<strong>Iran</strong>: <strong>Cultural</strong> <strong>Values</strong>, <strong>Self</strong>-<strong>images</strong> <strong>and</strong> Negotiating <strong>Behavior</strong>Political satire is also prevalent in modern <strong>Iran</strong>ian humor. The daily <strong>Iran</strong>ian(Reformist) press articulates its skepticism of the regime’s version of reality on aregular basis through cartoons <strong>and</strong> oblique circuitous tongue-in-cheek headlines. Theongoing duel between the Conservative <strong>and</strong> Reformist press is frequently expressedby humoristic retorts of the latter on the attacks of the former. 104A favorite character in <strong>Iran</strong>ian humor is the popular hero Mullah Nasseradin,. He isa lover of the good life who grapples with hopeless situations, <strong>and</strong> trumps blind fate<strong>and</strong> human contumely with an ostensible naiveté that conceals a superior intellect <strong>and</strong>shrewd insight. The classic ills of <strong>Iran</strong>ian society are also widely treated in popularhumor: arbitrariness <strong>and</strong> caprice of the rulers, oppression of the poor <strong>and</strong> thedisadvantaged, <strong>and</strong> the moral hypocrisy of the clerics. In much popular humor theoppressed succeed in averting danger through shrewdness, but the rulers-oppressors,being no less <strong>Iran</strong>ian, appreciate the skill of their subjects <strong>and</strong> reward them.104 For example, on the day of the fall of Baghdad to American troops, the Reformist newspaper <strong>Iran</strong>reported the event (16 April 2003) with a headline “American Tanks in Baghdad.” In the wake ofconservative criticism (Kayhan, 17 April) that the newspaper was supportive of the American enemy,the paper published a “correction” (18 April): instead of “American tanks in Baghdad, the headlineshould have read “Iraqi Tanks in Los Angeles.”26
Communication <strong>and</strong> <strong>Negotiation</strong>OverviewCultures are frequently categorized as “high-context” or “low-context.” 105 Thisparadigm was developed mainly out of observation of the differences between highcontext East Asian (particularly Chinese <strong>and</strong> Japanese) culture <strong>and</strong> low contextWestern culture (particularly American, being the epitome of that type). In terms ofcommunication, the East Asian cultures are said to be highly language-oriented, butmarked by linguistic ambiguity <strong>and</strong> therefore dependent on extra-linguistic devices totransmit the true meaning of messages. The Western cultures, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, aresaid to use more explicit "WYSIWYG" (“What You See Is What You Get”) languageas the main carrier of messages, avoiding ambiguous extra-linguistic devices. EastAsian cultures are also often identified as "shame cultures" in which outwardappearances, personal st<strong>and</strong>ing, reputation, <strong>and</strong> honor are paramount.This model is useful in underst<strong>and</strong>ing certain elements of the predominant <strong>Iran</strong>iancommunication paradigm. Ostensibly, <strong>Iran</strong> is an example of a high contextcommunication culture. <strong>Iran</strong>ian use of flowery language <strong>and</strong> linguistic ambiguityplaces <strong>Iran</strong>ian culture in this category. Moreover, <strong>Iran</strong>ians accord great import to thecontext of communication. This is not only true in communication with each other,but in communicating with foreigners who arguably may not be sensitive to many ofthe contextual implications that are being communicated. Furthermore, in theirinteraction with foreign low context interlocutors, <strong>Iran</strong>ians frequently tend to readcontextual non-verbal connotations that their interlocutors had no intention oftransmitting .From many other aspects, however, <strong>Iran</strong>ian culture is closer to the low contextWest than to the cultures of East Asia, or even its neighboring Arab cultures. It ispragmatic <strong>and</strong> considerate of “force ratios,” honor plays a role but not one thatsupersedes rational considerations <strong>and</strong> considerations of confidence building <strong>and</strong>future credibility rarely bow to the practical <strong>and</strong> “here <strong>and</strong> now” goal.<strong>Iran</strong>ian negotiating techniques are best understood in contrast with those of EastAsian <strong>and</strong> Western societies. Classic Western negotiation techniques are based ondynamics in which anything can happen. The underlying premise is that as long asthere is a common denominator (both sides want the interaction to succeed),incremental give <strong>and</strong> take will produce the inherent compromise <strong>and</strong> a mutuallyacceptable solution. Western negotiation techniques are, therefore, not averse tocreating crises as part of the negotiation process. Such a crisis is not seen as impairingthe confidence between the two sides, but a device in the interactive process. Bluffing<strong>and</strong> disinformation are legitimate tools, though they should be used with caution,105 This paradigm was first proposed by Edward Hall, in 1976. Since then, it has (usually) served as atool to analyze differences between Western <strong>and</strong> Eastern societies, while also defining a challenge <strong>and</strong>possible solutions for those involved in various intercultural connections, especially business. EdwardT. Hall. Beyond Cultures (New York: Anchor Press-Doubleday, 1976).27