Iran: Cultural Values, Self images and Negotiation Behavior

Self-Images and Stereotypesorder to put an end to the chaos→new despotic and arbitrary rule. 94 It was this cyclethat engendered the tendency towards subservience to the incumbent ruler, the easewith which the opportunity to overthrow him was seized, and the willingness toaccept a new despot as long as he provides respite from the period of anarchy. Fromthis point of view revolution can be seen, in Iranian cultural eyes, not as a sin againstheavenly ordained rulers, nor as an intrinsically good expression of the will of thepeople, but rather as a necessary evil, in extremis.NomenklaturaThe Iranian nomenklatura is composed of close knit “old boys clubs” made up ofpre-Revolution comrades in arms, extended families with extensive access to theleadership, and the Bazaar, the traditional marketplace merchant class that has playeda pivotal anti-modernization role in Iranian politics for generations. Many of theleading 'Ulama are from prominent bazaari families, 95 as are many of the mostinfluential non-clerical leaders of the regime. Lineage and social circle divide peopleinto categories of khodi (insider, "one of us") and gheir-e-khodi(outsider).The ‘UlamaTraditionally, the clergy drew power from the bazaar and requited theirbenefactors with religious legitimacy. Throughout the years, “Ulama and bazaarisoften belonged to the same families; much ‘ulama income came from levies paidmainly by bazaaris; the guilds often celebrated religious or partly religiousceremonies for which the services of ‘ulama were needed; and piety and religiousobservance were among the signs of bazaar standing or leadership. Entry into the‘ulama through study was an avenue of upward social mobility and entailed morerespect than entry into the service of the Shah’s government. Mosques and shrines(located close to the bazaar) were a major area of bast (refuge) for individuals andgroups that feared governmental arrest or harassment.” 96BazaarisThe ubiquitous presence of scions of the old bazaari families in prominent (andlucrative) public posts in the Islamic Republic, the fact that the organizational powerof the bazaar remains behind the Islamic regime, and the takeover of non-bazaarsectors of the Iranian economy by old bazaari families reinforce the old stereotype ofthe corrupt and exploiting bazaari. Iranians frequently will refer to an additionalmerchant stereotype: the meydani. The meydani is a member of the lower merchant94 Katouzian 22–23. Katouzian refers to the term “pickaxe society,” derived from the way buildings inIran no more than thirty years old are considered worthy of removal, as “pickaxe buildings”(sakhteman-e kolangi).95 Many bazaari families give their patronage to important Shiite schools and religious centers andwield, through that support, their influence over graduates of those centers. It is also very common forbazaari families to send some of their sons for a religious career, thus cementing their links with the'Ulama (much the way that families in medieval Europe would "allocate" one son to the sevice of thethrone, one to the church and one for the family estate).96 Nikki Keddie, quoted in Robert Kaplan, “A Bazaari’s World,” The Atlantic, March 1996.23