<strong>Iran</strong>: <strong>Cultural</strong> <strong>Values</strong>, <strong>Self</strong>-<strong>images</strong> <strong>and</strong> Negotiating <strong>Behavior</strong>Dissimulation, high-level disinformation <strong>and</strong> manipulation are widelyacceptable. Western diplomats <strong>and</strong> go-betweens have lamented the fact that <strong>Iran</strong>ianinterlocutors were consistent in not maintaining their promises, <strong>and</strong> that oralstatements or promises are often employed by <strong>Iran</strong>ians pro-forma, just to get aninterlocutor out of their hair, with no intention of carrying out what they have stated.The British Ambassador to <strong>Iran</strong> in the 1970s, Sir Dennis Wright, summarized hisdealings with <strong>Iran</strong>ians as follows: “The <strong>Iran</strong>ians are people who say the opposite ofwhat they think <strong>and</strong> do the opposite of what they say. That does not necessarily meanthat what they do does not conform to what they think.”<strong>Iran</strong>ian negotiators tend to accept frequent crisis as part of the negotiation process<strong>and</strong> seem relatively unconcerned by the prospect that such tactics may endanger thepost-negotiation relationship. Insinuated threats, bluffing, <strong>and</strong> disinformation are allhighly acceptable. Accordingly, the <strong>Iran</strong>ian negotiator may not only be not offendedby the use of these techniques by his foreign interlocutor, but may even hold agrudging admiration for the cleverness of his protagonist.In the light of the significance of <strong>Iran</strong>ian nationalism in the <strong>Iran</strong>ian mindset, it isnot surprising that <strong>Iran</strong>ians have had a certain difficulty in accepting a fellow <strong>Iran</strong>ianas a bona fide counterpart who speaks in the name of the adversary. Similarly,<strong>Iran</strong>ians tend to look askance at other Muslims who represent the West <strong>and</strong> to viewemissaries of non-Caucasian origin (blacks, Asians) as less authentic representativesof the West.The ideological constraints of the present regime tend to create a preference for.The <strong>Iran</strong>ian need for collective decision-making is especially evident in the treatmentof back channels. Even in high-level meetings, <strong>Iran</strong>ian negotiators will hold talks inthe presence of an official interpreter or a clerical “commissar” as a silent witness.<strong>Iran</strong>ian negotiators have been known to make extensive use of back channels <strong>and</strong> prenegotiations.In many cases, these channels seem to have been no more than amechanism for gathering operational intelligence prior to the actual negotiations.Often, though, these channels seem to be in competition with each other or torepresent different interest groups within the <strong>Iran</strong>ian leadership, or different people inthe close vicinity of the highest leadership who want to be the ones to bring a “prize”to the leadership.A frequent negotiating ploy used by <strong>Iran</strong>ians is to go off on a tangent into “virtualnegotiations” on new <strong>and</strong> unexpected issues, which become the focal point of thetalks. The non-<strong>Iran</strong>ian side finds itself compelled to negotiate back to the originalissue, <strong>and</strong> then finds that it has paid for the return to status quo ante. This seems to bemeant to wear out the adversary <strong>and</strong> to learn his weaknesses before raising real issues,but it also may be a reflection of the “bazaar instinct” <strong>and</strong> the “love of the game,” ademonstration of rhetorical, emotional, <strong>and</strong> intellectual virtuosity in negotiation thatraises the status of the <strong>Iran</strong>ian in the eyes of his colleagues <strong>and</strong> subordinates, <strong>and</strong>hence serves a social end, separate from the real goal of the negotiations.iv
Abstract<strong>Iran</strong>ian negotiation techniques are notoriously short-term focused. Very rarelywill <strong>Iran</strong>ians offer a deal in which the quid pro quo from the other side will onlyemerge years later. Furthermore, the bazaar does not close its doors after a deal hasbeen made. The “price” of the “merch<strong>and</strong>ise” proposed at the outset of negotiationshas very little to do with the real price that the <strong>Iran</strong>ian believes he can get. Thehaggling may even go on after an agreement is struck. This stage of the “postnegotiations”may have to do with implementation of the agreement or even with a reopeningof issues previously agreed upon due to “changes in circumstances.”v
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