Iran: Cultural Values, Self images and Negotiation Behavior

Iran: Cultural Values, Self-images and Negotiating BehaviorDissimulation, high-level disinformation and manipulation are widelyacceptable. Western diplomats and go-betweens have lamented the fact that Iranianinterlocutors were consistent in not maintaining their promises, and that oralstatements or promises are often employed by Iranians pro-forma, just to get aninterlocutor out of their hair, with no intention of carrying out what they have stated.The British Ambassador to Iran in the 1970s, Sir Dennis Wright, summarized hisdealings with Iranians as follows: “The Iranians are people who say the opposite ofwhat they think and do the opposite of what they say. That does not necessarily meanthat what they do does not conform to what they think.”Iranian negotiators tend to accept frequent crisis as part of the negotiation processand seem relatively unconcerned by the prospect that such tactics may endanger thepost-negotiation relationship. Insinuated threats, bluffing, and disinformation are allhighly acceptable. Accordingly, the Iranian negotiator may not only be not offendedby the use of these techniques by his foreign interlocutor, but may even hold agrudging admiration for the cleverness of his protagonist.In the light of the significance of Iranian nationalism in the Iranian mindset, it isnot surprising that Iranians have had a certain difficulty in accepting a fellow Iranianas a bona fide counterpart who speaks in the name of the adversary. Similarly,Iranians tend to look askance at other Muslims who represent the West and to viewemissaries of non-Caucasian origin (blacks, Asians) as less authentic representativesof the West.The ideological constraints of the present regime tend to create a preference for.The Iranian need for collective decision-making is especially evident in the treatmentof back channels. Even in high-level meetings, Iranian negotiators will hold talks inthe presence of an official interpreter or a clerical “commissar” as a silent witness.Iranian negotiators have been known to make extensive use of back channels and prenegotiations.In many cases, these channels seem to have been no more than amechanism for gathering operational intelligence prior to the actual negotiations.Often, though, these channels seem to be in competition with each other or torepresent different interest groups within the Iranian leadership, or different people inthe close vicinity of the highest leadership who want to be the ones to bring a “prize”to the leadership.A frequent negotiating ploy used by Iranians is to go off on a tangent into “virtualnegotiations” on new and unexpected issues, which become the focal point of thetalks. The non-Iranian side finds itself compelled to negotiate back to the originalissue, and then finds that it has paid for the return to status quo ante. This seems to bemeant to wear out the adversary and to learn his weaknesses before raising real issues,but it also may be a reflection of the “bazaar instinct” and the “love of the game,” ademonstration of rhetorical, emotional, and intellectual virtuosity in negotiation thatraises the status of the Iranian in the eyes of his colleagues and subordinates, andhence serves a social end, separate from the real goal of the negotiations.iv