked. I nndcrswod from 

erpress, while thc gunu1 ahowcrl him n iwl ligllt. llrc siptlmnn thnt they lvcm blocked, nnrl tlm he wns 

He a n d to sec mc I dou't know if nnybdy tryiog to nttmct nttcntion to klegrnlh on nmouut of

the midenL I went to my driver (Bray), and said 

to him, "We had bet& go to Huntingdon formedical 

nn4 other Rsaistnncc." We pmded fornanl with 

permission from the signalman, md pickcd up the 

lircmnn. I stoal on the off side of the engine, nnn 

showcd a red light to warn a driver of any coming 

tmin. After ving under the bridgc over the line, 

nnd before?we got to the distnnt-signd, I saw a Vain 

which W& thon the other side of the distnnt-signal. 

I anid to tho driver, "For God's snke, Joe, blow up, 

for here's n trnin coming up." He did so, while 

I IixUooed and &owed a red light. I think we were 

8eeu and bcnnl, for I saw the driver hnd shut off 

steam, and tho specd of his trnin was reduced. We 

afterwards stopped the Manchester goods tmin near 

-the Huntingdon prison. I told the coginadriver of 

that train not to go forward. Betmen Feteibora' 

and Abbotts Ripton cahin all the dgnnls showed a 

white light, but I did not sec the home nor the 

advance signal st Abbotts Ripton. At Stukcley the 

signals we* off. We saw a red light in appmaehiog 

Huntingdon, which turned out ta be on a brcnkvm 

ia n aiding thew. ' At four o'clock in the nh- noon it began to snow hwvily nt Pctcrboro', and tho 

flnkea grcw bigger, ns big a4 a two-shilling pi-, and 

they seemed to stick to everything they touched. 

r Whcn Iwving the nignal-box at Abbotts Ripton, I 

. hcnrd ant some one had been sent to prntect the 

down mad. The express was just nt the distantaipd 

when the driver of the coal train eve the 8- 

whistle. 

q Clrorks Day (sworu). I am a guard in the Gc'ent 

Rrthern Company's service, nnd will have hen m under my cnginc to .the point at which 

14 ).cm next \Vhit Monday. I was the undorgunrd camc into collision wit11 the other tmin, t 

with the Scotch tmiu Lwviug York at 3.45 pm. on 

the 21et instant. I was not hking the time; but I 

knov* we left Peterboro' at 6.24, 8ir minuted lata 

My train con&tcd of an eugine and tender, n brenkme, 

two wmposite, a sea)~~d&~. four ht-duss, 500yunlY It sho\vcd a distinct whito IighC 

thcn a second-elm carriages, and my break-van. wow would in! blowing against the lae4 ':d 

The snow was falling very fust after we left Peter- signd-lamp. I did not hem the whistle of the 

born', and I could see no sign& I wna not aware enginc beforc I weut over the fog-sipals. I &T+ 

. ... of auythiug king wrong until I wys thrown down in red light nnd heard tlm whistle f ~ the m coal 'ed 

rhc van. I wss hurt in the llond and shoulder, and nt the mme time. a few seconds after wissiue over 

have not yet lxen able to go to work aguin. I got 

up, and relighted my hand-lnmp, and put my fogsignals 

under my left nnn, which wss mmewhnt disabled 

; .and abr turning on the red glsrs wok my 

band-lamp in my right hsnd, ~ n d proceeded towards. 

Peterbro.' I ruet the cod-guard, who snid," You mn 

p into us full stcam on." When I got pnst the distnntsignal 

fmm AblmU= =pton, I saw it was showing noticed nothing out of the usual 

a lighe I did not sec the home-signal at that 

time I put fog-signals on the mils, and stopped the 

Mmeheatcr and Leeds express due from Peterborn' 

nt 6.28 pm. Thc gunrd of that hiu then \vent 

back towanis Petcrboro; md 1,returned to tbe wreck. 

I found the home-signal at Ablmtla Itipton showing 

a white ligli4ond the distant-signal wutinued to show 

a white light.. I did not toll the si@nlman that his 

sign& wore showing white lights. 1 got into my van, 

and felt ill, I imngioe for half nn hour. ; I did not 

go into the signal-cabin at all. . I felt no checking of 

the whataver until thecollidon occurred: I had 

my pencil in ono hmd, and the.way bill in the other. 

Willim Wibn (sworn). . I am nu engine-driver 

in the Grest Northern Company's acrviee, nod have 

hen so ucdy five yam. 1 leR Londou nt 5.30 pm. 

with an express hain for I'eterboro'. I stop@ in of' our train, and 

due course at Finsbury l'ark, and wns not due to stop 

again until I ~wched Poterborn'. . The wind wus 

blowing strongly from the nortll-east all the wny 

. down, and it bognn to snow bctwwn Tempford and 

St. Hoots. I fouocl nothing but white lighta on the 

signal pats right through, up to the time of the 

~elliui~rr. 1 found u wl,iic light nt tho distsnt-signnl 

ac Ablmtla Ripmm Anur pirsaiag tllut signd-posl, 

I ww alanned by pwhg over two fug-sign-sigsula \vexplodc4 

; l at onw slmt ulF atunln, nnd told my in;~(r: 

to put on tlm tcsdw bwk. I wvw tllen going nt 40 

. or 50 mile an hour. In nuother illstoult I met an 

G

I 

... ~ i r n ~ Sdt e (8aorn): I hnve boen five P m a 

fi&man, and 11 yeam next July in the Coyany's 

~enica I left Peterbro' at 6.25 pm. ~ t the h 

sotch expraa for London on the 21st .Jan,nwrry. 

&&ing nnosnsl oeeumnl up to Abbotts Ripton. 

. glnw the weatlror-hoa~l cf my engine wna 

covered with man, nnd l oprd it to m% the holqesignal 

W& ~~lton. Thnt signnl showed a whlte 

iight. I could not sec it fnrther than 200 ynrds 

away. I did not notice the distnnt-signal at Wood 

W&.,. I first enught sight of the distant-signal 

from A b t Ripton ~ whcn I as about 200 yards 

fram it, and 1 kept my eye on it nntil I m within 

hatd. On the night in question, the P~WA in 

v~mching Ahbotts nipton distant-signal was rcduood 

about l0 miles an hour. -Ordinarily wc shonld 

nm at 60 miles nn hour at the point, and on this 

occnsion we, might hnvo Rppmchcd the siqnl at 50 

miles an hour. I %\v nothing of the sigal,~n,an :)fte,, 

the odlision. We were one n~ioute late in Icpving 

Kings Cmgs nnd Finsbuy Park, and slacked at St. 

Neots for relaying. I hnppened to lwk nt my wnrch, 

and noticed we pasml IIuoiingdon north box 6.51, 

two minutes late. 'lh collision oe~~ml dmel fiw 

minutes to 7 o'clock. My van wae smashed to :,toms.. 

I found myself in the ditch at the hottom of the 

few of it It showod a clear white light ; the 

lamp WILY vi*hlc. After being en'tnin that 

the at all tight I put coala on the fire. 

men I hwl regained the 'upright position after 

fiilng I sari some waggons close to the aide of the 

. ,gine. They were in the siding, and I thought they 

cutting after the collision. I heard tbc commnniex--ation 

with the driver tnt& at King's Cm. It 

not half a minute between the explosion of the fog. 

signals and the whistling of the canl cugine. I could 

not tell the diffemncc between 50 Rnd 60 mile5 sn 

nonr in my vnn. We were nbont NO minute Ink at 

were coming oat ofit. I said to Catley (my driver), Abhotts Kipton, not having last my time bctween 

u WO ! here's eome wk~oons 

!" nnd the collision Huntiogdon and Abbotk Ripton. WC hnd not lost 

mcud immediatelj. If the sham was shut off time, and Could not tberefo~e have reduced speed 

it muet have been at the last moment; I did not in approaching tile Abbotta Ripton distrot-signal. 

, see it shut off. I hesrd nothing fmm my driver Wdson redd. We were running at the nsud 

! passing Holme signdesbin until the collision sped in approaching the Abhotts Ripton distnot- 

.occurred. We had no mmiog after leaving Peter- signal. I hnd mn that engine for n fwtnight, and 

born' until the collision occnrred. - Although not havc been running fast trains betrean London mid 

able to 6% the distanssignal at Abbotts Ripton m Peterbom' for two years on and ofE T work my J 

fnr ns nsual I did not notice that the driver rednced engine in all wenlhers m ns to keep time. I NIW 

his speed at all. In ordinaty clear weather that nover out in a worm night than thnt of the 2lst. It 

diatmt-sip1 is visible in psssing the Wood Walton wna fme~ing, blowing, and snowing. It wss bad for 

din. seeing signals, and I have frequently known signals 

! 

&&rt m& (swomj. I am a pnsseugor-gwrd in to stick on aneh nightb. 1 wae four minutes late at 

the 'Grest. Northern Company's scrvica, and have Abbtts Ripton. I judged that, because I had been 

been so for five yyesr I left tin@ &am nt 5.30 four minutes late at Huotingdon. I tried all I could 

p.~. on the 21st of this month with. the York and to keep time, but through atress of wenther I lost a 

Leeds express An engine and tender, a six- little. When a lad porter I wss in the habit of 

wheeled bre,reek-van, a third-ohs, two cotuponit0 lighting the signals, and have fonnd them to have 

earringas, a break-van, a bogie composite, a third- stuck in sncb westher as that of the Zlst. I did that 

class, a enrringe-van (a second-ela% brenkssrriage), duty for about three yeam, and hnve v&y fqumtly 

a third-clnas, three six-wheeled eompoaiteq and known the signnlla to stick noder sneh cimnmstnnces. 

B bzsk-"m;-those formed the tmin at the It m nt Claypole that I have known them to stick. 

time of collision. We hnd nlso in leaving King's I should think I have known them stick nbout thm 1 

C- four &ages which were slipped at Ratfield or four times I can't ssy that I have known them . 

ss usml. There were three hresk-vans to 13 stick at Gmntham. AB an enginedriver, I have 

i wrriagea, and ench break-vehicle of the three hnd observed the signals not working pmperly fmm frost 

sguerd in it. W e ran in the otdinaty way and at or wow, but have never had occasion to report 

the usual speed nntil we got inside the distant-signal them. I wes astonisbed to mn into the Min nfter 

from Abbotts Ripton. I did not nee that signal finding the signals exhibiting white lights. I m- 

althongh I m looking out for the signals. The marked on the night of the nceident to guard Wills 

first thing I heard after pssaing that distmt-signnl and my fireman that I found the signds all right, 4 

m no alnrm-whiitle from the cod engine. I heard and I reonled thc fact in a book for the purpose. 

several shslp short ,whistles. I applied my break at 1 waa not asked on that night by any one connected 

onoe as tightly as poenible, I was riding in, the vnn with the Company why 1,mn past the signnls. I 

next behind the tender. The next thing I hewd was saw Mr. Rouse and Mr. Parks, the superintendent nt 

ht we struck something; that is all I remember, New Englnnd. I also saw Compsny's officers fmm 

becerise I was stunned. I should think we pnssod London, but they did not ask me about the signals. 

the distant-signnl nt 50 milra an hour, and from 30 

to 40 when the collision occurred. I heard a break- Copy of lctter by Wilson reporting the accident 

d i e 

from my own cngine &r the whistling from rr sir, .Jsnnary 22nd, 1876. 

the co+x@no. After the whistling of the coal- " I beg to report I wss working No. 203 down 

engine, and ~ f the o whistlk ~ of my om cn@"' pnssengcr tmin on the 21st. On sppmaching Abbotk 

I heard fog-signals explode. They smmed to be Ripton d i t s it wss at all *hht After pasing . 

near that bridge, between thfi fistant the the ~~~~~~~~al I p over a fog-signal. I shut 

home-sigonls; I believe that I PX0vered ~ ~ m lof f steam, and whistled for the break so011 M 

about five minntas after the colli'sion, and went back this was -done, nn engine on tho up lino phs7nl me, 

to if my train Was Ptcckd ; and I am@ to the giving me signals of distyas. I reversed my cngine, 

conclusion, fmm the fact that his lnmp and signals and instnotly oowIon mumd. 

.were not there, that tho renrynrd hnd gone back "I am, &c. 

to protect the train. I then aseistod the injured . "W. WILSON, 48 engine." 

pssmngers as mwh 88 I could, but I rrns 80 badly 

injured mysclf that I coulddo lit-tle. After the nccidcnt Jar@ Simpaa, (worn). I am a pasaanppeunrd 

1 only 'noticed titat %c advnnarsignal nt Abbotts in the Gwt Northern h p f s +W, and hnvo 

Ripton cabin wns nt "rill right' I did not noticc that been so for'more than 20 years. I have been in the 

sgnsl until after the colliwm. When tnrvolling habit of running with feat trnins about 10 years. We- 

-thmu,$ fog or snow it is our prxctiec to run left King's Crm ns nearly ns poesible nt 5.30, imd 

vcry antionsly nntil the distant-signnls nre s e w slipped carriages at Hutfield. My break-vnn wm in 

+m WC conclode it is elcnr for us throtrgh the the middle d the tmin. It was a sceond-class Grcnt 

stations or past the wldns. On this occnnion it was Northern breakarriage. I think it wea t.he seveath 

snarving very hard, lugc flnkra; it was tbc roughest vehidn from the tender. 1 firut noticed it soonring at 

nirrbt I waecver out in,snowiu~, fiee~ing, nnd hlowing St. Neots. I MW the signnk sp to thnt ph~, but

then thc snow got worm and worsc, and blocked up 

the windows. After leaving Hl~ntiugdon the first 

tl~ing I head was, on applo~chinn Ahhotta Ripton, a 

\vhistlc from a passing engine. -The whistles were 

three in numher, nnd very sharp. I am almost sure 

WC hnd psscd ihc distant-signal when I heard thnt 

whistle. I heard no ffogsignrds explodq nor any 

break-whistle from my 'own engine. I opened ,my 

side window, and looked out, but coalcl sec noth~ng. 

Vl'c seemed to Nn into thcm momentnrily, and my 

hcnd wrcnt through the gloss of tllc top corner window 

of the ndsecl part, of the brcnk-cnrriage. As Mlon I 

heard the whistle of the coal-cngine I applied my 

break. If it had not hecn for the whistle of the ml- 

engine I should have aone nothing. I am almost 

ccrtniu we werc a g& distance inside the distant- 

bignul whcn I henlrl the whistlc and.applied the 

hmk. I noticed after the accident that the signals 

werc lnacled wiCh snow. 1 did not note the time 

when the collision occurred. My carriage did not 

appr to h dnmaged . I first re-lighted my lamp, 

which had been knocked out by the collision, and 

then rnn ncross to the dgnalman, and sked him whe- 

thcr hc h d blocked both lines, as I had .olaerved the 

cnrringcs had blocked both lines. I went up into the 

signal-cabin. The sigoalman, in answer to my in- 

quiry whether the lines were blocked by the signals, 

replied, "Yes;" and I noticed that two levers which 

Im pointed out to me were thmwn baek. A good 

number of levers were thmwn forward, but thaw were 

thmwn. back. I do not underatand the working of 

signnls. I told the signalman thnt my mate had gone 

. (c; m Hontingdon, and that I was going towards Peter- 

boro' nt once. No more passed, and I left, and 

went nbout hllf a ' mile townrds Peterbow'. I 

found n trnin coming slowly which had been wmed 

by somebody whom footprints I saw in the mo~. I 

jumped on the stop of the cngine of this train, which 

was the Lads and Manchester up expresn; and when 

we appmached the distnnt-signal worked from the 

Ablatts Ripton signal-cabin, the driver 8aid, "Joe, 

look nt thnt signal; what do you call it, showing 

rcd or white?' I snid, "Wall, it showvs white fmm 

here." WC were then going very slow, and nbont a 

dozen yards from it. We could see thnt signal at 

40 yurds. It wns snowing fast at ilmt time. The 

spectacle-glm of the lamp was covered with snow. 

man named George ~ &ht at the distant+&, and 

gave him three fog-signals. I.told him to .pnt,ai 

red speclncle over the white light. The arm g %ho! 

spectacle move together, I know. .I did not kotieaba 

nnd I think he said 6.57. I also 

- ~. - r-..,:m 

signalson the line; and he. said he 

below the hridee. I asked him fo . -.-- 

some fog-sign& and I proceeded to ~untG~do%&, 

met nn engine with a goods-tmin, and rode on&,; 

engine to Stukeky. I asked the signalman if.it.wns: 

'l&c red-glw was before the Light, but the snow 

which co~ed the spectnale made it show n white 

light. The am.1 noticed was up at "danger." I did 

not notice the home or advance-signal at Abbotta 

Ripton. The drivcr (Edis), on whose engine I was 

riding, said, "Go into the signal-cabin, and see if tho 

'' signalman )las qt his lever over, and tell him his 

l' signnl shows a white light." I went to the cnbin, 

nnd said to the hignalmnn, "Ay you sure your signal 

is nt ilnnger, because it shows a white light 7" He 

replied, "lt must be the snow which is on it," and he 

also mid he had just aent one of the men to look after 

the distnnt-signol. I then went down and minted to 

ligbt n fire fbr the gwscngcrs, and to deliver people 

'from the wreck. When I weut into the cabin the 

, signal~nn wns busy with his telegmph instrnmcnts. ' 

Iie mid nothing ns to how tho ncddent lnppenwl. 

Tltc eommnnieotion in the train is only hetwcen tlm 

reacgunrd and thc driver, but an interwmliate gnnrd 

can pull thc cord by putting his hand oat. The sig- 

, nnlmnu seemed to he clcar when I spoko to him. 

