Iran: Cultural Values, Self images and Negotiation Behavior

Iran: Cultural Values, Self-images and Negotiating Behaviorgroup; 134 he does not have to obey the instructions of high-ranking officials who leadthe team of which he is a part. 135Iranian politics has traditionally taken advantage of the purported or real links ofhigh-level Iranian officials with foreign powers. This has been especially relevantregarding people with links to the UK. Many Ulama have a public image of Britishproxies. This identification is not limited to reformist or moderate Ulama; it is basedon the public’s perception regarding visits of the cleric to the UK and his relationswith people in that country. The regime then uses these individuals as channels fortransmitting information and disinformation to the West. Frequently, a person who isconsidered close to the side the Iranians are negotiating with is placed on the team inorder to coax the other side to make concessions that would serve to maintain thecredibility of their proxy. 136In addition to the Mullahs and the bazaaris who may take part in an Iranian team,there is an additional team member type: the Western-educated expert. They areusually much more receptive to the Western mode of negotiation. They serve as abridge between the Mullahs cum bazaaris and the Westerners, though their affiliationwith the West makes them suspect and reduces their influence on the real decisionmakers.The Iranian side has impressed most observers with the level of preparationsfor meetings or negotiations, and the precision of the choreography of their teams.Important exceptions may be those Western-educated individuals who come fromwell placed clerical or bazaari families, or whose families are closely related to theleadership. 137Personal MotivationThe prevalence of corruption and bribery in Iran has been noted above. It is almostinconceivable that an official would hold negotiations on a business deal withoutproviding for his own personal renta or pour cent. The reformist outcrynotwithstanding, there is no social or political stain as a result of disclosure of suchdeals.134 In 1993 an Iranian airliner was forced to land at the Uvdah airstrip in Israel. The passengers wereinterviewed before they were allowed to continue. People involved in the interviews recounted thatfrom the first, one could tell the difference between regular passengers and representatives of theclerical side of the regime. The latter remained silent during the long wait, they did not inquire abouttheir fate (some of the passengers inquired if Israel intended to hold them in return for Ron Arad), orask for favors (many of the Iranians initiated contact to ask if they could be taken to visit Eilat orJerusalem).135 On one occasion when the Iranian opposition planned to hijack military vessels that France wasabout to send to Iran, the Iranian Captain of one of the vessels (who was a member of the opposition)ordered all crewmembers below deck for a professional lecture. The only crewmember who remainedon deck was the Rahbar's representative…136 One source pointed out a case of a senior Iranian official who was well known as a Russian agent ofinfluence. Nevertheless, he remained in influential positions. At one point he was arrested (ostensiblyfor espionage) and then released and sent on sensitive diplomatic missions to Moscow. The Iranianassumption, according to the source, was that the Russians would want to bolster the status of theirproxy.137 This is a point that Picco made, based to a great extent on his experience with specific individualssuch as Javad Zarif who served as Iran's ambassador to the UN and ex-deputy FM. His influencederived from his personal rapport with Khomeini and Rafsanjani.38