Iran: Cultural Values, Self images and Negotiation Behavior

Iran: Cultural Values, Self-images and Negotiating Behaviorthere was a tendency to revisit issues that were thought to have been decided already,and to unravel the whole package. 139Principle vs. ParticularsThe Iranian attitude towards dealing with principles or details of implementation isnot monolithic. Many Western negotiators claim that Iranian bargaining modusoperandi is focused ad nauseum on irrelevant details, and shies away from catchallstatements of principles. In a way, this runs contradictory to the Iranian custom offlaunting principles (regarding naval rights, the basis for the Iranian nuclear program,etc.). Indeed other observers, with no less experience, have related long-windedsessions with senior Iranian officials in which the latter dragged the meetings intodiscussions on matters of principle that were ultimately abandoned. 140Short Term vs. Long TermIranian negotiation techniques are notoriously short-term focused. Very rarely willIranians offer a deal in which the quid pro quo from the other side will only emergeyears later. In this respect, Iranians are very different to East Asian cultures; they donot seem to see the trust that the deal builds as an asset that may be worth makingconcessions for. The assumption is that the opposite number is as opportunistic andcunning as oneself, and therefore will not provide the merchandise only because oftrust. U.S. diplomats who dealt with the U.S. embassy crisis of 1979-1980 describedthe Iranian attitude towards long-term confidence-building as follows: “Favors areonly grudgingly bestowed, and then just to the extent that a tangible quid pro quo isimmediately perceptible. Forget about assistance proffered last year or even last week.What can be offered today?” 141Length of negotiationsIranians are known for long, drawn out negotiations. One interpretation of thischaracteristic is that the underdog psychology brings the Iranian to assume that thelonger the negotiations last, the greater a chance that things can change in his favor.The intrinsic Shiite belief in the virtue of patience also contributes to this tendency.The American adage that time is money is foreign to Iranian discourse, at least as ageneral principle. It is said that Iranians have, in practice, turned procrastination into avirtue. In personal hierarchical relations, delay is a tactic used by subordinates toavoid implementing decisions they believe to be problematic; in negotiations withnon-Iranians, it has frequently been interpreted as deriving from the assumption thatdelaying decisions may be advantageous. 142 This is not to say that Iranian leaders anddiplomats have no sense of urgency. During the Iraq-Iran War, when Iran was in direneed of military materiel and held negotiations for purchase of spare parts, Iraniannegotiators pressed their interlocutors to continue talks and reach a quick conclusion.139 Giandomenico Picco, former U.N. emissary, personal interview.140 For example the Iranian insistence on a declaration of the responsibility of Iraq for the Iraqi-Iranianwar as a precondition for a cease-fire agreement.141 See cable sent to Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance written by the American charge d'affaires, BruceLaingen on 13 th August 1979.142 Arasteh 45–46.40