When speaking to tho driver, Edis, on his engine nt 

the Abbotts R~pton signal, he mid, "Joe, whnt light 

do you call thnt; it shows a white light?" When we meanLe to ask whether 110 hnd turned his si~nalsfo;: 

got opposite the .post he said, It must be the snow kit tin; tadanp. He said " Yes:' I got on a s 

in front of the glass spcctoclc." 

took down fog-s~,onnls from n box, gnvo them to 

John Ifdinson (sworn). I have heen a p~~8engcr Abhotts-lfipton porter, and said to him, "Take t 

'gwwl in tho Great Kortbcrn' Company's. secvice for 

10 yenra, nnd havc ruu with fast trnins for five ycars. 

I Ich Iiing's Cross with the Leeds and York express 

nbout n minute latc, and rode in the rcar vnn of the 

lunin-lint portion of the twin. Some carriage8 were 

slipp~rl nt IIatfiald, and thcu my break was the last 

vehicle of the twin. .I did not xrotica the time in 

gor u, llhu~~lon 

as quickly ns cvor we'can :".aria.: 

called out for some one to uscouple the cngi~e.,.~I 

wont to look nt the coupling, but before I could do $0 '

aaa told that the eauplin& -9 broken and the stood at the signal at the timc. I told him to cut the 

engine therefore'.mld from the min. 1 then got wire, and shove it up to daow. I assisted, the p 

on the engine, and found the driver WM them and senkn, bnt did not examine the signals I sa~d to 

said to him, Now we must get to Ifunlin$on ;" and gud, Day, " h k Chnrlie. the signals are off now :" 

he said to m* 1' xsTe you seen the sigoalmnn; !I mid and he mid We had a collision, Rill, and a second 

1' It j, all rioht with rho aimlmnn : " and almost one haa occurred." I did not and could not seo citllcr 

dimtly we m& a &h TG engine had just m 0 t& spectacle or the signal-arm of the distaotaignal 

when a from the ballast enlled out, end I north of Ahbotts Ripton. Caning to the home 

think he =id he mnted to come with and he.cama, signal I met gurrd Simpson between the home nnd 

My imp-ion is thnt jmt before we got W tbe distsntaiinals. He got on the step, and asked mu if 

di~taot-si~al ,re met the down expres. I IebonOt nnybody had gone back to pmtect the train ; to which 

my for eerhin whcther that train had p~ged the I replied, " Yeq Chartie Lhy." I looked at the homediatantsisnnl 

or not when we met it. Just heforo signal; it showed s perfect white light; nnd I called 

the mPmssFsecl ub'I an" two flashes, and heard two the attention of seveid to it. There did not appear 

slight reports, which I took to he the explosion of two to be any snow on the spectselc to ohre it. 

fo@gnals. As soon re we rvw the express, the Simpson mde with me until I druu~ht my engine to 

dnver of the coal+ne hkw aevernl wvhistlw ; 'I nm a stand nmrly oppoeite the home-signal of Abbotts 

not nure whether .that n.a before or aRer wve heard. Ripton. The p& whwe nttention I mllecf to the 

the fog-signals T sav gnnrd Hunt waving his rwl state of the home-signd were pnrd Brndley, my 

' light. We wers whi8tlimg and ~houtingend wnving fireman, Cntlq the driver of tbc Smtch express, 

the red light all it once, hut I cannot say that we and Simpsou the guml, I mid to guard Simpson 

attracted any attention. The express passedns at n, thnt it must he the mow whidt was in front of 

high speed. We went forwnrd to Stukcley, where we the gka spetaclc. He said m to me, or I might 

stopped, and I went up into the sipnl-eahin, and told linre said so to him; I ean'i tecollect. I passed 

theeignalm~n we were going on to Huntingdon for over s fog-signal nur the Ahhotts Ripton dhtanG 

assistance. I leR him immediatelv, nod returned to sipd. I went hnck on the wrong road to Holme, 2 

the engina I did not notice any of the down-signals, nod looked at the sign& on the way, and lhey all - 

but I did notice mm npipls, two or three, which showed while lights. The snow W Inrge, thick, 

were.ahoning half-d snd hnlf-white lights. I do nnd moist, tending to mt on an object on which it 

. not know exactly whnt signals they were. I cannot fell. It was at the distant-signal tbnt I nscd the 

a. ssy whether it was hefiia I got to Stukelcy. I did platehycr to cut the \rim I observed the signal for 

ID- to the sgnalman there shout it ID 300 or 400 yards. I told- pd Simpaon to go into 

buntin&n to Abhotls Ripton 1,was the signal-box at Ahbotts Ripton, and tell the 

stopped hy guard Rohinson, nnd that wns the first siLmnlmau thst his signals wera at nll right, and to 

time I heard that the d o had run into the turn them to danger. I ncvm had neen snow in auch . 

wreck of the first collision. We mu over several fog- large pieces in my life befa% 

signale on the way hndr to Ripton. Ilnrden ~Iv~jfl (anorn). I am a fireman in the , 

William Edti (aworn). I have been nn engine service of the Great Northern Campany, snd hare 

driver in the Great Northern Compnny's servicebe- hem so for 4& yesn I acmmpdnled Edis from 

tween 14 and 15 years, and 11 yearn rtlnniug fast Peterborn' by tho6.28 pm.; I think wewcre a hit 

train+ My practiee in working trains is, when the late. I notid all the &pals &owed white lights 

' weather is bad, to slnckw speed, if I do not see. the until we mhed W& \Yalton cabin, where the . 

signalsat the proper dice, until I do eee them. signalman showed s red light from his band-lamp out 

This I always do in snow or fog, anddI would rnthcr of his window. We ran prut that cabin nbout 40 

10% time than infringe that plslctiee I Rtnrted from miles an hour. Thesteam hsd not been shnt off until 

London with No. 99 down train for Grnntham, wlrem the red light was seen from the cabin st Wood Wdton. 

I aniv6cat 12.44, and I left Grantham at 5.45 or The steam was not 6hnt oB' on app-hing \W 

. 5.4G:'I; next arrived'.st Peterboro' nbmt 6.18 pm, Walton diitnnt-signal, becruse it showed a perfcct , 

delivkd up thnt train, and took mother train, the whim light The engine enme to s stand aome 

Manchester express. I left Peterborn' at 6.39, distaace past the -bin ; I muld wttell how fay. My J 

l1 minutea late. I found all sigosls nt nll-right, until mnto then got off tho engine, and spoke to the gun& 

I reached Wood Walton. It m e anowing hnrd at the and they decided to procmd cautiously to Abbotts 

time, nud I muld not see tho distant-mpnl nt mom Ripton, which we did. We met guard Charles Day, 

thsn.20 or 80 yards, or it might b6 50 yards. The with n red light, and &opped.n,~n. He told us whnt 

distant and homesi@;n.ls %vorkcd fmm the Wood Wdton had haplaned. nnd then we drew up to Abbot& Hipton. 

cabin were at all-right, and I sltut off my atem on I snw the.distantsignal there, which showed a perfect 

approaching the dirtanGaip1 until .I saw it. I white light. We then met s platelayer, and stopped 

paased Wood Waltnn at a speed of nbout 40 milw nn to his red light, and did not meet any one else until 

hour, and the signalman showed n red light by a bnnd- we came to a standstill at the bnek of tho Scotch 

lamp-fivm the window of his enbin. I then shut expm and outsidc the home-si,d Lord Colrille 

off etearn, opened the mnd-hex, whisllnd for the -me on to the cngk'nnd after him came guard 

gunrd'shreaks,'nnd reversed nod brought my troin to Simpson. I observed that Edis and he were talking, 

a stand near the down distnutsignnl of the Wood hut I did not hem what they mid, beawns soon as 

Wnlton enbin. I' go1 off tho engine them, and spoke Bimpson came up they both got down nod spoke on 

to my rear guard,Bnulley, telling him that the sipal- the hallart. I notied that the arm OF the home-signal 

mm had given. me a red hnnd-light, nlthouglr ho hnd nt Abbotts Riptoo m lmded with snow, and it 

sltowed a white lizht on tho simnl. Tho euaid then nowred to be half down and half UD. I could see 

mid tbnt it WRS &USO stopping there, as tlTe Abhnntn th; mm distinctly. l oodd not aeo tl;o hp-glass or 

Ripton distnnt4gnal rrasshowio: n perfoet shitelight. speclsela It shod o pen% white light, not as if 

Weaoold sec it fmm a diaunce of 300 or 500 vnrdr tho SNOW wero in the wsv to nrevont its shinioe 

I wh-latled and started again, until I met guard Dny, properly. I went back to &oh< and saw that thi 

vrho hJd.hii id hnnd-lamp exhibit& and I stopped signals were showing perfect white lights I do not 

again. He gnw me orders to drnw up cautiously, think I have ever seen n lamp-glasscovered with snow, 

which I did to within 20 or 30 ynrds of the rcsr of I never saw anything like thnt snow hfore. I lmve 

Sooteh qnesa train. I noticed the Abbotta Xipton boon out in soowy wveathcr, but never knew it mnko 

bmnesip4 and it showcd n perfect white lighb nod any diftemn&~ the ~ignnls before, but I hnvc koowu 

continued to do so until I left the spot nbout 9.40 M the signals stick through the snow. 

back to Pcterboro'. I went to U~eeabin, hut it waa Gevrge Wrilrr (nwarn). I nm no under platelayer 

El1 of pnssengern,aud I did not epeak to the signal- in the service of the Grent Northern Company, and 

man. I told n platelayer to put Utc up distontsigoal 

.t l a.dt Lnnw r r b nln+rl.~~~r'~ 

xanrn- N. 

have laen so for 34 years. I remember the 2lst of 

+hi. rnnntl.. T Ainr ,hr- n* +lln Al.l.ntlc Ridnn

gate-housa John Ball, the foreman piatolayer, called 

me out, and said there was a " pitch-in" at Ahbttn 

nipton. He wanted me to leave the gates, hut I 

would not leave them, thinking it would he a neglwt 

of duty. I laid two fog-signals on the down-line at 

the level crossing, and showed a red light from my 

hmd-lnmp. I did not and could not 6W anything of 

the Ahhotts Ripton sign& . A guard spoke to mg 

hut I forget whnt he said. I then 'stopped a gde- 

train, which drew gently fornnrd. Gunrd Robinson 

did not put me at the diatnnt-signal, but he gave me 

three fog-signals, whioh another man tonkaway from 

m& and went on with them tom& Stukeley. . : 

Georgc Thmnar Grepry (sworn). I nm tho station- 

master at Holme, and have bmn so far l2 yeem I necassnry. 

remember the 21st of this month, when the collision John CdZim O ~ J W (sworn): Iam a ki 

occud. I wns in the offiee when the coal-tr& the seniee of 'the Great Nodhem &mp 

passed my station, hot I saw the Seoteh express pasa, 

without anything remerkable, at its usunl .speed. 

Aftcr the Scotch expresa passed I ssw some. plate 

layers, for whom I had sent, working the sign* and 

they then worked prbpcrly. The signalman came to 

nxe after the coal-train pnssed, and told me that that 

trnin had run past the signals. I went into the signal- was its usual time of running. I made the 

eabin, and W.+ that the leverswem over in the position 

of.danger, and I then ran down and looked at the ,up 

starting-signal and the up home-signal, an& found 

them at dsnger. But previously to goioidg ta them 

I sent a lad portsr for the platelayere. I did not then 

look at my otheraignals. I ~vatched the plaklnycra 

working the hnlanm weights at the foot of the signalost, 

and ssw large quantitiffl of snow fall off.the arm. 

f- noticed . that the down home-signal, when it should 

hnve been at dnngcr, stood at caution, the arm being 

half-np and halfdown. I thcn told the platelayws,to 

go to nll the signals, and to work the hhce weights 

so &to knock the snow off the arms. They did 60% 

Issw it done nt the home-sipnlq hut I did not go 

to the distant-signals I stwd on the platform while 

the5 pm. express fromKing's Cross passed. Iattef 

wards.noticed that the down starting-signal did not 

go to danger, appearing ns if tho signal aas not, 

worked fmmethe mbin.' I went to the lnmprnan, md 

told him to go and examine the lamp to sw if it were 

properly wound up. He went, and said it and 

thnt the arm would not go up, to let the spctncle go 

I@ to cover the lamp, bceause of the snow. I went 

severnl times to the scene of the accident, hut do not, 

know at whnt time. I noticed the signals et) the way 

to Ahbttn Ripton. ConingLpu distnut-signal. showeda 

white light, hut the heme-s~gnal a red light, though 

you could not discem it until you got close 'to it, 

fmm wow, as I supposed. on the spectacle. The 

Wood Wslton signals were in similar positions. 

I did not not& the Abbtts Ripton signnls. The 

snow began to fall in the nfhxnoon, and began to lie 

nbout 6 ~'clock. When thc btch expnsn paPsed, I 

think it was freezing. I never saw such an nceumulotion 

of snow before ou the spectncles and arms of 

tho signale. I can't say that I have seen the sipais 

fnil to work bceouse of snow, hot I think I have. The 

eigoalman esme to me ss soon as ho could after the 

coal-train. passed, to say that train had run past the 

signnls. I did not think it was necessary to have fog- 

$ignnlslnid to protect the earning up %press. ..The 

sigonls were showing a dim red light when the Fnltrain 

passed. The signals hnd been put up w s t 

tha coal-tmii to shunt it for the expreas. I sent 

Marriott to the up distant-signal to clear. it. It was 

myOuty, having received liuc dear from Coniugton 

not to atop the express. ' I knew they hid bad line 

clear aftor tho cod-train from Conington. . An soon 

as the signalman roported to me thnt the ooal-tmin 

had ran by his signnl?, I went to him, and he mid, 

1s Them me my signnle ; they am nll slnnding at 

dnugcr." I ssked him how he eould nceount for it, 

nod hc told me hecould not account far it in any way. 

I. immedintolym down, nnd examine4 the up starting 

sigud, and found it shomd s dim m1 light. I stood 

by while Alnrriott wiped the spectaelo of the up tho Alanchester expmea, and looked to sw. whethw. 

ntuting+ignd, ad .%\v him do it, aud I thcn in- the distantsignal lnmp wns turned to rl.wvh'ilst it; 

. . . r )

. . 

was at the st.tion,'but the.ldmp eontinud to show a on line 6.36. It p&& my =bin it 6.38, and % 

white'light., I put on my clothes, and came out to cleared from Wood Walton'kt 6.41. I mw it pm at 

the signnl, ind foundthat tho arm was more off than it! usoal speed. The first time I found any difficulty 

on, instead of standing out at danger. Thc Tow had ~lth my signals was when I tried to "top 5 slow 

settlOd on the.ann, and weighted it do~vn, whlel~ pw- mngert~nin at 7.10. I stdpped the thin with a 

vefi&:it rising* danger. I tmk hold of tbe b$my hand-lamp, becnnse I. hsd not got line clear from. 

&d shook the snow off the arm by ~ r k ~ d n g Wood Walton, when I heard it approaching at too 

up and down. :I ftslkd baek n little distpnce to Bee peat a speed. Tbc enginedriver then aaked me why 

h.,& the signal porke& and saw it ~shihlted a red Phad stopped him with a hand-lamp'when my signals 

' light. I then went to the station,and met a man, and were off. I told him that my levern vrere over in tho 

told.hh,.to remain at that aignal till furtbci orders. laopcr place, and I supposed my dgnala to bo at 

meh.1 hadcleared the snow off the. arm it worked dauger. When he informed me that thc signslsdid not 

pmpkrly., .I then went to .the y@ to aucnd to work I blocked the line back to Holme by five bents 

the poinwmd ,~ttended to that duty all night I had on my telcgrnph hell. I went oukide my .m& to. 

fbond both home-signals also affected by the snow, ascertiin whether my signals mm as the $river 

- ;d,cl& them in a similic manner. I did not go reported, and found that 11c wes correct. I found a 

.'t,pththe- Holme distant-aih;nol, as anottkr mm railway chair, broke it in two vith a hammet, and 

had gone there We repeated the clesring three of fastened hnlf of it to the halana, weight of each homcf&.timm 

during the night.. I have known the sow signal. I had no means of doing anything to my 

6 ~ ~ i the ~ arms h t of signals previously, but not so distnnt-signals, and there was nobody whom I could 

& at this time, It happened once before this send out to look after them. After that the road was 

,+inter. -It wns fmm my knowledgs thst snow mrght blocked, and nothing was running. . 

