Iran: Cultural Values, Self images and Negotiation Behavior

SummaryIranian negotiating culture is deeply rooted in the Iranian national psyche,linguistic conventions, cultural mores and habits, and religious conventions. The highvalue that Iranians place on cleverness and on their ability to outwit their counterparts,and the social and religious legitimacy of dissimulation guarantee that almost anyexchange with Iranians will be extremely opaque. Equally, the Iranian negotiator willrarely accept a Westerner at face value; culturally ingrained mistrust, a general beliefin conspiracies, and the specific suspicion towards the West will most likely makehim believe that what seems like frankness and a candid approach on the part of hisinterlocutor is but clever deception. The hostility of the present regime in Iran to theWest accentuates this tendency.Iranians negotiators have frequently used blatant threats – many of them empty –as staple instruments in the course of negotiations, though they have also proven to besusceptible to use of threats by others. Cases of effective negotiations with Iranianshave shown that more has been achieved by taking advantage of inherent Iranian fearsand weaknesses and wielding a credible “big stick,” thus bringing into play Iranianpragmatism and the Shiite principle of the predominance of public interest. Once it isclear to the Iranians that only compromise can avert a serious threat, the compromisewill become a legitimate choice. Ambiguity in threats may not achieve this end sincethe Iranian side may assume that the other side is using tactics similar to its own.An analysis of the Iranian tendency towards mistrust and conspiracy theoriessuggests that arguments in the course of negotiations should be based on clear shorttermincentives and threats, and not on incremental long-term confidence building.Progress will not be made through discussions of the rights and wrongs of each side'sview of the issues. Iranian political dynamics will not allow a concession on the basisof the justice of a position. Negotiations must achieve an acceptance by the Iranianside of the brute facts, rather than an understanding of the merits of the other side.Only if it is clear beyond any shadow of doubt that the maslahat (interest) of theregime is at stake will this mechanism come into play. Despite the Iranian tendency touse back channels to transmit such messages, it seems that Iranians have frequentlyseen back channels and secret negotiations as giving the other side an advantage.Western negotiators have an inclination to try to nail down budding understandingsin writing in order to preclude retraction of the understandings. Since the Iranianleadership has total authority, a Western negotiator can demand immediate decisionsand compliance, taking into account the Iranian disposition towards post-negotiations.Written agreements have more or less the same status as oral ones; they are subject toreview when the circumstances that prompted them have changed.45