. 

weight down the signal-arms, and h m my previous CIuwles Rise (ssvorn). I have been signalman at 

in that reapet, that I watched the si,onal Wd Walton in the Greet Northern Companyh ser- 

&-above described. vice since last May. I produce my record-book, 

. i,zo~m CId (swom). I am. a plate+ at Holmc, showing that a eonl-train .was signalled, Be ieady 

in .the secvia, of the Greet Noctherh Company, and from Conington at 6.20 ; !bin on line at 624. It 

hake &been:so a little ,over 12:'months. I live on the passed my cabin at 6.31,.and w~ not clenred from 

down of the line sbouttta quarter .of smile fmm Abbotts Ripton. At 635 I received from hiagton 

&he ' to-de 'Huntingdon. I cnme out a little Be ready for the Scoteh, expp8 ; at 6.37 Train on' 

Mm seven, bemuse I was suspicious of the weather, line for it. It. passed. me at 6.40, whilst line clenr 

and thmzht Imight he required. I met Mr. Grego~, had not been received for the coal-tmin. My home 

. < &d he told me to take my hand-lqp, and go out and dintsipds were, ns far asmy levers were con- 

fdgging. I went to the up-distant-signal from the cernd, fixed at danger. I could not see how the 

Holme etation, and stopped thew all nigh+ I 6hwk signals werestsndiog, for the snow which covered the 

the mow oE the. signal-srm by lifting the hahnce windows of my cabin. I thought when the Scotch 

.weight up and -down;: 1 snw the snow loading the -press passed that the .&-train would dot ha dear, 

arm, sad3 had to clear the arm-many times in the beqmse I expected it w'mld he shunted st Abbotts 

&urn of the night np to 12 o'clock, when thb wow Ripton. I did not show any hand-lamp to the express- 

abd. : Ihsve never hid to ahnke the anow off the. train, because I believed my fixed signals to be at 

sigdallanns before, having never been out in the wow udanger." I did not h e the. train approaching, 

with slgnals befom Imet Gammons on his way from on account of the wind, untilit pmpdmy &bin. O w 

'thb distant-signal, and I found on renching it tbmt the in December my signnls would not work on monnt 

sddw'hi&secumuln'ted onthe arm, and the Bigoal WBB of snow, but that was in the dnytime. On the evening 

shbwiug a white light. I shook off thesnow, and in question I came on duty at G pm., after having 

t&r?dit red spin. .. been away for a week. There is no recordof a train 

; :WiEIiam'Mam'nft (sworn).Iam a platelayer in the being stop+ that evening at my. eahio. If our 

service of the Great Northern Compmy, and had been signals go wong we hsve'no menus of sending my one 

ao for tbroegearslast JuIy. Iwas sabtforby Mr. Gm to corrret them. I had told si,&-fitter Pdlinder of 

gory between six and seven o'doekontho2lstinatnnt. the sign& not workin- properly. Referring to the 

.ad '&me up to the IIolme station, and found the rrylntious ihont fog-$gnnlling 1 did nothing towsrds 

startinpmd home signals there were not in working obeping the rule referred to. .If I believed my si@& 

order, heeDuse the snow had &thered on the arm and ~ e workingproperly w I could not.leavc the box. I 

wei~htcd it down. It kept the srm down at cnution hedrd the Manchester .express approach m if the 

instoad of allowing it to go to danger; and na the signals vere not obeyed, and I exhibited ahand-signal. 

arm snd glass worked topther, so the glass was kept I made a note in my book nt 6.40, when the Scotch 

do?, end sllowed part rcd and part white, instead of cxpms. +, '6 Ilan by signals," and I made th6 

e wholly ired light. I tmk hold of the bnlaoopweighf same note with~egnrdtotheMznelmter expresa at 6.53. 

smh'.movcd.it up and down to shsko off the snow: ' I' The Xbehester exp- did stop, though it wes out- 

v@ntup txeladder once, and wiped thc snow off the side my signals. A train slnckcd to my downdiathnt 

q6ctncle dglass; but I found it momulnted rery sign~l at 6.35, and the sipd wculd,'therefore, apFr 

. goickly.'@in; ohd knowing I could not keep it dcnr. to have been working properly at that time. The lnst 

Insed my hatid-lamp instead. My work during the messnge.1 sc?t,or could send, to Abbctta .Ripb5n.w? 

night hs~tied'+twecn the .points and the' signals, at 6.31.. *. . .. . . 

keeping them.clesr of snow. The whitelight -nns Clm+lu WiIIidrn Juhmm (sworn). I am a signalth&'brigbter 

ofthe'twti when Ifirst went to tha home mm at Abbot6 Riiton in the somid .of :the Greet 

signal ; the lad-thatfetebed me told me that .a train Northern Com ny, and wilillhave becn so two y- 

'had pm past the '?i&&, which ahowcd white lights. next Mnrch. pawas previously at Wrshthorpe about 

Jt was snowing vey~f~st when I.went ont . . thna monthi signalma man.'.. I pkduee :my record 

.Iflmollry Jahcs (sworn):Im~~ a signslman in 'the book 'showing that I reciived the Be ready afgnal 

Great Nodhem Compnn~.setvk+and have h& so fmm Wood Walton for a dtiain at 6.29 on the.2lst 

' nhY~t six months, of which:four months at Conington: instant, and Traid on-line' at 632.- It :!$ached my 

I prcdnce my recurcl-book showing a cod train p d . -bin at 6.41, and I 'signalled, bywaving my.hnnd- 

, my'.~bin; on: the 21st inshut. '. iI'received B e . 4 ~ lsmp to the'engine-driver;to shunt thd.hniu iotothe 

fmm~IIolme at 6..14 ; .'.hain m line at 6.21. It pnssed siding on the up-8ide. .I3e drew forwaid dem of the 

.'my cnhin:nt6:25, and WAS cleared fmm Wod Welton. sidinbpoints ' without any dolap, odd I at once gRvd 

at6.32: *My 'si'@nls were off .for it to pma, and him the signal to sethadk. ' He did 86, ma just 6a the 

tiothinz pnrtie~llur Wcurrod in regard to it I m engine h s psssiog my cnbin I ded out to 'him; 

riot'h~are tbnt ,it.had' run *et tho signale at Holme " Shovethem bnck, the Scotihminicdmdiu#nt Wd vithont. being 'intended to 6 tltem. At 6.32 F Wnlton." I turned round then to ~ttend to some of 

&id from &hne, Bc ren B y for the express; lhim the instruments, when I lraird the shur.tiag lever 

B 2

shake: I fnncied thnt the coal-tmin was off the led. 

I turned round to look, and notioed the engine of the 

canl-tmin hhoot fonwd. and then for the first time 

it~&sal my mind thnt.the Scorch express had ran 

into the d-min. I had rceeired Be rendy for 

tho Scotch express from Woal Walton at 6.39, nnd . 

acknowledged it. Atter that I made no signal to 

Wood Ilrolton of any aort or kind. I had not cleared 

thswnl-train, nnd therefore snp@ the Scotch tnin 

would be stnnding at Wood \Vnlton, na it would have 

been if the signnls wel? working properly. So long 

as I did not elrnr t&e -1-train it would be the duty 

of thc signnlmnn at Wocd Wnlton to keep his homcsignal 

nt danger in clear wcntlwr, and in such 

weather ns thc 21st I myself rrpnld have kept home 

nad distnnt at dnnger. My own signals should have 

hoen nt dnnger, ns my levers were in the position 

of danger. I could nnt ace the sign& through the 

window for the snow. I did not go to look nt them 

nfter the aceident. -The first thing I rcmember doing 

alter the first collision wns placing the levers 01 my 

down-signnls nt danger. I hnd received notice of 

KO. 203 passcngertmin, the Leeds down-axpws, 

leaving Tempsfold at 6.35, I do not remember when 

I got Be r d y for it. I hnrdly know what I did 

Rtter the first collision ; it never entered my mind about 

the down-express being 66 close, ns 1,wns so much 

excited by the first collision. I remlleet ueeing Mr. 

Usher come into the whin, and the gnmcds of the wdtmin, 

together with 'some passengers. The downdistant-signal 

from Ahbotts Ripton mnst have worked 

wrfectly at 6.4 for a down-train, knse it pulled 

up.%tmin for shnnting. The exact time of the first 

collision, according to the time at rhieh I meivzd 

Be rendy for the Scotch exprexs would hnrc been 

6.44. The nonth distant-signnl mnst have been aorking 

a1 within 20 minutes of tha second collision, 

beennse a trnin had hen slacked by it at 6.36. I 

am not sure that I blocked the line to Stukeley after 

the first collision. IF I hd not been ao confused I 

might have stopped the Leeds exprcss at Stukeley. 

The points nt Ahbetts Ripton nre interlocked, and the 

pointa could but have been open for the coal-train to 

hnvc been shunted without putting the down home 

and distant signals to " dnnger." The passengers 

were nll bothering me after the first collision to 

wlcgnph to their friends. 

Willim TT-U (sworn). I am a signalman nt the 

Stukele cabin, whcrc I have been for two monthq 

and h&= th~t I had been for about six months at 

Creeton. I pduoe my record hook, which shows I 

received, n signal, Be ready for 206 pnssenger-train, 

the doan Leeds express, at 6.47, Train on line at 6.50. 

It passed my cabin nt 6.52, rind at 6.52, ns that train 

wns pnsrjng my cabin, I mived five beats on my 

telegwph bell, which meant line blocked from the 

Ahhotta Ripton'enbin. I thcn mn to my bell and 

gave oue hest and unpqgcd my needle, nnd the 

needle was then pegged over £mm Ahbotts Ripton, 

which m-t that the line was blocked between me 

and that plnce. By that time the expresa had p&. 

If I had received the five bents n few seconds mner, 

I could have thrown my signnl np to "danger" nod 

shown a red light from my hnnd-lnmp to the engine- 

&W$. I .knew ndthing of any collision having 

happened previously to my rnziving five beats fmm 

Abbotts Riptou. I had no occnsion to stop nny 

tmins before 6.52, nnd therefore did not find any 

defect, in the working of ~y signnls.. To sscertnin 

wheLher my down-distnnt-aignnl wns at dqer, being 

n~spicioua because of the awther, I sent n mnn to it 

to see, ns I h d previously had trouble for that reason. 

On the 8th or 9th of December last, at Creeton, I 

could not work my distant-signal properly, in con- 

sequbnee of the snow nnd. fmst in tbe morning. 

When the mnn, Charlee \Vnmen, wham I had sent to 

my distnnt-signal, cnmc hack, I ,all64 out, asking him 

altether my distant-signnl was nt danger, and he mid 

"Ycs, it is at daosr." He did not tell me heth her he 

'hnd done nnythiog to it I could not sce'my up- 

distnntsipd on that night ns I usunlly could, because

I like m see it nrta in before I leave. I6 is doe at Ute form of a $k'e of ica. In some place this pip 

Retford: at I joined the general manrgefs attained n diameter of abut 8 inchw. It8 aeight 

specid tnin at RacfOrd, .-h& the spot where wan meaanred in two r-ceh In one ease, betwean 

the noeident mumed about 3 n.m. At G~aothm two polas, the weight of lee wna estimated to be a ton 

I. left the in which I had been riding, and md a half, but I do not know the number of wires : 

wenton the en&e, so as to he able to see the atate in the other a-, 16e weight upon n single wire was 

of t h sign.& and &lepph along the line. I found about 200 lbs., in a length of about 80 yards. The 

the. sip& working &iefwtorily d1 the way to stom was nmmpaoied by a gsle of wind, which 

Peterhrn'; it was snowing st that time. The shatW the poles in hundreds. The effect upon 

telepph ~ires wern hrnken down in many pincer. the wires was to hrenk Lhem in thonmds of 

I saw no snow falling. On appronching Wood Walton plaw. That covers the disttict hetwmn Huntingdon 

I fonnd the ip dint,d4gml at ?rill right." I pre- and Peterborn'. Ihe Great Weatem, the Midland, 

mmed that it ougllt to h:we been at "dsnger:' and and the London and No~th-Western Railways were 

I,mpped enpine st the cnbin. The homdgnd aEected by the stoppage of telegrsphic communicrtion 

atss at 4' danger," n d I asked the signalmnnahy the by the storm. 

&stanhiznnl wm not at-"danger." His lever wss, Charles Edmund OIdman (sworn). 1 reside in 

he &d, in the pitiw for "dnnger," -and he did not Chnrch Street Spnlding, and nm sutgeon to the 

appear to know but wbat his signal nrss at ''danger" Groat Northern ,&mpany for thnt district. I left 

There wnl a signal-fitter presenk named Owen, whom Peterhrn' at 6.20 p.m. on the 21st Jsnuq, in the 

I told to go and pot the diitnnt-sigml to Udanger." up Sootch express It waa snowing very heavily 

ARer reporting the shte of this signal to the general indeed. I h d previously started from Spdding, and 

mnnnger, I went m the acme of ae neeident, and had chan,d trains at Petetboro'. I noticed nothing 

found the down'stnrting-signs11 at "all right." As the betwcen Peterboro' and Abbotts Ripton I rode in 

lines were all blocked, I did not tmuble about it. n aecond-elaes avringe about the middle of tho tmin 

I never knew, during 30 years, n single instanceof the and in the end compnrlment. There were two passnow 

praventing n signal frnm showing the proper acngem with me, one of whom was the valet of the 

indication. Some years ago, when parts of the tail- Russian Ambassador. The first thing I experienced 

way were mowed-up, I did not see any aignol impeded waa heiog thmwn fmm the seat upon which Iwna 

to that dew by the snow. A very deep snow only lying into themins of M. Lelich. . I sfterwards found 

would hnry the wires. On the night of thc 21st myself on tho pand, md when the -h had msed 

I noticed .that the snow hnd ndhered to the wires. I crawled out on my hands and knew Finding then 

I do not reooUect a ens^ of necident on the Great that3 wss not much hurt. I attended to' my fellow 

i.. Notthern Railwny thro~h the snow, nor on any other passeogers. HnFing pl+ the rdet at the foot of 

rsilway. Thc wei&ting of the wires or -a would the signal-box, I obeerved the down erptessnpprodi- . 

eqoally affect the sig~sls. I never hod a. report of in& and rushed up into the signal-box ssd mid to the 

signals being affected by mow. I have not been. the Bigoalmao, "Why on earth hare you not blockcd 

permn to whom such report8 would he made; they the line and stopped that train?" This was just aa 

would go to the superintendent's ofiec, who would the second collision oceunwl : and the signalman 

deal wirh.the matter. The last witncw Pallinder, replied, "I have, sir; look. they have come against 

atends to the machinery for working the signals. their aignalsS' He pointed at the same time to the 

The mow woald he m m likely to bo shaken off the dids to show that he had blocked the line, but I did 

arm than off the :wirep, hut. if the signale were not not notice what couditiou they were - is. I-went 

wotked fmm "all right," then the m might he fixed down again on the line to render further onsishce, 

'by the snow. ' and quarter of an hour or 20 minutes later I went 

(Mr. Cackshott here stated he had hd reporb of again to the nignd-box, and noticed only one lever 

'imperfect signal8 during. mowstmq but uerer e~sea down, pulled over from the fonvrud to thebackward 

of erroneous ones. The cases am \p rare of im- position ; the mt were ell in the forward wition.. 

pfect signals.) The only signal-post I notioed was the homesigml 

. Jnnres Radcliflc (sworn). I am tel-h mginee~ towarda hdoo, and I a white light from the 

md superintendent on the Gtent Northern Bailnay, hack of the lamp. 

and have hcen 60 for 5$ years Prior to that I was John McDionnid (mvom). I am D gnsrd in the 

engineer. to the Magnetic Telegraph Company for Great Northern Company's service and have ken LW 

I1 years. I have had great erpeticnce in the main- 14 yem, and for the whole time I have been ecnning 

tanance of telegraph wires, and tho effect of snow aa head guad with the fast knins fmm Edinbnr h to 

upon them. On the night of the 21st I was mused London. On the 21st Jsnoary I left ~dinhnr& at 

up snd told thst no neeident had murred on the line, 10.31 am., one minute late; got to York at 3.29 pm., 

raid thnt all the telegmph-wires south of Ponton had and loft st 3.48, three minhtoa late. We were checked 

fallen down. Fonmn is 25 miles north of Peterboro'. two or three timw hy ~iguds between York and 

I came up to Peterborn' nnd found the wires cmted Peterborn', and reuhed the latter place at 6.19, md 

more with ice than &h snow ;,this was from l'onton left agnin at 624, six minutes late. I found a little 

to Peterborn'. The anow or ice round the wires was snow Orst in coming to G-tham. On leaving 

in. some ase. a inchcs in dinmeter. I did not go Peterborn'my tr$n mnsistedof anengme andtmder,~ 

further south, for the communication wne maintnined. hd-vm, n seeond-eloan cnrrisge, a&&elnsp carriage, 

I never knew but one occnsion, in 1866, where the two compite, three fitat-class, a second-doss, and a 

dsmagg done to the wires wns anything like m brwk-carr+tcuvehieles.. I rode in the front breakoxten& 

; then it wna grester. . The damage wns van next hehind the tesder. I looked outafter leaving 

not done by the wind, but by the snow only in this Peterborn'. I clewed the whdow frnm time to time, 

rase; on the previvus occasion it was donc hy ,the hut os fast sa I cleared it the anow came on win. 

wind. .. . I snw one or two signale Bfer leaving Pe~boro'; bot 

William Henry fie- worn): I m division81 no others until the collision murd. I am dot.8~ engineer to the Post Office Telegnyh Department. that I did not eee Holme signals, but I did not sea the 

On the evening of the.21st a storm, accompnnied with signals at Coningtoo, Wood Waltob, or Abbotts 

mow, commenced at the Bristol Channel, and pro- Ripton. It is my impression thnt we went into the 

mrded in a narth-eastetly direction, embracing a t d oml train f i speed on, the usual aped of the train 

of cauntty of about 40 miles in hrdtlr,-lessiog the Itdid not ?cur to me at tbe time eat them wss any 

English mnst about The Wash It vonted its chief necessity forelnckeningspeed. The weather decidedly 

fury in the tsaot of oolrntry between Birmingham and does affect our running. I never eaw a heavier snow 

Huntingdoo. Its ch-teristic waa thia, thnt the than that which fell between Peterhorn' and Abboh 

tcmpenrtum of the vim was below the temperature =pton on that night. I have heard thnt signals e.10 

. cf the Rir nnd the snow, so thnt when the snow fell linble not to nct well in suowstorms. Itmur practice 

u p the wires it froze md dhered to the wires in to run more cautiously in bad weather, and, we havo

. ..I 

: . . 

metimes to scribe time lmt to mow or fog. I witneaseh I did not go out to the a.@ 

s-muld have crpeted the enginedriver to exedae hecaum 1 hnd only just got home and .had my sopm* 

mom antion in keeping a keen laoka~xt nnd alackon-. Clark and I Iaro never spken about sign& gettiq,s,,L. 

. ;,W ,nod ,,v--- nn wrh R - ni~ht -~ o~~~ 8. ~~- tlm ~~.. 21st -..., 11nd evervMv deed hv~.now. 

~~ 

should be ready for nn emergency. T 

beating against the front of the van, nn 

the drivm's face. I knew nothing until 

doam by the collision and buned 

any of the wreck 

shaken md a 

. .

other two, Marshall hns 'kn at Holme i month 'boro' a message ii- re* to the Scoteh exp& 

or fin reeks. .The boy Wills principally attends to and I might have , vived .it, but it is not booked. 

the gates and sssistn me. I cnll the PO&, by their I could~stop fighting on the wim It did not occur 

surnames. I never head the boy qlling these men. to me when the stahon-master informed me nhont the 

' Msrsball's ehristian nnmo is Thomns. 1 went a 8% d the Holme signals that othet signals might 

second time to the signal-&bin to nsk thc signalmm bo'in the samc condition. There were 16 minutes 

how .l& sigr,llls -c working. If n tmin 'were between the exptoss nnd'the '-1 trains, and two 

late I should know if as I slionld be expntmglhe blockatations, nod I thought the exp- ought to 

trnin. .men I went into the aigndcsbin first I go fmd. I complnined to thestation-master of 

nsked.him how he nceonnted for tho coal-train running fighting on the w:m, with a view to bhdwing thst 1 

paat'sigo&. EIc mid he could not tell, and pointed could not get throngh what I hnd to do,hcnuse there 

outthat his lowrs wcre in'thc paritionfor "danger." were too many on the circuit. I made nd written 

I did not hcarfrom him U~at he had conversed with report 

anyone on the instruments that the cm1 trnin hnd John T h w HmshoIl (sworn). I am a 'portat 

run past signnls. I lnve been. ncnrly 13 yam nt in the Great Northern Compqny's service and have 

Holme. I hnvc had occnsio" to pull np thc'exgresres. k n m for a month to-day at Holmc shtiotian. I 

X coal.+zn has hrokcn down; I don't..know that know the lad porter at Holme; his name is .Wills. 

trains have mn..psst signals. I cannot say what 'He has dlcd me by different nemes. I heaid 

punishment I might have had if I hnd stopped 'the Osborne toll Mr. Gregory thht the signnls would not 

bproos. I did not think of heink fined. Our in- work. Mr. Geegory Twtehed the signals; and seeing 

&ructions are to work the trnins properly; avoiding they did not work properly he sent for the men. I 

delnys. 1.h.v~ never hen censured for atopping the taw there was a white light instead of n red one, 

expresses; hut they were very different mions to and I knew it wns bnse of the snow. After tbat 

this. - It .is not the duty of my& or the signalman, I wns attending to other trnins and things in the yard. 

when thetrain has run pst our sipinlqto telegraph %by Wills I saw in the portere' room &r all 

the fnet to the station st the immedinta rear. I have the down wins had gone away. I .saw the Scotch 

heard 'Wit aiphlrnen fight for the poisession of the erpress pm, hnt I don't know where the boy Wills 

telegraph .circuit. I mu)' hove heaid the Holme was then. 'About a few minutes before 7. I saw J 

'si&;nalmr& spk of that, hut he has .not made 8 Wills taking the tickets of a train. I did not hmr 

re* I do not know tbat I have made a relj.rt on 'or a& the station-master send Wills on B m-. 

'the subject. I think I ahonld have:Wn censured ' Silm Brndshmo (sworn). I am a aipalmno.m 

if,I:had stap?d the expm after having meived the employ'of the Grmt Northern Compmy at 

line clmr from Conin(rton. I do not think that.1 Ahbott. Ripton, and how been there a twelvemonth. 

1. would have been jostificd in stopping the express on I was on day duty on the 21at Jmuq, and left at 

r that night. The platelayera came on duty as saon 6.7 p*., and went to my cottage, shot 200 yards 

. as they conldhave been expeetcd. Xy impression is from the cabin. I heard the fimt collision, bnt I dia 

thnt Narriou was at his signal beforethe Scoteb not know at 6rat what it m. I ww toliF there had 

dxprws pna8,cd. - Maniott and lldason shwld certnidy been a collision by WnWing, a porter. I' at ones 

, have seen the Manchester expm pancl.. ,My idea is went to the box, and =bed it about 6.57 or 6.58, 

that 1,should have hen eensuredif I hadnnnneasarily jnat after the seoond mllision. I saw at the cabin 

'stapped the express ; npd.1 did' not thii it necessary that dl the levera eicept No. 10 W in the foiaard 

. on that night. I have. had complaints m& verbally position, and I alsoeawtbt thetolegmpbinshments . 

'fo'me by Ushrne ns regsrda the aiiculty of sending were at "Train on line" both for the.np and down 

,on trains by the instruments, but have never taken linw. I saw Johnson, and h6 asked me whether.1 

notice of those complaints. would wnd the m-ea a h t tho accident I askea ' 

: 

Osbome (recnlled). The mal train, m. past my .him what m-s he had sent, and he @id none 

at 6.21, the levers of my home .and stosling hut he had been trying to do so. I told him I would 

wals being at danger. I then called myaelf far try to send the messages. I only thought of working . . 

Nr. Gmgory. Re anle immediately, and stayed i on the talking instruments I sent m%- to Bantminute 

Or two. I told him about the cod train, and ingdoq nod Peterboro', to the dect that 156 had run 

.hewcut awny at once. I sent on the speaking in- into 175 conl, nod that they should send doctors nnd 

drumcnt to Ahhotts Ripton,, "$c has run past help,-at 7.5 to Iiuntiogdon nud 7.9 to Peterboro'; 4 

'a@&" at 6.26, referring to the coal train. 'The and I was, under the impression those wm the 5mt 

'mesy.8emight have bean scen atPeterbom',S+Neots, messages that leR the cabin. It m shoot hpo 

HunBngdon, Ahbotts Ripton, and three boxes ntNew minutes before I got the instrument, which mns 

England ynrd, if they had been looking at the instm- enpyed. As soon us I got the others stopped, I 

menb. I cannot recollect that the station-moster broke in with ST., a special message, nnd then in- 

. . 'exprd his iutention of sending for the plnteln ers formed thosc on the cirmit that ,+r were to keep off" 

,My intention in tolegraphingto AhbottsRipton as%.did: for Ahhotts Ripton, where there had been a serious 

ME to inform the signalman that I had intendedsbnnt- collision. Johnson wrote the mwsagm which I' sent 

ingthe con1 train nt Halme. It- before the down previously ti my going in@ the cabin. I' got no 

trninspaased through that Mr. Grego~y mme into replies from Euntiogdon or'l'cterboro' beyond the 

my cabin.' When Mr. Gregory came np the wnd acknowledgments from both.plneos. It +W snowin 

time Be mid that the up home-signal was not working hardest about G 'o'clde&; when I went 6ff duty: f 

properly. I don't think he &id an thing else, and he h c had no tmuhlo with the aignala. I'havi never 

. ' stayed ohly. a very little while. d e did not discuss found any diioulty h sending .my mesinges bemnae 

.stopping the express at Peterboro'. I think that of them Xi too many persans on the circuit. The 

:Mr. Gregory m not in the cabin whan I reeeived mcss~c sent nt 7.5 ww hcnded FJ, meaning .6.45. 

line clcar froni Couington for the caal train. I should I was able to send the mewge'nlmost' immediately. 

'not tclcgrnph to a station in the rmr when a train mn Johnson wm confused at the time, and I felt I; W 

'past signnls. I received notiee at 5.60 that the express more able to transmit the memge than he. F.J: was 

'had left Grantham nt 6,s. and might hove knqwn in Johnson's hondwriting; At 6.58, when .I entered 

,j therefore that the exprws had not left Peterhoro' the abin, Johnson upped to he doing his bwt,to. 

den the coal trnin ran pnst my signals. The Scotch send the messnge. It is usual to wriU,down a m%- 

?expray was Inte at Holma: Mr. Grego~ gave me no sage before'sending it. . .. , ,.. 

'instructions when he m e into the-box. Ihave Jolmson, sipalmnn (recalled). I l& nome"'& 

:wmplnined of fighting on the dres to'%. Greg.0~ collection ofhnving rudg five bob to give the%lock 

many timw. The men m not playing trick% but -to Stskeley. I rempmber Bmdshaw coming intothe 

.&h wishing to send his mesinge first. An S.P: cabin and trying to send a mesrage. I first tded .- 

kght to stop all t1w.t; we should give-up. the instru- to send the message without writiuz it. That would 

nm~t at oucc. I should have. received from Peter- be two or thrcc minutes after tho firat collision, and 

. B4

. 

before I sent the five hell. to.Stnkeley. I put the 

code rime nt the head of the message at which I 

first tried to send it. 1 -4 the sign S.P, md if 

I could bare pined attention it would hare been 

visible to crerymy on the circuit from l'eterbmo' 

to St. Xeots. I kept trying now nnd then to send 

the message; the plusengen wished m e to tdegrnph 

to their friends nnd one thing nnd nnollm. I d ed 

Bdshnw to send the me-lac WM cool. I hnve 

previously found difficult? in sendin mossngcq hut I 

haw not emplained, for we cm't d 7 use the instrn- 

went at onec.. 1 hnve ner-e~ complained to my 

nupion abut it We don't have inuch con- 

vemtnon. I btd been ndvised of the Sooteh 

exprss from Esscndine nncl l'cterbom'. It left 

Esscndine at 6.1, snd I was infumed at 6.17. I can- 

not my why I did not hew of.it hef- It left 

Pcterboro' at 6.24, nnd I was informed of it at 6.31. 

TLe delay would lx bccanse other people were using 

the circuits. We would. never pot S.P. to a train 

nlwsngc. I did not think it wmng t? receive infor- 

mntion that the express and con1 tmms \vem so near 

end, other, hecnuse of the block nnd signals. The 

levers of 'the sipnls could not he altered after the 

collirion occumd. I rcnmher Mr. Usl~er coming 

into the cnbin. I?" might have asked me wvhether 

I bad blocked the lincs. Holme 'told me thut the 

coal trnin had run pnst his signals, with train on 

line I did not recollect that nwenge when last 

examhed. The platelnyers Lorl just gone ont fogging , 

nt thnt time. I did nothing in conseqnena! of receiving 

the mesage that the coal-train had run by 

signals. It is not an ordinmy thing for trains to 

mn-t signals. I did not send to Huntingdon that 

the cdabtrain hnd run past My lint duty would he 

to block the line to Stukelay, and iho reason I did 

not do so was tl~nt I had never drenmed of the down 

min. I did not know until tho Stulieley man told 

me at wlrpt time I had blacked the line' I imme- 

diately put the siguals to danger. I Bd nd get train 

on line for the express. I could not because the in- 

slruwcnt wea pinned over for the cod-train to shunt. 

It is ncomlnon thing when toleopphiig a tmin tondd 

some observation M I' hewy," "light," and so forth. 

When1 hcnrd the message "bout the cod-train I knew 

that the Conington and Wood Wnlton, as well as my 

own signals, would be agninst the express. I had not 

the least notion thnt there was dnngcr of a collision 

between the express nud con1 tmins. The Essendinc 

signalmnn would hnve to telegraph to sir stmtions 

before Ainhotts Ripton of the appmneh of thc express, 

. r, R ~epmte m-e toench plnee, tllmngh two circuits, 

and that would account for the time betwccn the 

lqiiog of the expross and my rewipt of the informntion. 

I did not know that the first collision hnd obstructed 

the down line ; I supposed it might be obstructed, 

though I conld not sec. I did not giro line 

clem to Wood Wnlton because tho cod-train was not 

in the sidii. In fine weather I wonld haw done su. 

Rose (recnlled). The reawn I didnot show n red 

light from my hand-lnmp to thecxprcsa when I had 

not received line dent for the cod-train was because 

I was using the lamp for drswing down a trnin of 

empties. I hnve never oxperieneed diUicnlty in 

sending messages owing to lighti?g on thc \vim. 

,The Scotch express poss$rl my cnbrn nt 6.40, and et 

that timc there was p tmin of emptias on thc dom 

line. Thcre was n tmin prccerling tbc train of 

empties which had not bcen clcawd from Cooington, 

' and I was dmwing.the former t.:niu within the sigonls. 

If I hd aJ.becu at liberty I wauld hwe shown n red 

light from my hand-lnmp to tbc Scoich exp~css. 

It would ha better if I had n spenking instrument nt 

Wood Wnlton; we should know the wherenhouts of 

trains earlier. It would facilitate tha working.. The 

train of empties nns stoppcd Ey my fixed signals. 

Walter Blatch (mow). 1 nm n telc,mph clerk in 

$he service of the Groat Northern Colupallg statirmod 

nt Peterhom'. I hnvc imn them sereu yenrs. 

I was on dutx on the night of the 21st Jnnunry. 

117 uutv wns to send messnges nnd fonvnra state- 

ments about the timaa of trjios. With 

the hotcb eXpleS3 

lenving Newark at 

next left Grnntbam 

fomd the iuformn 

Huntingdon by Beparate m-gea At thii G&

indiute an S.P., Fherytbing should give way to an sud , hare been M for 20 pm I never saw such a 

S.P., hut if thesignals have tobe put up the instrument night as thnt of the 2lat Janurry. The coal trnin 

must be LeR. At 6.49 I telmanhwl the Imdr exprw was shuntinc as I m o UP. 1 went into the cahin nnd 

on to the north box, &lyock+d nbout n minutc. got my fog-signnl.?, nod aaw thc collision :IS I ww 

I did not bczr or see any wdiittg Iwlwtrn 6.47 nncl Iknviug thu a,hin. l Iknd inte~cled to p to th~ up 

6.57. Idid not see the lottcrs A.%, nor S.P. nor N.G. distant-signnl to nttend to it. If thc snow imlxded 

Abbotts Ripton 1,s oommuniation with thonorth box. the working I dlonld hnve shaken it off, if I conltl, or 

The m~tth box ~ould ho thc propcr box for uly ono put dowe ibpsi:nnls. It snowal a littlc hdom I 

wishing to commltnicnto wit!, tlm stntion-mnster .to wont to ten, over IB:II~-past 5, sncfwheu I came out 

address; it is the order. 6.57 wns the lirst time I the coal-tmin ~2 shuuting. 1 would not p out 

heard Abbotts Riptot1 alling me. North Huntingdon fogging unloss tho mow was very severe. IT I nm 

wns working his instrument at 6.49, and I know it wnntcd I nm sent for nitor going hcmo from my dnfs 

becam of llis Imk, which he showcd tnc. I got work. I remninnl in the house \vit.hont knowing 

Tmin on tint for the express from Olford nt G.%, iv1a.d was thc weather uotil I >vns fetched out' 

then 1 would give Bc rendy to north box; I would Frellerick Rrmgc (sworn). I am district locomotive 

then make the entries in.the book, h ready 6.44, On suporintendent nt Peterborn'. I heard the engineline6.46 

; then I gnvc On lino to the northbox nt 6.46, driver of ihc oml-train my that ha lost some timc 

snd ~ould mnke the entry, time it pawd me 6.49, linn owing to wnshing out The engine had been underclear 

to Offord 6.49, nndclcnr from Hnntingdon north going repaim and the shm could not be got up until 

. at 6.49 dsn. There were no entries mndc hy me bctwcerr four or five minutes late. When he got into tla coal 

6.46 and 6.49, and ngnin butwccn 6.49 nnd 6.57. Aftcr yard his lino ~vns obstruetnl, and Ire had to be turned 

6.49 I mccivcd On line from Olford nl 6.49 for thu into nnothcr line, and hd then to go buck to his tcnin. 

down Manchester goods. I gavc north box Attention In doing this, owing to the points being clogged by 

and the Be ready nt 6.49. 1 l~nd nlso to attend to my snow, the cnginc was turned down thc wrong md. I 

semaphore signnls. The Manchester goads arrived bolicvc Bmy, the driver,mnde same report about losing 

at 6.57. I put my signals up for an up tmin, and the time I hnvo known owl trains stnrt late. Time 

went to my instmments ngnin. To get a trait, through is sure to be inquiry in such cases. if in the pnrtithere 

must he 18 opemtions, besides booking the timo cular cnso, I found the hest Lad been done, I should 

of pnasiug. Besides I have to work two skp~nls, caution the people conoerned. I think the slorm of 

dropping them and raising them. My nttentlon is the 21st Janunry wau the worst I recollect. I 

. 

hnve 

allcd to the express nt 6.44; 1 got linc clear at 6.49, had crpcricnee of nmning in fog and snorrstorms 

nod dr~ring the tiliw I nm cithcr giving mewes or If the signals nrc not distinct, gmtcr care should be 

wnitingfor them. Between giving hl.Q.and receiving token, and spced reduccd ; but if they could be men 

the mesMge woulcl be nbout six moments. I did not S driver might bc justified iu not doing so, simply 

give 11.9. at 6.57, but nsked for t.he code time. Immose they might be giving woug indications 

Harry Gurney (sworn). I nm n signnlmnn in the Thornas Calbwf (sworn). I hare been 21 years 

employ of the Grent Northern Cotnpnny, at the in the Gmt Northern Company's serriee, and at 

St Ncots station. I hnve been there nbout thrw l'eelorborn' eight years I communicate with nll 

months. I hn~e been n signnlmnu two yearn and stations town to St..Ncots by telegmph spesking inthrcc 

monthg. I wns on duty on the 2lst Janunry. struments. I produce my recod book, whicl~ show 

At 6.24 I rewired an express from Peterbow' that thc coal-tinin .pm& me (in the' Creseent 

, and nt 6.37 I reecivcd it from Holme. Again at 6.41 juuction cabin) nt 6.5 pm. on the 2lst Jnntmry. 

I received an express fmm Peterbom'. Next at 7.47 The express, 156 up, followed at 626; thc next 

I got 84 goods from Huntingdon. About 6.47 I wns 139 express, which at 6.39; then n slow 

noticed Abbotts Ripton ealli~~g Huutingdon. He passcngcr at 6.45. A Id who with mc told 

gave him S.P.; it w a s to the south enbin. After me nboot 6.50 thnt Abbotrs Ripton wns kdling ' 

Abbtts Ripton gavc his S.P., he nddnl 'LFrom;" Huntin@on ; Ire wss looking out for nuother mewxc. 

Runtiugdon stopped him and mid, “Colic." I NUS I would expect thnt messng1D"c from 6.47 to6.53. Tile 

then called to nttend to tlw Scotch express. I saw Id told me about 7 o'clock ho thought aorncnothiog 

mbie until 7 o'clock, when I mw tho 1nessltgc thing war the mnttcr as Ablmtts Ripton was sending 

'c Send doetorsand holp, &C.' I happened to be looking nn S.P. I had no ti&e to attend to it myself. 1 

at the clock nt 6.47. I sl~ould think it was about belicvc the S.P. message wns "Send doctors nod 

6.50 when I wns called about the Scotch %pross assistance; &c" The cod-tmin would tmvcl nbut 

The word code would mean the time on thc clock. 20 nnd the express 45 miles a4 how. The former 

John Jolly (sworn). I nm a plntelaycr on the would get to Holme in 21 minutes, and could bo 

Great Northern llnilwny at Abbotts Ripton. I wns shunted in four minutes. I mid nothing nlrout 

on duty on the 2lst January, nnd wcnt honw to gct shunting the cod-train at. Holmc ; I thought it 

tca shut f pnst 5, and nbout 20 minutcs to 6 csmo uoneecssnry. We regularly let coal trsins stnrt in 

out ngain. I did nothenr my down tmin coming, so thnt wny. It would bo for the signalman nt 

I wcnt in again. It was snowing very lid. I s n ~ IIolmc to decide if the c&l-train should be shunted 

the cod-train coming, nnd I clcared the pints of thcrc. There ~ nample s timc sod to spnre for tho 

snowto ennble it to shunt. I wan in the signal abin cod-tmin to get to Holme, snd be shuqtcd beforc the 

whe" the first collision oeeurrcd. I went into the exprcss came up. It was perfwtly enfc under those 

enbin to get my fog-signals. I mw the signnlmnn uimumstnnccs to work the cod-twin in that way. 

cnlling on the driver of the corl-tmin to mnko hnstc ITslw (recalled). Whcn I went into the cabin on 

nnd get iotd the siding, thnt the Scotchmnn was the nightof the midcot I mw the signalmnn working 

, waiting nt Wood Wnlton. While l was renohiog tho the instruments. I naked him whether hc hnd blocked 

fog-signals the collision occu~ml. Atbr thc collision the down lad. Stukelcy was not mentioned. Whcn 

' . I Nent to the Abbotts Ripton porter to sak him to I hcnrd thnt ha had blockyl the lines I thought it wue 

assist. As swa ns the collision occurred l anw tho F&. 

aignnlmnn go to the tnlking instrumcut, nnd htkc Itold Janrer OsLorn (swom). 'I mu a tolegrnph lad in thc 

of it I did not see him wriknnything down. I tlm Grcnt Nortlmn Compnnjr's service, and hnve been 

wcnt awny. Johnson only aid thc Scotchmnn was so about 15 months. I have been doing duty in the 

into the eonl train. I went up thc linc to stop thc Crescent box, on the south of Peterbow', with 

Manchester trnin, md snw the distnnt-signals showed witness Colbert, who is the signdmnn. I was on 

amhito light. John Hall eonld be mnt foain~ by dnty them on the 21st Jnnuncy, nnd wntehing the 

thc Abbotts Ripton signnlmnn. Johnson nskecl me tclagrnph instruments. 1. 8nW Abhotts Ripton (A.13.) 

to gv fogging when I spoke to him nbarrt thc points trying to all KG., IIuatingJoq ; i: %vas tlbout 6.52, 

being elenr for thc cod trnin. nn4 I told the signnlmnn A.11. could not gct 1.1.G.'~ 

'John if& (sworn). I am n plntclnycr in thc ntluntion for two or thrcc minutcs. I ERW nuLhing 

Gmt Northmm Compnny's sarviec nt Abbott. llipton but H.G. given by ,YR. until I iutcrfered with C.S., 

. . 

9YWd .I c '

' 'q 

when Ahbotts Ripton gave &P. 1 then left oft, and i~terrnpted oa paid what followed. He waJa 

Ahbotts Ripton began to call KG. win, and P.E., =ed with the block instruments L .?.l 

mcaning Pcterboro' office. I did not notice djthing Tha Huntingdou South box wan aleo engages &&l 

else on the instruments until the message, Send for the block instruments at 6.44,6.46, 6.49,6.52, &m:: 

doctors and assistaoce." The S.P.'s are very special 6.59, 7.4, in addition to signalling and n~ahing en* 

and rare at our cab&. We do not take S.P!s in onr in his hook& 

cahin, hut Iahould see one pssning tlmmgh. 

KO one on the circuit appears to have obsened 

Mr. ~'ig,uotr (recaUod). I have emmined the books interferewe, except the Yaxloy signalman, who &tea: 

at the r:u'ious telegraph bosa on the circuit with he noticed an .intemption between 6.45 and §do,..' 

reference to the calling nnd mrmp anlncelcd with this is doubtless the time when lad Osborn of the: 

the iceidcut, and mnde the following mport to the Cr-nt junction took lmesvion of the cirsoit as 

supcrintendcnt of the lino. I have questioned the heteinbefom mentioned. 

signnlmen on the circuit R. to Abbotb Ripton having I cannot trace anorher csse of anyone interfering 

called EIsntingdoe at 6.47, and enn get no more with the instruments, except the instnnce quokd by 

evidence than what hns hcen already rcccived. S.P. Mr. ULAtch. wben he trnnmitted the trnina 

is re~,mrded as mn~ethin: urgent, and a ~ignalmnn 

Yours obcdie&, 

should tnkc it nt once. If there wem fast trains F. P. Coeksbott, Esq., Aaros Rooon. 

nassine thev must hnvc nttention. A sidman'8 Kinds - h. 

kmm& ought m h ~ve induced him tske an John Corble (sworn). I am inspector at peter&*' 

S.P. hrn Abbotts ltipton instanter. I should think slation in the tiervice of the Grest Northern CompJ,' 

the way iu which Muddieon accounted for his time and have bean inspector for 11 ywm, 8 years at 

between 6.46 sod 6.49 wns' snilieienf though I mn- Peterborn'. 

sider an S.P. 

I was on duty on the evening of 

rneggllge might and ought to have been 21st January, md sent forwnrd the Scohh exp1- pt? 

receir.ed at thnt time. The tmin in question having 6.25 at the ststion. I gave the guard the signnl.6' 

been tltrec minutes passing between O50rd and sta~t I did not know what trains Were preoeding it; 

Buntingdon, nnd ooly half a minute required for thnt would rest with the CFesecnt signalman. 

recording, at about 6.47 he would be watching for 

There" 

was nothing unusual about the leaving of the soot&'! 

the train passing the distnnt-signal, hot S.P. being expreas; it was seven minutes late. I saw the tele ' 

so unusunl from Abhotts Ripton, he onght to have ph clerk, but made no inquiry about trains h: 

been auxious to know what it was. The signals are gut, nor was it my duty to 40 m. ~e did not W.: 

the signnlmnn's first considerstion. He ia on duty me of any message. I did not see the coal-train 

12 hours, but there are slack times in the day. I im I see a semaphow rum lowred,andthen start a traintrain;* 

not sure that Huntingdon could have received the it is my duty not on the Creaeent signal. C 

S.Pamessage before 6.49., even if he hnd prepared 

HmryOakley(mporn). I am General >Inn ar of&# 

hims'ell~ st once to tske it The message, " Express Great Northom Railway and have been so %r 

ran into the coal-train," the particular message which 

was sent, could be tn!cen in one minute. 

years; 25 years in the scrvice of the company. The :.: 

Scotch express wasstopped at Doncaster. I wa. thare:'?; 

The train is ordered never to gc tlvough that statio$:2, 

Report r e f d to in Mr. Piggott's Evidence. at more than ten miles an hour. It stopped to .t&s;,;. 

up Lord Colvillc, and the detention wss not mom:,!: 

Gaear Noarmm4 RNLWAT. 

than hall a minute. We stop trains two or thrae? 

Signal Department, times a weak to necbmmodate the public, but I riiSih$ 

Retford, February 12th, 1876. state positively that the offim never stop trains. or 

their own convenience. There.were directore Beeingy 

Tcleyraph Circuit, St. Neots to Pderhd. the Corparation at Doncaster; we thought it only" 

Sir, 

right to stop snd take them up. l have never beard$ 

I have &day Gisited St Nsots, Orod, Hun- of any single instnoce of a signal being so nEe~t@''~~ 

tingdon, Yaxley, nml the Cresoent, Spitnl, and Weat- by mow aa to give a noag indication to s drivei;!? 

w d junctions. [These m all comprised in the Like all mechanical arrangements, sign& nre liable?; 

circuit ; New England north is not] 

to fnilure, and an imperfect aignal might 

,p I nm unable m trace aoytLing on the cirwit thet given. A formd rapt signed by every sigaqlmq $ 

?nr d~onld have hindered the S.1'. measage being promptly is wnt to the supcrintendcnt, stnting if a signal h& 

despatched from Ahbotts Ripton, except Greacent f&d,andwhy, nnd acmmpauied by s rcport from the:;:{ 

junction interfering while Huntingdon was being signal-fittor explniniog the defect. In December the ij 

culled, and Pcterboro' transrnittiu~ - the trains ss lute defect wns that the arm when .moved for danger did::,: 

6.53. 

not go quite to n right augle, but there was nothing to' 

No. 203, down express, passal St. Neots at 6.41, led us m suspect tbnt n signnl might give a mug 7. 

snd vns telegraphed to Westwwd at 6.44. 

indication. The great aim of .railway companies k':f 

NO. 150, left P ~~C~~OTO* 6.4% was to keep time, aod our efforts are exertcd to proservd.'d 

niennlled to Holme nt 6.52. and to Huntidedon " nt punctuality and aafet~, nnd the former should alwiyd5 

6.33. 

give wny to the htter. There is no doubt thot iu fogL%. 

The ooly interruption1 can discover, in addition to and snowstoms drivers kcep their trains under sou-a't 

that roferred to by Mr. Blatelr in his evidence, ie trol. Tlle danger of signals showing wrong indica- .; 

that telepph lad Osburn in the Creacant junction tions was quite nunpprelreoded. We bad eonfidenm . 

box statcs he notid someone calling Huntiog- in the block system in preserving an intenal of space," ,: 

don nt about 6.50; he' stopped them md began and thought the sign& might bo rolied upon. The' !.: 

to all AbbottsBipton, nt the some time giving the signals which failed were tbose which would be used .:: 

C~seent junction code call ''C.1." Ahhtts Kipton under other systems of working than the block. ,d:.::replied 

hy giving S.1'. Osburn then gave up the never hwd from anyone in our scrvice that a sip, ; 

circuit, and someone recommenced calling Hunting- hnd giveu a wrong indication ; we know they wor ed .., 

don, and continued calling for some time. 

stiffly. It would undoubtedly beprudent when sign&$:: 

Oslmn did not we any further interferenea, but mny be affected to reduce speed; but this was a nod::?. 

observed thnt whocver was cnlling did not resdily danger, und we arc alrendy considering how nu&'> 

gain 1Inntingdon's attention. 

dangers con be avoid4 under all eircumatsnwe..,i: 

I ntn undw the impression it wan Osbom'e inter- Certainly punctuality should give way to ssfety, 1.: 

posing thot hrrs lmen mfcrred to ns "the intemption.)' but when .you begin to justify uupuuctunlity you..'..: 

167, down g&, lelt Offd at 6.49, but Offord dierrnnge the tratlic, and the rclntive positions of.. 

NUS tmablc to tolegmplt this tmin, owing to tho trnins ought to be, if possible, mnintoined. In wen 

instrnment lming onmd 

of Cog we take off trains (go& trains), and ' 

Signnlmun ~ I of Otrord M stnkn he observed at it might be equally desirable in snowstorme, but I .: 

about 7 pm. some one gave SP, hub he neither hesitate to think of disarran,Gg the traffic We are .,:,; 

. ..A

already rcquua i?y our uviwro .., . .. ..... ... 

the hest means bf prwanting such dnngcrs. The ~nntin~don. l do not think it reaauuuaw ru cr,rr-r 

directors have -ivd mports of ermnwus that the platnlayern at Abbtts~ipton, nRer n hnrd 

signals being exhibitd. With reprd to continnorm day's work, should have kept a look-oat for the 

brake, we hsvqwith other compnnies, experimented weather. Every irregularity of every description, 

with all the known kinds in uso nt home nod nbraaul. and neg)cct on the psrt of foepcn, wonld bc report* 

The result of those t.vinls 6a.c not hcen eommunicnted Thestation-msster at Holme might justly have thought 

.yet to the wmpnny. We have two trains running the erpnsq wuld go forward on the oe(y~.~imi. If 

\rith cootiuuous breaks under different wndjtions of sipb fail, the block system is perhaps worsethan 

gr,dien& We have not sufficient eyerlenw to the time system. hrtsin enbins havo no wnversing 

rely on the vacuum bmsk under all etrcumstances, wire, and on occasions of arcident one wonld he 

owing to t h ~ attaching and dotnchingof enmnges useful, hut'under ordinary circomstancm they would 

Any bre& thnt eau be-used must %fiord great fncility be u n n w where now mbseot. A wnwrsing 

for interchange, and the nttnchment must be perfect, instrument would hc of assistance. Lord Colville wns 

else we should place in the hnnds of tlrivc~ power at Donra%ter on the Compnuy's business , Iu wrd 

which might fail at tljc greatest nced. Then WC have to thc question of edntinuous breaks, tho prnctiec of 

to al~mnge with compnuies with whom we inter- slipping enrrin,g would hnvc to he considered. The 

chanp stock, and to tbat extent the driver must obcy si,malq whatever they we, and then 

breaks must be univct~al. I think no wtnpnny Inis responsibility wnseq. 

has quite made up its mind thnt any knam system . Emh Cdcy (sworn). I am an en$nedriver in 

of continuous hreuks could be universdy applied, the Grmt Northern Company's scmiee; it is 21 year0 

and it would, I think, bo nnwiso for any company to today since I entered the 8crvice ; and I hnve beeo 

furnish it4elf with n prticulnr br& without coo- driving fast trains nhont l5 yens. I muemher the . 

aidedog ioterchnnging companies. I-quite approve of 21st January, whch I left fiterhorn' nt 6.25 pm., 

cootinuons hmkg fully rccognking the necessity for without pnrtie"lnr instructions or warning. The fist 

them. We nrc in the condition of waiting and trying thing that hnppcncd out of the ordinnry wurse wns 

to lindn break worthy of our adoption. The trnin pitching into the wul train. The signals were at 

which,in reference to the Abbotfa Riptoneane, WO have " nU right." I .W nothing but white liglrta all the 

made up for cxpcriment, is as nearly as possible similar way from Peterborn'. I notid the Wocd oddton 

to the original down cxpr&s trnin. Frequently the signals pnrticularly, dl white, distsnt and home. The 

guards nt the ail of a train eaanot hear the enginc's distant-signal at Abbetts Ripton ass n bright white 

whistle for the breaks. The front guard is the head light, not an imperfeet signal, and visible at 600 or 

gumd. The guards would generally be able to sort 700 yanlu. It was snowing very heavily ss I pa9sed 

the lum in five miles ; there may be sometimes 100 Wood Wdtun nod appropched Ahbtts Ripton. WC 

< pnriels to sort. I have not heard of guards being were going €mm 40 to 45 miles an hour, the usnnl 

hindered by luggnge from gctting to their breaks. aped at that point, the same sped that I go with 

The order for men to go out in fop and snowstorms that hnin whatever the weather. I did not think it 

was simply an additionnL procantion. The men newwiry to slacken on acwunt of the wcnther. I 

should hDve stopped to work the aigds if the snow ssw no light fiom the van of the wal-win, nor the 

had kgun before they went home to M; the m& ccul-train itself, bcfom atriking it, which we did with 

should be sent to them, as provision ismade. The full atesm on. I KRS stunnd, bat I recollect the 

clerk in charge of esch station and permanent-way enginc turning over, and then. my getting off it. I 

inspectors are ordered to do this. On the day in wss too much injured to mnkc sny observations ahr . question it is onty said tbat snow was fslling lightly thnt. I got the fire out of the engine ss won as_; 

who" they went to ten, and on tht night food was wuld, with the assistasee of my mate. I did not go 

sent out to the men. If they hnd not gone home to into the signal-eabin:nor ncrw the line, ncithcr did 

tra befora 8.30 they would hnve had something to eat. I notice the signals. I hnvc driven thst train in my 

The driver was not bonnd to reduce his spmd nnless turn sometimes once and sometimes twiee n week. I 

he could not see the signals at adistaneeof 150 yards. have notid n trsin shunt, eomctims at Ymlcy, some . 

IIo could bring his trnin to n stand in 700 or 800 times at Holme, eomctimes at. Ahbotts Ripton, hut . 

perhaps 900 yards on the gradient. Pmnming without knowing what train it was in wrd to its 

the driver of the down expm heard the fog-aignals number. I have never had 4 narrow eseapc of 

1,000 yards from the fouling-point, he might hove running into a coal tmin at Ahbotts Ripton, and 

pll? up. I might ssy that rnc have never hewd of have not hnd conremtions here (Huntingdon Infirma 

tram running past the home-signal after the wnrning ary) about such esenpes. I hnve never anid that nonr 

of the distant-signnl. A speed of 15 miles might Abhotfs Ripton or Holme, I have 'l h~usht" thnt 

have praluced the ssmo effects in r8gnrd to' the trsin. I have not mentioned it to anyone. I never 

position of the wreck. It is possible that n mm mny notice wbt trains go up the Wood Wnlton bank in 

copged with a down train when he wished to front of me. I did npt know on the night of the 

shorn a 1.ed hnnd-light to an up expw, hut he ought nccident that there wns s cod-train in front of me 

to attend to the more urgcnr On thnt ooeasion it which would hnve to shunt to let me pass. I reduced 

' 

wasnoturgent, becaum homighthvethought he could my spd once at Ynxley until I wuld sec the signal. 

rely on hi signals. Them was no undertaking in the I could see the Holme distant-signal 500. or G00 

Great Northern Compnny2sAct of Parliament that they ysrds, perhaps ns far as usual on the night of the 

should lay downs 'sepnrate line of rails for minolal 21st Jnnunry, hut not so clearly as if them had 

t~xflic. We donot think the time hes yet come for ben no snow. On m ordinnry night I can SW 

n third line of rails hchvecn London and Peterlmro'. the Wood Wnlton distant-signal for three-quarters of 

We hrrve 35 miles of third line in ope&ion;and 13 in n milo in p~98ing Conington. On the uight in 

cowtuuction. The third line is used for any down question, I cnught sight of ic at about the same 

slow tmina. ye bnve lntely been considering the nd- diatnncc; the Gnow &cl not inrnfere with my view. 

. 

. vimhility of putting athird lino up this particular bnnk It was snowing very frmt, with big Ankes. 

at Wood Wnlmn, so as toprevent the delay to fast trios. 

Conclzlsion. 

The circumstaqces connected with these two co~lisions have, in the course of the 

above evidence, been clearly brought out; but, in order that they may.be better under- 

stood, it is uccessary to select the principal facts, and arinnge them in their proper order. 

It will then be more easy, in discussing the various questions involved, to deduce the 

C 2

' 

lessons to be learnt from so teniblc an experience; bearing in mind that the pa 

objects of such an inquiry are, not merely to ascertain what individuals am 

ofliccrs and servants of a railway Company may be considered to he tno 

implicated under the system of working in fore, hut also, and more es 

determine the causes which have, directly or indirectly, and in a greater or 

led to the disaster, and, with the aid of all previous experience, the remedie 

in practical railway working, such accidents may most surely he averted, 

safet,y mrcy best he secured. 

unsatisfactorily given, and is not clear; but 

13 minutes in advance of the Scotch-express-train, and the Wood-Walton cabin at 6.31, 

ninc minutes in advance of the Scotch-express-train, and was stopped at 6.41 at Abhotts- :. 

Riptou, where it was timed, and the engine-driver expected to shunt, by a hand-lamp . '2 

from the signal-cabin ; and the signalman, keeping his own signals at danger, and not '.'.? 

givi?g. line-clem to Wood-Walton, instructed the engine-driver to set hack into the -1 2 

up-sldmg. Thc coal-train, protcctcd, as the Abhotts-liipton signalman believed, by his ;.'.!!'. 

own signals, and alsb by thc Wood-Walton sigsals, was heing pushed .back, and had, . .I. 

cxccptmg thc engine, tender, and four or five waggons, got mto the siding, when the . 

signalman, knowing, from the information hc had received by telegraph, what ought to ". 

be the position of the Scotch-express-train, told the engine-driver to make haste, in - . ' 

order to prevent the detcntion of that train at Wood-Walton. As hc was thus . 

clldeuvouring to hurry the cngjne-driver of the .coal-train, the Scotch-cxpress-train . . y: . 

doshed, at 6.44, into the coal-tram at full speed, and with the steam on ; the engine- ..': 

driver of the express-train having seen nothing hut white lights at the Abbotts-Ilipton: .if:>;. 

and Woad-Waltou signals, and having seen nothing of the coal-train before his engine .:.$ 

came into collision with it. It was thus, in the first place, the failurc to act of the ' ':. 

fixed-signals at 13olmc, which caused the coal-tl-aiu to pass that station, where there was . .% 

16 lni~~utcs to spare, and the'rcforc time to shunt it without any risk of delay to the 

e

would otherwise, whilst being shuntcd at Abbotts-Ripton, have received f?om tl~ose 

signals. 

As might naturally be expected, it took somc little time for those who were concerned 

in this first collision to collect their ideas. The down-line as well as the upline was 

hopelissly obstructed, communication lrom the north to the south of ,the d6bn'n was 

difficult, and the storm was very severe. The Abhotts-ltipton signalman is uaalde to 

give a clear account of his subsequent proceedings, hut he appears to have at once placed 

the levers of his down.signals in the position of danger; and there can be no doubt, 

from the evidence of others on the sume telegraph-circurt, that, commencing at 6.45, one 

minute after the collision, he vainly endeavoured from time to time to send a specie1 

mesinge to Huntingdon, to report what llarl happened, and to %k for assistance. He 

did not, however, until eight minutes after this collision, or about 6.5'2, do what he 

ought to have done immediately after pulling over the levers of his down-siguals, give 

five beats on his telegr,aph:bell, to indicdte line-blocked, to the Stukeley clbin, 2 miles 

and 737 yards on the south of hin~; 8nd.w he was doing so-just too late-the down 

Leeds-express-train was passing that cabin, Meanwhile, a foreman-platelayer ran soutbward 

with fog-signals, two of which, according to his statement on the ground, he placed. 

and saw explode, 98 yards south of the down-distant-signal, or 1,136 yards from the 

Abbotts-Ripton cabin, or rather more from the point of collision ; and the fireman of 

the coal-tram, in fhllowing him, placed two fbg-signals, as he stated in his evidence 

50 yards inside of the same signal, but as he pointed out on the ground I48 yards 

inside that signal-say 900 yards from the point of collision. A relief-clerk, also, who 

had been a passenger m the Scotchexpress-train, after making his way to the south of 

the wreck, proceeded southward with the engine which had been detached by the force 

of the collls~on fiim the coal-train, in company with the guard of that train and others, 

%, b give warning and obtain assistance from Huntingdon. In uearioy the downdistantsignal 

they met the Leeds-exyesrtrain.,md they did their best, by openin the engine- 

whistle and exhibiting a red- lght from a hand-lamp, to warn the engine- river of that 

train. Thejr saw some fog-signals explode before they reached the engine of that train, 

but it was of course impossible for them, under such circumstances, to point out their 

precise position when they did so. 

Turnlug now to the Leeds-express-train, and the signal-cabins south of Abbotts- 

Ripton, it would appear that at 6.49, five minutes afier the first collision, that train 

passed the Huntingdon south-cabin ; and that the signalman in that cabin, who- knew 

at 6.8 that his up home- and distant-signals iere clogged, and at 6.34 that bis levers 

were not working properly, was awareiat 6.47, (though he denies having noticed anyone 

calling until 6.57,) that the Abbotts-Ripton signalmsn was trying to send him a special 

messase, which he did not accept until 7.5. At 6.52, also, e~ght minutes ufcer the 

first collision, the Leeds-express-train passed the Stukeley cabin, 2 miles 737 yards from 

the Abbotts-Ripton cahin, still at full speed, at the moment when the obstruction-si@al 

of five beats on the telegraph-bell wns being forwarded along the wires from Ahbotts- 

. ltiptou to Stukeley. Having seen nothing but white lights at the signnls up to that 

po!nt, and still believing all to be clear for him, the engine-driver of that train, who was 

domg his. best to keel) time, approached the Abbotts-Ript.on distant-signal, which also 

showed a bright white light, at a speed of 40 or 50 miles an hour. He was driving a 

powerful engine, with a tender and 13 vehicles, of which three were break-vehicles, each 

containing a yard, behind it.. He heard some fog-signals explode, about 60 yards, as 

he thought, after he passed the distant-signal. He saw the coal-engine travelling in 

the opposite direction, on the up-line, and the red light displayed from it. He did his 

best to bring his train to a stand, but he.ftiled. to do so until his cngine came into . 

collision with the d6bris of the first collision, at a speed believed by him and his fireman 

to hc 15 or 20 miles an boim, but stated hy other witnesses, including the guards of the 

train, to have been very much greater. Anci thus the second collision, with all its 

distressing consequences, occurred between 6.55 and 6.56, more. than 11 minutes after 

the first collision; the special mcsmge aborc referred to, intended to report the first 

collision, and attempted, after a calling ~vhich began at, 6.45, to be sent at 6.47, not 

having been accepted at the Huntingdon south-cabin until 7.5 ; the obstruction-signal 

having been forwarded from Abbotts-Ripton and received at Stukeley, as stated, at 6.53 ; 

and the Abbotts-Ripton down-distant-signal having still shown at 6.55 a bright whitc 

light, as if all were clear for the Leedscxpress-train to run at full speed past the 

Abbottdlipton cabin. ' 

Such lwing, geaerally, the circumstances which preceded and led to these two 

collisions, it will be desirable next to discuss the causes by which they were produced. 

C 3 

fi

tele.eph-communication, are three 

tively, and be entirely independent 

and have been used for very 

force, and they continue to be 

thc block-system or without th 

or otherwise. Then, again, n 

ruuning of trains, or of an o 

I'urther, as regards the use of 

and there are, different regul 

public safety is protected in 

liable to err or to fail ; so 

in any event be expected. 

experience to afford impor 

Tli? plain intention of that 

thnf an actual interval of 

render collisions, between 

of railway traEc will the 

block-system of ineffici 

led to any break-down i 

either in the regulation

13 

from their cabins, with their signal-levers in the positions of ,&n&r,' were i~nsittingiy 

diplayin white lights in place of red lights at their signal-posts to'the engine-drivers ; and 

such mis 7 eadiing signals were, in fact, far worse than no signals at all. If the lamps had 

gone out altogether, or had shown half white and half red, or had been visible for 

shorter distances, then it would have been the duty of the engine-drivers to treat them 

as danger-signals, or to approach them with caution ; but, inasmuch as these lampc were 

showing, bright white lights, they were the fatal means of saying all-right to the engine- 

drivers when there was imminent danger, and of inaucing them, in the u,p and down 

erpress-trains, to keep on their steam, and mnintain to the utmost of their power the 

high speed at which they were timed to travel, under the adverse conditions of weather 

to which they were subjected. The most subtle ingenuity could hardly devise means 

more misleading, or more certain of success, for luring the engine-drivers, with their 

trains loaded with precious human freight, forward to inevitable destruction; These 

signals, plainly indicating safety where. there was so much danger, enticed, first, the 

engine-driver of the Scotch-express-train to pass the Wood-Walton cabin and to 

approach the Abtrotts-Ripton cabin from the north at fnll speed, and to dash into the 

coal-train with his steam,on ; and, secondly, the engine-driver of the down-express-train 

to pass the Abbotts-Ripton distant-signal, on his say from the south, at such speed that 

he was unable, with the means at his. disposal, on receiving warnings from fog-signals and 

from the men on the engine of the coal-train, in travelling, say 1,000 yards, to avoid the 

second collision and its terrible results. 

These collisions thus occurred, then, not from any failure in the principle of block- 

working, but because the signals, as ordinarily used, with or without it, afforded 4 

misleading indications; and it is necessary to represent plainly and fdrcibly, and to 

dwell upon, these facts. of the case, in order, not merely to assign to the collisions their 

, true causes, but still more in order thpt the remedies and other considerations with a 

'view to safe-working may be clearly understood., The questions which naturally arise 

out of them are, (1) in what. respects the officers and servants of the company did or did ' 

, not do their duty properly ; (a),, how far the apparatus of signalling or the mode of 

wbrking may he improved; (3), whether it be wise under any circumstances to maintain 

so high a speed' through such a storm ; and (4), what additional means of precaution 

'might under such circumstsnces be adopted: 

As regards the servants of the Company with the trains, no blame whatever can be 

attached to them. The engine-driver of the coal-train ran forward properly to AbbottS: 

Ripton, on finding thc signals. at all-right for him to pass Holme, and he was doing his 

best to shunt into the sidirg at Abbotts-Ripton when the firvt eollisiou occurred. 

The engine-driver 'of the Scotch-express-train, who was himself seriously injured, is 

much to be pitied, but certaiuly cannot be blamed, considering his instructions, his 

practice of ~vorking, and the obligations imposed on him as regards punctuality, for 

mamtaming his speed when he found white lights at all the fixed sigdsls, and received 

no wirning of danger. The engine-driver of the Leeds-express-train, who wes but 

. slightly injured, was similarly misled by the down-distant-signal at Abbotts-ltipton, 

which shoin.ed a white light at 1;038 yards from the cabin ; and was doing his best to 

keep time with his train under very disadvantageous circumstances, when he was 

suddenly warned, by exploding-signals, and by the men on the coal-engine, of impending 

danger. . 'The rails were no doubt in a slippery condition. It is a question how far the 

middle and rear guards of the train afforded assistance to him in pulling up. He, no 

doubt, did what he could in the position in which he was placed, and no blame can 

properly be attacbed to him in regard to the second collision. But the station-master 

at I-Iolme, who was informed by his signalman ,of the coal-train having run past the 

Holme signals when they were supposed to be at danger, and who found that the 

signals were affected by frost and snow, might, if he had displayed greater activity and a 

modcrate ,amount of forethought and caution, have been the means of averting the first 

collision. He knew that, this Brst irregularity having been unwittingly committed, the 

coal-train could not then be shunted short of Abbotts-Ripton, and that it. would have to 

pre~ede the esyress-train up an incline of 1 in 200 before it reached the siding at that 

, 

cab. He could see what the weather was. He might easily have inferred that other ' , 

signals along the line would be similarly affected. It is i~nyossible to believe that he 

would have been found fault with: under such circumstances, by the su erior officerS of 

the.Company for so obvious s measure of precaution. And be might fairly have been 

expected, as hc could not communicate by telegraph with the Conington and Wood- 

Waiton cabins, to exceed what he seems to have considered the rigid bounds of his duty, 

and the stricti letter of his ibstructions, by stopping the Scotch-express-train, and 

C 4 

' 

. ~ 

' 

- 

~

the first collision, and if.the mess 

following three minutes, the secon 

The evidence that this man, Johnson, the Abbo 

message was finally dispatcheti by B 

- before Bradshaw rcached the cabin 

best to send it. 

The signnlnian at $he Huntingdon south-cabin appears 

ccnsure than any othrr servant of the Company. He 

fr6m Ahbotts-liipton until 6.57. But the evidence of 

circuit is clear. He mnst hav? known at 6.47 that the 

began to call him at 6.45, was trying to send him a speci 

which \vould indicate something unusual and import 

urgent. He contented himself with delaying the tra 

than once, by eking in ,reply for the code-time, an 

He allowed the Leed-express-train to pass him at 6. 

were employed meanwhile for other messages; and it was only at 7.5 that he accepted.X .. ,:. , . 

from Al,bottsiltipton this special message, with its code-time of 6.45, reporting the,:&;, 

collision, and ask~ng for assistance. His own excuse for not accepting it when it was.;?;:k.;i: 

first offered wns because it did not commence with the code-time and the number of::;.$'$ 

words, and was thus "unbusines~like.' If he had at once taken it, after seeing the.;u#@ 

important prefix S.P., as he ought to have done, he might, apparently, have been able;.:;$i!!$ 

to use his hand-lamp for stopping the Leeds-express-train near his cabin,-five minutesyyf5r, 

. ...,.+, S. 

'after the first, and six minutes before the second collision. 

: .!.j.:.:* 

'I'hcre wcrc othcr precautions, also, by thc usc of which these collisions might have-:.:ii"$$ . ..l,&> 

: ,. :. i;n , 

.; ,s.4 

..,;

een avoided, and to which it is important to refer. The signalman at Wood-Walton, 

not having received line-clear for the coal-tnin, which passed him at 6.31, and not 

knowing, even, whether it had reached Abbotts-Ripton, when he received be-ready at 

6.35 for the Scotch-expresskiin, when he received trt~in-on-line for it at 6.37, or when 

it'passed him at 6.40, gave no warning, even with his hand-lamp. to the engine-drivcr. 

. He could not see the condition of his signals, because the snow covered the windows of 

his cabin. He "thought, when the Scotch-e~press-train passed, that the coal-train. 

would not be clear, because he expected it would he shunted at Ahbotts-Ripton." 

He stated, first, that he " did not hear " the Scotch-express-tmin upproaching, " on 

account of the wind," until it passed his cabin'; and afterwards, when re-called, that he 

did not show a red light from his hand-lamp to the enginedriver, because he was '~usiv,g 

the hand-lamp for drawing down a train of ern ties " Hut as he had received from the 

Conington-ctibin, the be-ready signal for it alt35;and the traiwon-line signal at 6.37, 

he knew precisely when it.ou,qht to he approaching his own cahim. Under hie in- ' 

structions, he, ought to have placed fog-signals on the rails, to supplement. his fixedsignals 

on such a night. This would, of course, have necersitaled his leaving his cabin ; 

but if he conld not do so he might at lewt have becn cxprcted in such circumstances 

to use his hand-lamp in addition to his fixed-signals to warn the engine-driver, especially 

as he had experienced similar difficdties in regard to the working of his tixed-signals, 

and..in daylight, on account of snow, in the previous December. He subsequently 

used, his hand-lamp to stop the Manchester-express-trein, when that train .\!,as running 

p&t his signals. The subject of the use of hand-lamps under such circumstances will 

be again referred to in a separate paragraph. 

The platelayers, also, might have averted these .collisions, if they had, in accordance 

with the prioted instr~~ctions quoted in the appendix, attended to t11.e signals, and 

ensured their ivorking properly. But there were no platelayers in attendsocc at any one 

.-. -of these signals at the cr~trcal moment. Two platelayers went, indeed, to the Ahbotts- 

. Ripton cab~n; ind tbey were 'engaged, the one in reaching down fog-signals, previously 

to s@rtins,.at the signalman's request, for the down-distant-signal,-and the other in 

leaving the cabin,. after having provided himself with fog-signals, for the up-distantsignal, 

when the first collision occurred. The storm came on, no doubt, at an awkward 

time as regards the duties of these men. They were finishing their day's work, ancl 

going home for their tea, t~bout the time that it commenced ;. and when they lefttheir . 

tea, and were preparing, if necessarr, for a night in the snow at the signals, it too 

late. But the lesson to be learnt,from such a state of things is a striking one. It is, on 

the one hand, difficult to blame men who, after a long and hard day's work, cio not, on 

the commen6ement of a snowstorm, at once start, without their tet, in heavy.s~~ow,, 

strong wind; a'nd hard frost, for a night. at the signals. Rut it is, on .the other hand, 

sufficiently apparent, how great the risk that must be incurred, in attemptingto conduct 

such traffic in the ordinary way, and to run express-trains at full speed, especially at the 

commencement of such a storm, and before the'platelayers have bad time to get to thc 

signals, to. knock the snow and ice from the arms and wires, and thus' to keep them in 

working order. 

In regard to the liability offixed-sign& to 'catick" in such weether, there is the evidence 

of 'several of the servants of the company concerned in these collisions :- 

Wilson, the eugiae-driver of the Ixedeexpress-train, who had at one time been a ladporter, 

employed to light the signal-lamps, had frequently known the sighals to stick in 

.such weather. Mufitt, his fireman, has f'known the signals to stick through the snow." 

Gammons, a platelayer, noticed, as the up Manchester-express-train passed Holmc, that 

thedistant-signal which ought then to have been turned to red, continuedto show a white 

light; 'and, knowing that the snow might weigh down the arms, he watched the signal, to 

see whether it remai~,ed in the same condition after the passage of a sloppiog train which 

followed. He had seen the same result from snow reviously, .but not so badly, and 

. "once before this winter." Rose. the signalman at bood-~alton, found in Dece~nber 

last, in the daytime, that his signals "would not work on account of snow." Tr~~ell, 

,the signal~nnn at Stukely, having before had tr~uble of the same sort, and being c'suspicious 

because of the weather," sent a man to see whether his down-distant-signal was 

!working properly. Pallinder, the signal-titter at Huntingdon, had '' very ofcen found 

" that signals would.not ,vork in st~owy weather, but had on previous occasioos been 

$" able to free them by working the balance-weights. Last December he had to clear 

the.snow off the signals at Huntingdon, Holme, Yaxley, and Pletton, because they 

' were all more or less obstructed bp snow." 

And these conGderations lead to the subjezt .of the signals themselves. 

These fixed-signals, ss comnionly employed, arc constmcted, with some varieties as 

38474. 7.

spectacle is withdrawn fr 

back again, the halance- 

slack-wne through the 

horizontal position, at 

light of the lamp. 'T 

employment, mainly 

general efficiency ; 

means of causing 

of a wire stretchi 

overloads the sem 

with the action o 

caused mainly by the failure of exis 

such deliberations, the facts dust not 

mistakes, machinery is still liable to 

in all cases to.produce greater safety 

perfecting the apparatus employed, 

done caotiously, and, as heretofore; 

in practice t6 conduee to safe an 

much from a single case, but the 1 

of other accidents, in indidtiog. 

effected. 

As regards the regdations for 

Ahbotts-Ripton signalman did 

the first colliiion occurred, and 

coal-train would thus ' have b 

Abbotts-Ripton signals. But 

the printed regulations, have 

the coal-train was still shunt

two collisi&s .on the Midland s~lway, to the thickness, so to speak, of the signal-post. 

It is obviolis that the advantages supposed to be derived from the block-system, by 

insuriig intervals of space between trains, must, under such circumstances, be more or 

less nullified, ind that the black-system so worked becomes only a delusion and a snare, 

leading to the belief that absolute safety is provided when there is constant .risk. And 

inasmuch as collisions are very much more frequent between running train$ and shunting 

trains than between running trpins foll0Win~ onc another, the system thusbecomes weak 

where it most requires to be strengthened. 

The printed regulations issued for.the guidance of the Company's servants during 

1' fogs knd snowstorms," Appendix A, aiil properly receive special attention with 

reference to these collisions. In those regnlations 'it is provided (par. d), that when 

" $zed sigaal,r cannot be sekn at a distance of 150 yardF, a platelayer to act as 

fog-man must be placed a4 each distant-swl, and one must crlso be placed near 

" die &gnaGbox of each juncEion to assist the signalman ; " (par.' 3), that " it CV 

m not necessay to place fog-rnen at the home or d&znt+ols ofany block-sipa6-box 

w11kI1 is not ata station or junction; " and (par. 13), that "+almen at intermediate 

' 

born niwt bepravided ~iK&lonators, and,in -$oggy weather w.a mwsturm must, as 

'c far as practicable,~keep'two detonators on the rails wlm the hme-signal is at danger." 

It'wU,~ seen that the platelayers were not required by these regulations to attend 

under $y +cumstances ( ar. 3) at the signals of the Conington or Wood-Walton 

cabi~,,pqr (par. 2) at the Ro~me or Ahbotta-Ripton cabins so long as the signal-lamps 

~ere.visibi+.for ,150 'j&ds ; and .that ip thse'regulationk the contingency: of the signals 

~qni&~tteulion .. always valuable, as a guaiautee to the:engine-drivers, both of the proper 

woikmg of the.fixed-signals, and of the care ad attention of the signalmen. It would, 

of &?+c& irhpossible, .when the traffic: is constant, and trains are liable frequently to 

pass &the sadok time in both directions, for the signalmen in all cases to employ their 

hand-signaly in additiou to their fixen signals, and it is not necessary that they should 

do so ; but'the practice might with advantnge be adopted more frequently, and especially 

when t$ signalmen are unnble to see, as in a heavy snow-storm, whether their fixedsi@als, 

un+urnlshed with repeaters, are working properly. It is im ossible, at all events, 

to avoid the reflection, with reference to. the present case, that if t 1 e Holme signalman 

hn'd,as'ihe.'Abbotts-Ripcon signalman did, shown a red-light from his hand-lamp to the 

enginek3iver'ofthe coal-train, (who knew that he would in the event of the Scotchexpress-t$n 

rundingpunctually have been stopped there), the coal-train might 'thus 

have stopped and'shunted safely out oE the way at Holme; and if the U'ood-Waltou 

signalman had]kmployed hishand-lamp, in confirmation of his fixed-signals, to waru the 

. 

engine-driver of the Scotch-express-train;khe first collision wonld in all probability have 

been avoided, and thebqcond .would not then haveoccurred.. The Manclibster-expresstrain 

foIlowing the Shotch-express-train was;in fact,as already refer& to, stopped, as 

the Scotch-esprcss-trainmight have been stopped, by a red-light from the hand-lamp of. 

the signaln~an at Wood-Wdtoi~ ; in obcdiencc to which the engine-driver, after finding 

white, lights at the dist:mt:signals, and passing the Wood-Waltqn cabin at a speed of 40 

miles an hour, brought his train to a stand at the down-distant-signal beyond that catiin; 

and the Coninytou siguulm~u'i;niploy~d the same means to atop a slow-passenger-train 

at'7.10, wheu, uot having'bot line-clear fiom- Wood-Walton, he observed it approaching . 

him, after passing white lights at the signals, at toa high a speed. 

n n

28 

It no&l not tliercfore, Ix unreasonable, and it is ireportant, to require, especially ini;. 

such weather, if detnnating sig,pds cannot be put dowd in compliance with the ab0v.k 

regulations, that this simple precaution, of employing hand-signals, should at all even& :.: 

justifia5ic to attempt to c 

heavy snow-storms and thick fogs. 'r 

referred in regard to previous accidents 

has received much illustration in the ev 

to givc some idea of the dangers that are ancl must be 

kecp up the full speed of expreas:tmins in such a st 

p viously imnknown, and that no degree-of erfection in 

be cxpected altogetlier to obviate. . 'faking i ,p 

ememb em be ring that railway-servants ,are ss ohhcr 

of clothes, or a superabundance of waterproof m 

of thc difficulties under which they are expect 

which uray cause them to be wet through in 

possible to provide that the rnany extra precautions xhich tnay under such conditions. 

bc required shall always be supplied with abs 

sin~ial, in readiness for a suilden emergency on 

%llcre is, ho&.ver, ohe iniprovemeit whi 

to the desirabilitv of which there can be no 

of ircommendati&+.o the railway Companie 

doubt have pie+ented the second. coll~sion 

occurring. Continuous-breaks in the !>and 

trnin would have enable& him easily, after 

his train tqa stand within the distance. a110 

in the.case, that it became desirable to 

ments heing made on the subject. :The 

. provide two trains, one fitted with cont 

. prepared for experiment before the Roy 

. othci as nearly as could be arrayed. ill t 

results of those experiments will be fo 

observed that the first threc trials were 

stopped by the aid of continuous-breaks, on a falling gradient of 1 in 200, when tmve11. .,: : 

ling at 45 miles an hour, iu,ont; case in 410 yards of space and 26 seconds of time, rind,'.';, 

in another me in 451 yards and 30 seconds ; whereas the same train, with three hnndj : :iij 

.-, ,,;;&

mks and. the tender-break a plied, at a speed. of rather less than 41 tnllea au uuu, 

was only pulled UP in 631 p& anh 44 seconds. It appeared possible, with. reference ' ' . 

to the lasementioned but first-tried experiments, tbat some of the break-blocks might 

not be quite free of the wheels ; and the three next ttrials, with hand-breaks only, were 

made with rr train differently composed, as shown in the Appendix. The object oi 

these trials was to give an idea, as far as could be obtained under a totally different 

condition of the rails, as to what might have been done proportionately on the night of 

the accident.,-(l), if the engine-driver of the hx@xpress-train had been assisted by 

all the guards in the train, and (2), if he had, from the first {yarning .he received, donc 

his best to pull up, wholly or part~ally unassisted by the middle and rear guards. These 

three trials were all on a falling gr+dient of 1 in 200, and the distance .of pulling up 

varied, under the conditions stated in tbe Appenaix, from 795 to 1,125 yards of distance, 

md,from 55 to 70 seconds in time. On the night of the accident, the rails having been 

~nuch more slippery, &l1 of the distances above mentioned would, of c9urse, have been 

materially increased. 

The proportion of break-power employed on the Leeds-express-train on tlie 21st 6f 

Januarv-three break-vehicles (besides the tender-break) to 13 vehicles,-was, perhaps, 

as mu& as can in practice be expected without a system of continuous-breaks, and was 

.more than is frequently employed., But the defect of the system of band-breaks worked 

hg separate guards in different parts of the train is well known, and has often been 

.stated. The guards near the middle or end of a train are frequently unable to hear the 

break-whistle, and the enginedriver is thus unable to obtain their assistance when he 

.most need2 it.. It appears fmm the evidence of two of the guards of the Leeds-expfess- 

$fain thatthey did not on this fatal night hear any fog-signal explode or the break- - 

..whistle ftoni'their own engine, though they state tbat they heard and saw the engine of 

,the coal-train ; but it b by no means certain how much assistance they gave towards 

stopping their train before the second collision occurred, as they though6,at a speed,of 

(' ..?O or 40 miles an hour. If, on- the other hand, $he power of readily spplyin breakblocks 

to every wheel of the train, by mea6s of the vacuum or any other goof iystem , . 

of continuous-breaks, had been in the hands of the engine-driver, he would have bees 

e -able, aftei going over the fog-signals and seeing the coal-engine, without doubt or 

-diEculty, to haye. brought his train to a stand fir short of the d6bris of the first 

collision. 

. . On a general review of the case, the causes, direct or indirect, of the first. collision' -- 

'.may thus be summed up :- 

l. Thc late departure of the coal-train fiom Peterborough, .which prevented it from 

reaching and being shunted at Abbotts-Ripton before the approach of the Scotchexpress-train. 

. .. . . 2. The failure to work, during a heavy .snow-storm, of the signals at Holme, which 

prevented the coal-train, running late, from being stop d and shunted at Holme, as 

lotended by the signallman, out of the way of the ~cotc~ix~ress-train, and without the 

..risk of danger or delay to that train. 

. 3. The want of judgment aud precaution exhibited by the station-master at Holme, 

.who might otherwise, after. the report made to him by the signalman. and on finding 

%he effect produced by the snow upon his own signals, have inferred that other signals 

were similarly affecred, ancl have taken measures to warn the engine-driver of the Scotch- 

, .express-train, and prevent him from beins deceived by them. 

. .,. . 4. The absence of telegraph-speaking-instruments in the signal-cabins at Conington 

Rnd Wood-Walton, by means of which the signalmen in those cabins might have been 

informed of the coal-train having run past Holmc contrary to the intention of the Holme 

sipal,man, and have been warned of the pmbahle condition of their signals. 

5. The action of the snow and ice upon the signals at Wood-Walton and Abbotts- 

Ripton, -in preventing them fiom res onding to the action of the levers in the signalcabins, 

and' in thus causing them toge, not only useless for warningky fed-lights the 

engine-driver of the Scotcll-express-train, but also a means by the exhibition of white 

. . ligl~ts of luring him forward at full s eed to the collision. 

B. The neglect of the Wwd-WJton signalman, rbodid not either obey pir. 1.3 of 

the printed regulations applying to ';fog? and snow-storms," requiring him, in snch 

weather, to put detonators on the rails, as far as practicable, when his home-signal was at 

danger, or even employ his hand-lamp to give warning to the engine-driver of the 

Scotch-express-tmin: 

7. The absencc of the platelayersor L' fog-men " from the signals at the critical mo&ts, 

when they were so much required, either to clear the signals of snow and 10 cawe them 

D8 '

to work proper1 or else, if they could not ensure their efficient working, by 

detonating-signa f' S, to, warn the engine-drivers of the trains. 

8. The running of faat-through-trains at full speed through such a storm 

as h;wing been the most severe ever known in that part of the country, w 

ido option of extra precautions, such as the detention of slower trains, the use of h 

in the sigual-cabins, and the employment of platelayers at the signals. 

And the causes which operated more particularly in ,producing the second 

were :- 

!). The want 6f notice, until eight minutes'after the first collision, from the A 

ltipton cabin to the Stukeley cabin, by five beats on the telegraph-bell, of 

on the down-line caused by the first collision. 

10. The delay of the signalman at the Huntingdon south-cabin in accept 

message which the Abhotts-Ripton signalman, who - commenced- to call 

endeavoured, after obtaining his attention at 6.47 pm., to send him, 

collision and ask for assistance; which special message the. Hunting 

might otherwise have received in time to admit of his stopping the Leeds-expre 

an2 peventing the second collision.^ 

I I. The failure to act of; the down-distant-signal worked from the Abbo 

cabin, which continued to show a white light when the engine&iver 'of 

express-train passed it, nearly eleven minutes after the first collision. 

12. The wantof continuous-breaks in the hands of the engine-driver 

C. express-train, to enable him' to avoid thi'second collision, which waa the 

much loss of life,' after receiving.notice from detonating-signals, say 1,d0 

the site of, it, ,and immediztely sfterwards from the men on the engine of 

of something being wrbng: -- :: :..I.. ':. . . 

The mostimportant - remedies to be cori&dekd with a view to the avoi 

. ' . . . . 

coiliGonsa~ :- , 

I. 'Improvement 'in the apparatus of fixed-signals, to prevent them as. far a 

from becoming inefficient duringfrost .arid snow, and to cane them to afford i 

to theGgn'almen when they cease work in^, or arenot working properly. 

2. Improvement in the working of fixed-sigo:~ls, bykeeping them habitually at 

instead of at all-right, so as to render th6m less liable to stick h the more d . 

position of all-righr. 

. . . .- 7.: ,&&'E .+,rI 

3. Improvement in the regulationifor the guidance of station-masters;inspec-C- . ~. ,. 

.tors, engine-drivers, signalmen, and platelayers, as to. their duties during " fogs and snow. ~$4 

storms." 

. . 

!:>M 

-... 

-d.* 

4. Careful supervision in regard to the working of fixed-signals at intermedia 

well as bt the principal block-cabins, during snow-storms. 

5. The employment' by the .signalmen of hand-lamps, especially in severe W 

in confirmation of the indications of their'fixed-signaIs.' '. ' 

6. The provision and employment of speaking-telegraph-instruemnta in all the c 

7. The temporary stoppage of less important traEc, and the' reduction of tb 

of fast trains during severe snow-storms: when it is more diEcult for engine-dri 

guards to keep a good look out; for signalnien to see out of their cabins, for p1 

to keep the fixed-signals in efficient wo~king order, and for all the outdoor officers 

servants of railway companies to perform their duties satisfactorily. 

8. Tbe employment of continuous-breaks, by means of .which the trains can be brought .,&: ?p$ 

to a stnnd, on warnings of danger being received, within more moderate distances, by:$@$ 

the action of the' engine-drivers, without trusting to the guards, who are frequently : ;&! 

unable in cases of emergency to he* the break-whiitle from the engine, and who cannot.

. . 

3 1 

conduct heavy rnilway.traffic & usual, and to run express-trains at full speed, through 

heavy snowstorms, must be attended with ve serious risk, even though the best known 

means of eafety in common use be provided. ';p. here can be no doubt of the advantages of 

~lunctuality in ordinary railway workrng. It is a good test, in one sense, of efficient 

management, and habitual unl~unctuality is inexcusable. But occasional unpunctuality, 

which is in practice unavoidable, ought not to be the excuse far an accident, and even 

punctuality may ne purchased at too dear a price. It would be far better 'to submit 

m the temporsry stoppageof certain tmina, and a reduction of speed of other trains, during 

suchexceptional weather, than, in attempting to maintain punctuality witli very fast 

trains, to incur serious risk of such collisious, 

L ... I hive, &c. 

Tlse Secretw, H. W. Trim. 

[Hailway .Deparhnmt,) 

' Board of ?).ade. 

I concur in the above report. 

CHARLES Bowm. 

- -

.; " 

. .;& 

UPENDIS A. a:. 

h. :,.F. 

... . 

, i . ..g. ,;. ..% 

., 

. 

Re-mue of Circulnr No. 617.i. snowstorm, even if not summoned by the clerk .i,n .;: 

TIIE GREAT NOIV~UERN RAILIVAY. 

charge or signnlmnn. This will not relieve the clerk , ; . . 

in charge or si,dman fmm the responsibility of .: ',,: 

Fogs and Snowstorms. sending for the plstelaym. The inspectors of per- :; :.' '. 

Ih h ~ weatlar, y when the arm of the Remphon!- mnnent-way will arrnnge for relief men should the .$

. . 

.- . 

I 

Twin on linc. ~ 

. APPENDIX B. 

G~EAT NOUTIIEICN RAILWAY. 

I

trz,in it 1)a8s~s, and ~atisfy tlbemscIvc% that tllu 

of the aain has p-& and tbat the he is 

h fiow olwtructi~n before giving tlio aigoal-"line 

,.lear to tllc station in the rear. Thy must ad80 k 

p&oulnr to observe whether the lnst vehicle carries 

a red bollrd by,day or an rulditioual tail lump 

by ni& indication that a "special train" is 

following. 

14. in tl,e event of a rncond engine or tmin prcpnrcd to stop at any moment, should it be 

:,t station hfow the pccceding tndn to do so. 

or engiuc: Itas bww?on telcgmphed :&a having pnsscd the 18. 'l%: signlnlcn on giving a 

s&ot2 iu wivancc, it must l* brougbt to a stnnd liy tllut Llkcir ncedlea ilm Gmly nnd ea 

t,bc being kept at drnbwr ; tbc cngincu~nn over ; nnd when the necdles rrrc b 

must tlloll h t,,ld to dn~w thc tail OF his bin will~iu 

the sign&, and there :wait. lider orders. Such 

train must not %%itin h s.wM until the guard or 

enginemalr reeciveb: vcrbnl instn~ctio~ta from the. 

signalman to that effect 

15. SIIOUI~ sn engine or train psgs a sigud statiou 

dark without rail lamps m thelast vehicle, the 

signalmnll must, immediately ho has forwarded the 

signal "tmin on line," if such train be trnvding On 

a level linc or a rising gndieaf at OnW giw the 

s@l ustop and exfirnine tnlin:) If, however, the 

train be running on rr fnlling gradiuut, the signal 

c. stop and examine train" must UOL be used NO 

must not telegmph "liue clear" to the station in the 

rear, but most all such rlstion in the usod mnnncr, 

and on gaining attention, must give wen tich of the 

needle to the left hand. Thia signal having been 

ncknowlerlged, be will again block the l~ccdle over W 

&he words train on line," the sipduun st the rear 

-&ion \$l thereupon top any train or an$c 

following, and vel.bally instruct the engineman to 

p ~ cautionsly d towards thc station in advan?, 

informing hini why it is necessary that he should do 

80. AE soon as ~uch train or engine has paesod th 

signal station fi.om whence the caution sigusl was 

-ived, the signalmm thwc will recommence signnlling 

in the ordinary mnuner. 

16. KO obstrnction mnst, under any cireumstun~u, 

allowed on the down main line nfter "train on 

line" bns k n received from the down station in rear, 

nor must the up main line be obstructed sfW " frab 

on linc" has hen 'received fmm the up station in 

34 

' "f 

APPENDIX C. 

. 

i?#; 

Gnur No~mn~nx. RAILWAY. 0 D 0mw.-Goods and mind trains to Hun--.. 

.,. . 

tingdon. 

Biggleawadk Hitchin, and Box B, King's Gtoss. 

Slow pwenger trains to Holme, Abb0W Rlpton. 

Huntingdoo, and Offord. 

Clursmm Jmrcno~.--Goodstmins to.Ynfiey, Holme, 

and Huntingdon. 

Ykzer.-~&~ and mined dins to Holme and 

' Ab8bbott.l Ripton. 

Bo~m-~~t ps.&ngcr tr~ins to Tempford and 

Sandy, .Goods and mineral trains ta Ahhta 

Ripton and Huntingdon. 

Aumrrs nmon.-(;oculs mina to Offord. Gwds 

and trains to Runtingdon. 

g; HUNT~GUOK.-F~IS~ pnsenger :eYins to Bigglewsde 

nnrl Arlc~r?y siding. Slow pnsseogcr and gmd8 

trnins lo St. Ncots Gds sod mined trains to 

t l Whcncver n t&n 8ignaUing s(atmn rquires special 

information respecting the whereabouts of a particular 

twin, the clerk, or signnlmnn in charge of the instru- 

35.: ment, must nsk for it, and the atation mUea must 

refer to the hook, or to the clerk in charge, for the 

correct information, and reply with the, ienst pomible 

dclng. 

The wires between London and York nre djviaed 

into eleven circoite, aa follows :-London to khutb- 

pt, South te to Welwyu, Welwyn to Hitchin, 

Hitchin to g. *eats, St. Neots to Peterborn', Peter 

bm' to Essendine, Esseudine to Grantham, Gmtham 

to Newark, Newark to Retford, Ratford to Doncaster, 

Doneaster to York; thus, Kings Crosn will commu- 

nieate wit.b Holloway, Edgware Bmneh Junction, 

IIornsey, Wood Green, and Southgate; Southgate 

with stations as fnr as. Wclwyn; Welwgn with 

stations far 8s Hitchin, and W on. It will, there- 

fore, be the duty of terminal sbtions to transmit the 

information signalled to them to !.)re ntations ss 

ordered nbove. .. . 

In signslling. fast trains to stations bbyond the 

terminus of the circuit the throngh wim should be 

nlwnys used. 

Signnls must, if pwsible, be'fmded immedintelp 

altor the antry 01 the depnre at me irwt i,ia.- "G%" 

mde in the time book; and should the instrument 

be engaged with other serrriees, the station having s 

train to signal will, sfbr h minutes of such entry, 

intempt with the prefixM.T.,which takes precedence 

next after S.P., hut where the through ~ i arc m 

uml, five minutes must be allowed to clnpse i=fm 

nny interruption bkee plaea . . 

In aignnlling, it in neccssay to give the number 

of all trains, ns shown in the nilway wmpuny's 

ordinnrg' time or working ucorsion bills, togctlier 

1. with the timo of thcir dewurn,-thm: numl~r 

seven, ten fifty-tbrae. Cattle, goods, and mincrl, 

and alw special tmnins, are to 8bbo didinguisbed hy 

spelling nnmc before signalling the timci-thus: Na 

four go&, eight ten ; number eight specid, six 

Ori+om~-Gd~ and mined trains to St. Ncots. four, and so on. 

to Arlesey, Hitchin In transmitting trains, tbe following form muat be 

Sow passenger trains anied out; for example, No. 55 passenger train 

Other trains to louring Tuxford 9.45, having to be traoamitted by 

Hetford to Bnwtryi Retford will signal it thu+ 

". 

and goods trains to Number fifty-fivc left T.X. nine forty-five, and so on. 

. :. Bigglesde. Mineral trains to Sandy. 

Train signals received must be imrnediatcly entered 

on the slate (where one is kept) and in the train 

book with the time such 'signals were mivcd; and 

when a special train in signalled, the telegraph clerk 

or signalman must, in acidition, immediately enter it 

on n message form for delivery either. to the clerk 

in charge, insplaor. or foreman, and oh& his 

signature for it in his railway messapw delivery book. 

If From nnjr muse trains have not been signdled 

in nccordnuce with these rules at stations where Jerks 

are employed, n report of the eircumstmce must at 

once be forded to the telegraph superintendent 

at Retford. 'At stations where the telegraph is 

worked by signalmen, the report must be sent to the 

clerk in charge. 

At stations where thc~ are telegnph clerks 

the time of the deparmm of the trsins. must be 

wtered in the telegraph train book by the plntform 

policemm or porter, as may be arranged on the doty 

sheet, and the telegraph clerk must enter the time 

when the message is- tmnwlitted. Where the imtruments 

are in charge of .and nre worked by signalmen, 

thev must themselves mske the . notripa. . - .. . . 

FBMTCIS P. COC~SEOTT, 

London, King's Cross, Superintendent of the Line. 

3rd Jnly 1873. . 

. ~.,. 

.I,' .,I- 

. , i. . d. 

. .,:K , . . 

APPENDIX D. 

. . 

FO~TION of 5.30. pm. Dom EXPRESS. Foa~bmon of a0 p.a. Scolcn Exmesi. 

.Taunay 21st, 1876. January 21st 1876. 

Engine 48. 

York-Break, G.N. 

Ncweaatle-Third, N.E. ; composite, N.E. 

,, Composite, N.E.; break, N.E. 

Engine. 

Glasgow-Break, G.N. 

Newcastle--Second, N.E. ; First, N.& 

Glssgow-Compwite, E.C. 

Lecda-Composite, Bogie. Perth-Composite, E.C. 

,, ' 

Third, G.N. Edinburgh--First, E.C. ; Firs!, E.C. ; First, 

Semnd-clnss bredr.,G.N. Edinburgh-Second, E.C. ; Break, G.N. 

I&ford-Third, G.N. Total 10. 

Composite, G.N., Inrge. 

~al~fari~ompoaitc, G.N. 

HoII--Composite, W?. 

Rdifax-Brenk, G.N. ' 

Total 13. 

E 2 

..

GREAT NORTREW RAILWAY. 

SE~IES of Experiments mndc on Ihbrunry 17th, 

18i6, with the Urmk-power nttRehed to Passenger 

'I'rains 

The trnin n.ar composed of elcvon enrringcs, mith 

lmo sis-wheeled and one four.~vheelal byks of thc 

N . Cornpimy's make, in all fourteen rchielca, 

~. 

nrmaccd in the followinc order :- 

No. 

Six-mheeled brenk-vnn . - - 1,412 

Four do. third-elws wrriagc - 912 

Six do. com(rosi1e do. - 462 ' 

Do. do. . do. do. - 1,544 

hur do. third-class do. - 1,420 

Six do. campsite do. - 278 

Do. do. do. do. - 111 

Four do. third-class do. - 1,432 

Do. 'do. hresk , do. - 790 

Do. do. third-class do. - G52 

Six do. composite do. - 371 

. Do. do. do. do. - 47 

Do. .do. do. do. - 50 

Do. do. breok-vnu - - 1,047 

Thc engine W= of the oxpress passenger c h. with 

7 fcct driving wheels uncoupled,aod u.eighed 82 tom ; 

thc temler hnd six wheels, and wejghed 26 tons , 

*..The totnl weight of thc trnin, ioelu&ng engine,, 

ten?lcr, brenkq and &ages, wns 205 tons. . 

Thc trials were mnde between Huntingdoq and 

Holmc station?, on the up nnd'do~n-1inc.e 

1st--trial.--On down-line, with ordinnry tender- 

break nnd guards' breaks in two six-wbeled and one' 

fonr-mbccled vnus ; Etcnm, shut off at Abbotts Ripton 

down distaut-signal. 

iimdicut falling with trnin - - L in 200. 

Spccd (! mile in 22 mn&) per honr=4(59 milea. 

Trnin ran after .steam was shut off - 631 yards. 

Timc occupied in pul!ng up - - 44 seconds. 

NOTE.-The hind bmk nas not applied. 

2nd trial.-On the down-lino with Smith's Vacuum 

brwk; steam shut off at Abbotts Rioton d on distant- 

sigual. 

Grndient falling with train - l in 200. 

Speed per hour - - - 45 miles. 

Train ran actor ateaan W- shut of[ 410 yards. 

Time occupied io pulling up - 26 seconds. 

3rd trial.411 down-line with Vacuum brenk; 

stem shnt off at Holrnu down distnnt-signal. 

Gmdicnt falling with trnin - 1 in 200. 

Sltccd per hour - - 45 mib. 

Trnin rnn n hr steam was shut off 451 yards. 

Time oocupicd in palling up - 30 seconk. 

L& oj'Kifled. 

I. S~uclcmn, BSi Mwgamt. 

2. Snndcrson, Miss Eliznbelh. 

3; k'osberry, Miss S. 

4. Posbyry, Miss. 

A.. Foebemy, Mrs. 

U. Jolliffo, Mr. Ucnjumiu. 

i / 

APPENDIX E. j . ':,\ +: 

!.I,.., . . I : , 

.. , 

A second train was now prooured at l'elerL01'0'O f&.. ' ., '' 

the purpae of more tl~omughly twting tho o$imry : 

breaks. . ! ;$ 

This trnin m s composcd of the following' vehicles, 

viz. :- 

,$ 

No. 

Four-wheelal bmk-.inn - 

Do. do. lirst class enwiagc - 90,; ' 

Six do. composite do. - 279 . . 

Four do. do. do. - 224: 

Do. do. third-class do. - 1,649, ' - 

Do. do. brenk do. . ;8$4, ,: 

Six do. .eompite do. 

Four do. third-clus do. - - 78s': ;F , 

Do. do. composite do. - 221 . : .a 

Do. do. bwnk-vna - - 1,056: .. 

Sir do. composite cnmhgc - 371 +:.:& 

Do. do. do. ,do. 47 , . ?&TC 

L'o. do. do. do. 

Do. l. brenk van - 

The engine of tbe second tmin wus 

prrssen~er claw, with eight-feet drivi 

coupled, and with a bogie frame on four wbeels undar 

the leading ezd. The enginc weighed 39 tons.. The 

tendcr had six wheels, nod wcighd 28 tons. 

The' tow weight of the tmin, including engiw, 

tender, brenks, and carring-, was 209 tons G cwt. . - 

' 4th trial.-On up-line will* ordinary tonde14wd; : 

and guords' bmk in two four-wheeled vans. Stam .:. 

shut off nt Huntiugdon np distantsignal. 

Gradient falling with trnin - l'in 200. 'P 

- Speed per bow - 

Trnin ran after atcnm was shut off 

Time occupied in pulling up 

PForn.-Thc hind break nns not applied. ~ :,:,, 

5th trial.-On down-line with ordinary tender-,:::; 

break, and gun& breaks in two four-wheeled and 'l ;! 

one six-wheeled vans Steam shut off at Abbotts . '< 

Ripton domn distant-signal. 

Grndient falling with train ' - 1 in 200. . , 

Speed per hour - - 40.9 milk . 

Traiu ran after steam was shut oE 800 yards. '. 

Time occupied is pulling up - 59 secondi . . 

6th trial.-On down-line with odnnry tender- ' . 

break, and guards' bred .in one fourwheeled van' . ' 

only. Steam shut otl at Conington down-distaoG 

signal. 

Gradient fding with train - 1in 200. 

Speed per hour - . 45 milca. . 

lmin rnn after stoam rvns shut off 1,125 ynrda. , 

Time occnpied in pulling up - - 70 acconds. :c; 

. .. 

'.. 

APPENDIX F. 

, 

7. SUU~CIMII, Mr. dan~es. 

S. Allgwd, Mr. J. C. 

9. Allgwl, Mrs. 3. 

. 10. Allgood, Mr. D. N.. 

11. Noble, Mr. 

12. Boucimult, Mr. W. Diou. 

13. Mure, Mr. 'l'ho~nus. 

.

I 

orkkcy, Mr. - I Gcnnral m mnp - - l8 

.~dmuon, Mr. I linginccr - - 3 

ruulishott, M?. j Superintcndont - - 4 

piggott, Xr. - I Cllicf sig!:d inzlnclor - 12 

- llccallcd - - 18 

~:~ldiilfc, Mr. Telcgmplr cngincct nnd 

~opcrintcndcnt - - 13 

Itonsc, Mr. - Poterlmro' district locomo- 

tive rnperintcndeot - 17 

I'n:exz, Mr. - i l'ost Oltice Tclepnphs - 18 

OlJman, Dr. - . I'asscn,m.r by .Scofclr yplrss 13 

lrcly . - I Driver of con1 tmin - , - 5 

I::rulkner - Yiwmnu do. - - 5 

llunt - - Guml do. - - 5 

C - - Driver of SEotch exprcss - 19 

Scott - - lrircmnn of do. - 7 

McUiarmid - Head guard of do. - 13 

Ihy - - Under yard of do. - 6 

Wilson - - Driver ofLccds crprcss - 6 

- Remllcd - - 7 

Iblkinder - Fircmtn of do. - 6 

Wills, Robwt Gnnrd ol do. - 7 

Simpson - , do. 110. - 7 

Robinwn - do. do. - 8 

IMis - - Dcivor of Mitnclwstercipm 9 

Murfitt- - Pilrmirn do. - D 

Oabome . - Sip~ulmnn nt Iiolrne - - 10 

>> - ltccnllcd - - - 15 

Jakes - - Sipdman ntConingtonn - 11 

., 

,l7 

APPENDIX G. . 

k c - 

1. - 

lohnwn 

3, - 

Rmdrlmv 

rlowcll 

;\lnddison 

- 

Gari~cy 

Colbcrt - 

Orbrlb 

I'nllindcr 

U1:ablt - 

Gregcry 

~en:rnons 

Cbrk - 

Marriott 

Alnaoo - 

\Vills, do.?. 

Alnrshnll 

\Vrigh1 

dnlley 

IIdl - 

'Curble - 

Usher - 

3. 

Sipdmm at Wwd Wdtan- j 

llccrdlnl - - . -: . 

Signnlmnu nt Abbotts Ripton ; 

1lCc:lllcd - 

Si:nn'lnnn nt AbbtbRipton i 

Signnlmhn $&l St,nkctey 

do. I-Iontingdon - i 

(south cabin) - 

Sipdmno nt St. Ncah - 

1 2, t~nde;;~b?Injer 

- 1 

- Ilolmc forcman plakhycr - 10 

- :: 

1 

- do. do. - L4 

- do. ltul porlcr - - 14 

- do. poryr - . 15 

- Abbolh Rlpton pl~lnttelaycr - 9 

do. do. ' 17 

do. do. 17 

- Inspector at l'cter\loro' 

station - - 18 , 

- Ikliel clcl* - - - B 

- REesllcd - - - 17 

J

ABBOTTS. RIPTON '. - The Railways Archive

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